

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIERS OF INDIA.

---

VOL. II.

---

P A P E R S

REGARDING

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING TRIBES  
ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

OF

INDIA,


AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN  
AGAINST THEM DURING THE YEAR

1897-1898.

---

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

---



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,  
BY DARLING & SON, LTD., 1-3, GREAT ST. THOMAS APOSTLE, E.C.

And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from  
EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, EAST HARDING STREET, FLEET STREET, E.C. ; or  
JOHN MENZIES & Co., 12, HANOVER STREET, EDINBURGH, and  
90, WEST NILE STREET, GLASGOW ; or  
HODGES, FIGGIS, & Co., LIMITED, 104, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1898.

[C.- 8714.]      Price 2s.



✓



**PART III.—TELEGRAMS BETWEEN VICEROY AND  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, RELATING  
TO MALAKAND, &c.**

Nos.	Telegrams.	Pages.
	<i>A.—Malakand, &amp;c.—</i>	
1 to 24	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27, 27, 29, and 30 July ; 2, 4, 9, 11, 11, 13, 16, 20, 22, 23, 27, 30, 30, and 31 August ; 2, 4, 6, 8, 8, and 13 September, 1897 ...	1 to 6
25	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 15th September 1897 ... ..	6
26 to 48	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26 September, 2, 18, 23, and 23 October ; 23, 24, and 27 November ; 5, 6, 24 December 1897 ; 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11, 13, 13, 14, 14, 17, and 19 January 1898 ... ..	6 to 10
	<i>B.—Mohmands, &amp;c.—</i>	
49 to 84	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8, 9, and 9 August ; 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 17, 18, 19, 19, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, and 30 September ; 1, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, and 21 October ; and 10 December 1897 ... ..	11 to 18
	<i>C.—Afridis, &amp;c.—</i>	
85 to 102	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 16, 17, 18, 18, 19, 20, 20, 22, 23, 23, 23, 24, 25, 25, 26, 26, 28, and 31 August 1897 ... ..	19 to 22
103	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 1 September 1897 ... ..	22
104 to 116	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 8, 12, 13, 14, 14, 20, and 24 September, and 4 October 1897 ... ..	23 to 25
117	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 6 October 1897 ... ..	25
118	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12 October 1897 ... ..	25
119	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 13 October 1897 ... ..	26
120 to 129	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 29, 29, 30, and 31 October, and 3 November 1897	26 to 29
130	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 3 November 1897 ... ..	29
131, 132	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4 and 4 November 1897 ... ..	29
133	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 4 November 1897 ... ..	29
134 to 146	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 17, 17, and 18 November 1897 ...	30-32
147	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 19 November 1897 ... ..	33
148 to 153	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19, 20, 21, 23, 23, and 24 November 1897 ... ..	33, 34
154	From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 24 November 1897 ... ..	34
155-180	From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26, 27, and 30 November ; 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 18, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, and 31 December 1897 ; and 1, 4, 13, 15, 18, and 25 January 1898 ... ..	34-39
Appendices A. to L.	Translations of letters found in Saiyid Akbar's house ...	39A to 39D

# PART IV.—CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO MALAKAND, &c.

No.	Document.	Page.
1	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 14th July 1896 ... .. 40	40
	Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Political Officer, Dir and Swat, to Foreign Secretary, dated 14th June 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 40	40
	(ii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Political Officer, Dir and Swat, dated 9th July 1896, with Sub-Enclosure ... .. 43	43
	Letter from Quarter-Master-General in India to Military Secretary, dated 12th June 1896, with annexure: Letter from General Officer Commanding, Malakand Brigade... 44	44
2	Letter from Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 27th August 1896 ... .. 44	44
3	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 25th August 1896 ... .. 45	45
	Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Note by Major Deane on the Malakand-Dir-Chitral road, dated 13th June 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 45	45
	(ii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Major Deane, dated 20th August 1896 ... .. 48	48
4	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 7th July 1897 ... .. 49	49
	Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Political Officer, Dir and Swat, to Foreign Secretary, dated 9th June 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 49	49
	(ii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Political Officer, Dir and Swat, dated 3rd July 1897 ... .. 53	53
5	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 14th July 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 54	54
	Selection from Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from the Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 2nd September 1896 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 54	54
	(ii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 26th December 1896 ... .. 54	54
	(iii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 10th April 1897, with Sub-Enclosure ... .. 54	54
	Letter from Commissioner, Peshawar, dated 27th March 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ), with annexure: Letter from Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, dated 23rd March 1897, with two Sub-Annexures... .. 55	55
	A. Letter from Mulla Gulandaz ... .. 56	56
	B. Letter from Maliks ... .. 56	56
	(iv.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 29th April 1897, with Sub-Enclosure ... .. 56	56
	Letter from Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, dated 6th April 1897, with annexure: Translation of Chikhai's letter ... .. 57	57
	(v.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 8th May 1897 ... .. 57	57
	(vi.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 20th May 1897 ... .. 58	58
	(vii.) Letter from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 9th May 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. 58	58
	(viii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 4th June 1897 ... .. 58	58
6	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 1st September 1897 ... .. 59	59
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 12th July 1897, with Sub-Enclosure—	64
	Letter from Mian Gul ... .. 64	64

No.	Document.	Page.
(ii.)	Letter from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st July 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	65
(iii.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 26th July 1897 ... ..	66
(iv.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 26th July 1897... ..	67
(v.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 27th July 1897... ..	67
(vi.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 29th July 1897... ..	67
(vii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th July 1897 ... ..	67
(viii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd August 1897 ... ..	67
(ix.)	Telegram from Political Officer, Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd August 1897 ... ..	68
(x.)	Telegram from Resident in Kashmir to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd August 1897 ... ..	68
(xi.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 4th August 1897 ... ..	68
(xii.)	Telegram from Political Officer, Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 4th August 1897 ... ..	68
(xiii.)	Telegram from Political Officer, Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 5th August 1897 ... ..	69
(xiv.)	Letter from Government of India to Punjab Government, dated 7th August 1897 ... ..	69
(xv.)	Telegram from Political Officer, Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 7th August 1897 ... ..	70
(xvi.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th August 1897 ... ..	70
(xvii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th August 1897 ... ..	71
(xviii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 8th August 1897 ... ..	71
(xix.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th August 1897 ... ..	73
(xx.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 9th August 1897 ... ..	73
(xxi.)	Telegram from Political Officer for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 9th August 1897 ... ..	73
(xxii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 10th August 1897 ... ..	73
(xxiii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 11th August 1897 ... ..	74
(xxiv.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 12th August 1897 ... ..	74
(xxv.)	Letter from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Amir of Afghanistan, dated 13th August 1897 ... ..	75
(xxvi.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 12th August 1897 ... ..	75
(xxvii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 12th August 1897 ... ..	76
(xxviii.)	Letter from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	76
(xxix.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 14th August 1897 ... ..	82
(xxx.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 15th August 1897 ... ..	82
(xxxi.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 15th August 1897 ... ..	82
(xxxii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 15th August 1897 ... ..	82
(xxxiii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 15th August 1897. Sub-Enclosure— ... .. Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, dated 14th August 1897 ... ..	82 83
(xxxiv.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 16th August 1897. Sub-Enclosure— ... .. Letter from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Punjab Government, dated 8th August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... .. With annexure— Translation of Adda Mulla's letter ... ..	83 83 83 84



No.	Document.	Page.
(xxxv.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 17th August 1897 ... ..	84
(xxxvi.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 17th August 1897 ... ..	84
(xxxvii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 16th August 1897 ... ..	84
(xxxviii.)	Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 18th August 1897 ... ..	85
(xxxix.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 17th August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ). With Sub-Enclosure— Extract from Political Officer, Khyber ... ..	85 85
(xl.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 19th August 1897 ... ..	86
(xli.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated 20th August 1897 ... ..	86
(xlii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 20th August 1897 ... ..	86
(xliii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 19th August 1897. With Sub-Enclosure— Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, dated 17th August 1897 ... ..	86 86
(xliv.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st August 1897 ... ..	87
(xlv.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 21st August 1897, with Sub-Enclosure— Proclamation to Khyber Afridis ... ..	87 87
(xlvi.)	Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	88
(xlvii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	88
(xlviii.)	Letter from Amir of Afghanistan to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 18th August 1897 ... ..	88
(xlix.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd August 1897 ... ..	89
(i.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 23rd August 1897 ... ..	90
(ii.)	Telegram from Lieutenant-General Commanding Punjab to Military Secretary, dated 21st August 1897 ... ..	90
(iii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Punjab Government, dated 20th August 1897 ... ..	90
(liii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th August 1897 ... ..	91
(liv.)	Letter from British Agent at Kabul to Foreign Secretary, dated 18th August 1897 ... ..	91
(lv.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 26th August 1897 ... ..	92
(lvi.)	Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 25th August 1897 ... ..	92
(lvii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 27th August 1897 ... ..	92
7	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 14th October 1897 ... ..	93
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
(i.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 23rd August 1897 ... ..	100
(ii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 25th August 1897 ... ..	100
(iii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 25th August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ). With Sub-Enclosure— Letter from Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 17th August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	101 102
(iv.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 29th August 1897 ... ..	103
(v.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 29th August 1897 ... ..	103
(vi.)	Kharita from the Governor-General to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 30th August 1897 ... ..	104
(vii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th August 1897 ... ..	105
(viii.)	Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 31st August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	106
(ix.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 30th August 1897 ... ..	106

No.	Document.	Page.
(x.)	Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 1st September 1897 ... ..	107
(xi.)	Letter from Amir of Afghanistan to the Viceroy, dated 19th August 1897. With Sub-Enclosure—	109
	Adda Mulla's Letter ... ..	109
(xii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 1st September 1897 ... ..	110
(xiii.)	Letter from British Agent at Kabul to Foreign Secretary, dated 25th August 1897. With Sub-Enclosures—	110
	Agent's Letter to the Amir, and Amir's reply ... ..	111
(xiv.)	Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Foreign Secretary, dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	111
(xv.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Officer for Dir, &c., dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	112
(xvi.)	Telegram from Political Officer for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	112
(xvii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 2nd September 1897 ... ..	113
(xviii.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 2nd September 1897. With Sub-Enclosures—	114
	Translations of 2 Petitions of Halimzai Maliks ... ..	114
(xix.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 4th September 1897 ... ..	115
(xx.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 4th September 1897 ... ..	115
(xxi.)	Letter from Military Secretary to Adjutant-General in India, dated 3rd September 1897 ... ..	115
(xxii.)	Kharita from Viceroy to Amir of Afghanistan, dated 6th September 1897 ... ..	115
(xxiii.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 7th September 1897 ... ..	116
(xxiv.)	Letter from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 31st August 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	117
	With Appendices—	
	A. Agreement of Upper Swat Jirgas ... ..	119
	B. Statement of Aka Khels, &c. ... ..	120
(xxv.)	Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 13th September 1897 ... ..	121
(xxvi.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Malakand Field Force to Adjutant-General in India, dated 15th September 1897 ... ..	122
(xxvii.)	Letter from the Amir of Afghanistan to the Viceroy, dated 10th September 1897 ... ..	122
(xxviii.)	Letter from the Amir of Afghanistan to the Viceroy, dated 12th September 1897 ... ..	124
(xxix.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 18th September 1897 ... ..	125
(xxx.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 20th September 1897 ... ..	125
(xxxi.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st September 1897 ... ..	125
(xxxii.)	Telegram from Major-General Blood to the Adjutant-General, dated 21st September 1897 ... ..	126
(xxxiii.)	Telegram from Major-General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd September 1897 ... ..	126
(xxxiv.)	Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 22nd September 1897 ... ..	126
(xxxv.)	Telegram from the Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 22nd September 1897 ... ..	126
(xxxvi.)	Telegram from Major-General Blood to the Adjutant-General, dated 20th September 1897 ... ..	127
(xxxvii.)	Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 23rd September 1897 ... ..	127
(xxxviii.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Commissioner of Peshawur, dated 23rd September 1897 ... ..	127
(xxxix.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th September 1897 ... ..	127
(xl.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 24th September 1897 ... ..	128
(xli.)	Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th September 1897 ... ..	128
(xlii.)	Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 25th September 1897 ... ..	128

No.	Document.	Page.
	(xlili.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force, dated 24th September 1897	129
	(xliv.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Foreign Secretary, dated 25th September 1897	129
	(xlv.) Letter from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th September 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> )	129
	With Sub-Enclosures :—	
	A. Letter to Adda Mulla	130
	B. Letter from Adda Mulla	130
	(xli.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Foreign Secretary, dated 26th September 1897	131
	(xlvii.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Foreign Secretary, dated 28th September 1897	131
	(xlviii.) Telegram from Major-General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 28th September 1897	132
	(xlix.) Letter from British Agent at Kabul to Foreign Secretary, dated 25th September 1897. With Sub-Enclosure—	132
	Letter from Amir, dated 23rd September 1897	133
8	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 4th November 1897	134
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th September 1897	136
	(ii.) Telegram from Major-General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th September 1897	136
	(iii.) Telegram from Major-General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th September 1897	136
	(iv.) Telegram from Major General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd October 1897	136
	(v.) Telegram from General Jeffreys to Adjutant-General, dated 29th September 1897	137
	(vi.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Foreign Secretary, dated 3rd October 1897	137
	(vii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Malakand Field Force to Adjutant-General, dated 2nd October 1897	137
	(viii.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 5th October 1897	137
	(ix.) Telegram from Major-General Elles to Foreign Secretary, dated 6th October 1897	138
	(x.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 6th October 1897	138
	(xi.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 7th October 1897	138
	(xii.) Telegram from the Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 7th October 1897	138
	(xiii.) Telegram from the Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 8th October 1897	139
	(xiv.) Telegram from the Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 9th October 1897	139
	(xv.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Adjutant-General, dated 11th October 1897	139
	(xvi.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 11th October 1897	140
	(xvii.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 13th October 1897	140
	(xviii.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 16th October 1897	140
	(xix.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 16th October 1897	140
	(xx.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 18th October 1897	141
	(xxi.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 19th October 1897	141
	(xxii.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Adjutant-General, dated 16th October 1897	141
	(xxiii.) Telegram from Major-General Blood to Adjutant-General, dated 19th October 1897	141
	(xxiv.) Telegram from Political Agent for Dir, &c., to Foreign Secretary, dated 21st October 1897	142
	(xxv.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to Political Agent for Dir, &c., dated 28th October 1897	142



No.	Documents.	Page.
9	Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 11th November 1897 ... ..	142
	Selection of Enclosures :—	
	(i.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 21st September 1897, with Sub-Enclosure ... ..	145
	Draft Proclamation ... ..	150
	(ii.) Letter from Punjab Government to Government of India, dated 24th September 1897 ... ..	150
	(iii.) Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 29th September 1897 ... ..	152
	(iv.) Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 29th September 1897 ... ..	152
	(v.) Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 30th September 1897 ... ..	152
	(vi.) Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th September 1897... ..	153
	(vii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 2nd October 1897 ... ..	153
	(viii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to Sir William Lockhart, dated 4th October 1897 ... ..	153
	(ix.) Draft Notification to the Tirah Afridis and to the Orakzais ... ..	155
	(x.) Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 5th October 1897 ... ..	156
	(xi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 5th October 1897 ... ..	156
	(xii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 6th October 1897 ... ..	156
	(xiii.) Letter from Foreign Secretary to British Agent at Kabul, dated 6th October 1897 ... ..	156
	(xiv.) Kharita from Viceroy to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 7th October 1897 ... ..	156
	(xv.) Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Sir W. Lockhart, dated 7th October 1897 ... ..	157
	(xvi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Adjutant-General, dated 9th October 1897 ... ..	158
	(xvii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to the Adjutant General, dated 11th October 1897 ... ..	158
	(xviii.) Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 13th October 1897 ... ..	158
	(xix.) Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Chief Secretary to Punjab Government, dated 15th October 1897 ... ..	159
	(xx.) Letter from Military Secretary to Government of India to Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, Punjab Circle, dated 13th October 1897 ... ..	159
	(xxi.) Telegram from Commissioner, Peshawur, to Foreign Secretary, dated 16th October 1897 ... ..	159
	(xxii.) Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated 18th October 1897... ..	159
	(xxiii.) Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurrum, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 17th October 1897 ... ..	159
	(xxiv.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 18th October 1897 ... ..	160
	(xxv.) Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated 13th October 1897... ..	160
	(xxvi.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Adjutant-General, dated 20th October 1897 ... ..	161
	(xxvii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to the Adjutant-General, dated 20th October 1897... ..	161
	(xxviii.) Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurrum, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 20th October 1897 ... ..	162
	(xxix.) Letter from the Amir of Afghanistan to the Viceroy, dated 13th October 1897 ... ..	162
	(xxx.) Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurrum, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 21st October 1897 ... ..	163
	(xxxi.) Telegram from British Agent at Kabul to Foreign Secretary, transmitted 22nd October 1897 ... ..	164
	(xxxii.) Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to the Adjutant-General, dated 20th October 1897... ..	164

No.	Documents.	Page.
(xxxiii.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding 1st Division, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General, dated 22nd October 1897 ... ..	164
(xxxiv.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to the Adjutant-General, dated 22nd October 1897 ... ..	164
(xxxv.)	Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 22nd October 1897 ... ..	165
(xxxvi.)	Letter from Punjab Government to the Government of India, dated 20th October 1897 ( <i>Extract</i> ) ... ..	165
(xxxvii.)	Letter from Government of India to the Punjab Government, dated 23rd October 1897 ... ..	165
(xxxviii.)	Telegram from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated 23rd October 1897 ... ..	166
(xxxix.)	Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurrum, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 25th October 1897 ... ..	166
(xl.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 24th October 1897 ... ..	166
(xli.)	Letter from British Agent at Kabul to Foreign Secretary, dated 18th October 1897, with Sub-Enclosures ... ..	166
	A. Letter to Amir, dated 15th October 1897 ... ..	167
	B. & C. Letters from Amir, dated 17th October 1897 ... ..	167-8
(xlii.)	Telegram from Officer Commanding Kurrum Movable Column to Adjutant-General, dated 26th October 1897 ... ..	168
(xliii.)	Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurrum, to Commissioner, Peshawur, dated 26th October 1897 ... ..	169
(xliv.)	Letter from Foreign Secretary to British Agent at Kabul, dated 28th October 1897 ... ..	169
(xlv.)	Kharita from Viceroy to Amir of Afghanistan, dated 28th October 1897 ... ..	169
(xlvi.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 29th October 1897 ... ..	170
(xlvii.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th October 1897 ... ..	170
(xlviii.)	Telegram from General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force to Adjutant-General, dated 30th October 1897 ... ..	170
(xlix.)	Letter from Foreign Secretary to General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated 29th October 1897 ... ..	171
(x.)	Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 30th December 1897 ... ..	171
(xi.)	Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, dated 28th January 1898 ... ..	172

### PART III.

---

#### SELECTION OF TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE VICEROY AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA RELATING TO EVENTS IN

A.—Malakand and adjoining country, including Buner.

B.—Mohmand Country.

C.—Afridi and Orakzai Country.

---

#### A.—MALAKAND, &c.

---

##### No. 1.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Deane telegraphed last night reporting advance of a local gathering of 500 to 1,000 ill-armed men in Swat Valley, excited by religious preaching of a mad Fakir, and that the Malakand moveable column was going out to disperse them early this morning. Telegram received early this morning reported attack on Malakand Kotal, which was repulsed after severe fighting. Troops were prepared, notice having been received from absconding levies. Deane appears to think that local leaders were not concerned, but were afraid to oppose fanatics. Chakdara said to have been also attacked, but wire cut and no details yet.

---

##### No. 2.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Deane telegraphs fighting continues up to mid-day. Attack on camp is expected again to-night. Tribes generally are rising.

---

##### No. 3.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 29th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Fighting went on all 27th and Kotal Camp was heavily attacked on that and following nights. Swatis from all sides and Utman Khels took part. Men have been seen crossing Swat river and joining enemy, but Deane reports that influence of Mian Guls, grandsons of late Akhund, is against disturbances. Wire was cut between Hoti Mardan and Malakand on night of 27th July, and restored night of 28th.

---

##### No. 4.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th July 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Deane reports this morning that the Fakir who has led the Swat rising was wounded in last night's attack on Malakand camp, that the gathering, though still considerable, is not showing energy this morning, and the people seem to



have lost heart. A strong reconnoitring party was going out to-day to obtain news of Chakdara. Bonerwals reported joining enemy, but this remains unconfirmed. Dargai not attacked.

---

No. 5.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Chakdara has been relieved. Garrison is safe.

---

No. 6.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Deane reports that gathering at Chakdara and at Malakand comprised Utman Khels, Bonerwals, Bajauris, Ranizais, lower and upper Swati Sadinzais and Dush Khels. Gathering at Malakand computed by natives at twenty thousand and gathering at Chakdara eight thousand. The Dir levy joined in the attack on Chakdara, but their jemadar was killed fighting for us. Khan of Dir sent post from Chitral to Deane at Chakdara; he is at Dir, but Deane has sent for him. Tribal gathering on the west of Malakand moved homewards in consequence of our troops taking offensive. We had news of Kandahar Isafis, and Utmanzai Mohmands living on right of the Swat river below junction with Panjkora, having started to join. Deane anticipates our forward movement will have the effect also of making those Bonerwals and Hindustani fanatics who were collecting decide to return home. Deane can hear of no gathering anywhere. The people put their loss at Chakdara at two thousand.

---

No. 7.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India dated 9th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

In consequence of information regarding possible movements of Bonerwals, extended reconnaissance made from Amandara, but without discovering enemy. It is reported that they may demonstrate in the direction of Mardan. Three cases of sunstroke, British troops, who have otherwise stood the severe heat well. Colonel Lamb's condition fair; all other wounded doing well. Organization of Field Force completed to-day on arrival of second half of 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment.

---

No. 8.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Deane communicates report from men in Nawagai that Amir's Khassadars had joined Adda Mulla's gathering; also report that messengers from Adda Mulla have visited mad Fakir, who has been joined by 80 Upper Swat maliks. Ranizais from Khar downwards have, on the other hand, sent jirgas to Deane asking for peace, and have agreed to surrender of all arms and Government property, and to reservation by Government of right to impose any necessary further fine or punishment; and two clans of Upper Swat are reported to be collecting jirgas to come in. Commissioner, Peshawar, states that Adda Mulla's gathering before Shabkadr included large numbers of Amir's subjects.

---

## No. 9.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Deane's native agent reports that Shamozaï Swat jirga and half Nekpi Khels are with him. Aladand jirga came in on the 10th, and have left to collect Government property and arms in possession of their people. No gatherings with Fakirs or Mian Guls at present. Commissioner of Peshawar's reports say that contingents from Laghman and Kunar valley, including Afghan sepoys in plain clothes, have joined Adda Mulla's gathering, and rafts are kept ready by villagers about Lalpur for passing various contingents down Kabul river.

## No. 10.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Further cavalry reconnaissance from Shabkadr on morning of 11th failed to discover the enemy. Jirgas of the clans of upper Swat north of the river have come in to Chakdara. Deane is going to see them, and he is being authorised to settle amicably with them on the basis of their making submission, giving passage to our troops if required, and paying fines to be settled by Deane as reparation for their attacking us. Deane expects jirgas on left bank to follow the line taken by Khans of Kheyl of Lower Swat, who have submitted unconditionally. We have considered in Council the situation in Swat and on the Mohmand border, and have authorised Sir Bindon Blood to advance on the left of Swat river into Upper Swat, not with a view to depriving tribes of independence, but to insist on due assurance that they will not attack us again, and to show that we can so advance when we please against those who have attacked us. We decided to postpone consideration of advance into the Mohmand country for the present.

## No. 11.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 16th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Immediate move prevented by heavy rains at Malakand. Ten jirgas from Upper Swat on right bank of river are in Chakdara, and Deane says at present all points to prospect of no opposition to move up the left bank. Mian Guls have, however, been summoning jirgas.

## No. 12.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th August, 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 18th August. General Blood marched on 18th to Ghalegai. No signs of enemy; villages deserted. Found valley open; magnificent crops; abundance of fodder and grain. Health of troops excellent. Mian Guls desire to submit, and lay blame on Bonerwals.

## No. 13.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

All quiet. The Adda Mulla reported to have gone to his home at Jarobi. Column marched Mingaora on 19th. People of Mingaora and Shaligar surrendered arms demanded. Jirgas of Mingaora and valley beyond coming in, also Pisari Mulla, representing Mian Guls. Latter have gone to hills on Boner border.

## No. 14.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Malakand. Health of troops good. Wounded doing well. General Officer Commanding reports 20th shots fired into camp during night. Villagers turned out and pursued snipers. A large quantity of arms being brought in. Towers being destroyed. Supplies being provided gratis. Submission appears complete.

21st August, small column sent to Mangloor, from which reconnaissance pushed up valley to Guli Bagh and towards Kotkai Pass. No firing. Health of troops very good. Force will probably return to Burikot to-day. We regret to say that Colonel Lamb died 23rd.

## No 15.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

25th. General Officer Commanding, Malakand, halted Burikot, reconnoitred Karakar Pass to Buner. Second Brigade reconnoitred left bank of Swat down to Pir Khel. Villages submissive.

26th. General Officer Commanding returned Thana. The Brigades will now change place, Second concentrating Thana.

## No. 16.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

In Orakzai the Samana is now quiet, and an advance to Kurram will be made when reinforcements from Peshawar arrive by Kohat Pass. Daulatzi Mullas held meetings 29th with Pass Afridis to induce them to rise, but the jirga came into Kohat, where representative jirga of Jowaki has also arrived. Shinawari police post evacuated without any casualties, and raiding parties have reached Kahi and Nariab in Upper Miranzai. Overtures of submission made by Bunerwals to Assistant Commissioner, Mardan, but Commissioner of Peshawar shows that these advances do not come from the section most implicated against us, and Deane gives some reasons for doubting the genuineness of their letter.

## No. 17.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Malakand. Advance will be made into Utman Khel country on left bank of Swat. Brigadier-General Jeffreys accordingly moves 30th August with three battalions, one squadron, one battery of Mountain Artillery, one Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, and five days' supplies, to Totekan; if Inziri Pass from thence into Totai too difficult, force will return and enter by Dargai. Colonel Reid with one-and-a-half battalions, two squadrons, 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery, half Company Sappers, moves to Uch 30th August. About 40 cases of fever, 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment. Health of troops good on the whole.

## No. 18.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 31st August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 30th August, regarding Malakand. In consequence of reported movements of Adda Mulla, General Officer Commanding reports move



into Utman Khel country suspended. Second Brigade ordered back to Khar. Third Brigade ordered up from Mardan. Colonel Reid's column to be in readiness to move to Sado.

## No. 19.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

On 1st a fine of Rs. 15,000 paid, and 120 more arms were surrendered to Deane at Uch. People of Adinzai and Talash are repairing damage done to road during rising. Adinzai jirga has burnt house and property of Malik who led rising in Adinzai. Adda Mulla said to be about to start again, but objective uncertain. Troops are now advancing into Kurram and to Samana. Attitude of Shiah Muhammad Khel jirga Kohat excellent. Orakzais have blocked road leading to Samana with rocks and trees. 150 Khyber Afridis have reached Samana, and 12,000 were expected to arrive night of 1st. Afridi and Orakzai combination appears no longer doubtful. Feeling of unrest spreading among Zaimushts. Torwari police *chowki* burnt.

## No. 20.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding, Malakand, reports, 3rd September—General Wodehouse moves from Uch, 4th September, to Panjkora bridge with two battalions, one battery, company of Sappers, and cavalry. Health of troops good.

## No. 21.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Malakand. Our telegram of 4th September. General Officer Commanding reports Wodehouse found Panjkora bridge in good condition. General Officer Commanding, with Second Brigade, marches Chakdara 6th September. Surrender arms continues. Health good.

## No. 22.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Reported that Sangu Khel Shinwaris, who had started for Ghaza, were pursued and forced to return by Amir's cavalry. Rumours rife in Jalalabad that Amir had sent orders to Adda Mulla to stop hostilities, as he was losing three lakhs by stoppage of Khyber traffic. News as to prospect of opposition to Blood's force doubtful, but there seems to be a general tendency for gatherings to break up. Last of weapons demanded from Upper Swat sections surrendered, fines paid, and settlement with them complete.

## No. 23.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding reports arrived yesterday at Sarai. His force concentrates to-morrow right bank Panjkora. Opposition is not expected. Health and weather good. General Elles' force will move on 13th September

## No. 24.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

On 10th the Shamozaï Utman Khels, who have promised 100 breechloading rifles, surrendered 15 ; on the same day Deane visited Jandol, and brought into camp at Ghosam two brothers of Umra Khan, who took active part in Swat rising.

## No. 25.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 15th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Please send me a copy of Amir's book on Jehad.

## No. 26.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Upper Swat jirgas and younger Mianguls met Deane at Chakdarra on 24th. As attempts were being made to induce Mianguls to return, and Amir's name was freely used, Deane announced to jirga Amir's public denunciation of disturbances and his friendly letter to Government. Maliks protested that neither they nor people had wanted or contemplated disturbances, but that disturbances arose through their losing hold of people owing to Fakir's miracles.

## No. 27.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Utman Khels cis-Swat have surrendered 100 guns as instalment of 600 demanded. Two more members of Mian Gul family have come in to Chakdarra. Elles reports Utmanzai have complied with terms imposed on them. Zakka Khel Afridis Mulla, who had started for Kabul, has returned and circulated warning in Tirah that no Afridi Mulla or tribesmen are to go to Kabul, as Amir has issued orders to arrest any who appear there.

## No. 28.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Salarzais have accepted terms. Move to Toralas countermanded, but whole force marched up Salarzai Valley. General Blood with Cavalry and field guns proceeds to Pashat. Major Moody left Malakand for Nowshera 15th October. Lieutenant Watson and other wounded progressing favourably.

## No. 29.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Malakand. Blood's force is withdrawing across Panjkora. Second Brigade at Sarai to-day. First Brigade Panjkora, left bank.

## No. 30.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Settlement with tribes west of Pankora completed. Shamozaï—Utman Khels having complied in full with demand for rifles, which was reduced in consequence of their satisfactory attitude and assistance while troops were in Bajaur.

---

## No. 31.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd November 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Following troops concentrated at Dargai 23rd November, under command of Colonel A. G. F. Reid, to enforce terms imposed on Cis-Swat Utman Khels, who have not yet complied :—1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, 21st Bengal Infantry, 35th Bengal Infantry, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, one squadron of 10th Bengal Lancers, No. 5 Company of Madras Sappers and Miners.

---

## No. 32.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th November 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Reid's column moved Hariaukot 23rd and Kot this morning. Battalion of Native Infantry protects canal headworks during Utman Khel operations.

---

## No. 33.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th November 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Reid reconnoitred hills route to Bar to Toi by Kelo Pass, and river route by Jhindai streams, also Spinkhara and Troshah Pass, without opposition. Visits Agra 28th.

---

## No. 34.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 5th December 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Utman Khels having completed all terms, troops returning to their posts.

---

## No. 35.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th December 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Utman Khel column broke up yesterday.

---

## No. 36.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th December 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

We have instructed Punjab Government to announce terms to Bunerwals, with warning that failure to comply within week will be followed by advance of troops. Terms comprise complete submission, surrender stolen Government property, fine 600 guns and Rs. 11,500. Simultaneously, terms will be announced to Chamliwals and, if necessary, to Gaduns, but latter jirga expected in and will probably pay up. Khudu Khel came to Assistant Commissioner and complied in full with terms then explained to them.



## No. 37.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

The force detailed below, under command of Major-General Blood, is to operate against Bunerwals and Chamlawals. First Brigade, Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, 16th Bengal Infantry, 20th Bengal Infantry, 31st Bengal Infantry. Second Brigade, Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, Infantry of the Corps of Guides, 21st Bengal Infantry. Divisional troops, 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery, No. 7 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, four squadrons cavalry detailed from Cavalry of the Corps of Guides and 10th Bengal Lancers, portion of 3rd Bombay Infantry, No. 4 Company of Madras Sappers and Miners, 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry. Troops concentrated at Sanghao yesterday, and General Blood reconnoitred Tanga pass, on which about 1,000 men with standards were seen. Ambeyla and Malandri passes, reconnoitred by cavalry from Rustam, are also held by enemy. Blood proposes to advance early to-morrow and clear Tanga pass.

## No. 38.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Blood reports yesterday 20th Bengal Infantry took peak above Tanga pass and two standards. At 2 o'clock 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment were in possession of new pass. As far as is known only loss is one man 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry wounded. Road near crest of pass impracticable for mules, also descent on the other side. It is not sure whether transport can be got over to-day. Coolies with men's coats and blankets accompanied troops over pass. The slight loss in taking pass is attributed to efficiency of artillery fire and long range volleys. Infantry of Corps of Guides, 31st Bengal Infantry, one section No. 4 Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, marched from Rustam for Pirsai pass 4 p.m. yesterday.

## No. 39.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 9th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Our telegram of 8th January. Meiklejohn, with 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, 20th Bengal Infantry, reached Kingargali 7th January. Village deserted. Cavalry in camp six miles east of Kangargali under Colonel Adams, who reported that he was reconnoitring towards Tarsak. Road over Tanga pass opened; mules and supplies passing over.

## No. 40.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports 8th January, from Sanghao, that the enemy who opposed crossing Tanga pass amounted to possibly 2,000 men. Enemy's loss is estimated at about 20 killed and 50 or 60 wounded. Colonel Adams with cavalry bivouacked night of 8th at Kingargali. Colonel Merse, commanding 31st Bengal Infantry, expected to get all infantry baggage over Pirsai pass to Knai yesterday. Blood crossed Tanga pass to Kingargali yesterday, and found everything working satisfactorily.

## No. 41.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Jirgas of Salarzai and Asherzai sections of Bunerwals have come to Meiklejohn's camp. Attitude very submissive.

## No. 42.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Adams reconnoitred Jowar 9th January. Found large village, good water supply, open camping ground. Meiklejohn marched there to-day with 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 20th Bengal Infantry, 31st Bengal Infantry, Cavalry of the Corps of Guides. Cattle were driven off by villagers, but a large quantity of grain available. No. 7 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, hospitals, and mule convoy of supplies crossed Tanga yesterday. Jeffreys, with Head-quarters of 2nd Brigade, 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, 21st Bengal Infantry, 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery, marched to Katlang 9th January. Road over Sikri Baba Kotal has been improved; will be open for traffic to-morrow. Blood with Head-quarters' Staff crosses pass to-day.

## No. 43.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Blood reports arrived Kingargali 11th January with Head-quarters' Staff and proceeds Tursak with half 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, and two Mountain Batteries, 12th January, where he will be joined by Meiklejohn from Jowar. Further operations from Tursak, which will probably be temporary secondary base, not yet decided. Troops and transport in exceptionally good condition. Jeffreys with 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery, 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, and 21st Bengal Infantry marched Rustam 11th January. Good road fit for country carts has been made *via* Sikri Baba.

## No. 44.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

As road over Tanga Pass cannot be made fit for camels in reasonable time, Blood proposes to equip 1st Brigade, of two British and two Native battalions, two batteries, two squadrons, and one company Sappers and Miners, with mules entirely, carrying seven days' supplies, for operations inside passes. He considers this force strong enough for requirements inside Buner. Second Brigade, of one British and two Native battalions, with Field Battery and three squadrons, with camel transport, to move to Surkhahi to open British end Ambeyla Pass. One-and-a-half Native battalions and one squadron, with camel transport, to keep open communication with Mardan. Blood expects to move into Chamla country and so on Mardan, *via* Ambeyla Pass, where Jeffreys will join him.

## No. 45.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Blood reports First Brigade, with the exception of half battalion of 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment and a portion of No. 4 Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, concentrated at Tursak 12th January. Nawedand and Girar Passes, also Pajja, reconnoitred. Jeffreys moved yesterday with six companies of 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, 21st Bengal Infantry, and No. 5 Company of Madras Sappers and Miners one mile above Surkhahi, leaving 10th Field Battery Royal Artillery and two companies of East Kent Regiment at Rustam. He has received information that Bunerwals intend to oppose further advance, and a party has re-occupied Ambeyla Pass. Meiklejohn with a portion of force moved to Bhai on 13th, and reconnoitred to Jowarai Pass.

## No. 46.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

The Salarzai and Asharzai Buners are paying their fine. Blood reports little prospect of further opposition from other sections.

## No. 47.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Blood reports half the force in Buner, with Head-quarters, marched to Dagar 15th January and to Bajkatta on the following day. Meiklejohn with other half to Rega 15th, and Barkilli the following day, where Blood joins him and moves to Ambeyla Pass to-day. Head of Jadizai Valley reconnoitred 14th; Bagra, Gokand Valley, 15th. The Mad Fakir was not found at Rega, but his property there confiscated. Jeffreys with Second Brigade crossed Ambeyla Pass to-day.

## No. 48.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Bunerwals have complied with terms. Force is withdrawing.



## B.—MOHMANDS.

## No. 49.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Reported from Peshawar that the Adda Mulla, after proclaiming Jihad and annihilation of our troops in Swat, has advanced with 2,000 or 3,000 through Mohmand country to vicinity of Shabkaddar on Peshawar border, and troops have been despatched on commission of requisition during night of 7th August to protect the frontier from threatened raid. Commissioner telegraphs later Shabkaddar attacked by gathering of 5,000 at 4 p.m. on 7th. News from Commandant of Border Police, garrison of fort, 5 o'clock morning of 8th, garrison claim to have killed 40 men without any loss to themselves. One-third of gathering had gone back across the border, and the remainder had withdrawn out of rifle shot. Commissioner expects cavalry to reach Shabkaddar at 11 a.m. Hindu inhabitants Shankargarh Bazar adjoining the fort had either left before arrival of gathering, or took refuge in fort, and are safe. Two only stayed in village and were killed. The village was burnt. Deane reports the Mulla who led the late rising tried to stir up Musa Khel Swatis, who rejected his attempts, and he has gone further up the river.

## No. 50.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

In consequence of report received by Commissioner, Peshawar, that Shabkadar post, held by small garrison of Police, would be attacked by gathering under Adda Mulla, following troops from Peshawar were sent out to protect frontier:—Two squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers, 20th Bengal Infantry, 51st Field Battery, Royal Artillery, four guns. Enemy said to number 5,000. Enemy succeeded in burning bazaar of Shankargarh on night of 7th August. Troops delayed at crossing river; did not arrive till morning of 8th August. Raiders appear to have retired into hills. Garrison of Peshawar is being strengthened.

## No. 51.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of our telegram of to-day regarding raid on Shabkadar. General Commanding at Peshawar reports troops sent out under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woon, 20th Bengal Infantry, found enemy in position on low hills; numbers estimated over 6,000, their line being two miles long. Force attacked, but being outflanked fell back. General commanding came up at this time and smart action took place, including brilliant charge of 13th Bengal Lancers under Major Atkinson along enemy's line. Latter suffered considerable loss and retired to high hills. Force then formed up on edge of low hills, but enemy declined further action. Troops then returned to fort. Enemy said to have entirely disappeared.

## No. 52.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Peshawar. We have approved immediate operations being undertaken against the Mohmands, by advance of forces under Brigadier-General Elles from Shabkadar, and Major-General Blood *via* Sado and Nawagai.

## No. 53.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram of 2nd September. The object of the operations will be, first, the protection of road to Chitral and territory of Nawab of Dir ; second, destruction of hostile gathering under Adda Mulla ; third, such punishment as will deter Mohmands from again attacking British territory and our allies. It is not our intention that the troops should remain in the Mohmand country. They will move down to Peshawar valley as soon as objects of expedition have been attained.

## No. 54.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding, Peshawar, reports, 3rd September—Mohmand gathering dissolving, no present likelihood of attack by them. Afridis reported preparing to attack in large numbers. Patrol of 4th Dragoon Guards reconnoitred Khyber yesterday. Our troops were fired at ; one man killed.

## No. 55.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Amir's letter of 18th August to Udny summarised in my telegram of 23rd August. Amir has sent me a copy *via* Quetta. His Highness encloses a copy of Adda Mulla's proclamation or invitation to jihad, and says that no doubt the Mulla has sent hundreds of such letters to his disciples in Afghanistan. He adds :—"If the false utterances and fabricated reports of self-interested persons be investigated in a friendly manner, God be pleased, the relations, union and friendship between the two Governments will always be considerably strengthened." I am informing Amir in reply that troops are about to enter Mohmand country to search out the Adda Mulla and his lashkars, and to disperse and destroy them. If my troops meet him in territory which falls within limits of the British Government, his punishment will be speedily accomplished. But I am informed Mulla has established his abode at Jarobi, which, it is understood, probably lies within territory which, according to agreement proposed in my letter of 12th November 1896, would fall within the limits of Afghanistan. Mulla must not escape from the punishment of his misdeeds, and if he retires before my troops to Jarobi, or any place similarly situated, my troops will be authorised to follow him up and destroy him and his habitation. "I do not wish your Highness to regard any such action on the part of my troops as indicating an intention to vary or depart from what we have agreed upon as the dividing line in the Mohmand country. I have no intention that my troops should stay in that country, and they will certainly not go further into it than is necessary in order to carry out object with which they are being despatched. On the other hand, if the Mulla should take flight across the mountains into the Kunar Valley, my troops have orders not to follow him beyond the watershed, but I shall look to your Highness to restrain him from exciting foolish tribesmen to further acts of hostility, and to give orders to your officers to deal with him as he deserves."

## No. 56.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports, 9th April, all quiet. Brother of Nawagai Chief arrived ; promises assistance. Force now concentrated near mouth Jandol river.

General Elles reports, 9th September, enemy's picquets watching Gandab and Alikandi routes, but it is believed that Burhan and Isa Khel do not intend to oppose the movement of our troops.

## No. 57.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Elles' force, now concentrated near Shabkadr, advances 15th September. General Blood reports, 12th September, Head Quarters and 3rd Brigade near Thaghkhat. No opposition experienced. Second Brigade at Khar.

## No. 58.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 15th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Elles reports, reached top of Kharappa Pass without opposition. Road vile. No gathering in Gundab, which First Brigade should reach to-day.

## No. 59.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 16th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports attack by Mamunds and Salarzais on camp of Second Brigade near Markhanai night of 14th September. Position was well chosen, and enemy declined to come to close quarters and retired after about six hours' fighting. Casualties :—Killed, Captain Tomkins and Lieutenant Bailey, 38th Bengal Infantry, one sepoy ; dangerously wounded, Lieutenant Harrington, 26th Bengal Infantry ; other wounded, one Native officer, five sepoy. Brigade has been ordered to march at once to punish tribes concerned. Large proportion of casualties among officers is attributable to men being in sheltered trenches, while officers were moving about without cover.

## No. 60.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Davis, Political Officer with Blood, reports on 15th September, from Nawagai,—Musa Khel Maliks have asked and obtained leave to send jirga. Dawarzaies, Safi villages subject to Nawagai, and Butkor Utman Khels have sent jirgas to him, Mitai. Opposition to forward movement is not expected except from Adda Mulla with small gathering at Bedmani, unless conduct of other tribes is affected by the attack upon Ramat camp and consequent punishment of the Mamunds and Salarzais.

## No. 61.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports 14th September, arrived at Nawagai. Khan is rendering assistance. Adda Mulla reported to be on Bedmanai Pass with small gathering.



General Officer Commanding Second Brigade reports cavalry pursued Mamunds concerned in attack on camp, killing 21 without suffering loss, but casualties 14th September included one more sepoy killed, also 79 horses and mules killed and wounded. Second Brigade now at Inayat Kila. We regret to say Lieutenant Harington's condition hopeless. First Brigade have returned Panjkora with reserve rations and ammunition ordered up by Blood, and will remain until receipt of further orders. Health of troops good.

---

No. 62.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Elles reports, 16th September, difficulties of road delayed transport and compel halt in Gandab till road in rear improved. Road onwards easy. Gandab open fertile valley, barley and forage plentiful. Halimzais coming in. General Blood reports, 16th September, Third Brigade halted Nawagai; signalling post established Lakarai hill, 15 miles to the north of Nahakki Pass. General Jeffreys reports engagement with enemy, who would not stand. General Meiklejohn tending convoy under escort of two squadrons Corps of Guides, 45th Bengal Infantry, from Panjkora.

---

No. 63.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Shamozai Utman Khels quiet; also local Khans reported by Deane assisting in conveying stores to Jeffreys, and their attitude will tend to prevent disturbances spreading.

---

No. 64.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Telegrams received from General Blood through Panjkora show that Jeffreys' brigade was engaged on 16th September with 6,000 Mamunds and Salarzais. Casualties on this date: wounded severely Lieutenant Wynter, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, Lieutenant Watson, No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners. Adda Mullah's gathering has increased, and it is possible that Blood's camp at Nawagai may be attacked. General Elles reports from camp Ghalanai, 19th September, all quiet. Reconnaissances into Khaurzai country were not molested.

---

No. 65.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Elles reports 18th September all quiet at Gandab. Road over Nahakki reported bad. Halimzais submitting.

---

No. 66.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports, dated 17th Sept., he had not received particulars Jeffrey's doings on 16th, but understood that on return from upper portion

Mohmand valley was considerably delayed by two companies having gone too far, and was ultimately obliged to take up position for the night about three miles to the north of camp at Inayat Kila, and was fired on during the night at short range. Casualties not yet reported, but feared list rather long. Ultimately, Jeffreys returned to his camp on the morning of the 17th September. Names of officers said to have been killed and wounded were reported in our Military telegram of 18th September. Full further particulars will be reported by telegraph as soon as received. About 800 Adda Mulla's gathering have been seen at mouth Bedmani Pass, but troops could not get near them. General Elles reports 19th September, First Brigade of his force moved 19th September across Nahaki Pass. Road in rear now practicable for camels. Heliograph communication with General Blood opened on 15th September.

---

No. 67.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports having received Jeffrey's account of action 16th September. He appears to have inflicted heavy loss on enemy, but single company having become isolated on hills eastward of Mamund valley, its relief took so long that troops were benighted and bivouacked three miles from camp. The General, with guns and few infantry and Sappers became separated, and stopped in small village, where they were fired on after moon rose. They were joined by four companies Guides and Sikhs. Casualties in addition to those already reported appear to be nine killed and 60 wounded, including two native officers 35th Bengal Infantry. These are exclusive of casualties among rank and file Sappers and company which got detached. Mountain battery lost 18 mules and two ponies killed, nine wounded and missing. Jeffreys resumed punishment of Mamunds 18th September, and was in action morning of 18th, when last heard from. Blood at Nawagai reports situation 19th September as follows:--Adda Mulla with small gathering Bedmani pass eight miles across plain. Third Brigade at Nawagai holds this gathering in check, and keeps Nawagai quiet. Second Brigade under Jeffreys in ample strength is punishing Mamunds, who are beginning to ask for terms. Blood proposes, as soon as joined by part Elles' force, to attack Adda Mulla. Elles will probably descend into Kamali valley 21st September. Malakand and line of communications Panjkora have been strengthened by No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 16th Bengal Infantry.

---

No. 68.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports attacks by Adda Mulla on Third Brigade at Nawagai midnight 19th September. About 1,200 men attacked in half-hearted fashion. Attack was repulsed by steady fire. Again following night 20th September attack was made by at least 3,000. Simultaneous rushes on several sides were repeatedly made, and firing continuous for four hours. Troops admirably steady, repulsed all attacks with loss. General Elles reports meeting General Blood at Lakarai morning 21st September. Former marched to within six miles of Nawagai with three squadrons, 10 guns and First Brigade Mohmand field force. General Blood has placed his Third Brigade at Elles' disposal to attack Bedmanai on 22nd September. General Blood himself will join Jeffreys.

No. 69.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th September 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

General Elles reports, 23rd, attacked Bedmanai. Some opposition, but captured heights and pass. Will encamp at Bedmanai village. Casualties unknown. General Meiklejohn's force with convoy marching to Jhar, returning thence with convoy sick and wounded.

No. 70.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th September 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

General Blood reports, 25th September, Mamund jirga expected in. Operations consequently suspended. All towers in Bedmani destroyed. Third Brigade has destroyed some villages in Mitai and Suran Valleys. Brigade has been ordered to Lakarai to await developments. Convoy sick and wounded arrived Jhar 26th September. Wounded doing well.

No. 71.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th September 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

General Elles moved, 26th September, from Sarfaraz Killi on Jarobi, situated in difficult gorge. Slight resistance by Isa and Musa Khel. Forts of village near Jarobi destroyed, also those of Koda Khel Baizi by First Brigade, which is at Kung. Troops retired slowly, being followed up. Casualties :— Native troops, killed one, wounded 16 ; followers one killed. Enemy's loss unknown. Wounded doing well generally. Harington's condition unsatisfactory.

No. 72.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th September 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Representative Mamund jirga came into Jeffreys' camp on 26th. They offered rupees and match-locks as earnest that they were prepared to treat for terms, but refused to bring in breech-loaders, alleging that they have been taken by men of Trans-Kunar, who had come to their assistance. In Mohmand Khwaezais are paying fine imposed in guns and money. Jirgas of other tribes have been given time until 3rd October to pay similar fine. Deputation of Afridis and Orakzais reported by British Agent at Cabul to have been stopped at Jelalabad, refused assistance and ordered to return.

No. 73.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th September 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Kung villages declining to comply with terms have been punished. Second Brigade now visits Pipal, Yakhdand, Utmanzai and Danish Kul, First Brigade remaining Nahaki. Wodehouse's Brigade of Blood's force has marched Galanai en route to Peshawar. Wounded doing well.



## No. 74.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 1st October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Mamunds have failed to submit. Jeffreys' Brigade visited twelve villages, destroyed fifteen towers. No opposition experienced.

## No. 75.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 1st October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeffreys' Brigade encountered enemy in force at Agrah and Gat villages. Enemy made considerable resistance, and troops being hotly engaged at close quarters suffered some loss. Agrah finally burnt, and Gat partly burnt. Casualties : killed, Second Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Bryen, 31st Bengal Infantry ; severely wounded, Lieutenant E. B. Peacocke, 31st Bengal Infantry, Lieutenant H. Isacke, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment ; slightly wounded, Captain C. Style, 1st Battalion West Kent Regiment. Rank and file : British killed three, Native seven ; wounded British 15, native 23.

## No. 76.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Elles' force with Wodehouse's Brigade withdrawing from Mohmand country reaches Galanai to-day. General Blood, arrived Inayat Killa 3rd October, reports dislodgment of enemy, 30th September, involved really hard fighting owing to natural strength of position and enemy being well armed with breech-loaders. He considers great credit due to Jeffreys for his able dispositions. All wounded doing well.

## No. 77.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 5th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Blood reports Jeffreys occupied Badelai with slight opposition. When troops withdrew, enemy who had collected in force followed retirement, though easily held in check. Casualties :—Native two killed, thirteen wounded ; British soldier wounded. Wounded doing well.

## No. 78.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Mohmand Field Force broken up. General Blood reports wounded are doing well.

No. 79.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Mohmands have surrendered 12 breech-loaders, 60 Enfields, 1,070 guns, 850 swords, and paid fines aggregating Rs. 15,000. Expedition probably cost Mohmands over one and a half lakhs of rupees, including above and value of forts and towers destroyed and free supplies for troops.

No. 80.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

The gathering from Kunar returned across border and dispersed on 8th October. Mamunds have surrendered ten Martinis. Deane is endeavouring, with some prospect of success, to bring about surrender of Mamunds through Bajauri Khans, but progress slow, and matters complicated by Sipah Salar's interference.

No. 81.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Settlement with Mamunds being completed. General Blood's force marched Jhar yesterday, Matashah to-day. No signs hostility displayed.

No. 82.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th October 1897.*

Troops have moved into Babukarrah valley to settle with Salarzais, whose jirga is expected. March unopposed; people friendly. Mamunds have surrendered nearly all rifles lost by troops on 16th September, and given security for remainder. They promise to maintain peaceful relations. Blood considers damage done to their valley has settled outstanding accounts.

No. 83.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Mamunds have sent in outstanding rifles. Upper and Lower Salarzais have surrendered rifles and guns demanded with the exception of few for which security has been given. Deane expected Shamozaï jirga in on 20th.

No. 84.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th December 1897.*

Letter from Amir states that the Hadda Mullah has been ordered either to remove from Afghan limits or to proceed at once to Cabul, and thence to Mecca or Medina *via* Persia; failing compliance, he would be arrested.

## C.—AFRIDIS and ORAKZAIS.

No. 85.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 16th August 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Report of possible hostile combination of Orakzai and Afridi tribes ; I have accordingly approved immediate reinforcement of Kohat garrison by 9th Field Battery, R.A., wing of 1st Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers, 18th Bengal Cavalry, and 15th Bengal Infantry.

No. 86.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th August 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Reports dated 14th from Samana indicated that Orakzais would join Afridis if they rose, and that Afridis were assembling to attack Jamrud, but Udny's information does not confirm regarding Afridis ; also the latest account from Kohat is that Mulla who was preaching *jehad* in Orakzai country has gone to his village on receipt of letter from Adda Mulla. Have approved Kohat garrison being strengthened.

No. 87.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th August 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Officer on special duty, Kurram, wires large body Mussazais advancing towards Parachinar. Reliable information received Afridis preparing to attack Jamrud. Orakzais rising and threatening Samana. Ladies and children left Samana, except Mrs. Des Voeux and family. Samana regular garrisons concentrated Fort Lockhart, and Gulistan Militia at Dar. Other posts withdrawn. Kohat Pass Afridis seem quiet.

No. 88.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th August 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Column consisting of K Battery Royal Horse Artillery, 4th Dragoon Guards, wing British Infantry, Battalion Gurkhas, wing 26th Bengal Infantry marched to Jamrud this morning, staying there until further orders.

No. 89.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th August 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Large body of Massuzai Orakzais seen moving towards Parachinar in Kurram on 17th. Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel Afridis, informed Commissioner, Peshawar, that Lashkar nation of Afridis, including all Khyber clans except Kuki Khel, said to be 10,000 strong, with 1,500 mullas from Ningrahar, is advancing on the Khyber, where they were expected to reach 18th August ; that Orakzai Lashkars crossing the frontier to attack Samana, while Adam Khel and Aka Khel Afridis are to attack border posts on western Peshawar frontier. Barton, Assistant Political Officer, Khyber, and his Native Assistant have come down to Jamrud, and the Khyber posts are held by Khyber rifles only. No news of Lashkars having reached Khyber limits up to noon of 18th.



No. 90.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Peshawar. General Officer Commanding at Peshawar reports reconnaissance towards Afridi country. No enemy seen. Previous reports appear very much exaggerated. Reconnaissance from Shabkadr up Alikandi route reports no gathering in Mohmand country. Mulla at Nawagai.

No. 91.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

In Swat Deane has received letter from Mian Guls suing for peace and offering to comply with wishes of Government. They say that opposition at Landikai was forced on by Bonerwals. Usual kafilas passed up and down Khyber 20th August. No disturbance in Khyber, and Amin Khan's reports seem to have been exaggerated, but there is a gathering of Orakzais in hills north of Sadda in Kurram. Afghan troops cantoned in Shinwari country said to be restrained by orders from Sipah Salar from joining *jihad*. Reported that Adda Mulla has gone to Nawagai, and Afghans of his gathering returned home.

No. 92.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding reports Adda Mulla collecting men to attack Shabkadr and Michni. Large gathering of Afridis approaching Khaibar. Jamrud reinforced by wing Gordon Highlanders and wing 28th Bombay Infantry. General Westmacott commands Jamrud. Column under Colonel Borton, 1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry, consisting of two squadrons 9th Bengal Cavalry, 57th Field Battery Royal Artillery, wing Devonshire Regiment, 30th Bengal Infantry, marched Bara 21st August.

No. 93.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Nothing new from Swat. The Mohmands are reported to be collecting again with intent to attack Michni and Abazai. Attack made on village near Sadda in Kurram on night of 20th easily repulsed. Reports again come in from different sides of Afridi gathering in Bazar Valley about to attack Jamrud or Barah.

No. 94.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Fighting is reported to be going on at Ali Musjid between Afridis and levy garrison.

No. 95.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd August 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding, Peshawar, reports Afridis attacked Ali Musjid this morning, and were attacking Fort Maude 10.30, their line one half miles (*sic*) long. Another body moving towards Kadam. All Afridi tribes are said to have joined.

## No. 96.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Ali Musjid attacked by Afridi gathering morning 23rd, and Fort Maude later. These positions are held by Khyber Afridi Amars. No regular troops in pass above Jamrud. Fort Maude was captured in the evening, and burnt, and its garrison retired, their loss being two killed in the defence and one during retirement. Another gathering reported to be approaching Fort Bara, and all Afridi tribes said to have joined gathering.

## No. 97.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 25th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Officer Commanding Parachinar wires attack on Sadda expected. Orakzais are said to be attacking Marai and other points Kohat border. Hangu moveable column strengthened and ordered Marai.

## No. 98.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 25th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

News of 24th. Ali Musjid not taken up to night of 25rd. Baftian Hytte post evacuated during the night, and 11 Zakha Khels deserted with their rifles during retirement. Later,—Ali Musjid evacuated and burnt. Afridi gathering said to be short of food and ammunition, but have received provisions from Tirah.

## No. 99.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lundi Kotal Serai, held by about 350 Khyber Rifles and 150 tribesmen, taken yesterday, 25th. After enemy effected entrance there was hard fighting inside. One native officer killed, one wounded. Nearly the whole of Ali Musjid garrison have reached Jamrud with their arms. Afridis in Khyber are said to have dispersed for the present, but with intentions of reassembling.

## No. 100.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lundi Kotal taken 25th August; Afridi Lashkars are reported to have dispersed homewards. Khyber Rifles garrison of Ali Musjid came into Jamrud bringing their rifles. The Kuki Khel Afridis appear to have remained true, and all other sections to have risen and broken their engagements. The Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that it is unlikely that Afridis will settle down without being visited by troops, and if an expedition into Tirah is undertaken it should be done as soon as possible. The unprovoked aggression on Khyber Pass gravely affects our position on the frontier, and is calculated seriously to weaken us in relations with tribes generally. The Commander-in-Chief advises that the only effectual way in which to reassert ourselves is by moving on Tirah. We adopt that plan, and ask your Lordship to approve. The preliminaries will take some three weeks for preparation, and in the meantime the troops in Swat



will visit Adinzai and Talashe country on the right bank and the Utman Khel country on the left bank ; but until the Afridis are settled we intend to defer decision as to necessity for more extended operations against the Utman Khels and operations against Mohmands.

---

No. 101.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Following account is given by Aslam Khan, Political Officer, Khyber, of Lundi Kotal defence. Garrison consisted of 370 Khyber Rifles, composed of 70 Lwargai Shinwaris, in whose limits Lundi Kotal is situated, 180 Zakha and Malikdin Khel Afridis and Malligoris, 40 Peshawaris, 25 Shilmani Mohmands, 28 Adam Khel Afridis from Kohat Pass, and 25 unarmed recruits, Munshis, &c. The Shinwaris' jemadar was wounded, and his tribesmen then deserted ; the rest of the garrison fired on them as they ran to their villages. Jemadar Mursil Commanding was shot dead in repelling an assault, in which some of attacking party had penetrated into enclosure ; the defence after that became disorganised, the gate was treacherously opened, men of Zakha and Malikdin and Adam Khel fraternized with the attacking force. Six Peshawaris have been taken prisoner, a few have come to Jamrud without their rifles. Aslam Khan is certain that, from first to last of fighting, the Khyber Rifles have not lost more than 10 killed and wounded, whereas they are said to have inflicted loss of 250 killed on their assailants. Aslam Khan has disarmed and granted leave to all Khyber Rifles at Jamrud, except Kuki Khel. In Kohat direction, raiding party of Daulatzai Orakzais, having attacked from Ublan Pass the Muhammadzai police post on night of 26th, were followed up on 27th by a force under General Yeatman-Biggs, who took the Ublan Pass and drove off the raiders. The border posts of Lakka and Saifaldarra on the east of Samana were attacked on 27th and relieved by movable column at Hangu ; garrisons withdrawn. The border post of Shinawari on south-east of Samana was attacked on night of 26th by Ali Sherzais, Ali Khels, and Manuzais ; attack repulsed. Telegraphic communication interrupted with Samana and Parachinar, but post comes regularly from latter.

---

No. 102.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 31st August 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding reports Samana not threatened at present, but large bodies of tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Shinawara, Saifaldara and Ublan. Shinawara has been evacuated. If gathering there does not disperse, General Officer Commanding will attack *en route* to Kurram. Column consisting of 18th Bengal Cavalry, four mountain guns, half company Sappers, and 5th Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Richardson, ordered Doaba. Main column, under Colonel Lawrence, 9th Field Battery Royal Artillery, 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, 15th Bengal Infantry, 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment, and half company Sappers, remain Hangu. Advance will be made as soon as reinforcement, namely, 6th Bengal Cavalry, 30th Bengal Infantry, 1st Battalion 2nd Goorkha Regiment, arrive from Peshawar. Troops holding Kohat to Thal will be under Colonel Vousden.

---

No. 103.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 1st September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Yours 26th. As Afridi Expedition is considered by your Government unavoidable and urgent, I agree. But before any action is taken, you must refer for my consideration all questions involving future policy after military operations have terminated.



## No. 104.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding Peshawar, reports Adda Mulla's gathering unlikely to assume serious proportions, but Afridis are said to have collected in large numbers, and attacks on Bara and Jamrud are possible. General Officer Commanding, Kohat, has despatched flying column of picked troops to Sada, which is now believed to be safe, but half Afridi gathering is reported to be joining Orakzais for attack on Samana and Hangu.

## No. 105.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Very large lashkar Afridis again reported to be collecting in Tirah for attack on Samana and Peshawur border, but Afridi lashkar not yet arrived before Samana. No gathering in Khyber. Mishtis continuing to fire at night into camp, a force from Hangu on 3rd September destroyed three of their villages in Khanki. Adda Mulla is reported to have dispersed his following on receiving a letter from Amir, which, he told his disciples, directed him to defer fighting for eight days or until further orders, after Amir should have consulted his military officers. Fact of letter having reached Mulla from Amir is corroborated from separate source. Amir in autograph letter to the British Agent in Kabul, on 21st August, declared that he has instructed his officials in Ningrahar to watch, and that his Hakeem attacked five hundred men of Lughman Valley whom a disciple of the Mulla had collected, dispersed them, arrested forty, and is taking steps to arrest their leader. He also stated that his subjects cannot do anything openly.

## No. 106.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding, Kohat, reports all quiet. Colonel Richardson reports watering party of 18th Bengal Cavalry being fired on, he charged, killing five enemy; one sowar 18th Bengal Cavalry killed. Attack on Balish Khel, 1st September, appears to have been made by 3,000 Afridis. Our casualties—two Turi levies killed, one militiaman wounded. Mishti villages at mouth of Khanki valley having engaged in attacks were punished by small column under Colonel Sturt on 3rd September. Attack on Gulistan reported in our telegram of 3rd September (*sic*) very feeble; casualties three sepoy wounded.

## No. 107.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding Peshawur reports Afridi dispersion confirmed. Zakha Khels removing families, &c., from Khyber to Tirah.

## No. 108.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Kohat. General Officer Commanding reports attack on Gulistan by 5,000 tribesmen on night of 3rd. Casualties, four sepoy wounded. Enemy's loss unknown. Maharaja of Kuch Behar has joined General Officer Commanding.

Strong column starts to-night for Samana with convoy of thirty days' supplies for garrison. Mishtis and Sheikhs reported anxious to submit. Kurram reports confidence Turis restored. Afridis and Massuzais retired. Supplies plentiful.

---

## No. 109.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

All is now quiet in Upper Kurram. Tribal gatherings there have dispersed, and confidence is fully restored.

---

## No. 110.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Kohat. General Officer Commanding reports heavy firing last night on Samana towards Fort Lockhart. This morning enemy were in great force in Khanki Valley. Troops moved west to prevent attack on Shahu Khel. Enemy attacked rear-guard in determined fashion. Our casualties about 20 killed and wounded and missing. Enemy's loss heavy.

---

## No. 111.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Enemy attacked Samana forts last night after General Officer Commanding and column came down. Saragari post was taken by them. General Officer Commanding moves Samana to-night to relieve Gulistan. For want of water troops prevented remaining there in force.

---

## No. 112.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Kohat. General Officer Commanding reports Afridis and Orakzais in great force captured Saragari, which it appears was well defended by small garrison. 100 men from Fort Lockhart attempted a diversion, but had to fall back. Gulistan being reported hard pressed, General Officer Commanding intended marching with four guns, 300 men of 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, and three Native Infantry regiments, to Gulistan last night. Garrison report having made sortie and captured three standards. In rear-guard action on night of 11th September several maliks enemy killed.

---

## No. 113.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Kohat. General Officer Commanding and relieving column arrived Fort Lockhart ten o'clock to-day. Enemy's position at Gogra stormed by 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment, covered by guns. Casualties one killed, five wounded. Enemy's loss was very severe. Sangar garrison made sortie, capturing one standard. Column is pushing on to relieve Gulistan.

---

## No. 114.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The scheme for expedition against Afridis and Orakzais has been approved provisionally, but owing to news since received from General Blood's force, modifications may be necessary. When finally settled, details will be reported by telegraph.

## No. 115.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Kohat. General Officer Commanding reports, 23rd September, Shahbaz Kila, near Sadda, was raided by 200 Massuzais on 21st September. Mulla Saiad Akbar is endeavouring to incite another attack on Samana.

## No. 116.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Tirah Expedition. Lockhart, before he enters their country, is being authorised to announce to the Orakzais and Afridis of Tirah that he is coming to exact submission and reparation.

2. We are sending him instructions as to terms and conditions of submission which he is to announce from the heart of the country, and to enforce before we can entertain re-establishment of relations with the tribes. Both notification and terms follow closely precedent of Waziristan in 1894, and of Swat in August last. The terms include restitution of property, fines in arms and money, and surrender of hostages.

3. No announcement will be made to tribes as to future relations till after submission, but we are telling Lockhart that we agree with Punjab Government that it is desirable, if practicable, to re-establish tribal relations with Afridis for maintenance Khyber route, but that details of future arrangement cannot for the present be defined. The Commander-in-Chief in assenting stated his opinion that a movable column should be kept constantly ready at Peshawar, in order to guard against sudden outbreaks like the last.

## No. 117.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 6th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart's instructions. I approve your proposals ; but do not, as regards future relations with tribes, commit your Government without reference to me. Accurate information as to reasons for rising, and extraneous incitements, if any, should be obtained locally, if opportunity offers.

## No. 118.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports from Samana tribes gathering to fight on Sampagha, and attacks on Shinaori threatened. Two columns of troops from Peshawar for Tirah Force have reached Kohat *via* Kohat Pass.



No. 119.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 13th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram of 6th October. Political settlement should, in my opinion, follow as speedily as possible upon termination of military operations in the field. You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of British Indian border. I also think that present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary, but I understand you to be in favour of strictly limiting our interference with independent tribes, and thus avoiding serious eventual responsibilities involved in extension of administrative control over tribal territory. In this I entirely concur. The question of disarmament, so far as it appears to imply protection, should be examined from this point of view. Assuming that our policy is to maintain permanently our position as it existed before these disturbances, you will no doubt consider and let me know what posts and lines of communication you regard as indispensable for this purpose, due regard being had, first, to what is possible with existing military force, second, to financial situation, and third, to great political importance of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent among tribes and consequently recurring disturbances. Local arrangements should be based upon a clear and well defined general plan which it should be our object to obtain.

No. 120.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Tirah. General Lockhart reports Second Division crosses Khanki valley 22nd October. First Division follows 23rd October, and force concentrates for attack on the following day. Some Afridis reported to have come over Sampagha Pass. Samil Orakzai gathering in Khanki valley, Gar Orakzais in Dargai. It is reported that Adda Mullah has returned Jarobi with small following.

No. 121.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th October 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

General Lockhart reports 18th October:—In order to clear Chagru defile and enable road-making to continue, General Palmer was directed to operate against Dargai with two Brigades, Westmacott attacking direct with No. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, 2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers, 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment; while flanking attack was carried out by Kempster's Brigade with No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No. 4 Company of Madras Sappers and Miners. Large Orakzai and Afridi force assembled at Khangarbur, crossed Khanki on hearing firing, and moved rapidly towards Dargai, encountering Kempster's Brigade. After severe fighting enemy was defeated with severe loss. Though ground most difficult, Dargai and defences several other villages destroyed. Troops, who behaved splendidly, returned Shenaori absolutely unmolested. Loss on our side was:—Killed, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, Major Jennings Bramley, 2 privates; 2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers, 1 private; 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment, 2; 15th Bengal Infantry, 3. Wounded severely, Lieutenant M. C. Pears, 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles. Wounded, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, 14;

2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers, 4 ; 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment, 14 ; 15th Bengal Infantry, 11 ; 3rd Sikh Infantry, 1 ; three followers. General Officer Commanding Peshawur Column reports two Squadrons 9th Bengal Cavalry reconnoitring from Bara towards Mamuni were ambuscaded in hills, losing 1 Native officer and 11 killed, 4 wounded.

---

No. 122.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. Further fighting has taken place on hill west of road descending from Chagru Kotal to Karappa. General Lockhart reports :—Second Division under Yeatman-Biggs being directed to march to Karappa, supported at Kotal by two battalions of British Infantry and one Mountain Battery belonging to First Division, found enemy posted in great strength along crest western heights. Position was carried after seven hours fighting. Troops bivouacking on the ground. Casualties not yet known. Lockhart advances with Second Division to Karappa to-day. Hammond reports that actual killed of 9th Bengal Cavalry in reconnaissance towards Mamuni appears to be five only, one having returned and five being prisoners.

---

No. 123.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. General Lockhart reports full particulars regarding action 20th October. Attack commenced about ten by Second Division assisted by 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, and 3rd Sikh Infantry. 1st Battalion 2nd Goorkha Regiment formed firing line, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment in support. 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in reserve. 1st Battalion 2nd Goorkha Regiment attempted assault at 11.45, but were obliged to turn westward to meet severe attack. 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment and 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment then advance, but were checked by heavy cross-fire. Finally, position was carried by 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, supported by 3rd Sikh Infantry, at 3.15, under covering fire of four Mountain Batteries. Second Division has now moved down to Karappa, and shelled enemy out of Khangarbur. 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, 3rd Sikh Infantry holding Dargai hill, 30th Bengal Infantry on Chagru Kotal. Remainder First Division at Shinowri ready to cross Kotal, but detained by block of baggage on the road. General Officer Commanding hoped to reach Karappa with his whole Division this evening. Wounded have been brought down Shinowri. Macbean, White, Pears, doing well. Robinson's condition critical. Arnold dangerously wounded. Dingwall slightly.

---

No. 124.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Amir, in letter dated 13th October, replying to mine of 7th October, promises to arrest Adda Mulla and expel him from Afghanistan, if possible. According to latest news Mulla is in Jarobi. Amir says, if fighting ensues between British troops and Afridis and Orakzais, he cannot prevent latter taking refuge in Afghanistan, but he will not allow such refugees to interfere in British territory, or allow his subjects to join them. Except as regards disarmament, which he gives reasons for being unable to enforce, he accepts attitude I asked him to assume. British Agent in Kabul is forwarding correspondence with Amir, which we await ; he reports that a deputation of Afridis and Orakzais is in Kabul appealing to Amir for aid, but His Highness has given no reply yet.

## No. 125.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 29th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. First Division, Second Division moved to Ghundaki 28th October, clearing heights on both flanks. Our casualties, two privates wounded. Reconnaissance made same day to foot of Sampagha Pass found a large number of enemy on Sampagha and adjacent spurs. Information has since been received that Sampagha Pass was attacked and captured this morning. Details not received, but loss on our side was apparently not serious.

## No. 126.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 29th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 13th October last. We have arrived at the following conclusions in Council, and we await your Lordship's approval before communicating them to Lockhart, viz. :—(1.) We do not contemplate as basis of settlement with Afridis to be made by Lockhart the annexation or permanent occupation of Tirah. The Commander-in-Chief dissents. (2.) We do not desire to occupy Kohat Pass, and the present time is inexpedient for enforcing tribal engagements for improvement of road. (3.) Lockhart should be authorised to require small tribute from the tribes if, after receiving submission, he thinks it advisable. (4.) Policy requiring tribute as admission of suzerainty may be gradually introduced among the other tribes as opportunities may offer after local investigation. (5.) In dealing with re-opening of Khyber (*see my telegram of 4th October last*) Lockhart should consider advisability of securing right to improve and re-align road. (6.) Arms of trans-border tribes have been used against us, and as many as possible should be taken from them. Disarmament as thus carried out does not seem to imply protection. (7.) We cannot give definite answer until after conclusion of military operations, on concentration of forces, indispensable posts, and lines of communication, or definition of permanent position and policy.

## No. 127.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. Lockhart reports regarding yesterday's action, enemy on Sampagha Pass were deceived by demonstration in the afternoon of the previous day and reinforced their right. Attack was made on centre with turning movement on enemy's left. Concentrated artillery fire on successive sangars rendered them untenable. Loss on our side consequently small; so far only 4 killed, 20 wounded, reported. Force now encamped Mastura valley, at elevation 6,000 feet. Very fertile, with many villages. Enemy in force on Arhanga Pass, which will be attacked to-morrow.

## No. 128.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 31st October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. General Lockhart wires :—Captured Arhanga Pass to-day. Loss trifling, owing to enemy having been driven out of the sangars by artillery fire.



No. 129.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd November 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Tirah. General Lockhart reports from Maidan, Tirah, 2nd November:—Transport coming in from Arhanga evening of 31st October, and again 1st November, was attacked, and some fighting at close quarters took place. Bagh, head-quarters of Afridis in Tirah, was visited 1st November. There was slight resistance, but enemy easily driven off. About mid-day Afridis in large numbers began descending from hills to carry off fodder and other property. Second Brigade, with No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, moved out to stop this.

No. 130.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 3rd November 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Your telegram of 29th October. Lockhart's instructions. I am advised on further consideration that system of tribute is open to following objections:—(1.) Collection of money tribute sure to be difficult; and if payment is at any time withheld fresh complications would revive. (2.) Even if tribute were merely nominal or symbolical, the foregoing objections would not be removed; and such tribute would be hardly worth while in any case. (3.) Stability of any arrangement in which tribute formed part would be hazardous. On the whole I am of opinion that the balance of considerations is against imposing tribute. Subject to report of any proposed changes of importance, I agree that Lockhart should consider advisability of improving and re-aligning present Khyber road. I approve generally other conclusions.

No. 131.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th November 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Tirah. General Lockhart reports enemy at Arhanga Pass held sangars each side of pass. Westmacott's brigade advanced to Osnai village, artillery coming into action at 1,300 yards from pass. Second Brigade turned left of pass, enemy being driven off at 10 a.m.

No. 132.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th November 1897.**(Telegraphic.)*

Are we to understand from your telegram of 3rd November that we can now instruct Lockhart in terms of our conclusions except as regards tribute? He has urged inconvenience of deferring settlement of the future relations, and that prior announcement of terms of submission which we directed in our Despatch to him, 4th October, might hamper us hereafter or lead to charge of breach of faith. Our conclusions cover main line of future relations, and to announce them now might obviate inconvenience pointed out by Lockhart.

No. 133.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 4th November 1897.**Telegraphic.)*

You can instruct Lockhart as suggested in your telegram.

## No. 134.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

All sections of the Afridis and Orakzais have been summoned to attend Lockhart's camp unarmed, and hear terms. Jirgas of clans nearest to camp are expected to attend on 6th or 7th November.

## No. 135.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th November, 1897*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports foraging parties were sent to north-east and north-west of Camp Maidan, 6th November. Latter came under heavy fire from enemy. Our casualties, two natives killed, six wounded. Same evening camp fired into, and Lieutenant C. L. Giffard, 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, killed; Captain E. L. Sullivan, 36th Bengal Infantry, severely wounded. Officer Commanding Kurram Moveable Column reports reconnaissance in force made on 7th through Khurmanna defile, in which a portion of Massuzai country was sketched. Enemy were surprised. A large number of them followed retiring troops for some distance. Our casualties, two natives killed, five wounded.

## No. 136.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 9th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. General Lockhart reports Kempster's Brigade, with No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, accompanied foraging party to the north-west of Camp Maidan, 7th November. Enemy followed troops on retirement. Our casualties:—British, reported in our telegram of yesterday; natives, two wounded. Camp fired into same evening; one native wounded. It is now reported that of troops who reconnoitred in Khurmanna defile, 7th November, picquet, one native officer and 35 men, of Kapurthala Infantry are missing. We await further particulars.

## No. 137.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports foraging parties sent on 8th November destroyed Zakka Khel towers whence camp had been fired into. Captain E. Y. Watson, Commissariat Department, killed 8th November by firing into camp. 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment, 2nd Battalion 1st Goorkha Regiment, encountered enemy to the south of Arhanga Pass. Our casualties:—Natives, killed one, wounded one. General Lockhart on 9th November reconnoitred Saran Sar to the north-east of camp, destroyed defences of a large number of Zakka Khel villages. Intelligence received that picquet of Kapurthala Infantry, reported missing in our telegram of yesterday, having descended into ravine from which jungle fire cut off retreat, were surrounded by enemy and all killed.

## No. 138.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Jirgas of all Samil Orakzais and Firoz Khel Daulatrais, also Akhels arrived in camp on 6th, in response to Lockhart's summons. Malik Din

Kambar and Tirah Adam Khel jirgas arrived 9th. Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas expected very shortly. Zakka Khel and Aka Khel holding aloof. Former distinctly hostile.

## No. 139.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports force employed on reconnaissance, Saran Sar, consisted of 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, 15th and 36th Bengal Infantry, two batteries Mountain Artillery, one company Sappers, under Westmacott. Nearly 40 Zakha Khel forts were destroyed. Rearguard was attacked as troops were returning. They are said to have inflicted sharp punishment on enemy, but Northamptonshire Regiment retiring along a nullah, right flank protected by Dorsetshire Regiment, 15th Bengal Infantry, left flank 35th Bengal Infantry, appear to have been surprised by party of enemy lying in ambush, and to have suffered considerable loss. Court of inquiry will be held to investigate circumstance. Casualties during the day :—Northamptonshire Regiment, killed, Lieutenant J. T. Waddell, Second Lieutenant A. H. Macintire, 17 privates : wounded, Lieutenant G. A. Trent, 29 privates. Dorsetshire Regiment, killed, two privates ; wounded, Lieutenant O. P. S. Ingham, Second Lieutenant A. A. Mercer, six privates. Natives, killed one, wounded seven.

## No. 140.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. General Lockhart reports foraging party under Kempster visited Zakka Khel villages 11th November, destroyed defences of 63 houses. Enemy offered some resistance, no casualties on our side. Foraging parties under Gaselee and Westmacott sent 13th November, former not seriously opposed, latter destroyed defences of Zakka Khel villages. Our casualties believed to be three slightly wounded. Kempster's Brigade, with two batteries, two companies Sappers, reconnoitre Waran Valley to-day, and will punish Zakka Khel.

## No. 141.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart received complete jirgas of Tirah Orakzais on 12th, and announced Government terms as in Foreign Secretary's letter to him of 4th October, except that demand for breech-loaders reduced to 500. Even this number jirga say is more than they possess, but they were told that this term was final. A fortnight has been allowed for compliance. Jirgas decided to divide demand equally between Gar and Samil factions, and undertook to make further internal distribution without assistance from us. Aka Khel jirga has now come in and disclaimed any share in opposing reconnaissance to Saran Sar.

## No. 142.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 15th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports detachments from Hart's Brigade, under Major Smith Dorrien, forming foraging party, were attacked near Mastura 13th November by considerable number of enemy. The troops were well handled, and enemy smartly repulsed with loss. Brigadier-General Broadbent



and Major O'Sullivan, under escort of half battalion 2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers, No. 3 Company of Bombay Sappers and Miners, and Sirmur Sappers, proceeded 13th November to select alignment of road to Bagh, and were met by Malikdin Khambar Khel villagers. Forage collected 14th November without opposition. Kempster reached Sherkhel Waran valley 14th November without opposition.

---

No. 143.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports camp Maidan fired into, night 15th November. Enemy dispersed with loss. Kempster completed survey to junction of Mastura and Waran valleys. Enemy followed up troops. Kempster's camp fired into on 15th November. Our casualties believed three wounded. Force engaged 16th while returning Maidan. Particulars will follow. Westmacott foraged 16th Malikdin Khambar Khel villages. Enemy followed up and fired on troops. Gaselee's Brigade, with headquarters divisional troops First Division, move to Bagh 17th.

---

No. 144.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports Kempster's column returning from Waran attacked Saransar by enemy in force 16th November. 15th Bengal Infantry covering rear four miles from camp Maidan being hard pressed were reinforced by 36th Bengal Infantry and two companies of 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. Remaining troops took up position to cover retirement. When light failed, these latter proceeded camp with few casualties. 15th Bengal Infantry, 36th Bengal Infantry and two companies of Dorsetshire Regiment remained out for night. One company of Dorsetshire Regiment unfortunately became separated, and was attacked in great force, as were both Sikh regiments. Severe fighting took place. Enemy's loss was heavy.

---

No. 145.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart reports that though some Afridi jirgas have come to his camp, the Zakka Khel, Khuki Khel, Kamrai, and Sipah are holding aloof; also that foraging in Maidan and Upper Mastura will not last beyond end of this month, and forces cannot stay in those places beyond that date. If Afridis still refuse to comply with our demands, we propose to move Lockhart's force down to Lower Bara valley within easy reach of Fort Bara, whence flying columns can be organised to visit Rajgal and Bazar valley and the Lower Mastura is easily accessible, so that the Orakzais can be dominated too, if necessary. This may involve troops being kept in tribal country all winter, which we must face if necessary. As a means of putting additional pressure on the Afridis we contemplate sending troops into the Khyber to occupy posts there, and as a temporary expedient keeping that road open during winter by troops. We ask sanction to adoption of these measures if they prove necessary.

---

No. 146.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart reports 16th that Kuki Khel, Kamrai, and Sipah jirgas still hold aloof, and Zakka Khel seem irreconcilably hostile. He is marching to Bagh

to-day, and if jirgas do not come in during next few days he will announce Afridi terms by word of mouth to those jirgas who have come in, and to others in writing.

## No. 147.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 19th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I approve measures proposed in your telegram of 17th, if found necessary. What do you propose to do with posts on the Samana range during winter? As regards keeping the Khyter open during winter by troops, do you contemplate protection of traffic?

## No. 148.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 19th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports Gaselee's Brigade moved Bagh 18th. Some opposition offered. Our casualties not yet known. Two natives of Westmacott's Brigade wounded while foraging. Camp Maidan fired into night of 17th:—2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment, wounded, one private. Defences of offending villages destroyed picquet Jhind Cavalry. Camp Mastura attacked night of 17th; one man wounded. Defences of offending villages destroyed.

## No. 149.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 20th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart telegraphed on 17th:—"I am sending by post translations of several curious letters from Adda Mulla and Afridi Jirga which were found in house of Akha Khel Mulla, Saiyad Akbar, in Waran valley, but they contain nothing of grave importance." Will telegraph again on receipt of letters.

## No. 150.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

On 6th November Lockhart asked leave in the event of leaving Maidan for winter quarters to tell jirgas he would return in the spring to occupy their country during the summer. We replied 11th November:—"Government of India do not wish to tie their own hands by explicitly saying force will stop in country till terms complied with, but no objection to saying, while we do not want country and will be glad to leave it, tribes will be worse off if they force us to stay or return." Lockhart now telegraphs, "There can be no doubt that the Afridis are penetrated with the idea that if they only held out steadfastly we shall withdraw from their country, leaving them masters of the situation. The only remedy is to tell them distinctly when announcing terms of Government that till they comply with these terms we shall not leave their country, and that though it may be necessary for us to move to the lower Bara valley for the winter months, we shall re-advance in the spring. I would therefore again urge Government that it is essential that I should be authorised to make this announcement." Lockhart has announced terms (as in paragraphs 10 and 11 Foreign Secretary's letter, of 4th October) to Malik Din, Kambar, Aka and Adam Khels verbally in camp, and to Zakka, Kuki, Sipah, and Kamrai in writing. He allowed to all one week's grace for compliance. We solicit your Lordship's instructions.

## No. 151.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports he reconnoitred Diva Toi with Westmacott's Brigade 22nd, 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment being left to hold Arhanga Pass. Picquet 2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers leaving camp 21st were fired on. General Hart reports successful reconnaissance of Badashai valley and Sangra Pass, to the north-east of Mastura.

## No. 152.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Your Lordship's telegram of 19th November. The Commissioner of Peshawar has been pressed by merchants to arrange for re-opening Khyber for traffic, and if we occupy it we can. Certainly expedient to do this, which would be also most effective mark of political supremacy. Samana will no doubt have to be held in strength during the winter.

## No. 153.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports from Dwatoi defile very difficult; rearguard only arrived 23rd. Road being improved, and Rajgul valley reconnoitred. Force returns Bagh 24th November.

## No. 154.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I see no objection to proposed announcement to the tribes that till they comply with terms offered we shall not leave their country, and shall return in the spring.

## No. 155.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 21st November. Afridi terms. Lockhart is demanding surrender of 800 rifles.

## No. 156.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports leaves Bagh 27th; visits Chamkanni, Massuzai, Mamuzai country by Lozaka Pass; returns Bagh 6th December; proceeds 8th December, with Second Division, Bara valley, reaching advanced base Bara middle December. During this period postal telegraphic communication will be interrupted. Effort will be made to intimate movements by heliograph. Brigadier-General Gaselee, with 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment, 2nd Battalion 4th Goorkha Regiment, 3rd Sikh Infantry, No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain



Battery, 3rd and 4th companies of Bombay Sappers and Miners, 28th Bombay Infantry, moved towards Lozaka and Massuzai country 26th November. Advance opposed; 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment captured enemy's sangar. Brigadier-General Hart reconnoitred upper Mastura 25th November.

## No. 157.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th November 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Letters found in Saiyid Akbar's house referred to in my telegram of 20th November: translations have now reached me. Copy being sent by post.\* Letters from members of Afridi and Orakzai jirgas at Kabul speak of Amir advising them not to fight with Government. There is nothing from the Amir, or implicating him in risings. Two letters from Adda Mulla to Afridis: one, dated 5th September, very similar to his letter to Mian Guls, enclosed in Deane's letter dated 24th September: second undated, preaching *jehad*.

## No. 158.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart arrived on 30th November with Gaselee's Brigade at Hissar, wrongly called Esor, and there joined Kurram moveable column, which visits Thabi, Chamkanni country, 1st December. Reinforced by one Mountain Battery, 2nd Battalion 4th Goorkha Regiment, half company Bombay Sappers and Miners, Goorkha scouts. Gaselee, with wing Queen's, wing 1st Battalion 2nd Goorkhas, one Mountain Battery, moves Lozaka Pass to punish Gar Masuzais.

## No. 159.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Five clans of Orakzais are paying up, and by evening of 27th November they had given 164 breech-loaders, restored 16 Government rifles, and paid Rs. 9,224. Lockhart addressed on that day supplementary proclamation to the Afridis:—"I am going away from this high country of Maidan because snow is coming and I do not wish my troops to be here in the cold. But I am not going to leave the country of the Afridis. I shall remain in the country till they comply with terms of Government, and I shall attack you in your other settlements during winter. My advice, as an old friend of many of your tribe, is to submit and let your wives and families go to their homes out of the cold mountains."

## No. 160.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Destruction remaining Khani Khel villages completed in the face of strong opposition, heights being taken with bayonet. Many killed and wounded.

\* Printed as Appendices A. to L., pages 39 A. to 39 B.

## No. 161.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Orakzais continue to pay up fine, and of Afridis the Adam Khel and Malikdin have paid some, and the Kuki Khel jirga has attended at Bagh to ask for more time.

## No. 162.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Lockhart reports having reached Khanki Bazar 4th December unopposed ; returned to Bagh 6th December *via* Chingakh Pass.

## No. 163.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart moved with Fourth Brigade Bagh to Dwatoi 7th December ; two men 2nd Battalion King's Own Borderers killed, one wounded. Enemy rushed picquet, losing heavily. On 8th December Fourth Brigade halted, Third Brigade moved to Dwatoi : position commanding entrance Rajgal valley captured by two companies 36th Bengal Infantry and one company 1st Battalion 3rd Goorkha Regiment, with loss of one killed, three wounded : enemy lost heavily ; one man Dorsetshire Regiment wounded. On 9th December column from Westmacott's Brigade proceeded Rajgal valley to complete survey, collect forage, and destroy defences Kuki Khel villages : many enemy killed : our casualties, three Natives wounded. On 10th December 4th Brigade marched to Sadana ; march opposed throughout ; our casualties, Natives, one killed, six wounded. All fortified defences between Dwatoi and Sandana destroyed.

## No. 164.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart reports rear-guard of Kempster's Brigade, delayed by transport, was attacked 11th December outside camp Sherkhel, seized and occupied a village for the night. Hart's Brigade reached Barkai 13th December. Remainder Division following.

## No. 165.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 15th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart reports that Second Division marched to Spinkamar 13th December, Kempster's Brigade in advance, Westmacott's Brigade in rear. Continuous opposition throughout march. Enemy's loss heavy ; is estimated at 300 to 400. Defences of villages were destroyed. Detailed reports of our casualties not yet received ; believed to be forty. Force moved to Mamani 14th December. Enemy attacked Westmacott's Brigade ; enemy was defeated with severe loss. Mangal Pass being blocked by snow, Lockhart has decided to redistribute force as follows :—First Division and Peshawar column, Jamrud, will be available to reopen Khyber and move into Bazar. Westmacott's Brigade, Divisional troops will remain at Swaikot. Kempster's Brigade, Bara, till Bazar valley has been dealt with. Hart's Brigade marched Ilamgudr 14th December.

## No. 166.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Peshawar column moves Swaikot to Ilamgudr. Gaselee's Brigade Bara 16th December. Kempster's Brigade Bara to-day. Lockhart proceeds to Peshawar to-day.

---

## No. 167.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Orakzai compliance with terms is now practically complete. Afridi situation unchanged.

---

## No. 168.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart's headquarters, First Division, concentrated Bara; Kempster's Brigade Ilamgudr. Headquarter's Second Division, Westmacott's Brigade, Mamani.

---

## No. 169.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 24th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Hammond's column occupied Ali Musjid 23rd December without opposition, and halts to-day. Kuki Khel village Laza China found deserted. Defences Fort Maude are being improved, Ali Musjid will be garrisoned by 45th Bengal Infantry and two guns. Lockhart proceeds with First Division to Shahgai heights.

---

## No. 170.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 25th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lockhart proceeded yesterday up Khyber with First Division and two squadrons of 4th Dragoon Guards. No opposition experienced. No tribesmen about. First Division moves to Karamna, and Lockhart with Second Brigade marches to China through Chara Pass.

---

## No. 171.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 26th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

First Division arrived Ali Musjid. Towers Lala China village blown up 24th December. No opposition experienced. Road to Chara Pass improved for three miles from camp. A few shots fired at picquet. One private Sussex, wounded. Lockhart marched Chara with Second Brigade 25th December. Road fair. No opposition experienced. Intends to move Walai to-day.

---

## No. 172.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Hammond reached Lundi Kotal 26th without opposition. Walls and gates of Serai intact, but interior wrecked and moveable property carried



off. Road between Lundi Kotal and Ali Musjid in bad repair owing to rains. Wing of 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry has been added to Ali Musjid garrison. The following casualties occurred 25th December:—45th Bengal Infantry, one killed three wounded, a few of the enemy firing from top of inaccessible cliffs. Lockhart reports 27th December marched with Second Brigade Chora to China. Latter only considerable village in Bazar. Rear-guard fired on during march. First Brigade, with headquarters of First Division, reached Burg from Lala China in Kyber *via* Karamna. Bad road. General Symons reconnoitred Bori Kandao *en route*. Road being impracticable without much improvement, First Brigade directed to return by same route as it advanced; will arrive Lala China to-day. Lockhart with Second Brigade returns Lala China *via* Chora, and also arrives to-day. A further telegram reports towers of China blown up. Camp at China almost unmolested night of 26th, but rearguard of First Brigade followed next morning by about 200 of enemy, who were repulsed with heavy loss.

---

No. 173.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Second Brigade reached Lala China unopposed 28th December, and marched yesterday Jamrud. First Brigade and Headquarters Division expected Lala China to-day. Headquarters Tirah force will probably be moved to Peshawar shortly. Sowar Jodhpur Lancers found killed in Khyber yesterday, and wire being continually cut. Foraging parties from Lundi Kotal have obtained a large quantity of *bhusa* and wood from villages. Weather rainy all along frontier.

---

No. 174.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 31st December 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Second Brigade arrived Jamrud, 30th. Enemy followed rearguard of this Brigade in its retirement *via* China. On 28th December the towers of Karamna villages were destroyed, in accomplishing which Lieutenant C. R. Tonge, R.E., and one man of No. 4 Company of Bombay Sappers and Miners were unfortunately killed by explosion. Rearguard was closely pressed to Ali Musjid, enemy being favoured by rain and mist. Total casualties, 11 wounded. Details, as also of casualties in First Brigade, will be reported hereafter. General Symons moves to Jamrud to-morrow, leaving one battalion, one battery of Mountain Artillery in order to strengthen Ali Musjid. Wire has been cut between that place and Jamrud, and Ali Musjid picquets attacked from both sides of pass, but only one casualty among troops.

---

No. 175.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 1st January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. Headquarters of Tirah force have moved to Peshawar, and First Division is now concentrated Jamrud. Camp was fired into night 29th December, one man wounded slightly. Troops at Lundi Kotal, on 30th December, destroyed 22 Zakka Khel towers. Rearguard of foraging and demolition parties was followed up, but only casualties two wounded slightly. On 29th December picquets at Ali Musjid were again fired on, and picquets placed by 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry on convoy duty were attacked; on retirement they were unable to reach camp until arrival reinforcements. Lieutenant-Colonel Plowden, Captain Parr, Lieutenant Owen, wounded; rank and file, killed, three; wounded, 11. The telegraph is cut every afternoon as soon as picquets withdraw.

Body Sir Henry Havelock Allan received Jamrud by guard of honour and officers First Division and passed on to Peshawar with cavalry escort. From Kurram it is reported that a large number of Afridis with families have entered Massazai and Zaimukht territory and are selling captured rifles.

---

## No. 176.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 4th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Tirah. Hammond reports defences of two villages commanding Khyber road destroyed. Inhabited caves in Tsira Nala were visited and contents burnt, heights being held meanwhile by 45th Bengal Infantry, 9th Bengal Infantry, 34th Bengal Infantry. After withdrawal of troops enemy followed rearguard 34th Bengal Infantry. Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, R.A., orderly officer, severely wounded, also one sergeant, 2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

---

## No. 177.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Amir, replying on 3rd January to my letter, states that he has answered jirgas accordingly and dismissed them. Jirgas are reported to have returned to Tirah from Cabul thoroughly disheartened by the rejection of all hope of assistance or of Amir's interceding for them.

---

## No. 178.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 15th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel Afridis appear to have returned to the Khyber, and cutting telegraph wire and firing on escorts between Ali Musjid and Lundi Kotal has recommenced.

---

## No. 179.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 18th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Maliks of all Afridi sections except Zakka Khel arrived at Jamrud evening of 17th January.

---

## No. 180.

*From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 25th January 1898.*

(Telegraphic.)

Report not true that Afridi jirgas are dispersing. Some men of Kambar Khels left Jamrud, but most have returned. I cannot promise a speedy settlement. Warburton reports attitude of jirgas satisfactory, and expects Sipah, Kamrai, and Malik din Khels will comply with Government demands. The Sipahs have surrendered three Martini-Henry rifles, and the Malik din Khels have paid about Rs. 4,000.

---

TRANSLATIONS OF LETTERS found in SAIYID AKBAR's house in the Waran Valley.  
(See Telegram No. 157, p. 35.)

### APPENDIX A.

*Translation of a letter from the Mulla of Adda to the Mulla of Sipah, the Mulla of Aka Khel, Badshah Sahib, Malik Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, the Kamar Khel, Kambar Khel and Aka Khel Maliks, Maliks Yar Muhammad, Feroz, Wali Muhammad Khawas, Samandar and other people of Tirah, dated the 7th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H.=5th September 1897.*

After compliments.—On the 1st Rabi-us-sani 1315 H. (30th August 1897), I determined with a lashkar to go out for a holy war and defend the religion of the Holy Prophet. When I reached Lashkar Killa and was staying there for the night, I received a "firman" from "Zia-ul-millati-uddin," the King of Islam, in reply to my petition, and understood its contents, which were to the following effect :—

"You should wait for a few days in your former place, so that I may hold a consultation with the Khans, Maliks, chiefs and respectable men about 'ghaza,' and decide what steps should be taken. I will then either come myself or send to you my son for 'jihad,' with our victorious troops and supplies, such as rations and food, and will let you know again. I will with the greatest pleasure make exertions in the way of 'jihad.'" I therefore write to you people that I have postponed my intentions for the reasons given above, but that you should on receipt of this letter consult among yourselves and let me know faithfully of your decision, so that I may come to you with the Mohmand people, the Khan of Nawagai and other Mussalmans. You should try your best to save the religion of the Prophet. I shall await your reply.

### APPENDIX B.

*Translation of a letter, without date, from the Daulatzai and Sturi Khel Mullas to the Aka Khel Mulla and other Afridi Mullas.*

After compliments.—We attacked the Muhammadzai post on Thursday and destroyed it. We killed many Government servants and returned with success to Ublan. Our casualties were—2 wounded who have not yet died. Please let us know whether we should stay on here committing raids on Kohat, or should dismiss the lashkar to their homes, because we have no supplies here. Please also let us know by the bearer if we are wanted there, or if you will send us reinforcement here. The Shia Sipahs are afraid lest their property may be looted. We have stood surety to them that none of the Afridis or Ziauddins will cause them any injury. We have made peace with the Sipahs in order that they may join us in the "ghaza," and you should see that none of the Sipah property or animals are interfered with.

### APPENDIX C.

*Translation of a letter, without date, from the Mulla of Adda to all the Mullas and elders of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes.*

After compliments.—The Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussulman countries, and, owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people, are conquering every region. They have now reached these countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the people of these places showed want of courage in the beginning, they have now realized their mistake, and having repented and become ashamed (of their former deeds), they attack them (the Kafirs) day and night, and have quite confounded them. I have myself informed the people of Laghman and Kunar and the Mohmands, Ningraharis and Shinwaris, and they are all prepared to take part in the fighting. They are simply waiting for the summer to pass as the country of Bajaur is without water and shade, and common folk cannot afford to arrange for the necessities of "jihad." It is difficult for them to fight in summer. I inform you also that you may try your best to further the cause of "jihad," which is the best of all devotions and the truest of all submissions, so that we may not be ashamed before God on the day of judgment and be glorious before His Prophet. Though these men have no means, yet as the holy verse runs that "victory and triumph rest with God," it is possible that God may give us victory and power to recover the country of Mussulmans from the hands of Kafirs, but, if we fail, we shall have done our best and can bring a reasonable excuse before God on the day of judgment, because God does not expect a thing from a man which is beyond his power. I have deputed Mulla Abdulla, Akhundzada of the Mohmand country, to attend on you, and, God willing, he will reach you. Please let me know whatever decision you may unanimously arrive at, so that it may be acted upon. If you decide to send for me there, I am willing to come; but, if you wish to come here, I also agree. If you choose to commence fighting there, and desire me to fight in this direction, I am ready to do so;



but it is necessary to fix the time and day of fighting, so that, by the grace of God, the work may be accomplished. And as it is said that the only thing a man can do in a matter is to try his best, and that the accomplishment of the matter rests with God, so to leave everything in the hands of God is the best thing of all, and all "Mumins" (true believers) must trust in God. May God, the Almighty, lead us all to the path of virtue at our last moment, and save us from the punishment of the next world. And may He enable us to do an act which may be acceptable to Him! Peace be upon all believers!

---

## APPENDIX D.

*Translation of a letter from Sufi Sahib to the Mulla Sahib of Sipah, the Mulla of Aka Khel (Saiyid Akbar), Badshah Sahib, Malik Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan, Feroz, Wali Muhammad Khan, Khawas Khan, Samandar, and the Maliks of Kamar Khel, Kambar Khel, Aka Khel and other Maliks and people of Tirah, dated the 7th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (=5th September 1897.)*

After compliments.—I started with the people of the Kot valley, of Mohmandarra, of the Hisarak valley and of the whole of Ningrahar, for jihad in that direction, but on reaching the limits of Batikot with the lashkar, I received a letter from my spiritual leader, the Akhundzada Sahib (of Adda), the perusal of which gave me pleasure, and I understood its contents. He wrote to say that I should return to my residence with the Ningrahar lashkar, and should wait for a few days when, he said, he would let me know again. In compliance therefore with his instructions I returned to my place. I now write to say that on receipt of this letter you should assemble together, exert yourselves in the way of "jihad" and let me know faithfully of the result (of your meeting), so that I may understand it. God willing, the "Pir Sahib" (Adda Mulla) with his lashkar of Bajauris, the Khan of Nawagai and the people of the Ningrahar, and myself too, will start at once in that direction and will try our best to save the religion of the Prophet. Consider it an urgent matter.

---

## APPENDIX E.

*Translation of a letter from Fakir Shah (? probably some Afghan official in Ningrahar), to the (Aka Khel) Mulla (Saiyid Akbar), dated the 14th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. = 12th September 1897.*

After compliments.—I received your letter and understood its contents. I hope you will write daily the news of that side and send it to Mulla Idris, who will forward it to me, so that I may remain informed of the state of affairs in that direction and sympathise with the holy religion of the Prophet. Rest assured in every way from this side, and always send us news of that side.

---

## APPENDIX F.

*Translation of a letter from Adam Khan (Kambar Khel) to his brother Muhammad Zaman Khan (sent from Kabul), dated the 18th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H. = 15th October 1897.*

After compliments.—I also joined the Afridi and Orakzai jirga, which was well received by the Amir. His Highness asked us about the causes which led to the quarrels between the Afridis and the British Government. We stated that the British Government were day by day violating the former agreements, were forcibly encroaching upon our limits, and were realising fines and compensations from us for the arms which were stolen in the Khyber by their own servants, and that these naturally led to the disturbances. His Highness said that if he could he would try to make peace between us and the British Government. We stated that, if the British Government agreed to give up all frontier territories forcibly taken possession of by them and did not ask for the return of arms looted by us in fair fight, we would make peace. The Amir then communicated our statement to the British Government, and a reply to that is awaited. We are staying here, and every consideration is paid to us by the Amir. Rest assured. Till the result (of our mission) is known, take care that you are not deceived by the English, whom you should not believe.

## APPENDIX G.

*Translation of a letter from Kazi Mira Khan, and other Adam Khels composing the Afridi jirga at Kabul, to Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-awal 1315 = 25th October 1897.*

After compliments.—Let it be known to you that having been appointed by you and other Mussalman brethren as a jirga to attend on His Highness the Amir, we arrived here and held an interview with His Highness, who advised us not to fight with the British Government, and this was and has been his advice ever since. We said we accepted his advice, but that our wishes ought to be met by the British Government. We were ordered to record them in detail, when His Highness said he would, after consideration, submit them to the British Government, and see what reply they would give. We put down our wishes in detail and presented them to His Highness, who submitted them to the British Government, but no reply has yet been received. We shall see what reply comes.

There is a British Agent at Kabul who has on his establishment many Hindustani Mussalmans. One of these became our acquaintance. This man is a good Mussalman and a well-wisher of his co-religionists. He has given us a piece of good and correct news which is to the following effect :—

“ You, Muhammadans, must take care lest you be deceived by the British, who are at present in distressed circumstances. For instance, Aden, a seaport, which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal, through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days, has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India. The friendly alliance between the British and the Germans has also been disturbed on account of some disagreement about trade, which must result in the two nations rising in arms against each other. The Sultan, the Germans, the Russians and the French are all in arms against the British at all seaports, and fighting is going on in Egypt too against them. In short, the British are disheartened now-a-days. The Viceroy and the Generals who are to advance against you have received distinct orders from London that the operations in the Khyber and Tirah must be brought to an end in two weeks' time, as the troops are required in Egypt and at other seaports. In the case of the Mohmands and people of Gandab who had killed ten thousand British troops and had inflicted a heavy loss of rifles and property on them, the British, in their great dismay, concluded a settlement with them for 24 rifles only, whereas thousands of rifles and lakhs of rupees should have been demanded. This peace with the Mohmands is by way of deceit, and when the British get rid of their other difficulties, they will turn back and demand from the Mohmands the remaining rifles and compensation for their losses. They will say that, as the Mohmands have become British subjects by surrendering 24 rifles, they must make good the remaining loss too. The British are always giving out that their troops will enter Khyber and Tirah on such and such dates, but they do not march on those dates and remain where they are. This is deceitful on the part of the English, who wish to mislead Mussalmans by a payment of Rs. 5 and seek for an opportunity to make an attack by surprise. I have thus informed you of the deeds and perplexities of the English.”

We, the jirga people, consider it necessary to inform you of this, so that you may be aware of the distress, confusion and deceitfulness of the British, and may communicate the information to all the Mussalmans of the lashkar, in order that they may be on their alert against being cheated by the British in any way. You should also send us daily news for our information, and see that no attacks are made on you by surprise. Also appoint a few clever men as messengers to bring us daily news and letters from you and *vice versa*. Send us by the bearer all news of that side, and in future, too, send us fresh news daily by other messengers, as it is important that we should know about each other.

## APPENDIX H.

*Translation of a letter from Sherdil Khan and Abdul Rahim, sons of Malik Sinjab Khan, Orakzai (of Barki), to Malik Sinjab Khan, dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H.=25th October 1897.*

The Amir received our jirga of the Orakzais and Afridis with great honour and respect. He asked the causes which led to the commencement of hostilities between the Orakzais and Afridis on the one side and the British on the other. In reply to his enquiry, we stated that the British had encroached upon our frontier limits by taking forcible possession of the Samana and other like places, and that they (the British) were demanding compensation and fines from us for the arms stolen in the Khyber by their own troops from the middle of their own army, and that these were the causes which naturally led to the quarrels between the two parties. The Amir then said that if he could he would try to effect peace between us and the British Government. Upon this we said that, if the English gave up our frontier territories and abandoned the idea of re-occupying them, and would not demand the restoration of arms taken by us in action from British troops, we would make peace. After this the Amir, for the welfare of Mussalmans, communicated all that we had stated to the British Government, and a reply to this is expected. We are now staying here, and the Amir treats us with great consideration. You must therefore rest assured for us. Do not negotiate with the British, and take care that you are not taken in by them. Do not believe them. For the rest all is well.

## APPENDIX I.

*Translation of a letter, dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H.=25th October 1897, from Fazl-i-Rahim, Akhundzada, to the (Aka Khel) Mulla Sahib (sent from Kabul).*

After compliments.—As soon as you receive this humble letter of mine through some one, I beg you to write a letter of recommendation on my behalf to the Amir and to send it to me, so that I may present it to His Highness the Amir. I hope you will not hesitate about writing the letter to the Amir and sending it to me, and I request that it may be well written (*i.e.*, it should contain a strong recommendation). For the rest it is all well here and rest assured. Please pray always for the welfare of His Highness the Amir, the King of Islam, who is so kind to me.

## APPENDIX J.

*Translation of a letter from Fazl-i-Rahim to his father (name not given), dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H.=25th October 1897.*

The Amir has passed an order that he will hold me responsible for the actions of the Sturi Khels, half of which tribe will be managed by Malik Sherdil Khan, son of Malik Sinjab Khan. You or your tribe should not (therefore) make peace with the British in any case, even though a lakh of rupees is paid to any one of you. It is my duty to inform you of this. Take care that neither Ibrahim Khan nor Amir Khan, Abdul Khalik, Maizulla, Amal Jan, Tarrabaz, Ahmad Ali Khan, Mir Badshah, Azim Khan, Turabaz, or any other of your tribe make peace with the British on any account. As regards myself, I am highly obliged to the Amir for his kindness. May God spare his throne and (grant him) good fortune for ever! He treats me very kindly. Give my salams to my brother Karam. I am well here and rest assured for me. Let me know of any fresh news, especially as to how our tribe may settle with the British Government. Salams to all friends and salams from Sherdil Khan.

P.S.—If anyone desires to enter (Afghan) service, let him come here within the next few days, and he will get a good appointment.

## APPENDIX K.

*Extract from translation of a letter, without date, from Mir Muhammad Khan, at Kabul, to his father Kazi Maula Dad Malikan Khel.*

His Highness the Amir has very kindly written to the British Government on our behalf, saying that all the Orakzais and Afridis have come to his Highness and asked him for a settlement of their affairs. Mind that you do not make peace with the British.

\* \* \* \* \*

(The rest of the letter is irrelevant.)

## APPENDIX L.

*Translation of a letter from Mulla Sher Muhammad and Anis Muhammad to Mulla Mir Ahmad and others, without date.*

On receipt of this letter come at once with the lashkar at night, as the British troops have reached Sinkot. Do not make any delay in coming here Urgent, very urgent.



## PART IV.

### CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO MALAKAND, MOHMANDS, AFRIDIS, ORAKZAIS, &c.

No. 1.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 14th July 1896. (Received 4th August 1896.)*

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, a report by Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Officer for Dir and Swat, on the maintenance of the Dir road during the last nine months, and the recent relief by this route of the Chitral garrison.

The report discloses a very satisfactory condition of affairs. Our expectation that it would be possible to keep open the road to Chitral by peaceful arrangements with the tribes has so far been fully realised. Experience elsewhere on the North-West Frontier has shown that wherever the levy system has been adopted, and the authority of the headmen has been properly supported, the border tribes have settled down with wonderful rapidity into a more orderly condition, and have shown themselves in a remarkable degree amenable to the influence and control of our Political Officers. Our belief that similar methods applied to this part of the frontier would probably produce similar results has been justified by the event, and though it is too early to conclude that difficulties will not occasionally occur, we hope that with every year of peace the influence of our officers will become stronger and wider, and the task of controlling the tribes more easy. Great credit is, in our opinion, due to Major Deane for the firmness, tact and judgment which he has throughout displayed in his dealings with the Khans and tribesmen, and for the excellence of his arrangements in connection with the march of the reliefs to and from Chitral. We have much

Dated the 9th July 1896, with pleasure in bringing the services of this officer to the notice of Her Majesty's Government. A copy of our Foreign Secretary's letter acknowledging Major Deane's report is enclosed.

We have, &c.,

ELGIN.

J. S. WHITE.

J. WESTLAND.

J. WOODBURN.

M. D. CHALMERS.

E. H. H. COLLEN.

A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure 1.

*Extract from letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Officer, Dir and Swat, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Malakand, 14th June 1896.*

I have the honour to submit the following short report on what has been described as the initial and experimental stage of maintaining communication with Chitral *viâ* the Malakand and Dir, ending with the carrying out of the Chitral Reliefs.

Since the breaking up of the Chitral Relief Force on the 27th September 1895, there has been no disturbance amongst any of the tribes on the line against Government. There have been a few isolated cases of fanaticism principally against levies employed by the Khan of Dir, and committed with the hope of bringing the Khan into disfavour with Government.

The post to Chitral has run with great regularity, the only occasion on which there was delay being at a time when the Lowari Pass was absolutely dangerous owing to the heavy fall of snow.

The only local tribal disturbance which has occurred took place in January 1896, when the Khan of Dir, partly from irritation at men from the Jandol side making petty attacks on the levies, to a certain extent from factional feeling usual amongst Pathans, and also from a desire to gratify feelings of enmity and hatred towards Jandol and to show his power, invaded Jandol and overran the valley. He, however, acted on the advice given him, and the different Jandol headmen were restored to their respective positions in the valley.

Though his invasion of Jandol was on some grounds inadvisable, there being danger of his coming into hostile contact with the Khan of Nawagai and Bajaur generally, the result of his action was on the whole good in proving to the Jandois that they cannot give trouble with impunity.

The country generally has been quiet. The main difficulty in dealing with those tribes, with whom we are in direct contact, has been to prevent their tribal administration becoming disorganised. This would entail the risk of Government being compelled to act against their declared policy, and to interfere in the internal administration of the tribes, who feel the necessity of a controlling hand over them.

This is due to the character of the Pathans, restless, quarrelsome, treacherous and ready to sacrifice anything in gratification of injuring an opposing factionist. Each faction has been ready to force the hand of Government, the stronger in hopes that under Government rule their position would be maintained, and they would benefit permanently at the expense of the weaker party, the latter anxious to see the controlling hand of Government reduce the power of the stronger faction. Efforts have been made with some success to divert the thoughts of the people from their factions and feuds to improved cultivation. As the zemindars now feel some security in the possession of their lands, fruit-trees, the better classes of crops, such as sugarcane and cotton, are being grown and the sinking of wells on unirrigated land is being gradually encouraged. This is good for the people in every way, as the more valuable their holdings become, the less will individuals be tempted to indulge in feuds and factional disputes. It is a curious point to note that in this hot-bed of Muhammadan fanaticism, particularly Ranizai and Swat, there is far less respect for the Koran and Muhammadan Law than in the frontier districts of Peshawar and Kohat. In regard to their dealings with each other, the people are guided by no moral sense of right or wrong. While in British territory, it would be easy to refer to many excellent decisions by "Shariat" or Muhammadan Law of cases brought into Court, and made over to Mullas by consent of parties; there is not in this country one Mulla whose decision can be relied on as just, or who enjoys the confidence of the population. The point is one of interest. It is one that adds much to the difficulties in dealing with the people, and it leads to their bringing almost every petty case to the Political Officers in hopes of obtaining justice. Thefts in the country are few—murder is rife. Every case of murder is voluntarily reported, all classes being anxious for greater security of life. The Sam Ranizais went so far as to petition that a Government fine of Rs. 1,000 might be imposed in every case of murder. The only step that can be taken in such cases is to assist in bringing about a settlement according to Pathan custom to prevent, if possible, continuance of feuds.

The Malakand garrison has formed a market for local supplies of fodder, grain, &c., and is a source of great benefit to the people.

The Civil Dispensary has been a great boon to the country—over 7,000 individuals having been treated by Surgeon-Lieutenant Sutherland, who has done excellent work. There is room for another dispensary at Dir, where a Hospital Assistant would be able to work under the supervision of the Senior Medical Officer, Chitral. It is interesting to note that many of the patients are of the fanatical priestly classes.

The first Reliefs of the Chitral Garrison have been successfully carried out. The work has been a thorough test of the arrangements sanctioned by Government for maintaining communications with Chitral *via* Dir.



Fodder and grain for animals and fuel were arranged for at each stage through the Khan of Dir. Rice and ghi were locally purchased and stocked at the different stages with other supplies, which were forwarded ahead of the troops to enable transport with the column to be reduced as much as possible. Heavy baggage was also forwarded independently of the troops, and such supplies as are being sent from India for the Chitral garrison are now on the road. Endeavours are being made for supplies of wheat, barley and rice to be delivered in Chitral from Bajaur and Swat, and if the arrangements made be successful, a very considerable saving to Government will be effected. The main difficulty connected with this question is that the Bajauris and Swatis have hitherto adhered to the custom of storing their grain until the winter when prices are as a rule at their highest, and Kuchis and other traders then export it to Peshawar and Jalalabad. There is a feeling of dislike to changing the former custom.

The starting of the Reliefs from Chakdarra was delayed for five days, owing to the road and bridges above Dir having been carried away by heavy rain and floods, and portions of the road along the Panjkora river at the mouths of the Tormung and Kharmung valleys were also washed away. The Khan employed some 4,000 men on the line to repair the damage done and to rebuild the bridges. The work was well done and the Khan brought forward the tribesmen for payment on my arrival at Dir.

The reliefs started from Chakdarra on the 7th May, arriving at Dir on the 12th. The relieved troops assembled at Dir on the 24th May, and after one day's halt moved towards India, arriving at Chakdarra on the 31st May.

Tribal arrangements were made for protecting the line of march and the camps. The leading men of Jandol took part in the general arrangements, and effectually guarded the passes from Mamunds and Salarzai country to prevent fanatics from that direction from approaching the line of march. Two parties of fanatics, who attempted to cross from the Asmar direction on to the road above Dir, and below Dir to the Chutiatan bridge, were turned back by Dir tribesmen. Another party from Upper Swat were stopped at the head of the Anshiri valley in the same manner by Painsa Khels, and a small party that eluded the vigilance of tribal picquets on the Utman Khel side of the river were stopped by levies and tribesmen at the bridge over the Panjkora. These are good instances of hearty assistance given by the tribes, for however well disposed a tribe in itself may be, it is exceedingly difficult to prevent individual cases of fanaticism, or in a mountainous country like that traversed to prevent small bodies of men intent on mischief from finding an opportunity of making themselves obnoxious. The action of the tribesmen is the most satisfactory evidence that Government could receive of the friendly feeling of the tribes on the line of communication. The few instances of men attempting to come on to the line must not be regarded as due to any tribal hostility to Government.

There are always unruly characters within our border and amongst all the border tribes whom the communities are unable to control.

The two classes to guard against were those from the Asmar side, who might be impelled by fanatical hatred and instigation to attempt to make an attack on the line, and those who might be tempted to do the same in an endeavour to bring the Khan of Dir into disfavour with Government.

If the arrangements made for supplying wheat and barley (the rice required has already been purchased and despatched), should fail, it will be necessary to send the grain from India. It will be known by the 1st July whether the necessary quantities can be obtained. I do not anticipate that the arrangements will fail, but it is necessary to be prepared for the contingency of their doing so.

A somewhat unexpected difficulty has arisen with regard to the supply of meat in Chitral. The Gujars in and near Chitral and about Dir have sold most of the goats and sheep that they can afford to part with. The animals are of value to them for their milk, hair and wool. To meet this difficulty the experiment is now being made of sending up goats and sheep from Swat and the neighbourhood, men being induced to take them up as a speculation.



Relations with the Utman Khels, Jandol, Nawagai on the one side are satisfactory, with Upper Swat they are peaceful. The leading men of Upper Swat lately endeavoured to come together with a view to visiting me, but their own factional feuds, which prevent their coming together, have so far stood in the way of their doing so. The Mianguls, the descendants of the Akhund of Swat, not only sent a responsible member of their family, their uncle, to visit me, but addressed a letter to me on the subject. Hitherto I have taken no steps to induce the jirgas to come in, but if permission were given for individual jirgas of tribal sub-divisions to come in, they would all come separately. I think it, however, an open question as to what is best in Government interests in the matter. I incline to the view that it is more favourable to Government interests for an attitude of indifference to be preserved, for the tribes dare take no hostile steps against Government, nor do any sections of the tribe desire to do so. To deliberately work for the whole jirga to come in would probably mean that the priestly influence would have to be employed. The advantage in this might be that the Mianguls would lose further power outside tribal limits—they have lost heavily already by being ignored, and the disadvantage of now dealing with them would possibly be greater in increasing the influence of that party to a dangerous extent within Yusufzai limits. The Mianguls, however, are fully alive to the personal benefit to them of the presence of troops on the Malakand, which is a check on the spread of the influence in Swat of the Manki Mulla, who, though nominally a follower of the Akhund of Swat, lately tried to assume the position of rival to the family for power. Upper Swat can be so easily dealt with in various ways politically that, so long as they give no trouble, it seems best to leave the feeling which is undoubtedly extending in favour of Government to bring about the natural result quietly. An interview with a complete tribal jirga would then have a good permanent effect.

The Political Assistants, Mr. W. S. Davis and Sardar Sultan Ibrahim, have worked well and given me every assistance. Mr. Davis has succeeded in obtaining the confidence of the people.

---

Enclosure 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Officer for Dir and Swat, Simla, the 9th July 1896.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your report on the initial and experimental stage of maintaining communication with Chitral by

Dated the 14th June 1896.  
the Malakand and Dir. This stage has ended with the completion of the relief of the garrison originally posted in Chitral.

2. The Governor-General in Council has read the report with much interest. Since the breaking up of the Chitral Relief Force on the 27th September 1895, there has been no disturbance directed against Government among the tribes along the Dir route; the mails have been carried with great regularity; and a general and unprecedented feeling of security appears to prevail in the country. You also report that our relations with the tribes are satisfactory, and the relief of the Chitral garrison has been carried out not only without opposition, but with the active assistance of the tribes themselves, who repaired the road for the troops between Chakdarra and the Lowarai Pass, and successfully prevented fanatics from approaching the line of march.

3. The Governor-General in Council congratulates you on these results which, he considers, are mainly due to the tact and judgment you have displayed in dealing with the Khans and tribesmen concerned. I am to enclose a copy of

a letter from the Quartermaster-General in India,\* expressing His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of your excellent arrangements for the journey of the troops between Malakand and Chitral.

\*Dated the 12th June 1896.

## Sub-enclosure.

*Letter from the Quartermaster-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Simla, the 12th June 1896.*

In forwarding the annexed copy of a communication received from the General Officer Commanding, Malakand Brigade, regarding the movements of the Chitral Relieved Force, I am desirous to convey His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the excellent arrangements made by Major Deane for the journey of the troops between Malakand and Chitral.

2. His Excellency also considers that the help rendered by the Khan of Dir greatly facilitated the carrying out of the reliefs.

## Annexure.

*Letter from the General Officer Commanding, Malakand Brigade, to the Quartermaster-General in India, dated 1st June 1896.*

In continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to report the arrival of the Chitral Relieved Garrison yesterday at Chakdarra.

The route onward from South Malakand will be as follows :—

		South Malakand	Jalala.	Mardan.	Nowshera.
		June.			
2/3rd Gurkhas ... ..	Arrive	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
25th Punjab Infantry ... ..	"	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Section No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery.	}	4th	5th	6th	7th
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.					
No. 19 Field Hospital ... ..					

I have the honour also to forward copy of a telegram to me from the Officer Commanding the Chitral Troops, and in doing so to state that I most fully concur with Colonel Hutchinson in considering the arrangements made by Major Deane to have been most excellent, as the results have shown.

*From the Officer Commanding, Chitral Relieved Troops, Chakdarra, to the General Officer Commanding, Malakand.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The Relieved Chitral Troops arrived here to-day ; all well ; the health of the troops is good ; the arrangements made by Political Officer, Major Deane, have been so complete and far-seeing that there has been no hitch or difficulty of any kind ; the road is in good order throughout, requiring only small repairs in a few places ; the weather has been pleasant up to date and the nights quite cool.

## No. 2.

*Despatch from the Secretary of State, to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 27th August 1896.*

MY LORD,

I have considered in Council the letter from your Excellency's Government, dated 14th July 1896, forwarding a copy of a report by Major H. A. Deane, Political Officer for Dir and Swat, on the maintenance of the Dir road during the last nine months, and on the recent relief of the Chitral garrison by that route.

2. I have read this report with much satisfaction, and I concur in the commendation bestowed by your Excellency's Government on the tact and judgment displayed by Major Deane in his dealings with the tribesmen, and on the excellence of his arrangements in connection with the reliefs to and from Chitral.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 3.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 25th August 1896. (Received 12th September 1896.)*

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a note\* by Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Officer for Dir and Swat, on the future arrangements

\* Dated the 13th June 1896.

for the maintenance of the Malakand-Dir-Chitral road.

2. We consider it due to an officer in Major Deane's responsible position that his views should not be withheld, but we are unable to approve the proposal to advance the flying column into the Adinzai valley, as this would entail a departure from our declared policy of maintaining and securing the road from Peshawar to Chitral by arrangements with the tribes. At the same time, we are of opinion that it should shortly be possible to reduce the force on the Malakand by a battalion of native infantry and a company of Sappers and Miners, and we shall probably be prepared to adopt this measure early next year on Major Deane's return from the privilege leave which we propose to grant him in the coming autumn. The force that would be left on the Malakand and at Chakdarra would consist of two regiments of native infantry, a battery of artillery and one squadron of cavalry.

3. A copy of our Foreign Secretary's letter to Major Deane is enclosed.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed)

ELGIN.  
G. S. WHITE.  
J. WESTLAND.  
J. WOODBURN.  
M. D. CHALMERS.  
E. H. H. COLLEN.  
A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

*Extract from Note by Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., on the Malakand-Dir-Chitral Road, dated 13th June 1896.*

THE question as to the future arrangements for maintaining this road will presumably come before Government for consideration shortly—now that what has been described as the initial and experimental stage is practically completed by the carrying out of the Chitral reliefs.

Peace and order have been maintained hitherto all along the line. There are difficulties, of course, in the work; there is also the anxiety due to the Dir Khan's character.

In carrying out the necessary arrangements for the reliefs, whether for supplies, repair to roads and bridges, protection of the line of march and camps, I have been compelled to see the work done by my own men, putting them, if not myself, in an invidious position.



Even on such a small point as supplies at the different posts, notwithstanding money having been paid in advance, and constant reminders on the subject given to the Khan, we found at many places bad fodder, and at Dir itself grain absolutely unfit to give to the transport animals.

These are minor points. But they are a warning as to what we may expect at any time.

The Khan is at present on bad terms with his brother, Sher Muhammad. His relations with other brothers and Khans are not satisfactory, nor is his position with the Paindeh Khel clan and the Khel Akhundzadas on a good footing. His people generally, and in particular those in the Talash and Adinzai valleys, are a good deal oppressed by his agents, and appeal in vain to him.

The feeling of the tribes towards Government is, in my opinion, satisfactory, far more so than might have been hoped to be the case. There is no present danger that I can see of any hostile feeling arising against Government from dislike to Government—the risk lies in the Khan alienating men whom he ought to keep with him, and of these eventually forming a strong faction against him in his own country. It is only one step from this to some hostile act committed against Government in order to lead Government into breaking the Khan.

The people themselves are somewhat impracticable—they often tax one's ingenuity to keep things working smoothly, and to avoid disturbance.

The elements of trouble exist, but I wish to avoid giving them undue importance. So long as they are recognised there is a chance of their being quietly dealt with. It is the unexpected which mostly upsets our calculations. To maintain this line in a satisfactory manner, the point that must be steadily kept before the Khan and the tribes, is the strength of Government. Neither the one nor the other must be allowed to imagine that they are doing Government a favour. They must feel that it is Government who does them favours, it only is not acting on the only principle these people recognise that might is right, in not annexing their territories. They must also feel that for the continuation of such favours it is for them to conciliate Government. The affections of the Pathan are not to be relied on, though I have known the action of a tribe influenced by them. Nothing will induce a Pathan to give trouble more surely than allowing him to think one is anxious to conciliate him.

Experience of the working during the last eight months has convinced me that the Malakand is too far from Dir for certainty of control over Dir. This could only be remedied by moving the troops now forming the flying column nearer Dir to the open country in the Adinzai valley at the foot of the Laram. This, with the occupation of the Laram during the summer, would dominate the whole country, exercising a powerful influence on Bajaur, the Panjkora clans, and Dir and Upper Swat.

If such a move were made it would be necessary to manage the Talash and Adinzai valleys for the Khan. The move would be popular with the people, except probably on the point that we should have to take up land and water for the troops; the Khan would not be difficult to arrange with.

The advantages to Government would be in the move making the scheme for maintaining this road a thoroughly sound one, and in reducing the chances of future trouble to a minimum. It would enable Government to reduce the garrison at Chitral by one regiment, which would effect a great saving in expenses.

There is no internal danger to be apprehended in Chitral. A regiment and two guns would suffice for the purposes of an outpost, and Pathans could not attempt to move against Chitral with our troops within three forced marches of Dir.

If Government absolutely reject the idea of a forward move, either now or in the near future, unless driven to it by circumstances, I am inclined to

recommend that it will be better to start on the opposite line as soon as possible, viz., that of reducing the Malakand Brigade. In giving my views as Political Officer as to the strength of the Brigade which should remain in Swat, I based my opinion on the necessity for pressure on the line ahead of Chakdarra. Government may, according to the best of my judgment, feel assured as to the attitude of the tribes now—trouble if it comes will probably be through mismanagement on the part of the Khan of Dir, and I do not think the presence of extra troops at the Malakand will materially affect the situation. I am speaking now after the experience gained in connection with the late reliefs.

If Government decide to reduce the Malakand Brigade, I recommend the definite line of policy being taken and the Brigade being broken up on the 1st October next—that is, those forming the present moveable column with exception of the cavalry.

Since writing this I find that apparently Malakand fort can accommodate only four companies, and Chakdara two companies. To avoid overcrowding the Durgai post might be kept up for the present. It is a safe position.

A commencement may be made at once in altering existing arrangements by withdrawing the Durgai post.

I venture to suggest that the question of guns in the Malakand fort be considered. I am under the impression that the present guns cannot be depressed, so as to be worked in any downward direction. This, however, is a purely military question.

I would ask for a full squadron of cavalry (I should prefer two) to be maintained for some time longer. I think this necessary for the maintenance of order.

Something must be done to strengthen existing arrangements with the levies. A good active man of experience and tact who can give his time to keeping the Dir levies up to the mark is absolutely necessary. He would also work as a general assistant. The present Native assistant, Sardar Sultan Ibrahim, is too old for the work, though he has valuable experience and knowledge. Ahmad Mian, Officiating Extra Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, is the best man I can name for the post.

A good man is also required for the Ranizai and Swat levies. If the change be made, these levies should be given Sniders. The locally enlisted Jemadars from one end of the line to the other are with one exception failures. I could get a man of the stamp required for Rs. 150 or Rs. 200 a month.

Ahmad Mian now draws Rs. 250. His pay might be fixed at Rs. 400 and travelling allowance.

A local officer has to bear in mind that regiments once withdrawn are not easy to get again. I cannot undertake to assure Government that matters will continue to work quietly. But the present aspect is as good as it can be—far better than we had any reason to hope it would be. My view is that, if Government will not have a forward move, it is better to take the opposite line now, on the ground that there is no general feeling of hostility against Government, and that the breakdown of present arrangements, so far as can possibly be judged, will, if it occur, be due to some minor point, developing into a big one and upsetting our calculations.

A point that I have omitted from the above, but which is an important one, is that the Political Officer here *must* maintain such hold and influence over Jandol, Utman Khels, &c., as he can. If these people once realise that they are free to do as they like, and the Khan of Dir once takes the same idea, the arrangements for keeping the road open will not remain undisturbed for a fortnight, and complications will arise which will force themselves on Government notice. The Political Officer on his part must be careful not to commit Government in his actions.



## Enclosure 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Officer for Dir and Swat, dated Simla, 20th August 1896.*

THE Government of India have had under consideration your note, dated the 13th of June 1896, on the future arrangements for the maintenance of the Malakand-Dir-Chitral road.

2. You are of opinion that, if the Government of India desire to extend their influence, and obtain a stronger hold over the country than they now possess, so as to ensure the certainty of control over Dir and the neighbouring tribes, the troops forming the flying column should be moved nearer Dir, to the open country in the Adinzai valley at the foot of the Laram, the Laram itself being occupied during the summer. Such a measure would, you consider, dominate the whole country, and exercise a powerful influence on Bajaur, the Panjkora clans, and on Dir and Upper Swat. If the Government of India reject the idea of making this forward move, either now or in the near future, you recommend that the Malakand Brigade should be broken up, and that the present moveable column should be withdrawn. This would leave one regiment to hold the posts at Durgai, Malakand, and Chakdarra, and you suggest that a squadron of cavalry, if not two, should also be maintained at the Malakand for some time longer.

3. The Governor-General in Council is unable to approve of the proposal to advance the troops into the Adinzai valley. This would involve not only a move forward, but also, as you point out, the direct management of the Adinzai and Talash valleys, which form part of the territories of the Khan of Dir. Even if you are right in your opinion that such a measure might be popular with the people, it would be a departure from the declared policy of Government, of maintaining and securing the road from Peshawar to Chitral by arrangements with the tribes, and it cannot be entertained. The arrangements for keeping open the road have now been subject to the test of a year's experience; and, whatever their defects, they have secured the maintenance of order throughout the district, the quiet passage of troops to and from Chitral, and the regular and uninterrupted transit of the mails. They were sanctioned for the one purpose of keeping open direct communications with Chitral, and from this point of view the results achieved must be regarded as very satisfactory. It is not intended or desired to preclude you from exercising in Dir, Jandol, Nawagai and Swat, or among the neighbouring tribes, the personal influence, which you have acquired, whenever you think you can do so successfully, in keeping the peace or in settling tribal disputes, but the Government of India entirely agree with you that in Government interests the more that Government can keep out of this country, compatible with the maintenance of communications with Chitral, the better.

4. I am also to say that it is not considered desirable to reduce the Malakand garrison to the extent which you are understood to recommend. The Government of India agree with you that, in order to keep the road open in a suitable manner, evidence of our strength must be steadily kept before the Khan of Dir and the tribes. It is consequently of much importance not to risk the success of the policy hitherto followed by a premature withdrawal or by too great a reduction in the number of the troops. On the other hand, the forces at the Malakand have behind them the garrison at Mardan, while more troops could easily be moved up at short notice from Nowshera and other stations in the Punjab; and, in consideration of the support which could thus be rapidly given, the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that it should shortly be possible to withdraw from the Malakand one battalion of Native Infantry and one company of Sappers and Miners. No change will, however, be made until after your return from the privilege leave which you propose to take during the coming autumn; and no reduction beyond that indicated is considered desirable at present.



No. 4.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 7th July 1897. (Received 26th July 1897.)*

MY LORD,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch dated the 27th August 1896

\* Dated the 9th June 1897.

we have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, a report\*

by Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral, on the maintenance of communications with Chitral through Dir and Swat, and on our relations with the neighbouring chiefs and tribes during the last twelve months.

2. The report is again an excellent record of progress, and much credit is due to Major Deane for his management of his important charge. A copy of our

† Dated the 3rd July 1897.

Foreign Secretary's letter† acknowledging the report is enclosed.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)

ELGIN.

G. S. WHITE.

J. WESTLAND.

J. WOODBURN.

M. D. CHALMERS.

E. H. H. COLLEN.

A. C. TREVOR.

#### Enclosure 1.

*Extract from letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 9th June 1897.*

In continuation of my report of the 14th June 1896, I have the honour to submit the following report on the work of maintaining the Chitral communications through Swat and Dir since that date.

It was mentioned in the report above referred to that endeavours were being made to supply the Chitral garrison with grain from Swat and Bajaur. The grain required was obtained and delivered at Drosh at a considerable saving to Government as compared with the expense of forwarding the grain from India. Roughly speaking, the saving amounted to Rs. 80,000.

One of the main difficulties in connection with this supply of grain was the action of Mullas who endeavoured to dissuade the people from selling to the "Infidels." This was met by pressure being put on to the local chiefs and headmen to suppress the Mullas, which it was satisfactory to find that they succeeded in so doing. For the present year similar arrangements have been made with a further saving to Government of Rs. 25,000. It remains to be seen whether the supply required can be obtained without loss to the men who have undertaken the work, prices at present being very high owing to the famine in India.

On the 27th October 1896 I proceeded on three months' leave, Mr. W. S. Davis, Assistant Political Agent, remaining in charge. Mr. Davis deserves credit for the manner in which he carried on the work successfully. The principal risk of trouble was that some of the chiefs and tribes would take advantage of the change of Political Officer in charge. Advantage indeed was so taken by the Khan of Nawagai, who, in response to instigation and intrigues, attacked the Khan of Pashat. The Khan, however, stopped fighting when Government authorised his being directed to do so, but retained possession of a small group of villages known as Dageh. The direct object of the Khan of Nawagai was to assert his position as leading chief in Bajaur against the Pashat Khan, who regarded himself as an independent chief. The object of those who instigated the attack was to create a disturbance which it was hoped would spread throughout the country to

the Panjkora line, thus rendering Government interference necessary to restore order. This was averted by the Khan of Dir and the Jandol Chief's obeying the instructions sent them by Mr. Davis to keep aloof from the matter. Affairs between Nawagai and Pashat have been since settled under our advice. The immediate result of the disturbance has been other than that contemplated by its originator. It has brought us into more direct and more satisfactory relations with the Khan of Nawagai. A similar result has been brought about by the late occupation of Mitai by Afghan khassadars. The final withdrawal of these khassadars on the 23rd March last in accordance with Government demand has had a good effect on Bajaur generally.

The intrigues on the border, the constant working through the Adda Mulla in Bajaur and the Mianguls in Upper Swat to arouse fanaticism has the one object: to embarrass Government by creating disturbances, which would entail the movement of troops against and the shedding of blood of those who are at present working for Government. The desire is perhaps a natural one, for, as matters stand at present, Government have obtained a result in this "hornet's nest" which has probably hitherto not been contemplated. The fact of the tribes being left in enjoyment of their lands revenue free, a privilege which, notwithstanding the proclamation before the expedition, they did not expect to be granted owing to their not having fulfilled their share of the conditions of that proclamation, and the policy of not interfering with them except in so far as necessary to prevent disturbances, has created great confidence towards Government which would enable us at the present time to raise an irregular force of 15,000 to 20,000 men, whom nothing would please better than to receive orders to perform service. This is a very important change in the attitude of the tribes to that of veiled hostility, and in Government interests it is a power, unfortunately more easily lost than maintained, which it should be our aim to consolidate by maintaining and strengthening the confidence of the tribes and of their leaders in Government by keeping them as far as possible quietly working for Government, which induces them, and has already greatly led them, to place the Mullas and fanatical leaders in the background, and to regard themselves as allies of Government. Above all, it is necessary, if possible, while keeping the strength of Government before them, to avoid our being led into complications which would entail the employment of our troops against them. I do not now think it too sanguine to hope that these fanatical tribes may be converted into a powerful frontier defence. And I say this, while daily experiencing the tax on mind and ingenuity to keep matters working smoothly and to combat the unceasing effort made to arouse fanaticism against us. But I regard each such unsuccessful effort as a weakening of the power of those against us, and as a strengthening of our own hands, so long as we do not allow it to force us into hasty action.

During the past year there has been no sign of tribal hostility to Government. The following is the record of offences committed by individuals against Government during the year:—

1. *10th September 1896.*—Chowkidar killed at Dargai and gun stolen at Dargai.
2. *8th October 1896.*—Syce killed at north Malakand.
3. *3rd November 1896.*—Sentry wounded at north Malakand (attempt to steal his rifle).
4. *9th December 1896.*—Small pox patient at Malakand stabbed.

The record speaks for itself. Cases Nos. 2 and 4 are the only cases distinctly traceable to fanaticism.

Those who were most difficult and troublesome to deal with during the first year of working, viz., the Sam Ranizais, who were with difficulty prevented from forcing on direct annexation by misbehaviour and factional disputes, are now most exemplary in their behaviour. A firm system of village and tribal community has been established—an excellent form of local self-Government and the backbone of frontier working—the factions have been suppressed, and there appears in their stead an honest desire to maintain peace and order. We can only hope that it will continue.

In the Upper Ranizai and Swat country the people generally have settled down on the same lines.



The Khan of Dir has generally treated his people well, and instead of constant complaints against him, as at first, his present relations with his tribes appear satisfactory. He himself appears more civilised and much more alive to his real interests than formerly. The levies have on the whole performed their duties exceedingly well, infinitely better than I expected them to do.

The civil dispensary continued to do good work up till 31st January 1897, when unfortunately Surgeon-Lieutenant D. W. Sutherland, Indian Medical Service, was compelled by ill-health, due to the poisonous atmosphere of Chakdarra, to proceed on sick leave. A European Medical Officer being then unavailable for some time the dispensary was left in charge of an hospital assistant. During such period the attendance practically ceased, as patients finding no European Officer in charge would not stay for treatment. Both Chitralis and Pathans have the same feeling on this subject. Surgeon-Captain Hugo lately assumed charge and the attendance is again brisk. The Khan of Dir generously came forward with an offer of Rs. 5,000 for the building of a dispensary in honour of the visit of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir D. Fitzpatrick. The dispensary has been built at Chakdarra.

The annual relief of the Chitral garrison has been carried out successfully. The troops left Chakdarra on the 2nd May, the relieved troops on their return reaching the same place on the 25th May 1897. Arrangements generally were similar to those made last year. The experience gained last year enabled commissariat arrangements to be carried out better, and mules and donkeys have taken the place of bullocks for carrying of baggage. From the date of start to day of return there was no trouble in regard to the tribes, and against the attempts made by bodies of fanatics last year to break in on to our line I am glad to report that this year there was no such attempt. The Khan of Nawagai took a good part on this occasion in assisting to maintain order and to keep in check Mamunds and others who might have been disposed to give trouble.

The road over the Lowari was somewhat troublesome owing to the unusually heavy fall of snow during the winter, but work done by the 25th Gurkhas on the Chitral side and by Dir men on this side enabled the troops to cross. I have considered the question whether it might not be better in future to have reliefs in the autumn thus avoiding the snow, but I think the unhealthy condition of the valleys, between Malakand and Chitral, is of itself sufficient reason to dispose of the question.

I have reported separately to you the efforts made through the Adda Mulla, the Mianguls in Swat and the Palam Mulla at the head of the Aushiri valley to stir up fanaticism on the Panjkora line. The Khan of Dir intends to assert himself against the fanatical party lying on his flank in Upper Swat. It will probably be necessary to control his movements to ensure that such action as he takes results in the furthering of Government interests and not only his personal views. Government interests in this case would be the bringing in of Upper Swat (all true Yusafzais) in to harmony with the other Yusafzai clans, working together in the interests of peace. The Pathan element in Upper Swat are, I believe, genuinely desirous that the Khan of Dir should assist them to settle the country on peaceful lines in lieu of the constant factional fighting which is at present ruining them and which is mostly fomented up by wandering Skeikhs in their usual love of mischief and disturbance. The Khan will work on the ground of the faction in his favour at present being strong, taking up the position that his father held before him, and if he succeeds in breaking up the present combination of the Adda Mulla, the Mianguls and the Palam Mulla by alienating Upper Swat from that combination, it will be a distinct advantage, though so far as Government is concerned there is no immediate urgency. But the messages circulated throughout this country that the "last times have come" (Akhir Wakht raghe), the fact that in connection therewith the Khan of Dir has himself been sounded as to the line he would follow in event of a general rising of Muhammadans, and the Amir's late publication of a book on "Jehad," point to efforts against Government on which any check, especially one brought by Muhammadans themselves, may be viewed with satisfaction. The effects of the Khan of Dir's movement, if successful, may be expected eventually to be greater in Government interests than in his own.



On the 1st March 1897, in accordance with Government orders, I took over charge of Chitral, which has now been added to this Agency. On the occasion of visiting Chitral with the relief column I went carefully into the question of administration of Chitral with Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon, D.S.O., Assistant Political Agent. Lieutenant Gurdon brought to my notice certain facts which plainly showed that matters were not entirely on such footing as Government could desire. The Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk, presuming on the independent position which Government have given him, had collected about himself men notoriously hostile in their feelings to Government, two of them being leaders who had taken part in the Reshun and Koragh defile massacres. I ordered these men and one other to go to their homes at once, and in future not to visit him without the permission of the Assistant Political Agent. This was necessary, as the Mehtar has secretly done his best to discourage men from visiting the Assistant Political Agent. He has ignored the advisers appointed by Government to assist him except when absolutely driven to take notice of them by the Assistant Political Agent, and altogether his attitude was such that a continuance of it could only compel Government in the course of two or three years to depose him. He seemed swamped with a false idea of his own importance; and I think a little education, and later a visit to India for a time, would do him good; Lieutenant Gurdon strongly recommends the latter course. The Mehtar further seemed blind to the fact that he was gathering about him men most likely to be interested in bringing his career to an untimely end.

From what I can judge the so-called unpopularity of Government with Adamzadas and others, encouraged by this foolish behaviour on the part of the Mehtar, is a feeling of no real importance or account, and it will vanish before firm dealing and honest working with us by the Mehtar. The Chitrali is, compared with a Pathan, easy to deal with and control, and as the Mehtar has, after a fair trial, shown that he is incapable at present of working properly without being directly supervised in his action, I have instructed Lieutenant Gurdon, who is a good and capable officer, to control him absolutely in so far as seeing that no disloyalty or disaffection towards Government is permitted, and that the Mehtar studies the welfare of his subjects and does not collect about himself men who will not advise him properly, for on such points guidance and interference is absolutely necessary to prevent a boy in the Mehtar's position from ruining himself. Lieutenant Gurdon already informs me that a notable change for the better has taken place. Lieutenant Gurdon realised the points which I have mentioned, and, knowing that I should visit Chitral, has kept things going until he could feel sure as to the line of working which I should recommend after personal discussion with him, and after seeing things for myself. It is fortunate that he is remaining at present in Chitral as he knows the people and the country thoroughly and holds the confidence of the people generally.

The allowance that the Mehtar receives from Government is a large one, and, for the present, I have desired Lieutenant Gurdon not to pay it to him in a lump sum as has hitherto been done but to pay him by monthly instalments and to encourage the Mehtar and his advisers to spend some of it in productive irrigation works, which can be done with advantage, and to the improvement of the Mehtar's revenue. I have also directed the Mehtar and his advisers to attend regularly with Lieutenant Gurdon for the settlement of land cases and redressing of grievances generally throughout the country. Lieutenant Gurdon informs me that a fair start on these lines has now been made. Lieutenant Gurdon's time has been taken up with trying to reduce the present state of chaos to order, and it will be useful employment for the Mehtar to set with his advisers to learn to do his proper share of work in putting things straight. It will any way give him less time for listening to evil advice. I am inclined to think that his mother, who is an Asmari, has had much to say in misleading him, and I sent her a message warning her of the probable effects on her son of his listening to ill-advisers.

The post has worked throughout the year with the greatest regularity. Before proceeding on leave in October last, I effected a change in handing over the mails to the Chitral runners on the Lowari instead of at Ashreth as formerly.

This arrangement has worked well. It was made in anticipation of the announcement of the Government decision on the question of the boundary between Chitral and Dir. The Government orders on the subject were intimated to the parties concerned on my return from leave at the end of January 1897. The decision though perfectly just was disappointing to the Khan of Dir, as I was prepared to find, but he has accepted it without attempting to re-raise the question in any form through local quarrels between his men and those on the other side of the line.

Trade has been brisk during the year, the value of imports and exports being 64½ lakhs.

I will conclude this by saying that in the whole of the working of this line the spirit of the Government instructions is kept steadily in view, and interference with the chiefs and tribes is restricted to such extent as is necessary to ensure the declared policy of Government being successful, to prevent the tribes forcing Government into complications with them which would frustrate the ends that Government have in view, and to avoid, if possible, further military expeditions in the country. The position with Nawagai, the Utman Khels and other clans off the direct line of communications (not taking into account individual fanatics) is growing into an alliance which coupled with that of the Panjkora clans may prove of great value to Government. It is useless to be sanguine in such matters, but the present position is, far stronger than, with my knowledge of the Pathan tribes, I ever contemplated that it could become.

I have had the heartiest assistance in my work from Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Agent in Chitral, and Mr. W. S. Davis, Assistant Political Agent, Malakand, both of them thoroughly good officers. Ahmad Mian, Extra Assistant Commissioner, appointed *vice* Sardar Sultan Ibrahim, Khan Bahadur, has done good work at Dir. Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, reports well on the working of Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim and Khan Sahib Pir Baksh, Hospital Assistant at Mastuj, and of non-officials, Mian Rahim Shah and Abdul Hamid Khan deserve the highest praise for services rendered to Government.

---

#### Enclosure 2.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, dated Simla, 3rd July 1897.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 9th June 1897, submitting a report on the maintenance of communications with Chitral through Dir and Swat, and on your relations with the neighbouring Chiefs and tribes, during the past twelve months.

2. The report is an excellent record of satisfactory progress and has been read with interest. With regard to your observations on the position assumed by the Mehtar of Chitral, I am to point out that in paragraph 4 of the letter\*

conveying the instructions given to  
Sir G. Robertson on the occasion of

\* Dated the 17th August 1895.  
the Mehtar's installation, it was clearly indicated that during his minority the government of the country was to be conducted by the three persons named subject to the general control of the Assistant Political Agent, and not by the Mehtar himself. This entirely justifies your interference, and the arrangements you have now made are approved.

3. I have already conveyed to you His Excellency the Viceroy's congratulations on the successful completion of the Chitral reliefs, and it only remains to add the appreciation of the Government of India of the good work done by Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon, D.S.O., Mr. W. S. Davis, Surgeon-Lieutenant D. W. Sutherland, Ahmad Mian and the other officials mentioned in the last paragraph of your report.

---



## No. 5.

*Extract from letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 14th July 1897. (Received 3rd August 1897.)*

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter\* from the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, reporting

Dated 9th May 1897.

that persistent efforts have been, and are being, made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism in Bajaur, Dir and Swat territory against the Government of India.

We also enclose correspondence received from the Punjab Government regarding the proceedings of agents, and others posing as such, among the Orakzai and Khyber Afridis. So far as we are aware, the efforts of these people have not met with much success.

---

Enclosure No. 1.

*Extract from Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd September 1896.*

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an endorsement from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and of its enclosure, regarding the efforts of Mulla Gulandaz to persuade a representative jirga of Alisherzai and Mamuzai Afridis to attend upon His Highness the Amir in obedience to a written summons brought from Kabul by the Mulla.

---

Enclosure 2.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 26th December 1896.*

I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 16th December 1896, from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and of its enclosures, and to say that His Honour considers that there is nothing strange in one of Wali Muhammad's sons taking service under the Amir. These Afridis look for service under him as well as under us. The brother of Amir Khan, Kuki Khel, holds a high post under the Amir and, as mentioned by Colonel Warburton, Khawas Khan, the rival of Wali Muhammad, who perhaps, as he owns property in Peshawar, is more tied to us than any other leading Afridi, has two sons in the Amir's service. Neither does His Honour think that there is anything unusual in the Amir communicating with Pirs or holy men among the Afridis, but as Colonel Warburton, who is well acquainted with the ways of these people, thinks there may be something significant in what has occurred, the Lieutenant-Governor desires me to send on the papers to the Government of India for information.

---

Enclosure 3.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 10th April 1897.*

In continuation of Mr. Fanshawe's letter dated 10th September 1896, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, dated 27th March 1897, and enclosures, on the subject of the operations of Mulla Gulandaz among the Massuzais and Alisherzais, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor agrees with Mr. Merk as to the proper way of treating the movements of this Mulla.



## Sub-Enclosure.

*Extract from Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp, 27th March 1897.*

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my office endorsement, dated the first September 1896, to your address, I have the honour to enclose a copy of correspondence on the subject of the operations of Mulla Gulandaz.

This man is by birth a Kambar Khel Afridi, and is of humble origin. He has no local or tribal influence in his clan or home, and is making desperate efforts to achieve social and political distinction and power. Our best course is to appear to ignore him altogether, and to seem to take not the slightest notice of him, and his doings, his movements, and those of his friends and adherents. Neglect and indifference are the surest means for killing the kind of ambition that fires Mulla Gulandaz and for making ridiculous any movement attempted to be set on foot by him. At the same time we ought quietly to be on the watch; and should any clan misbehave in consequence of his exhortations, it would have to be punished not for following the Mulla's counsel, but for doing an injury to us. I would not recommend even speaking to jirgas about him, but would treat the man with absolute outward indifference. Nor would I recommend that the Political Officer of the Khyber be asked to put pressure on the Kambar Khel, as proposed by the officer on special duty. To begin with, a semi-religious agitation like this, whatever may be the professions or real wishes of the Kambar Khel, they have not the power to control Mulla Gulandaz; and, secondly, anything like action from our side directed against him, will instantly give him what he wants, the opportunity for posing as a martyr, and the fame (which he is yearning for) of being an acknowledged open enemy of the British Government, with whom it has entered into a struggle. As for the Maliks who go to him, I would let them go. It does not matter to us what they do and where they travel in the quest of lungis and "kharch," so long as they keep the peace and do what we want. If, however, they act in a hostile manner to us, that is another matter; and there is, I suggest, no harm, but, on the contrary, great advantage in warning a clan which appears to be restless, of the danger involved in misconduct, without referring to the inflammatory agitation which has induced uneasiness.

I should not have troubled Government with this lengthy letter, but for the fact that an obscure and ambitious individual is striving to obtain the position of a Mulla Powinda, or a Syud Akber Mulla, or Mulla of Hadda, and that nothing is gained by playing into his hands, especially at a moment when the abandonment of the Indo-Afghan boundary demarcation may possibly, though I do not say it will, be misunderstood by the Mohmands, Afridis and Orakzais. There will of course be some talk in the hills over it, but I have no doubt if we show perfect indifference any little excitement that may arise will die away.

## Annexure to Sub-Enclosure.

*Letter from the Officer on special duty, Kurram, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated 23rd March 1897.*

MULLA GULANDAZ KAMBAR KHEL AFRIDI,—

With reference to your endorsement, dated 1st September 1896, to Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, regarding Mulla Gulandaz's movement among the Alisherzai and Mamuzai last summer, I have the honour to report the arrival of this individual among the Massuzais, among whom he has now been agitating. He addressed the Massuzais the other day, and summoned them and the Alisherzais to a meeting to be held in Maidan, and is wandering about preaching disaffection among the Orakzais, causing considerable uneasiness among them. The original letter calling on the Massuzais and Alisherzais to meet him in Maidan was made over to me, and I herewith enclose a translation of the same. To-day a section of the Mastu Khel jirga also visited me, and when taxed with sending me a letter (translation of which is enclosed) the tone of which is quite foreign to their usual correspondence, Malik Muhammad Nur disclaimed any connection with the writing of it, and openly in jirga said that

Mulla Gulandaz had written it. Whether Mulla Gulandaz is working as an agent or not, the results of his preaching are the same, and are relied on by these ignorant hill tribes. Perhaps the Political Officer, Khaibar, may be able to give fuller information about this individual and might be able to put pressure on the Kambar Khels if he is, as he is stated to be, a member of that tribe. For my part I have done what is possible to place Gulandaz in his true character before the jirga, who, whilst not denying for a moment the nature of his visit to their country, were quite as ready to accept my view of Gulandaz as they in their own country were ready to accept his views of us, but the fact remains that considerable uneasiness has been caused by this, no doubt, self-interested agitator.

Sub-Annexure A.

*Translation of a Letter, dated 3rd Shawal 1314 (10th March 1897) from Mulla Gulandaz to the Ash Khel and Mando Khel Massuzais.*

After compliments.—The Alisherzais and Mamuzais are of one accord, and this is accordingly to ask you to start for Maidan on receipt of this letter. Make no pretence or excuse. Consider this urgent. Also send for the Khans of Tatang and bring them with you if you can. Take care to reach Maidan by next Friday.

To Said Mian, Mulla Muhabbat and Mulla Abdul Halim Akhundzada.  
Seal of Gulandaz.

Sub-Annexure B.

*Translation of a Letter, dated 19th Ramzan 1314 (22nd February 1897), from Malik Gulab Shah, Malik Sultan, Muhammad Mir Fakir, Abdulla Shan, Khwaja Mir, and other Representatives, and Grey-beards of the Massuzais Tribe, to the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram*

In 1310-H. we had made a promise to Mr. Merk, at Sadda, that he should warn his subjects to abstain from trespassing the Massuzai country, that the country lying between Darani and Topakkai belonged to us, that the Mastu Khel dues (tolls) were every year payable to us, and that we shall accordingly realise these dues and shall not commit crimes in his territory. Since then you have unjustly withdrawn these dues, and have devastated the said country as the British subjects invariably cut wood, grass, and "mazri" from, and graze their herds and flocks in, our country, while we on our part have hitherto abstained from injuring your subjects in every way; but, if the slanderers and spies have related to the contrary, their stories are not to be believed, but if in any way your subjects have been injured God knows who the culprits are.

We, up to this time, observe that promise; if you will let us have our dues well and good, and in case you withhold them unjustly, God punishes the tyrants.

We shall on no account accept the British suzerainty, but are sincerely the subjects of the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the King of Islam, whose men we have even now with us. This is therefore to tell the British Government that it should have no concern any longer with our country, and should communicate with the King of Islam about us, and have no concern with us.

Unanimously written by the Massuzais at Dogal.

NOTE.—This production bears the seal of Gulab Shah only, and was written and sent from Dogal where Mulla Gulandaz was lately.

Enclosure 4.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 29th April 1897.*

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter, dated 19th April 1897, regarding the proceedings of Mulla Gulandaz in Tirah, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a



letter and enclosures, containing a translation of a letter from Chikkai to Sardar Jahandad Khan, son of Sardar Sherindil Khan, Governor of Khost, in which Chikkai expresses his readiness to help the Amir in hostilities against the British Government. Mr. Young accepts Mr. Udny's opinion that no communication should be made to Chikkai at present, though he should be carefully watched.

---

Sub-Enclosure.

*Letter from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, dated 6th April 1897.*

In continuation of correspondence ending with this office letter dated the 23rd March 1897, I have the honour to enclose copy and translation of a letter from Chikkai to Sardar Jahandad Khan, son of Sardar Sherindil Khan, which has to-day come into my hands, and regarding the authenticity of which I have no doubts.

In two or three recent letters to Mr. Merk, I have reported that I have been watching for some time past the movements of Chikkai in the direction of Khost, and while, of course, it is impossible to hope to stop such intrigues, yet at the present juncture it is necessary to bring to the notice of Government the state of uneasiness caused by fanatical preaching which has for the past few months become most marked, and, as reported in this office letter dated the 2nd instant, is causing considerable uneasiness on this border. My own opinion is that it is best to take no definite action in such matters, and the line I have hitherto adopted was expressed in the last paragraph of my letter, dated the 23rd ultimo, but, as the movement has now become extended, it might be considered advisable to communicate with Chikkai, but this I shall not do unless I receive definite orders.

---

Annexure.

*Translation of a letter from Sarwar Khan, alias Chikkai, to Sardar Jahandad Khan, dated 1st Shawal = 6th March 1897.*

*After compliments.*—Before this, your father, my patron, had told me that I should be informed of the Amir's intention when His Highness wished to carry out a "ghaza" against the infidels, and that I should thereupon comply with the Amir's orders without hesitation. Now the sacred "firman" has reached the people of Tirah and the hill tribes, which, also, includes my name inviting all the Mutabirs and Maliks of Islam. After the snow has melted, all the Mutabirs of Tirah and the Muhammadans will (start and) attend upon His Highness, while I cannot move for fear of the English, but in case the Amir decides to carry out a "ghaza" against the infidels, I should be informed of the same ten days before his decision. God willing, I shall, with the help of God, carry out the "ghaza" without any pretext or excuse whatever, through the Mulla Sahib and the Wazirs and hill tribes.

*P.S.*—The seal of your father was not affixed to the Amir's "firman" which caused hesitation and delay on my part. I shall not fail to the slightest degree to meet with His Highness's wishes, and shall beyond all doubts attend upon him.

---

Enclosure 5.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 8th May 1897.*

In continuation of my letter, dated the 1st May 1897, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter and enclosures, reporting that the representatives of the Alisherzai Mamuzai, and Massuzai tribes who went to Kabul met with an unfavourable reception from the Amir.



## Enclosure 6.

*Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 20th May 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters forwarding a copy of correspondence regarding the proceedings of Mulla Gulandaz among the Massuzais and Alisherzais, and a letter addressed by Chikkai to Sardar Jahandad Khan, son of the Governor of Khost.

I am to express concurrence in the view that the best course in dealing with agitators like Mulla Gulandaz and Chikkai is to appear to ignore them. At the same time it is desirable that their proceedings should be quietly watched and occasionally reported for the information of Government.

## Enclosure No. 7.

*Extract from Letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 9th May 1897.*

I have the honour to report that persistent efforts have been and are being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism in Bajaur, Swat and Dir territory against Government.

The agent through whom the work is done is the Adda Mulla. The Adda Mulla, the Manki Mulla and the Palam Mulla are the principal remaining followers of the Akhund of Swat. The Adda Mulla has been in close communication with the Mian Guls in Swat, the representatives of the Akhund, and with the Palam Mulla who resides at the head of the Aushiri valley draining into the Panjkora at Dorara. The message which has been disseminated is that the time has come for all good Muhammadans to rise, and that having only two days of life, will they hesitate to give them for the cause of Islam?

Some short time ago I had reason to direct the attention of the Khan of Dir to the attempts made by the Palam Mulla to induce his levies to desert and other men not to take service. On the day that the reliefs for Chitral left Chakdarra, this Palam Mulla sent out his leading Sheikh, a fanatic of the calibre of Sheikh Yamen, who led the opposition to the Chitral Relief Force at the Malakand, to stir up trouble on the Panjkora route while the reliefs were passing up. This Sheikh was arrested two days ago by the Khan, who had him publicly beaten by the leading tribesmen with him. I have had a long conversation with the Khan, who is more alive to his own interests than he has hitherto been. He tells me that he himself has been "sounded" by Mullas as to the line he would take in event of a general rising of Muhammadans. His reply is clear, that Muhammadans are more free under the British Government than under their own kings, and he will remain loyal to the British Government. He has announced to me his intention of moving against the Palam Mulla so soon as these reliefs are through, and also to assert himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat, his reason being that he cannot risk the chance of leading Mullas turning his own men against him as an infidel. On this point I have told him he must study his own interests, and that being responsible for the continuance of the work for Government in maintaining the Chitral communications, he is at liberty to ensure success in the best manner that he can. I feel with him, though I have not told him so, that he is right, and that unless the fanatical party be got under control, there is considerable risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of Government interests.

## Enclosure No. 8.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, dated Simla, 4th June 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 9th May 1897, reporting the recent intrigues instituted with the intention of arousing Muhammadan fanaticism in Bajaur, Swat and Dir.

The attitude of the Khan of Dir has been very satisfactory, and the communication which you made to him is approved. The Government of India depend upon you to continue to keep a watch on Bajaur, and report from time to time any further information which you may obtain.

No. 6.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 1st September 1897. (Received 20th September 1897.)*

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to forward a selection of correspondence regarding the disturbances which suddenly broke out last month at the Malakand, and have since spread along our North-Western Frontier as far as Kurram.

2. In May last, Major Deane reported that persistent efforts had been and

See enclosure in our despatch dated the 14th July 1897. were being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism against us in Bajaur,

Swat and Dir. The Adda Mulla, the Manki Mulla and the Palam Mulla, the three leading Mullas in the country, were all said to be working with this aim, and Major Deane feared that, unless the fanatical party were brought under control, there was considerable risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of British interests. The Khan of Dir had himself been sounded by Mullas, but had rejected all overtures and had informed Major Deane that, as soon as the Chitral reliefs were completed, he intended to assert himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat, and to move against the Palam Mulla, who had been trying to make the Dir levies desert and to prevent others from enlisting. Major Deane told the Khan that, as he was responsible for maintaining the Chitral communications, he was at liberty to ensure success in the best manner he could. We approved the attitude assumed by Major Deane.

3. Early in June, the Khan commenced to execute his plans. He apparently experienced little difficulty in entering Upper Swat or in temporarily establishing his authority there, and Major Deane has since informed us that the Dir levies, who are maintained at our cost, were not allowed to take part in the operations, which were entirely carried out by the Khan's own men. There can, however, be no doubt that the Khan's action caused considerable local excitement. The Upper Swati clans sent in messages to Major Deane asking to be protected against the Khan. Major Deane replied that there was nothing to prevent their coming to him and establishing direct friendly relations with us, but that, unless they did so, he saw no reason for moving in the matter. The Mian Guls sent an emissary to Simla with a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab complaining of the Khan's proceedings, which they characterized as very severe. No answer was given, but the messenger was advised to make to Major Deane any representation with which he was entrusted.

4. On the 28th June, Major Deane telegraphed that the Khan was bringing in a jirga of some 400 men of his faction of the Upper Swat clans on the right bank of the river; while the other faction, who had hitherto been with the Mian Guls, had also sent in a jirga of some 200 men and were in hopes that he would settle matters for the future between them and the Khan. Early in July, Major Deane received these jirgas at Chakdarra. The Shamozaï, Nikpi Khel, Sebujaï, and Shamizai clans from the right bank of the Swat river, and the Musa Khels from the left bank were represented. There were also present from the left bank the principal men of the Babuzai section and a few of the Jinki Khel clan. The Maliks numbered 1,400 or 1,500, and there were perhaps as many more men of less importance. About one-third accompanied the Khan of Dir; the remainder came in direct. Major Deane reported that the jirgas accepted the fact of their being under Government influence in a good spirit, and looked to their country being placed on the same footing as that already under political control. They said that they wanted peace; were ready to perform service if required, undertook



to furnish fighting men for Government, if called on to do so, and declared that the friends of the Government should be their friends, and the enemies of Government their enemies. Their principal petition was that they might not be called on to perform unpaid labour; and that exiles, convicted by them of murder, might not be put back on the land against the wish of the jirga. Major Deane explained to them that Government had no desire to interfere with their internal administration, but would assist them in settling their disputes if they brought them before the Political Officer; that Government did not intend to impose revenue on them, and that all Government wanted was to secure peace and order in Upper Swat, as in Lower Swat and the Ranizai country. The tribesmen expressed regret that they had not entered into friendly relations with us before, so as to have excluded any interference by the Khan of Dir, who had recently successfully invaded part of the country hostile to him. "The main point about the present position," Major Deane wrote on the 3rd July, "is that the power of the Mian Guls, trading on the old Akhund's name, is broken. The Mian Guls have been determined that the Upper Swat Maliks should not come into direct contact with us, but they are glad now to send in letters, such as I have received during the past week, declaring themselves servants of Government and ready to do service." \* \* \* "It is satisfactory that it has been broken up without involving the movements of troops on the part of Government. The Swatis themselves say that, had they not made up their minds to 'lay hold of the skirt' of Government for good and all, they would not have come in." The jirgas left on the understanding that the good intentions and friendly feelings, which they expressed, would be judged by their future actions, and that they would come in again later to settle disputes, &c., and to arrange any points that might be necessary.

5. On the 26th July, barely three weeks after the return of the jirgas, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was sudden, broke the peace of the Swat valley. On the evening of that date, Major Deane telegraphed that a mad Fakir, who had lately come to Swat, had for the past week been preaching against Government and announcing that our troops were to be turned out of the country in eight days. He was threatening to give trouble above Thana and Chakdarra, and also to attack Thana. The Mian Guls had sent servants to remove the Fakir from the country as they feared disturbance, but he had secured a great hold on the religious feeling of the people throughout the valley and on the Dir side, and Major Deane feared it might become necessary to move a column towards Thana. An hour or two later, Major Deane telegraphed that the Fakir had been joined by the whole of Thana except one Khan, and was between Thana and Malakand with a small gathering, the local people having failed to stop him; and that a column would move out the first thing in the morning. The Fakir, however, advanced rapidly; the villagers and levies offered no opposition, and before 10.30 P.M. on the 26th, he attacked the position at Malakand with about 1,000 fanatics. The attack, which was determined, lasted till nearly daylight and was repulsed after severe fighting. Chakdarra was simultaneously attacked by about 1,000 men of the Dush Khel, Adinzai and neighbouring Upper Swatis. At daylight on the 27th, the 31st Punjab Infantry, with a cavalry detachment and 4 guns, were sent out from Malakand to pursue the enemy and to open communication with Chakdarra. The cavalry cut their way through to Chakdarra, but the infantry and guns were recalled to Malakand. The Guide Corps, with a marching strength of 160 cavalry and 300 infantry, had left Mardan on the evening of the 26th, under urgent orders from the Officer Commanding at Malakand, and reached Malakand on the afternoon of the 27th.

6. Fighting continued till midday on the 27th, when Major Deane telegraphed that the tribes generally were rising. The enemy attacked both the Malakand camp and Chakdarra in increasing numbers on each successive night up to the 30th July, notwithstanding that severe losses were inflicted on them. Chakdarra was also twice attacked in the daytime, but the enemy were beaten off with very slight loss on our side. The force at the Malakand was not sufficient to enable the Officer Commanding to make a forward move and orders were issued for the 38th Dogra Regiment and 35th Sikhs, with a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, to move up as rapidly as possible. The Lancers reached Malakand on the night of the 29th, but the infantry were compelled to



halt on the 30th at Dargai, the men having suffered greatly from the heat. During the night attack on Malakand on the 29th, the Fakir was wounded and withdrew, and his companion and chief supporter was killed; but this did not prevent still larger gatherings collecting on the 30th. The enemy were in such numbers that the intention to send a reconnoitring party to Chakdarra on that date had to be abandoned.

7. The troops at Malakand and those moving up were formed into a Field Force of two Brigades under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood who arrived at Malakand on the 1st August. On the night of the 30th July, there was a good deal of firing into the Malakand Camp, but no systematic attack. Reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached Malakand on the 31st, and on the 2nd August, a column, under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, relieved Chakdarra after some smart fighting.

8. The gatherings at Chakdarra and Malakand are estimated at 20,000, and included Utman Khels, Bunerwals, Bajauris, Ranizais, Lower and Upper Swatis, Adinzais and Dush Khels. The first assailants were however mostly from the immediate vicinity and some of those killed near the Malakand camp were identified as men accustomed to sell local supplies to the garrison. There appears little doubt that the Salarzai section of the Bunerwals joined the enemy *en masse*. Major Deane believes the influence of the Mian Guls was at first against the outbreak, and that they did not join until the 29th, when they were unable to withstand the pressure brought to bear on them. The Ranizai Maliks on the south side of Malakand do not appear to have themselves taken part in the attack, but they could not restrain their tribesmen, and no Malik of Lower Swat remained faithful, it is believed, except Inayat Khan of Thana, who sought refuge in Chakdarra. Some of the Dir levies joined in the attacks, but the levy Jemadar of Chakdarra was killed fighting on our side. The tribesmen themselves put their loss during the fighting from the 26th July to the 2nd August at over 3,000 killed.

9. During the fighting, the Khan of Dir had a difficult part to play, and one of Major Deane's Native Assistants, who was with the Khan, speaks well of the manner in which he openly declared he would not go back on the promises he had made to Government. After the relief of Chakdarra, the Khan at once commenced to punish those of his subjects who had joined against us, and then met Major Deane at Chakdarra. Postal communication with Chitral was only interrupted for a few days.

10. On the 7th August Major Deane telegraphed that the Fakir was trying to raise another gathering, saying that he had the assistance of the Amir and that the British would not remain in the country till the autumn. He tried to collect the Musa Khel to attack, but the jirga turned him out of their limits. The Ranizais from Khar downwards were among the first to send in jirgas to Major Deane suing for peace, and have been permitted to return to their villages on the condition of surrendering all arms and Government property in their possession, and of submitting to such fine or further punishment as may be imposed upon them. The Alladand jirga also came in and are endeavouring to collect all Government property in the possession of their tribesmen. The jirgas of the Shamoizai, Shamizai, Nikpi Khel and other clans on the right bank of the Swat river came in to Chakdarra on the 12th August, and we authorized Major Deane to settle with them amicably on the basis of their making submission, giving passage to our troops, if required, and paying a fine.

11. After the relief of Chakdarra, Major Deane proposed an advance as far as Saidu on the left bank of the Swat river, and to the head of the Nikpi Khel valley on the right bank, after which he thought that troops should visit the Utman Khel country between the Ranizai border and the Swat river. If the move to Saidu were made, he suggested that one or two regiments should co-operate by moving to Rustam in Yusufzai, directly threatening Buner, in order to keep the Bunerwals quiet. Sir Bindon Blood was authorized on the 12th August to advance on the left bank of the Swat river to Saidu or Minglaor, if he and Major Deane still considered the move advisable. This movement was not undertaken in order to inflict damage on the tribes if they made submission and reparation, but to mark the fact that they had wantonly attacked a British force, and that the troops had the power to advance when they chose into their country. The column started from Amandarra for Upper Swat on the 16th

August. On the 17th, after leaving Thana, they encountered 2,000 to 3,000 men in position on a spur between Jalala and Landikheh. The tribesmen were easily dispersed, some retreating to upper Swat and some towards the Morah Pass and Buner. Simultaneously with the advance of the column, a small force was moved to Rustam to contain the Bunerwals.

12. On the 16th, a representative from the elder Mian Gul came in to Major Deane at Thana and asked for advice. Major Deane replied that the Mian Gul, if he had anything to say, was free to come in and hear such terms as might be imposed; but beyond guaranteeing the Mian Gul's personal safety, Major Deane declined to say anything until he submitted. The column marched to Ghaligai on the 18th August, seeing no sign of the enemy. Here a letter was received from the Mian Guls, saying that they and the tribes wished for peace, and were ready to comply with whatever Government might wish. They were told that, if their letter was sincere, they should come forward and meet the British authorities. The Mian Guls, as well as the local villagers, asserted that the fighting on the 17th was forced on by the Bunerwals. On the 19th, the troops marched to Mingaora, where the Aba Khels and the jirgas of Mingaora and the valleys beyond commenced bringing in the arms demanded from them by way of punishment: six standards and 140 stand of arms and several swords had been surrendered by the 20th; many more have since been brought in. Sir Bindon Blood has since returned to Thana, and the political objects of his march through Upper Swat appear to have been satisfactorily attained.

13. During the first week after the attack on the Malakand, it was more than once reported that the Adda Mulla was preparing to join the enemy in the Swat valley; but, on the 7th August, he descended the Gandab valley with a following of about 5,000 men, and, after burning the Hindu village of Shankargarh, attacked the Shabkaddar post. The Hindu residents of the village had had some warning that trouble was impending, and the majority of them had made their way to Peshawar. All movable goods had been taken away, and the rest of the villagers took refuge in the post. Two men only remained and were killed. The Commissioner of the Peshawar Division had also received intelligence of the Mulla's advance, and troops were on their way to Shabkaddar when news of the attack arrived. The Shabkaddar post was occupied by a few men of the Border Police, who held their own and inflicted considerable loss on the tribesmen. A force consisting of 4 guns, two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, two companies of the Somersetshire Regiment, and the 20th Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Woon, arrived at Shabkaddar on the 8th. The enemy under the Adda Mulla himself were then in the low hills near the fort. They were attacked the next morning and driven back into the high hills beyond the frontier of the Peshawar district.

14. Additional troops were sent to Shabkaddar on the 9th August; but a few days afterwards the Adda Mulla left the neighbourhood, and except for an interchange of shots between a tribal picket of the enemy and a cavalry patrol up the Alikandi route on the 18th August, all has since remained quiet in the Shabkaddar direction. Certain Halimzai Mohmands have sent a petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, pleading that they were unable to resist the passage of the Adda Mulla through Gandab, and asking for mercy. There is little room for doubt that the Adda Mulla's gathering included many men from Afghan territory, and the villages along the Kabul river between Jalalabad and Dakka are said to have sent contingents. The Viceroy accordingly addressed the Amir, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, on the 13th August. His Highness was informed of the nature of the reports which had reached the Government of India, and was required to take immediate steps to recall his subjects, and to prevent the repetition of so exceedingly grave an offence. After reminding the Amir that the Viceroy had in May last year called His Highness's attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar, the letter concluded as follows:—"It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn Your Highness that, if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, Your Highness must be held responsible for his actions." The substance of the Amir's reply was telegraphed to Your Lordship on the 23rd August, and the full text is now enclosed. His Highness emphatically denied the truth



of the report that men of his regular army had joined the Adda Mulla and personally engaged that no such act of hostility would ever be committed by them. He attributed the proceedings of the tribesmen to the influence of the Mullas, whom he denounced as turbulent agitators. Our agent at Kabul states that the Amir read out the Viceroy's message and the draft of his reply in a full Darbar, held on the anniversary of his assumption of the title of Zia-ul-millat-wad-din; that his Highness was much moved, and publicly protested his unalterable good faith towards the British Government. Before the Viceroy's communication could have reached the Amir, intelligence was received that a farman had been sent by His Highness to the Governor of Jalalabad, expressing displeasure at men having gone from that district to join the Adda Mulla, and directing that no more should be allowed to go.

15. On the 16th August, a report was received that an Afridi lashkar, 10,000 strong, accompanied by 1,500 Mullas from Ningrahar, had started to attack the Khyber road and posts from Lundi Kotal downwards, and that the Orakzais would simultaneously commence hostilities in the Samana direction. The troops in Peshawar had been previously strengthened, and due precautions were taken, including a demonstration in force to Jamrud, where a movable column remains for the present. On the receipt of further reports of an Afridi advance and of an impending attack on the western frontier of the Peshawar district, a column was moved out from Peshawar to Bara to operate along the open country at the foot of the hills, in view to cutting off the Afridis, should they venture into the plain. The lashkar, in violation of the Afridi agreements entered into with the British Government for the safety of the road through the Khyber, attacked the posts in that Pass which were garrisoned by their own tribesmen. The Kuki Khel section have apparently remained true, and even, at first, some Zakha Khels in the Khyber Rifles resisted the attack. The posts were one after the other evacuated between the 23rd and 25th August and were burned by the attacking Afridis, who are reported to have thereafter dispersed to their homes.

On the 17th August, the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram telegraphed that a large body of Massuzais was advancing in the direction of Para Chinara, and that the two opposite factions of the tribe had combined. About the same time, news was received that shots had been fired into Fort Lockhart on the Samana on the night of the 14th. On the 20th a heliogram from the Sadda post stated that the Delmarzai Massuzai lashkar had started, and that the Massuzais generally were restless; but beyond a raid on the border villages near Sadda, which was easily repelled, no actual attack had been made in Kurram. Kohat has been considerably strengthened to admit of arrangements being made for reinforcing the troops in Kurram and on the Samana. Recent reports of large gatherings of Orakzais have been received, of attacks made on the police post at Marai, and of a raiding party in the Ublan Kotal near Kohat. At the time of writing however the intentions of the Orakzais generally have not been developed, and the result of the above-mentioned movements is not known.

The cause of the original outbreak at the Malakand is by no means clear. Major Deane is of opinion that the success of the rising was due to the bold advance of the mad Fakir, who was at first almost alone, and to the hold that he had obtained over the people by his pretended miraculous powers. Major Deane is emphatic on the point that the rising was fanatical and not due to tribal discontent or movements. It is certain that a considerable number of men from within the British Indian frontier took part in the fighting against us. As to other influences which may have been at work, we shall, if necessary, address Your Lordship separately hereafter.

We have, &c.,  
 (Signed) ELGIN,  
 G. S. WHITE,  
 J. WESTLAND,  
 M. D. CHALMERS,  
 E. H. H. COLLEN.



## Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, dated Simla, 12th July 1897.*

I am directed to forward, for your information, a letter purporting to be addressed by the Mian Gul of Swat to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, which has been brought to Simla by one Muhammad Ibrahim Khan.

2. The messenger has been told that the Government of India cannot enter into direct correspondence with the Mian Gul, and that he should return to Swat and make to you any representation which he may have been instructed by Mian Gul to make.

3. I am to remind you that the Government of India await the report regarding the relations of the Khan of Dir with the Upper Swatis.

## Sub-Enclosure.

*Letter from the Mian Gul of Swat to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated the 10th Muharram-ul-Haram 1315 H. = 12th June 1897.*

I write that the British Government have several times held possession of the tracts of Swat and Boner, but the ancestors of the servant of God of their free will made an agreement with Government and remained free until the Sarkar, on account of Umra Khan of Jandol, resolved to take possession of the country of Chitral and issued proclamations in the country of Swat by or with the object of obtaining a free passage. In spite of the fact that the country and the inhabitants and disciples had from ancient times belonged to the servant of God, the Sarkar did not make enquiry of me or demand for free passage. As the hill people are ignorant and foolish, they chose to fight and obstruct Government, and the Sarkar, on account of the stupidity of foolish people, took into their own possession the road as far as the village of Thana in the tract of Swat. Now all the people of Swat have assumed the profession of robbery and dakaiti. As disturbance and dakaitis would be the cause of annoyance and injury to Government, I forbade them, telling them that the Sarkar should have no cause of complaint against them, nor they against the Sarkar. I have no concern with the disturbances and injury to Government, and have not till the present time had any, and if Government stood in need of anything in the way of service in the hill country, I have helped and in no matter has any cry or complaint been made by me to Government. Now I am sending a messenger, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, my servant, with full powers as agent to Your Honour, because I was not concerned in causing injury to Government. I did not cause injury or trouble to Government, and I did not prevent the hill people from doing any work or service for Government. Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir has been from ancient times the servant of my family and me. On Thursday, the 3rd June, corresponding to the first day of Muharram-ul-Haram, he entered and invaded the country of Swat. When I made enquiries about his coming and asked about his actions, he sent a trusty servant to me to say that he had come simply in order to visit his ancestor's Ziarat and to kiss my feet, and had no other purpose whatever. Nevertheless, Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir, when he reached the country and crossed the Swat river, plundered and oppressed the Shamozaïs and Nakpan Khels. He caused the people damage to the extent of 2 or 3 lakhs of rupees and injured the people of God. Further, he kept saying that the Government had given him help and that the country had come under the rule of Government. Your Honour, Government up to this time has not indulged in theft or robbery, nor has the Sarkar given authority to undeserving and incapable persons to interfere in State matters. My purport and object is this: I am sending my messenger, Muhammad Ibrahim. If the Sarkar should declare that by its orders the Khan of Dir has caused this injury and annoyance it is well, and if Government wants any service rendered them, let the Sarkar consider whether the Khan of Dir has more servants and followers than the servant of God or less, which of us two can more expeditiously perform the work and service of Government. If then he has used force and violence

by the order of the Sarkar it is well. But if he has committed oppressions of his own accord through enmity, let the Sarkar grant me permission to oppose and fight the Khan of Dir, and then let the Sarkar stand by and witness what occurs ; and if the Sarkar has other objects in view, then if my agent, the bearer of this letter, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, be questioned orally, he will, please Government, clearly explain my objects to Government. I shall esteem it a favour if Government will send back my servant as soon as possible. For the rest all is well.

## Enclosure 2.

*Extract from letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Malakand, 21st July 1897.*

I have the honour to submit the following report regarding upper Swat.

Upper Swat comprises the country inhabited by the Khwajazai clans, viz., the Nikpi Khel, Shamozaï, Shamezai, &c., on the right bank of the Swat River, and by the Abazai, Baizai and the Khadakzai clans, viz., the Musa Khel, Babazai, Aba Khel and Jinki Khel on the left bank.

I informed you in my letter, dated 9th May 1897, that the Nawab of Dir, owing to the combination between the Palam Mulla, the Mian Guls and the Adda Mulla, intended to assert himself in Upper Swat, over which his grandfather and father had held the position of titular Khan.

On the advance of the Chitral Relief Force into Swat, the Upper Swatis collected under the Mian Guls to oppose the advance of the troops. The fanatical party also assumed a hostile attitude towards the Nawab of Dir for throwing in his lot with the British Government, and consequently during the two past years the Nawab has been anxious to move against Upper Swat. I restrained him for the following reasons :—

- (a) It was necessary that he should establish himself firmly in his own country to ensure, as far as possible, the successful working of the scheme for the maintenance of communication with Chitral.
- (b) I did not consider it advisable that in such a matter the Nawab should act otherwise than in the interests of Government, nor that he should make use of the position he owes to Government to secure a retreat for himself among tribes hostile to Government in the event of difficulties arising between him and Government.
- (c) There did not appear any special reason why the Nawab should move against Swat until such was afforded by the fanatical combination above mentioned.
- (d) Before acceding to his request, it was any way advisable to be satisfied that his faction in Upper Swat were strong enough to render him material support, so that unnecessary disturbances might be avoided.

The Nawab has lately, by the support of his faction and by the judicious manner he entered the valley, gained possession of the right bank of the Swat River. According to Pathan custom, he at once established guards in the country under Akhundzadas, who habitually bully and harass the people. In order to avert the trouble certain to arise through this latter action, and to prevent his maintaining on his own account the "purdah" which the Mian Guls had kept drawn over Upper Swat, I directed him to bring in the jirgas which had come under his influence. This he did. The direct consequence of this was that those who on being turned out of power had become "Sherunkis" or exiles came in to me of their own accord, and with these latter also came in a fully representative jirga of the Musa Khel on the left bank of the river, who had hitherto at the instigation of the Mian Guls closed the road against those who were suspected of a desire to enter into friendly relations with Government. The leading men of the Babozai section and a certain number of the Aba Khel and Jinki Khel also attended. In all some 1,500 Maliks were present.

The Nawab of Dir's views naturally incline towards self-aggrandisement, to be attained by turning to his own uses the strength he owes to Government.



Government interests in regard to this tract, according to my views, are to form such relations with the tribes as will ensure, as far as possible, peace and order; and as long as Government themselves are not prepared to occupy the country, to be in a position to enlist their services as far as possible for the protection of routes through this border against foreign aggression.

The first steps towards this are to establish a mutual acquaintance between the tribesmen and ourselves; to disabuse their minds of the idea, which has been deliberately impressed on them by agents in order to encourage them in hostility, that Government intend to seize their lands, to impose revenue and disarm them; to set aside the pretensions of the Mian Guls whose sole object has been to exclude the Pathan Maliks from direct contact with Government. These steps have now been taken.

The tribes who have come in profess to desire nothing but to enjoy their lands in peace and comfort; they are undoubtedly impressed with the state of affairs evident in the lower part of the valley, and are anxious to benefit by the same peace in their own country: they desire assistance in settling their quarrels, instead of always having to resort to arms. Their tone may be gathered from the fact that their only petition was that they should not be impressed for forced labour, and that men, who had been convicted by them of murder, should not be reinstated against the wishes of the jirga. They, in fact, want a guiding hand to help them to establish internal peace, which they have not enjoyed since the death of the old Akhund of Swat, owing to quarrels amongst the members of the Akhund's family.

The present state of affairs is that the Nawab will be in the position held by his father and grandfather, viz., titular Khan, and freedom of direct intercourse between the clans and Government officers is reserved. He will be guided in his dealings with them by consideration of Government interests, it having been impressed on him that these and his own true interests are inseparable. He has under my advice reinstated those who had been ousted from their lands, removed his Akhundzadas, and selected Sahibzadas and others have been sent to assist the people in composing their quarrels.

The jirgas, many members of which with their rosaries appeared a collection of fanatical Mullas rather than of Pathan Maliks, stated that they wished to be on the same terms with Government as the tribes of Lower Swat. They agreed to maintain peace and order, to attend when summoned, to furnish fighting men if called on to do so, and concluded by saying that they would not have come in, had they not fully intended to act up to their promises.

---

Enclosure No. 3.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 26th July 1897.*

A mad Fakir lately came to Swat stating he had been sent by some one for religious war; for the past week he has been preaching against Government, giving out that our troops are to be turned out of this country in eight days. He also abuses all who receive allowances from Government. A certain number of men have now collected and are threatening to give trouble above Thana and Chakdarra, and also to attack Thana. The Mianguls have sent servants to remove the Fakir from the country as they fear disturbance, but the man has taken great hold of religious superstition of the people throughout the valley and on Dir side. I am waiting to see if matters cool down, otherwise it may become necessary to move column towards Thana. Am anxious to avoid this, if possible, and personally do not anticipate that this step will really be necessary. The Fakir has, I think, undoubtedly been deputed for purpose of creating disturbance; it is all part of working already reported. If column should move out it would be I think advisable Guides should be ordered up, but I particularly ask that this should only be in case of real necessity for moving. Will keep you informed. It is a question of next three or four days whether matters develop further.

---



## Enclosure No. 4.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 26th July 1897.*

Whole of Thana except one Khan have joined Fakir this afternoon. He is now with small gathering between Thana and Malakand. The local people failing to stop him column moves out Upper Swat first thing in morning.

## Enclosure No. 5.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 27th July 1897.*

Fakir advanced rapidly; all villagers and levies absconded before him. At 10.30 p.m. he attacked Malakand Kotal with about 1,000 miscellaneous fanatics. Attack was determined and lasted till nearly daylight. Attack on Chakdara also reported, result not yet known as wire cut. Attack on Malakand was sudden, but troops were prepared. Actual notice of attack was received from absconding levies.

## Enclosure No. 6.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 29th July 1897.*

Minchin in Chakdarra reports that Mianguls have joined enemy with large number of Bonerwals and Manki Mulla with Utman Khels. No sign of this here. Enemy at present against us are Ranizais of Swat valley and tribes from Dush Khel, Talash, Adinzai and Utman Khels, with a few Upper Swatis. Up to the present no organised gathering has joined enemy here, as would be the case if Minchin's report correct. Sam Ranizai Maliks, so far, have themselves taken no open steps against us. The leader against us appears to have carried the people entirely with him by making his first move with very few followers, and giving out that he did not require assistance, as the heavenly hosts with him were sufficient. When he reached Thana, he had hardly four hundred men and boys with him, as seen by Minchin and Inspector Levies, and these mostly collected on the way down. By the time he reached Malakand he had large gathering. I have received no report yet of details of attacks on Chakdarra.

## Enclosure No. 7.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 30th July 1897.*

Everything is perfectly quiet in the Khyber, and along the western and southern borders of the Peshawar district. Some thirty leading Mohmand Maliks of Tarakzai, Halimzai and Pindiali sections came in to Stuart Waterfield day before yesterday, asking what service they could do at this juncture. Waterfield told them that they had only to keep quiet and to arrest any emissaries who might visit them from the Mulla of Adda.

## Enclosure No. 8.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 3rd August 1897.*

I have received to-day the original of a letter written to him on the 31st July by one of the principal disciples of the Adda Mulla, who lives with latter at Jarobi of the Baizai Mohmands. Letter states:—The Mulla is still at home, awaiting the result of Fakir's movements, but he will probably start for

Swat in two or three days. Sixty copies of the Targhib-ul-jehad and Takwim-ud-din have just been sent to the Mulla by the Afghan Hakim of Kunar. The Kandahari Safis and Utmanzai Mohmands of Yakhdand have started to join the Fakir in Swat.

---

Enclosure No. 9.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chakdarra, 3rd August 1897.*

Inayat Khan and all other men that I have spoken to on the subject, including Rahim Shah, cannot account for the people rising as they did; and when I saw Inayat and Aslam at Malakand and told them they must use their influence to get the Fakir removed, they scouted the idea of his being able to create any trouble. Rahim Shah also thought nothing of the man. I think the sole cause of his success was his bold advance almost alone. The hold that a man of this sort obtains on these people is incredible, as instanced by the fact of a Drabi who visited him, and when returning on Sunday, 25th, to camp dressed himself as a Fakir, and on arrival at Batkhela had a crowd following him begging his blessing. The people here all around are now cursing the Fakir for having deceived them in regard to his miraculous powers. When the working from the Bajaur side failed as it did in creating disturbance efforts were then made by working through India. The first attack on Malakand was almost entirely by men below Thana. The Mian Guls did not join till Friday, when our position at Chakdarra and Malakand naturally led the whole country all round to rise. Uncorroborated information is that Fakir had lately been to Mecca. He is said to be somewhere beyond Thana, and if decisive move be made as far as Saidu on left bank of Swat river, and also to head of Nekpi Khel valley on right bank, it will definitely settle the business on this side. Operations would occupy about a fortnight. The Shanizai Utman Khels were implicated and should be punished by an expedition on right bank of Panjkora. This will have to be undertaken some day, but whether positive necessity for it now exists will be seen when operations against Saidu and Nekpi Khel have been completed. I must leave it to Punjab to say what steps should be taken regarding Boner.

---

Enclosure No. 10.

*Telegraphic.—From the Resident in Kashmir, Gulmarg, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 3rd August 1897.*

Political Agent, Gilgit, telegraphs:—"Everything quiet at Chilas.

---

Enclosure No. 11.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 4th August 1897.*

Several reports confirm news of Adda Mulla having started with miscellaneous gathering from Jarobi for Swat on 1st instant, but no Mohmands, except a few Talibs and Mullas, are said to have accompanied him, and the news of dispersion of gathering at Malakand will probably turn him back before he crosses Panjkora river.

---

Enclosure No. 12.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 4th August 1897.*

There was a boy aged thirteen or fourteen with the Fakir on whose head he bound a turban: stated to the people that he was remaining heir to the throne of Delhi. I cannot ascertain where the boy is now.

---



## Enclosure No. 13.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Chakdarra, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 5th August 1897.*

See my letter of 9th May. This rising has been intended ever since we occupied this line, and it was intended on occasion of last reliefs. The men who actually started the business were the Thana people, and until they joined the Fakir he had no tribesmen with him. The people who first attacked Malakand were lower Swatis and Ranizais, and on the 27th they were joined by the entire inhabitants of the right bank of Swat river from Badwan downwards. Badwan is immediately opposite Malakand on right bank. The people who began at Chakdarra were Adinzais, who brought in with them some Shamizais; these latter after four hours' fighting left the field saying the Fakir had deceived them as to closing mouths of our guns. The attack having been made without our being able to reply by a countermove, men swarmed in from all parts. It has been the chance of this Fakir being found to start the business that brought about the rising. People I have examined have nothing more to say than that they believed he had heavenly hosts with him, and that the mouths of our guns and rifles were closed. Our own officials were inclined to this belief. As the business started above Thana and the Fakir has retired in that direction, and as also the Mian Guls joined on 30th July, I consider that troops should certainly go as far as Saidu, moving as promptly as possible. If Government desire I can open up communication with Upper Swat, and probably settle the whole business by jirga; but the tribes are scattered on the hills and it will take some time to get hold of them, probably a fortnight or more. Jar Khan reports strong pressure by Mullas and Miahhs having been put on Nawagai to join, but that he stood firm. If move on Saidu be made it should be prompt to minimise possible gatherings, and one or two regiments co-operating by move to Rustam in Yusafzai, directly threatening Buner, would probably have effect of keeping Bunerwals at home. At present I cannot hear of any gathering in the country.

## Enclosure No. 14.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 7th August 1897.*

I am directed to invite attention to Major Deane's telegrams, and to ask for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's views relating to the attitude of the Bonerwals, and the policy which should be adopted towards them.

2. Major Deane, it will be observed, recognizes that a military movement into Upper Swat, designed to punish the people there for complicity in the outbreak, must alarm the Bonerwals, and he therefore suggests a countermove to Rustam as a thing which "would probably have effect of keeping the Bonerwals at home." He has not, however, entered on the question of the notice, if any, which is to be taken of the part which the Bonerwals have played while the tribes around Malakand were in arms against us.

3. Information has from time to time been received from the Commissioner of Peshawar relating to the extent to which different sections of the Bonerwals have moved in support of the Swat rising, and Sir Richard Udny mentioned rifles and other property having been brought back by men of the Salarzai section. His Honour will, if it seems advisable, consult Sir Richard Udny on the question of dealing with the Bonerwals, but I am to say that it seems most desirable that anything which is to be done, especially in Swat, should be done quickly; and therefore the attitude which is to be assumed towards Boner must be decided with as little delay as possible.

4. In arriving at a decision regarding Boner, the Governor-General in Council would desire to be more particularly informed of His Honour's views as to—

- (1) how far the different sections of the Bonerwals were involved and represented by responsible men in the outbreak and subsequent fighting;



- (2) whether it would be possible to negotiate a settlement with the Bonerwals which must include restitution of any arms and other property which they have carried off, and perhaps the imposition of a fine ;
- (3) what would be the effect on the Bonerwals of an advance up the Swat river—
  - (a) after the conclusion with them of a settlement as above indicated or
  - (b) without coming to any settlement with them if it is impracticable to do so.

The Governor-General in Council would wish also to have the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor upon the situation generally.

---

Enclosure No. 15.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 7th August 1897.*

The Fakir, who is trying to raise another gathering, is openly saying that he has assistance, and that though the tribes have been beaten now the British will not remain in this country till the autumn. He tried to collect the Musa Khels to attack, but the jirga turned him out of their limits, and he yesterday evening moved further up the valley. The Fakir has also given out that Umra Khan is coming, and I have ascertained that four sowars have gone to try and fetch him. I have addressed Musa Khels asking them reason for what has occurred after their promises lately made at Chakdarra.

---

Enclosure No. 16.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 8th August 1897.*

Reports received during the last three days show that the Adda Mulla with his gathering was in Kamali of the Halimzai Mohmands, and was meditating a raid on Shankargarh, either by the Gandab route through Halimzai country or by the Alikandi route through Pindiya Mohmands, but both these sections were said to be firm in refusing him passage, and I regarded the threat of raiding as a piece of bluff which had no serious meaning, and would soon pass away with gradual dispersion of the gathering, now that matters were tranquil in the Swat valley. Last night, however, and this morning the reports became more insistent regarding danger of a raid, and I decided to postpone my departure from Peshawar pending further developments ; to-day also Colonel Aslam Khan brought me a copy of a proclamation by the Adda Mulla addressed to a Shinwari Mulla of Lwargai in the Kyber declaring that our troops in Swat had been annihilated and calling upon Shinwaris, Ningraharis and others to join in jihad and attack Shabkaddar. Other copies of this proclamation are said to have been brought on the 4th instant by a disciple of the Adda Mulla and forwarded to Sipah Salar, to Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Ningrahar, to the Afridis of Tirah, to Zakha Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley, to the Ut Khel Ghilzais of Laghman, and to the Waziris. Two reports received from other sources to-day also say that the Adda Mulla has been joined by a number of Ningraharis and people from neighbourhood of Jalalabad, Kabul subjects, and that the rest of his gathering consists of Baizai and Khwaizai Mohmands, as well as some assured clans, namely, Utmanzai, Dawezai, Halimzai, and Pindiya Mohmands, but Tarakzais are not mentioned, and doubt if Halimzais are much implicated, except by being obliged to allow passage through their country. On the other hand, I had a report as late as this afternoon that the gathering was disheartened and gradually dwindling away, but the information received this evening leaves no doubt that it must now have advanced by Gandab route to immediate vicinity of Shabkaddar ; I have requisitioned troops on this information.

---

## Enclosure No. 17.

(Telegraphic.)—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 8th August 1897.

Adda Mulla, with a gathering of two or three thousand men, consisting of Mohmands and neighbouring tribesmen north of Mohmands, is reported to have arrived this afternoon on Shabkaddar frontier with object of attacking Hindu Bazar of Shankargarh which adjoins Shabkaddar fort and villages.

## Enclosure No. 18.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 8th August 1897.*

With reference to the telegrams noted on the margin from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, regarding the sudden and unprovoked attack by the Adda Mulla and his gathering on the Fort of Shankargarh, usually known as Fort Shabkaddar, and the burning and looting of the village of that name lying immediately below the fort, I am directed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to intimate that, assuming that the facts are not exaggerated, in his opinion the following immediate measures are necessary to protect our interests and to guard against the occurrence of similar raids:—

- (i) The garrison of Peshawar should be brought up to full strength with as little delay as possible.
- (ii) The strength of the military garrison at Fort Jamrud should be raised to a force adequate to prevent any possibility of its being captured by a sudden attack by tribesmen. At present it is believed that it is held by about 100 rifles of a native regiment and 50 sabres of a Native Cavalry Regiment. It must always be remembered that the Khyber Rifles, whose head-quarters are at Jamrud, are recruited from the Khyber Afridis, and, in the event of a large fanatical movement amongst their own tribes, it would hardly be wise to place full reliance on them.
- (iii) Military garrisons should be thrown into Forts Michni and Abazai. In the former case the garrison can perhaps be sent from Peshawar and in the latter from Mardan.
- (iv) Measures should be taken to watch the Boner Frontier in the Sadhum valley to the north-east of Mardan, which can probably be done by the Reserve Brigade of the Malakand Field Force without necessitating the despatch of a strong force to Rustam, which might have a disturbing effect.

2. I am to point out that, without entering at present into the causes of the attack on Shabkaddar, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that, in view of the issue by the Adda Mulla of the proclamations calling on the tribes to join in the jihad, which is reported in Sir Richard Udney's telegram of to-day, it is in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion absolutely necessary that the steps detailed above should be taken at once to prevent the possibility of the spread of disorder on the Border, more especially in the direction of Tirah and the Khyber. The Kohat garrison is up to strength, and as the Kurram garrison, including the wing of the 5th Gurkhas, has been concentrated at Para Chinar, it is not likely that trouble will arise in that direction, while the Commissioner of Peshawar has already been directed in my telegram, dated 29th ultimo, which was forwarded to you with my letter of the same date, to keep a close watch on the western border of Hazara, and this, as far as His Honour can judge at present, will be sufficient.

3. No news of anticipated trouble on the Mohmand border reached the Lieutenant-Governor until early this morning, and there was the less reason to apprehend any disturbance in that direction, as on 30th ultimo the Commissioner reported in his telegram that thirty leading Maliks of the Tarakzai, Pindiali and Halimzai sections, which are the sections which adjoin our border,



came in on the 28th ultimo and asked what assistance they could render, and were told to keep quiet merely and arrest any emissaries who might visit them from the Mulla of Adda.

4. The Commissioner has been asked to explain fully the nature of the reports, which, as he states in his telegram of to-day's date, had been reaching him during the past three days, and also the meaning of a telegram, dated yesterday, from the residents of Fort Shabkaddar, which reached Sir Mackworth Young this morning, of which I am to enclose a copy for the information of the Government of India. He has also been asked to account for the fact that, though the attack on Shankargarh is said to have commenced at 4 P.M. yesterday, and this is only 18 miles distant from Peshawar with which it is connected by a crowded thoroughfare, though unfortunately the bridge on the Adazai branch of the Kabul river cannot be kept up on this line in the hot weather, no news of the affair was despatched to Peshawar until the cavalry met the messenger of the Shabkaddar commandant at the Adazai ferry, 14 miles from Peshawar, and only 4 or 5 from Shabkaddar, at 2 A.M. this morning. This circumstance appears to His Honour to be very significant, and the conduct of our own villagers in the neighbourhood of Shankargarh will require to be closely investigated.

5. I am also to intimate that the questions relating to the policy to be adopted as regards the Bonerwals and other tribes to the north of Peshawar, which were referred for His Honour's opinion in your letter of yesterday's date, are engrossing his attention, and a complete reply will be submitted shortly. Indeed before the receipt of your letter he had already addressed the Commissioner of Peshawar on the subject of the advisability of the advance into Upper Swat, which was suggested in Major Deane's telegram of 3rd instant, and which seemed likely to result in further complications with Boner, as will appear from my telegram, dated 4th instant, and Commissioner's reply—telegram of 5th instant—herewith forwarded. Sir Richard Udny's opinion appeared to require fuller consideration, but I am to intimate at once that Sir Mackworth Young thinks that, whatever may be desirable hereafter in regard to a settlement with the Bonerwals when the question of their complicity as a tribe in the disturbances in Swat has been fully examined, it would be most undesirable to weaken our position now by sending a strong force into Upper Swat. This would be to invite an attack not only from the whole of the Bonerwals on our right flank, but also from the Kohistanis, and might result in a general conflagration of the tribes eastwards to the Hazara border, if not northwards to Chilas.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor, however, considers that we must show a confident front at this juncture, and that anything like a retrograde movement from the Malakand in the face of the tribes would be disastrous. It is also in his opinion most essential that we should hold the Malakand-Thana-Chakdarra position in force, so as to prevent any attempt at a coalition between the Bonerwals and Upper Swatis on the east and the Lower Swatis, Utman Khels, Bajauris and Mohmands on the west and south-west. The Nawab of Dir also must be made to keep a firm hold of his tribesmen including Adinzais and Talash. If, in addition to holding this line and taking such punitive measures as are necessary in the Ranizai country, the Malakand Field Force is strong enough to detach a strong column for more extended operations, Sir Mackworth Young would suggest that, if practicable routes exist, such a force might well be moved to the west through the Lower Ranizai country, and so into the Utman Khel territory, which is one of the suggestions made in Major Deane's telegram, dated 3rd August. The complicity of the Utman Khels in the recent attack on the Malakand seems from Major Deane's telegrams to be fully established, and they also behaved badly during the Chitral Relief Expedition, though in neither case were their interests threatened or their territory violated. They thus undoubtedly deserve severe punishment, which can probably best be administered by taking their hills in flank and rear than by attacking them in front, though a force of observation at Abazai could co-operate in the lower villages. Such a move in addition to the moral effect which such energetic action on our part would produce within and without the border would, His Honour believes, prevent the Utman Khels and Mamund tribes with tribes to the north-west from joining the Mohmands, and would probably operate to bring about a prompt submission of the latter. If the



country is practicable and the force can thereafter advance across the Swat River and down through the Mohmand country by the Sikandah or Gandab routes, the reassertion of our authority in this direction will be complete. Such an advance across the Swat river into the Mohmand country would however necessarily require future consideration when the causes of the outbreak and the sections implicated have been ascertained.

---

Enclosure No. 19.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 8th August 1897.*

Colonel Woon, Commanding the column, with cavalry, two guns and part of his infantry, reached Shabkaddar in the middle of the day and relieved the fort; the remainder of his infantry and guns having been detained at the ferry and by the intense heat were not expected to reach Shabkaddar till late this afternoon or evening. Enemy three or four thousand strong with 14 standards under Adda Mulla himself have taken up a position on low hills near Shabkaddar, where Colonel Woon will probably attack them to-morrow morning.

---

Enclosure No. 20.

*Telegraphic.—From the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 9th August 1897.*

I left Peshawar at 5 to satisfy myself of situation at Shabkaddar. A sharp fight on low hills took place beyond Shabkaddar this morning. Colonel Woon had moved out at 6 A.M. with 20th Punjab Infantry, 2 companies, Somersets, 2 squadrons, 13th, and 4 guns, 51st, and came on enemy in position on low hills. He attacked, but enemy's line outflanked him on both sides, being over 2 miles long and extending from main hills across low undulating hills to edge of cultivation. I heard firing on my way out and pushed on, reaching scene action 8.40, found force retiring owing to outflanking. I brought guns into action at once and pushed cavalry out to right flank under main hills, and shortly afterwards infantry extended more to left. I then ordered 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from under hills on our right along enemy's line. This was brilliantly carried out by Atkinson with little loss. Atkinson and Cheyne both had horses shot. Cavalry rallied and formed on left of infantry. Enemy must have suffered considerably and retired to high hills. I formed up force on edge low hills and waited, the 200 men of 30th having come up. As at 10.30 there was no use for troops, and neither my force nor constitution of it warranted my moving into hills, I withdrew to fort and after seeing wounded returned at 3 P.M.

---

Enclosure No. 21.

*Telegraphic.—From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 9th August 1897.*

Report from men in Nawagai received to-day is that Mulla Adda's gathering consists of khassadars and men of Kunar and Jalalabad, and that the Mulla was collecting other tribesmen.

---

Enclosure No. 22.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 10th August 1897.*

My own reports to-day (tenth) say that up to yesterday (ninth), reinforcements were still joining the gathering from all parts of the Jalalabad valley, and that the villages of Chardeh, Ambarkhana, Basawal, Girdi, Sarkani, and Lalpura on the banks of the Kabul river were keeping rafts ready for the passage of the various contingents. Some 200 Ut Khels are said to have joined from Laghman,

also Shinwaris from the Kunar valley, and numbers of Afghan sepoys in plain clothes from the camp at Asmar. Reports from all sources agree that no attempt is being made by Afghan officials to check this flow towards Shabkaddar, if they are not actually encouraging it, and it is quite certain that the people would never have moved in such a general way if it had not been universally understood that they had permission. Beyond rumours of an intended attack upon the Samana posts on the Kohat frontier, and upon the Bara and Jalla Talla Border Military Police posts on the western frontier of the Peshawar district, there are no signs yet of unrest among the Afridis; but it is certain that letters from the Adda Mullah have reached Tirah, and it is said that Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, the principal Mulla of Tirah, was to have convoked a meeting of priests on the 6th instant, though I have heard nothing more of this.

---

Enclosure No. 23.

*Telegraphic.—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 11th August 1897.*

Since yesterday's telegram everything quiet at Shabkaddar. A cavalry reconnaissance made this morning again found no signs of enemy, but it is pretty certain that the gathering is still among hills just beyond border, and it is believed that they intend to have another fight which may be to-morrow, as it is the Muhammadan holiday of Bara Wafat. Reinforcements are said to be still flowing in from the Jalalabad valley, and Major Deane wired me this morning that, according to his information, the bulk of the Shabkaddar gathering are Kabul subjects from the Laghman and Jalalabad districts with some Afghan soldiers in plain clothes. On the other hand, the Deputy Commissioner, who is at Shabkaddar, reports to-day that the force opposed to us on 9th instant was eight or nine thousand strong, of whom two-thirds were Mohmands, and only 1,200 were subjects of the Amir from the Kunar valley, the Khugiani country and villages of Basawal and Hazarnao. Rumours about Afridi attacks on Peshawar western border still continue, but Political Officer, Khyber, reports from Landi Kotal that there is no movement in Tirah, and that the meeting of priests, which was to have been convened by Mulla Saiyid Akbar last Friday, has been postponed till next Friday. The wildest rumours are current in Peshawar city, and deputation of the leading Hindu merchants came to me this evening to express their fears of being looted.

---

Enclosure No. 24.

*Telegraphic.—From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral, Malakand, dated 12th August 1897.*

The Government of India authorise an advance being made on the left bank of the Swat river into Upper Swat to Saidu or Minglaor, as already recommended, if you and Sir Bindon Blood consider it still desirable. Let it be understood and made known that the advance is not made in order to deprive the tribes of their independence, but because the British Government must insist on due assurance that these tribes will not again attack us.

The advance into Upper Swat is made to mark the opinion of the British Government that the people of that place took part in the attack on the Malakand, and that the British Government have the power to advance if, and when, they choose. The Government have neither intention nor wish to inflict damage on the tribes of Upper Swat provided they immediately make submission and reparation. What measures have you taken and what do you propose with reference to the Ranizais and border Swatis in order to mark the complete ascendancy of the British Government over them? Do you recommend whole or partial disarmament of these tribes?

The Government of India are calling upon the Amir to withdraw his subjects who have joined the Adda Mullah's gathering and to prevent any more from joining. They are deferring for the present the consideration of the question of an expedition as proposed by the Commissioner of Peshawar into the Mohmand country.

## Enclosure No. 25.

*Translation of a letter from Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated the 13th August 1897.*

After compliments.—I have received instructions by telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy to inform Your Highness that the Government of India have received information from several sources that large numbers of Afghan subjects have joined the Mulla of Adda and taken an active part in the recent attack on the British frontier post of Shabkaddar and the burning of the British village of Shankargarh. It is reported that, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted on the Mulla's gathering by the Border Military Police holding the Shabkaddar post on the 7th August, and by British troops on the 9th August, he is still being joined by large parties of men from all parts of the Jalalabad valley, and that the villages of Chardeh, Ambarkhana, Basawal, Girdi, Sarkani and Lalpura are keeping rafts ready for the passage of the various contingents. It has also been stated that numbers of Afghan sepoys in plain clothes and Ut Khels from Laghman have joined the Mulla. It is unnecessary for the Viceroy to dilate upon the seriousness of this information. His Excellency demands that you will immediately take steps to recall your subjects, prevent others from crossing Your Highness's border with hostile intent, and render it impossible for them to repeat an offence so exceedingly grave as this deliberate violation of the British Indian frontier. The Viceroy in his letter of May 2nd 1896, called Your Highness's attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan. It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn Your Highness that if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, Your Highness must be held responsible for his actions. For the rest may you continue to enjoy good health.

## Enclosure No. 26.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 12th August 1897.*

Telegraphic.—I now think, in modification of my telegram of 5th, that the Shabkaddar attack on British territory is the one we must first avenge, and that advance up Swat valley should be postponed for present. I therefore recommend that Malakand Field Force should not go beyond Chakdarra, but should occupy itself with subduing tribes westward and south westward up to left bank of Panjkora and Swat rivers, while the Mohmand Field Force, which I proposed in my telegram of 10th, would sweep the country from right bank of same rivers westward to Kunar watershed. In this way we could effectually punish Utman Khels who live on both sides of these rivers, and who as you say require to be thoroughly cowed, as on the present occasion they have sent contingents both to Malakand and Shabkaddar, and they have never before been properly punished for the part they took against us in the Chitral campaign; but although I suggest that advance up Swat valley should be deferred as less immediately pressing than avenging the attack on Shabkaddar, I still retain the same opinion of its ultimate necessity, and the danger attending its postponement is apparent from Deane's telegram of last night, in which he says that people are beginning to believe again in the mad Fakir, because the latter says that he has stopped us at Chakdarra by supernatural means. I think therefore that a third field force of at least five thousand men should be assembled at Mardan with avowed intention of invading Boner from Peshawar side, if Bonerwals interfere again in the Swat valley. Government must be prepared to deal with these border troubles on a large scale, as they must be put down with a heavy hand.



## Enclosure No. 27.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th August 1897.*

WITH reference to the telegrams from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, which are noted on the margin, I am directed to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor realises that the burning and looting of Shankargarh constitute an outrage and a defiance of British authority which would very appropriately be met by the immediate advance of a strong column into the Mohmand country, and, if it is decided to take this action either in combination with part of the Malakand Field Force, as suggested in this office letter dated 8th August, or otherwise, he has no doubt it will have a decidedly good effect.

2. At the same time Sir Mackworth Young cannot but feel that, in view of information lately received regarding the issue of proclamations calling upon the tribes bordering on the Peshawar district to join in a combined effort against us, and of other circumstances which seem to show that the tribes are ready to respond to such a call, it is a matter for consideration whether such an advance shall be made at once or whether operations shall be conducted rather with reference to future possible developments and to the situation generally.

3. The force led by the Adda Mulla against Shankargarh was apparently a mixed gathering comprising not only Mohmands of the tract within the British sphere of influence, but also Mohmands and a number of others from Afghan territory; and the question which sections of Mohmands on the east of the Durand Line are implicated has not yet been definitely set at rest. Moreover the force has retired into the higher hills after suffering a loss of between 200 and 300 men killed besides a large number of wounded, and, though we must be prepared to meet any attack and, if necessary, to act on the offensive should the gathering remain in the neighbourhood, it is not impossible that here, as in the Tochi, our troops, if sent into the Mohmand country, will meet with no opposition and be locked up for a considerable period with the sole objects of asserting our authority. I am to state that the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that it is therefore more advisable to work out at leisure the mode in which punishment shall be inflicted for the Shabkaddar raid, and at all events postpone the occupation of the Mohmand country until full inquiry has been made regarding the composition of the gathering and the responsibility of the different sections, and until it may be more convenient to us to send troops across the frontier. He does not consider it necessary to make the advance at once, and he would much prefer to see the Peshawar garrison still further strengthened and a force mobilised for immediate action wherever our border becomes disturbed. The collection of such a force at Peshawar will have a more quieting effect than an expedition into the Mohmand country, especially if we find no enemy there. As General Elles in his telegram of 9th August says, we must have enough troops at Shabkaddar to act vigorously on the offensive whenever the enemy shows, but for the present it is in Sir Mackworth Young's opinion more important to strengthen our forces in the Peshawar valley than to invade the Mohmand hills.

## Enclosure No. 28.

*Extract from letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 8th August 1897.*

I have the honour to submit the following report on the late sudden disturbances in the Swat valley.

In my letter of 9th May last, I reported to you that persistent efforts had been and were being made by agents to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism in Swat, Bajaur and Dir, and I mentioned the steps which the Nawab of Dir proposed to take in order to break up the combination which had been formed

On 21st July 1897, I reported the result of his action. The Nawab being satisfied that everything was quiet, moved up to the Panjkora Kohistan, where some followers of the Palam Mulla were threatening to give trouble.

About the 18th July reports were received of a Fakir who had suddenly appeared in the country and established himself at Landaki, professing that one small pot of rice, which he had with him, was sufficient to feed multitudes; also professing to multiply to the vision of people a few small flags that he had with him. He said he had been sent by some one, but would not say by whom, and that he expected three others to join him. Two of these are said to have joined him, and one to be still in Boner. A large number of people, both trans-border and from the Peshawar district, visited him. All that enquiry could elicit was that he was a mad man. He was said to be brother of a man called Zardad in Boner; Zardad is said some 15 years ago accidentally to have killed the Fakir's son, since which time the Fakir had been a lunatic. Rahim Shah, however, who knows the whole of this country, does not believe this story, and says the man does not belong to this country.

About the 20th and 21st the Fakir began giving out that he had heavenly hosts with him, that his mission was to turn the British off the Malakand and out of Peshawar, as our rule of 60 years there was up. He claimed to have been visited by all deceased Fakirs, who told him the mouths of our guns and rifles would be closed, and that our bullets would be turned to water; that he had only to throw stones into the Swat river, and each stone he threw would have on us the effect of a gun. He gave out that he had no need of human assistance, as the heavenly hosts with him were sufficient. Up to Sunday, the 25th, people generally merely regarded him as a madman, and on that day I interviewed the Thana Khans, the headmen of Khar and some of the headmen of Uch, who all professed that there was nothing in the matter. The Fakir made one little start by setting light to a deserted hut near Lundaki, which had previously been occupied by tribesmen during the Chitral Relief Force. The tribesmen put out the fire and re-occupied the post without any orders from me and the Fakir withdrew. This was on the 25th, and on the same day he started off alone to come towards the Malakand, but was prevented by the people who told him it was folly. Nothing could be more re-assuring than this. I particularly warned the Thana Khans and jirga that they would be held responsible for preventing any disturbance on their border, and on Sunday Inayat Khan and Aslam Khan not only assured me that there was no prospect of trouble, but showed me letters from the Pisani Mulla, a man who is chief adviser to the Mian Guls, saying that, if the Fakir was causing annoyance, the Mian Guls would send their servant and remove him. Kakai Jan of Thana reported later that the Mian Guls had actually sent their servant, as they began to fear that the man would bring ruin on Muhammadans. This was the position up to the 26th. I had warned Colonel Meiklejohn that it might become advisable to move out the moveable column, but I was loth to do this for the following reasons. The column could only take five days' supplies with them, of which the men would have had to carry two—the movement would at once have caused a gathering to assemble about the Fakir—and the best and in fact only chance of the man being quietly removed was in the people themselves removing him. Further there would have been no troops left to guard the north and Kotal camps, both with a large amount of valuable stores which could not have been removed for safety into the fort under a week, and in event of a disturbance arising and the people taking to the hills above the Malakand, the water-supply of the fort would have been cut off, and it was certain we should have to return and fight our way back to the Kotal camp and recapture the Kotal.

On the 26th the Fakir moved with some boys of 13 and 14 years of age, one of whom he crowned with a puggrie, stating that he was the heir to the throne of Delhi, and, with another Fakir who had joined him, started towards Thana. He kept these boys steadily in front of him, and I saw one or two of their bodies afterwards lying in our camp. The Thana Khans and people were filled with superstitious fear of the Fakir, and



by his boldness convinced that he had arisen as a "buzurg." Inayat Khan fled to Chakdarra, Aslam Khan failing to restrain his men went off to Polai, and the remainder joined the Fakir *en masse*, and gave him passage onwards. On this day I sent Lieutenant Minchin, Assistant Political Agent, to Chakdarra to obtain full information and to report as to what was occurring; also to try and steady the Dir levies at Chakdarra, who in the afternoon were reported by the Jemadar to be unsteady. In the evening these levies joined the enemy with the exception of the Jemadar, who went into the fort and was killed fighting for us just as the fort was relieved on the 2nd August. When Lieutenant Minchin reached Chakdarra, he saw the Fakir pass Thana towards Alladand. The Fakir halted half-way between these two places, having at the time with him some boys and about 400 men, mostly of Thana, and these appeared to be for the most part unarmed. Rasul Khan, Inspector of Levies, who had endeavoured to get out the Alladand men and to induce the levies at Amandarra to stand to their posts, found he could do nothing with them. The fear of the Fakir took hold of them, they joined him, and he then in dusk of evening moved towards the Malakand. On his way up he cut the telegraph wire, and burnt the levy posts.

The levies at Khar fired a few shots on the Fakir's men, and then joined him. About 9.15 the Jemadar galloped in stating that the Fakir was advancing on the Malakand. There was only time to get the troops turned out to their alarm posts when an attack was made on the camp, the strength of the attacking party being at the time about 1,000 men. It is needless for me to enter into details of this and subsequent attacks, and the defence which the Officer Commanding at Malakand will doubtless deal with in his own report. Of the men who penetrated into the Commissariat and Sappers lines, and whose bodies were found next morning, most were identified by Sepoys and others as men well known in camp, formerly supplying wood, grass and milk. The enemy also entered the Serai in which levies were stationed, murdered the political Khazanchi (treasurer) and burnt all property in the Serai, including the whole of the tents of the Political Department. The men who murdered the Khazanchi were from Khar and Batkhela, and were heard calling out "that is the man who has the money." The enemy were admitted to the Serai by the levies who opened the door to them, and the bodies of three of the levies were found amongst those who fought against us. One Habib-ul-Rahman, who had been stopped as a suspicious character, was confined at the time under the levy guard in the Serai. This man escaped when the enemy entered the Serai; he joined with them in the attack and eventually went away with them.

On the 27th July fighting continued more or less all day, and it was found advisable to abandon the north camp where the guns, the 31st Punjab Infantry, the cavalry detachment and the transport were located. This step was necessary not only for defence of the Malakand Kotal, but also to save the transport which, in event of serious attack on the north camp, could not be protected by the troops in the camp. The Guides Cavalry and Infantry, which arrived from Mardan during the afternoon, enabled the concentration to be properly covered. On this day men swarmed across the Swat river from Badwan and Borangola, opposite the Malakand, and Utman Khels joined in considerable numbers. Chakdarra was attacked by Adinzais and Shamozaï Swatis on the night of the 26th, and a large miscellaneous gathering of Swatis, Adinzais, Talashis, Shamozaï, Utman Khels, Bajauris and men from Maidan attacked the fort continually until the 2nd August. Miru, the leading Utman Khel Malik, was killed in the fighting, and one of Umra Khan's brothers, Zain-ulla Khan, was undoubtedly present, as his horse was found wounded near Chakdarra. From information that I have gathered, I estimate that about 2,000 men from the Peshawar district joined the enemy. The son of a large land-owner in Hashtnagar, Shahbaz Khan of Utmanzai, joined with 120 men from Charsadda. Men joined from the Baizai tract in Yusafzai in large numbers, those from Kni, Mian Khan, Sanghar, &c., coming with Enfield rifles furnished to them by Government for defence of their villages, and there were also men from Nowshera. The difficulty of our position was that our men were getting worn out with continual fighting, and the number was not sufficient without reinforcements, to enable a counter-move to be made. It was felt that could such



move be made, the disturbance would subside as quickly as it arose, and that until such move were made, and the practical state of siege at the Malakand were removed, men from every tribe on the border would join the enemy. It was not until reinforcements arrived that a forward move could be made, and on the 2nd August a brilliant and successful sortie was made under General Meiklejohn, C.B., Commanding Malakand Brigade. The enemy already disheartened by their losses were driven back from the Malakand, and Chakdarra, which had been hard pressed, was relieved. The move was one of those which meant either success or disaster.

The following tribes were represented in the attack :—Ranizais of Swat, Lower Swatis, Sam Ranizais though the Maliks of the latter succeeded in preventing an attack on Dargai, which post was important for communications with India) one, if not two, sections of Bonerwals (the Salarzais and Ashurzais), Upper Swatis, Adinzai, Talash and Dosha Khel, Bajauris, including Maidan and Jandol, and Utman Khels, both of Asil and other sections on the British border and Shamozaïs.

Sharif Khan of Alladand and the sons of Saadat Khan of Alladand took a leading part in the attacks.

The Dir Levies of Chakdarra Serai, and at the Panjkora bridge deserted their posts, some of them joining the enemy. Fortunately they had been kept short of ammunition.

This temporarily cut our communications with Chitral. Khan Bahadur Mian Rahim Shah, who had been with the Nawab of Dir in Kohistan, came down as quickly as possible, and, as he has done on many occasions before, rendered Government excellent service. He used his influence with the Panjkora clans, the Ausa Khel and Nasratdin Khel and with Abdulla Khan of Robat; commenced to collect men to attack the gathering at Chakdarra. He worked strenuously to keep the Paindah Khels and Sultan Khels quiet. Of the former one small section sent men to the enemy—the Sultan Khels were shaky: this was due to the Akhundzadas of Khal, whom I have always noted to be the men who are most likely to start trouble on the Panjkora line. They sent men to join the enemy. The Nawab, who had been in Kohistan, returned to Dir on the 30th July. Ahmad Mian, who was at Dir, says the Nawab had a very difficult part to play. Great pressure was put on him to join the enemy, and he received letters from the Fakir offering to make him a Badshah if he did join. Mian Ahmad reports that there was never any wavering in the Nawab's mind, though like other Muhammadans he was upset. He was, in my opinion, affected by the attached letter, which I forward herewith. It is one of three which he received. I cannot ascertain who Abdul Wadud, the writer, is. The Nawab has the two other letters which reached him before this one, and which I cannot at present obtain. The significant point in this letter is the *Ranizai* and *Khan Khel* jirgas coming first, and it was Thana and Alladand who made the first move.

I must note that the leading companion of the Fakir killed at the Malakand was not a man of this country; and it is a matter of general belief that he came from India. I emphasise this point as I think it important that it should be faced. After the first attack on the Malakand and Chakdarra on the night of the 26th, the officers in Chakdarra saw at 2 A.M. a balloon with a peculiar bright ball of scintillating light let go from the hills about 4 miles above Chakdarra. The object of this was obvious, but this was neither made in Swat nor was it a Pathan idea. The Pathan idea is to light fires on the hills, but this balloon was undoubtedly imported from India.

On the 28th or 29th July the Fakir was wounded and his companion was killed, and it was then when he retired that the Mian Guls made a move bringing with them men from Upper Swat generally and Bonerwals. They arrived at the Malakand on the 30th with 900 men. I wish to emphasise this point, as it is to my mind conclusive against the theory that has been put forward that the disturbance has arisen owing to the action of the Nawab of Dir in regard to Upper Swat. Had this been the case, the Mian Guls would have been the first to join and the Upper Swatis would have been the principal assailants at the first. The Ranizais and Thana people who first joined are followers

of the Manki Mulla, not of the Mian Guls, and the Manki Mulla's reply on his own account to the Fakir was "the Malakand is a hill of hornets ; I advise you not to touch it," whereby he has gained much credit amongst the people as a man of foresight.

After the relief of Chakdarra on the 2nd August, the gatherings broke up. What the numbers were I do not profess to know. Native information is that the total number which attacked the Malakand was 12,000. From what I myself saw I have judged that there were not more than 6,000 of the enemy at any one time at the Malakand, but these were daily relieved, and Lieutenant Minchin puts the gatherings at Chakdarra at 8,000, *viz.*, 4,000 taking an active part in the attack and 4,000 on the hills around looking on. The losses to the enemy are by their own account from 2,000 to 3,000 killed, and the whole country is filled with wounded. They admit 500 to 700 killed in the attacks on the Malakand, over 500 were killed during the sortie to Chakdarra, and some 2,000 are reported to have been killed at Chakdarra.

The villages of Batkhela, Alladand and Thana being the worst, have been set fire to, but the damage done is not great. The villages are large and would take over a month to burn. The Fakir retired to his old haunt at Landaki. He there yesterday tried to stir up a further disturbance, giving out openly that he has the assistance of the Amir to rely on, that the attack has been premature, and for this he blames the people instead of himself for starting it, and he also states that any way the British will not be in this country in the autumn. By the way he talks he hints at further disturbances elsewhere. At present the Musa Khels have turned him out of their territory.

The question arises as to the steps now to be taken. My own opinion is clear that a force should move rapidly into Upper Swat as far as Mingalaor or Saidu. I regard it as important that a swift blow be struck to prevent further trouble. If delay in making the move takes place, the effect of the move will be to re-raise excitement. I think if this move be not made, opinion will gain ground in the country that we are afraid of the Fakir. If Government desire, I can, as already reported by telegram, possibly settle up matters, so far as the Upper Swatis are concerned, by jirga. This will to a certain extent depend on whether their faith in the Fakir is broken. As regards the Lower Swatis and Ranizais, I consider that the people might be allowed to return to their villages, their Maliki allowances and tolls being forfeited and a heavy fine imposed based upon the damage to Government and private property at the Malakand. The rice crop now on the ground is worth, I should say,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs, and the fine should be recovered from this. They should also be compelled to surrender all arms before being permitted to re-settle in their villages.

The Sam Ranizais should be punished similarly, but in less degree owing to the Maliks having averted any attack on Dargai, and I submit that measures be taken against British subjects who joined against us, so far as it can be ascertained who they are.

The right of Government to impose revenue should, in my opinion, be now reserved as regards both Sam Ranizai, Upper Ranizai and Lower Swat. Of the levies, those of the Sam Ranizais for the most stood their ground, though not with much heart in them. Of the levies in the valley, I disarmed and dismissed as many as we could lay hands on after the first outbreak, but some 15 sowars under a Thana Jemadar stood to their work, and withdrew to the Kotal with the troops from the north camp where they worked well until the camp was abandoned. The levies should be replaced, as far as possible, by men from our territory, though whether they will eventually be reliable it is hard to say. I think at the present time the less we arm these men, whether trans-border men or our own subjects, the better.

The whole rising has been an astounding business, and the people seem to have lost their heads and all view of their own interests in a blind belief that we should be turned out of the country. This confidence was so marked that cattle and grain, &c., had all been left in the villages, and at Chakdarra the

bridge over the Swat river and the cavalry horses in the post, though entirely exposed, were left practically unmolested in the confident feeling that they would be useful when the post was captured.

I regard the outbreak as having been due to steady and continual working. It has been going on since this line was occupied; it is the outbreak which was first started and intended in June 1895 (*vide* paragraphs 78 to 81 of my Political Report on the Expedition). It has been due now directly to the chance of the right man being found to start the business. His action in moving this way almost alone, showing confidence in the heavenly hosts, appealed at once to all. The people then flocked to him.

Had the Thana and Alladand people done their duty to Government, the movement would never have been made. Our bitterest enemies were those who have benefited most by our presence in the country. The only reply that I have been able to get out of any of them yet as to the cause of their rising is that the Fakir deceived them, while one reply I got was that "it had to be some time or other."

To touch on the effect of the action of the Nawab of Dir in Upper Swat on the matter, I consider that had it not been for his action we should have had a stronger combination against us, and had the first attack been made by large numbers instead of comparatively small ones we should have been placed in a very difficult position.

As regards the extraordinary power gained by the Fakir by his pretensions, I think it is sufficient to point to the manner in which our own subjects in Peshawar have been affected, and it is little wonder that he obtained such a hold as he did over these ignorant, fanatical, bigoted, priest-ridden people, who absolutely believed that we should be driven out of the country. The Fakir has again tried to collect a gathering, but my latest reports are that the Musa Khel section have turned him out of their limits, and that he has moved up to Chagarzai country. This latter point requires confirmation. One of the superstitions indulged in by the people regarding the Fakir was that he could render himself invisible when he chose. This point took hold of the mind of the Nawab of Dir who was doubtful whether by not joining against us he would not risk being visited by the invisible Fakir and killed.

It is fortunate that the outbreak did not occur when the reliefs were on their way to Chitral. Had this Fakir been the agent then employed, instead of the Sheikh of the Palam Mulla who was caught, the trouble would have been more serious.

Whether the Fakir has lately come from Mecca I cannot ascertain for certain; he himself says that he has lately returned from Mecca. One of the main places with which he is connected in India is Ajmere.

Since writing this I have received news of the attack on Shabkaddar Fort in the Peshawar district by another of the combination, the Adda Mulla. This man's connection with the Sipah Salar is well known. He was in communication with the Fakir in Swat between 18th and 22nd July.

This report is very hurried. I am much pressed with work and have no time now to rewrite it. It is needless for me to express my disappointment and regret that this outbreak has occurred. It means that two years' steady work and patience have been thrown away.

In view of the maintenance of communications with Chitral, the future passage of reliefs to and from Chitral, I think that those tribes and sections near our line who joined against us should be punished. On the Swat side a move to Minglaor or Saidu would settle matters, and the Utman Khels between the Malakand and the Swat river should also be dealt with. The Shamozaï Utman Khels on the right bank of the river deserve punishment. This means an independent expedition, but unless steps to punish these people be taken now, or they be given to understand that Government in its own time will punish them, there will be the greatest risk of an attack on reliefs passing up or down the road.



## Enclosure No. 29.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 14th August 1897.*

SITUATION unchanged. Everything quiet at Shabkaddar. Adda Mulla still at Galanai where he is putting up with Muhammad Didar, Halimzai. Report just received that men from Jalalabad district are still joining him, also that Sipah Salar has sent him four hundred maunds of grain on four rafts down the river, but confirmation is required of both these items of news.

## Enclosure No. 30.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 15th August 1897.*

EVERYTHING quiet. Situation continues unchanged at Shabkaddar. A firman from the Amir is said to have been received by Governor of Jalalabad, expressing displeasure at men having gone from that district to join the Adda Mulla and directing that none should be allowed to go for the future.

## Enclosure No. 31.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 15th August 1897.*

Do you believe report of the Commandant, Fort Lockhart, that Mulla Said Akbar has prevailed on Orakzais to unite against Government, and do you think that Kohat ought to be strengthened?

## Enclosure No. 32.

*(Telegraphic.)—From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 15th August, 1897.*

I THINK any report of Orakzai combination to attack Samana should be received with great caution. It is most improbable that they would rise without aid from Afridis, who if they do move are much more likely to give trouble on Peshawar side. No news yet of any jirga being held in Tirah last Friday, but Aka Khel Mulla is said to be in Maidan Tirah trying to collect Afridis by spreading a report that a British force is assembling at Bara to attack them.

## Enclosure No. 33.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 15th August 1897.*

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a telegram, dated 14th instant, from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, in which he intimates that Sayad Akbar, Aka Khel, has succeeded in prevailing on the Orakzais to unite against Government, and has gone to Tirah to work upon the Afridis.

In view of the information conveyed as to the strength of the Kohat garrison, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it will be well if orders are issued at once to hold troops in readiness to move in support to Kohat, if the further information promised by the Deputy Commissioner indicates that this agitation amongst the Orakzais and Afridis is spreading.

## Sub-Enclosure.

(Telegraphic.) From the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 14th August 1897.

Following telegram has been received from Donald, Fort Lockhart :—  
 “ Report received to-day that Mulla Said Akbar, Aka Khel, has prevailed on Orakzai tribes to unite against Government. Mulla left for Tirah to-day to induce Afridi tribes to rise. Am sending down ladies to-morrow.”

## Enclosure No. 34.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 16th August 1897.*

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, dated 8th instant, and of its enclosure, being a translation of the proclamation of the Mulla of Adda referred to in Commissioner's telegram, dated 7th instant, and to add that the chief book is entitled “ Kalimatu Amir il Balad fil Targhibi ila ul Jihad,” and that a copy of this work is being examined in this office and will be submitted to the Government of India as soon as this has been done.

## Sub-Enclosure.

*Extract from Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 8th August 1897.*

The Mulla of Adda or Hadda was himself originally a resident of a village of that name in Ningrahar, which is the country on the right bank of the Kabul river stretching westward from Dakka towards Jalalabad. It is perhaps natural, therefore, that he should write to his fellow-countrymen, the Sangu Khel Shinwaris and other Ningraharis, though these are all subjects of the Amir, who, he must know, cannot move without the Amir's permission, but he has no connection whatever with the Ut Khel Ghilzais of Lughman, to whom one of his proclamations is said to have been addressed, and when it is remembered that, though the Mulla left his home and took refuge with the Mohmands 7 or 8 years ago on account of the Amir's displeasure, he has been on the best of terms for the last 3 or 4 years with the Sipah Salar and the Amir.

I may add too that I have in my possession a letter in which the following passage occurs :—“ The Mulla Sahib is up to the present at his own place, but is watching the doings of the Fakir (in Swat). A letter of the Fakir's has come to Safdar Khan telling him to come quickly for jihad. The Mulla Sahib will start in the next two or three days. Sixty copies of the ‘ Targhib-ul-Jihad ’ and the ‘ Takwin-ud-din ’ have reached the Mulla Sahib of Adda from the Kunar ilaka. Kandahari Safis and Utmanzais of Yakhdand have gone

\* A “ kharwar ” is reckoned as 10 English maunds.

(Sd.) R. UNDY.

to the assistance of the Fakir. The Hakim (Ruler) of Kunar has sent 200 ‘ kharwars ’\* of wheat and 5 ‘ kharwars ’\* of barley to help the Mulla Sahib's supplies.”

Considering that the Mulla moved from his home at Jarobi of the Baizai Mohmands on the 1st instant, and that his gathering largely augmented by Ningraharis and other subjects of the Amir, attacked Shankargarh on the evening of the 7th, it can scarcely be doubted that the supplies and inflammatory pamphlets mentioned in this extract were sent to him from Kunar for the purpose of his expedition.

P.S., 9th August 1897.—Since writing the above, I hear that a further supply of a box-full of books on the jihad reached the Adda Mulla from Kunar only 2 or 3 days ago, and the reports received to-day from the Khyber fully

confirm the fact that his gathering has been joined by many hundreds of the Amir's subjects from Ningrahar, who crossed the Kabul river near Dakka in the most open and flagrant manner.

---

Annexure to above.

*Translation of a letter, without date, addressed by the Mulla of Adda to the people of Ningrahar, &c., &c.*

Help from God (awaits us) and victory is at hand.

Let it, after compliments, be understood by, and known to, the followers of the greatest of the prophets, viz., all the people of Ningrahar, the Shinwaris and others that the people of Swat, Bajaur and Boner have all united together and succeeded in annihilating the troops of the infidels stationed in Swat, and have plundered their property. All the Muslims are, therefore, hereby informed that the Mohmands as a body have joined me in advancing upon Dheri (Shankargarh) *via* Gandab for the purpose of carrying on a jihad. It is hoped that you on receipt of this letter will rise up, if sitting, and start, if standing, and, taking the necessary supplies with you, come without fail as soon as possible. God willing the time has come when the "Kafirs" (infidels) should disappear. Be not idle. What more should I insist upon. Peace be upon you.

(Sd.) The Fakir of Adda.

---

Enclosure No. 35.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 17th August 1897.*

I am watching events in Orakzai and Afridi country very carefully from this side, and all my reports from reliable sources say that up to date there is no serious or general movement, either among Orakzais or Afridis, though recent events on Peshawar border have of course occasioned a great deal of talk.

---

Enclosure No. 36.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 17th August 1897.*

Malik has just reached Peshawar in person, but with no following, any reports that Afridi lashkar, said to be ten thousand strong, accompanied by fifteen hundred Mullas from Ningrahar, started from Bagh, Tirah, yesterday morning to attack Khyber road and posts from Landi Kotal downwards. This lashkar was to reach Bazar valley to-day and the Khyber to-morrow, and consists of all Afridi clans connected with Khyber road except Kuki Khel, who are holding entirely aloof.

---

Enclosure No. 37.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 16th August 1897.*

In continuation of my letter dated 15th instant, I am desired to forward a copy of telegrams giving further particulars of the agitation amongst the Orakzai and Afridi tribes.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor has already recommended in my letter above quoted that, if a regiment has to be sent from Kohat to the Samana and the Kohat garrison is thereby left weak, reinforcements should be sent promptly, and this recommendation has doubtless been duly considered by the Government of India.



3. As regards the telegrams now sent, I am to say that it will, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, be matter for surprise if there is no disturbance on the Peshawar-Kohat frontier after what has occurred, and he thinks that we should be prepared for all possibilities.

4. I am to add that Sir Mackworth Young has already advised that the Kohat garrison should be strengthened, and that a force should be ready to move from Peshawar in the event of a combined effort being made by the tribes to the west and south-west of the district. It seems to him clear that, whatever be the cause, a vigorous attempt is being made all round to raise the tribes by the preaching of Mullahs, and that it is more necessary now to be cautious in discrediting than in crediting definite information regarding the intention of the tribes to respond to the call.

---

Enclosure No. 35.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 18th August 1897.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th August 1897, regarding the agitation among the Orakzai and Afridi tribes.

2. As His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is already aware, orders have issued for the Kohat garrison to be immediately reinforced by the 9th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, a wing of the 1st Battalion Scots Fusiliers, the 18th Bengal Lancers and the 15th Bengal Infantry. Meanwhile, it appears from telegrams just received from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division that an attack, both in the Khyber and Samana directions, is considered imminent, and steps are being taken to further strengthen the force in the Peshawar district.

---

Enclosure No. 39.

*Extract from letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 17th August 1897.*

I AM directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copy of letter containing particulars of the mad Fakir.

---

Sub-Enclosure.

*Extract, dated 2nd August 1897, from Political Officer, Khyber.*

THE Swat Fakir, known as "Mad Mulla," is a native of Boner. In the late Umbeyla Campaign, in which the Akhund of Swat took prominent part, the said Fakir with his brother, Zardad, *alias* "Pahlwan," had also joined. "Pahlwan" met his death in the fighting, but the Fakir escaped, and wandered from place to place. Afterwards he had a trip to Baghdad *via* Bombay, whence, after a time, he proceeded to "Mazar-i-Sharif" in Turkistan. After passing some time there, he appeared at Kabul some three years ago, and interviewed His Highness the Amir, expressing himself as a "ghazi." At Kabul he was known as "Diwana Baba." His Highness thinking him mad, dismissed him from Kabul with charity of a few rupees.

Thence he came to Mulla Najm-ud-din, Akhundzada of Adda, and, after passing some days with him, went to Boner and became custodian of the shrine of "Pir Baba." He is an old man, can read and write, and is known in Boner under the name of Sartor\* Fakir.

\* The bare-headed Fakir.

## Enclosure No. 40.

(Telegraphic.) *From the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 19th August 1897.*

NOTHING was seen by a cavalry reconnaissance this morning to Bajeari post inside Pass. Barton reports Afridi gathering smaller than originally reported, and, up to yesterday, had not left Maidan of Tirah. Khyber open. Commissioner informs me that first reports by Amin Khan appear to have been much exaggerated. Cavalry made a reconnaissance from Shabkaddar up Ali Khandi route; came on picket of enemy; a few shots fired; no damage done. No gathering reported in Mohmand country and Mulla still at Nawagai. Telegraph open at Abazai.

## Enclosure No. 41.

(Telegraphic.) *From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 20th August 1897.*

No attack in Samana direction and no news yet of any gathering in Khyber limits. Previous reports seem to have been much exaggerated. Cavalry reconnaissance on 18th from Shabkaddar up Ali Kandi route saw a picket of enemy, shots exchanged: no casualties. Adda Mulla still in Nawagai.

## Enclosure No. 42.

(Telegraphic.) *From the Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 20th August 1897.*

A FEW days ago Maulvi Shwaib of Babukarra in Bajaur is said to have left for Boner with several copies of the Amir's book on jehad for distribution. This Maulvi is a friend of the Sipah Salar's, and is believed to be in receipt of an allowance.

## Enclosure No. 43.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 19th August 1897.*

I AM directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India a copy of the telegram noted in the margin, regarding the departure of members of certain tribes on the Hazara border for Upper Swat.

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, dated, 17th August 1897.

## Sub-Enclosure.

(Telegraphic.) *From the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 17th August 1897.*

All quiet here. The following are reported to have left for Upper Swat in the course of the last week and are not yet reported to have returned: about 300 men from Chamla and the Upper Khudu Khel; about 200 Gadoons; about 120 Utmanzai; 200 Hindustanis, with a few Amazai; Hashim Ali and his cousin, Turabaz, with some trans-Indus Chagharzai; no Madda Khel, no Hassanzai, a few Akazai; no one from the Chakesar valley; no cis-Indus Chagharzai. About 300 men from the Puran valley apparently in Boner. Mudaru Khan of Dhaggar was suspected of treachery and is reported to have been killed by the Hindustanis. The so-called mad Fakir is said to be the nephew or brother of one Zerdad, a notorious bad character in Boner, originally a Khudu Khel, who died among the Daulatzai. The Indus tribes are carefully watching the course of events in Upper Swat; therefore kindly telegraph to me any news of importance from there.

## Enclosure No. 44.

(Telegraphic.) *From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 21st August 1897.*

Deputy Commissioner Kohat, in frequent telegrams of yesterday and to-day, continues to report that a large Afridi lashkar has left Tirah to attack Khyber, and that the Aka Khel Afridi Mulla Saiyid Akbar, is busy among the Orakzais and Daulatzais, stirring them up to attack Samana and Shiah villages on the Kohat border. Many reports are also being received on this side to a similar effect, and Political Officer, Khyber, wired from Jamrud this morning that a large Afridi gathering, which had actually started from Tirah, was expected to-day at Chora in Bazar valley, and would attack Khyber Posts if held by British troops, or else come down upon Fort Jamrud or Bara Post. With the force now at Jamrud as detailed in my telegram 17th instant, nothing is to be feared there, and after consultation between General Elles and myself, the movable column, which had previously been told off in case of necessity for Bara Post, marched out there this afternoon, consisting of two squadrons, 9th Bengal Lancers, field battery, wing of Devons, and one native infantry battalion. Everything is quiet in Khyber, although movement among Afridis is primarily due to preachings of Mullas incited by letters received from Mulla of Adda. I hear from several sources that the enhancement of the salt duty at Kohat mines is also being used as a grievance for stirring up the tribesmen.

## Enclosure No. 45.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 21st August 1897.*

As the recent news from Peshawar and Kohat, and especially that conveyed in telegram, dated 20th instant, from Commissioner Peshawar, appears to indicate that the Afridis are still wavering before definitely committing themselves to hostilities against Government, I am desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to suggest that it might be advisable to issue a proclamation to them somewhat on the lines of the draft submitted herewith.

2. Our force in Peshawar is now so strong that this action could hardly be attributed even by Pathans to cowardice, while it might strengthen the hands of those amongst the Afridis who are well disposed towards us. I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor would advise that a discretion be left to Sir R. Udny, whom the Lieutenant-Governor has not yet consulted, to decide whether to issue the proclamation or no.

## PROCLAMATION TO THE KHYBER AFRIDIS.

Be it known unto you that reports have reached Government that certain foolish members of your tribe have lent an ear to the senseless words of some self-seeking persons, and are said to be intending to commit themselves to hostilities against Government. The force now collected at Peshawar is sufficient to reduce to submission any tribe which may venture to offend. Government, however, is unwilling that through ignorance and heedlessness you should incur its displeasure, inasmuch as for some years past friendly relations have subsisted between it and you. That Government keeps its promises from the history of the Khyber arrangements entered into in 1879 you must be well aware. Your allowances have been duly paid, your country has not been occupied, and your tribal arrangements have not been interfered with. On your part also the agreement has been reasonably carried out.

This warning therefore is addressed to you so that you may pause before breaking the friendly relations which have hitherto subsisted, and which the Government is quite willing to maintain.



## Enclosure No. 46.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 22nd August 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 21st August 1897, submitting the draft of a proclamation which the Lieutenant-Governor suggests might, subject to the discretion of Sir R. Udny, be issued to the Afridis of the Khyber.

2. The Government of India have no objection to the issue of a warning which may be sent, verbally or in writing, in such way as the Commissioner thinks best calculated to reach the people for whom it is intended. The Government of India would prefer, however, that it should not take the form of a proclamation. The issue of any message of the kind must depend upon whether Sir Richard Udny considers it advisable. It should be addressed to the tribesmen either by himself or by the Political Officer more immediately in relation with them, and though it may well remind them of the advantage they have derived from the payment of allowances and otherwise, and the risk they run of forfeiting these advantages, as described in the draft proclamation you have submitted, it would be better not to dwell, as proposed, on the strength of the force now assembled at Peshawar. It would be a serious matter if the tribes thought we had admitted that we were not always strong enough to crush them.

## Enclosure No. 47.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 22nd August 1897.*

Commandant, Border Police, has received a letter of yesterday's date from Tarakzai Maliks to say that Adda Mulla is trying to re-assemble a lashkar of the Khwazai, Baizai and other Mohmand clans, and that the Halimzai, feeling that they have already committed themselves, wish to persuade him next time to attack Michni, so that the Tarakzais may be implicated too. Letter ends by asking permission to come in and obtain verbal orders, but Deputy Commissioner has replied that there is no need for this, and that they should stay at home to prevent any attack through their own limits, for which they will be held responsible.

## Enclosure No. 48.

*Translation of a letter from the Amir of Afghanistan to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated Wednesday, 18th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H. = 18th August 1897.*

After compliments.—I received and perused your letter of the 13th August 1897 = 13th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H., in which you write :—

*(See above, No. 25.)*

I have understood its contents.

I read your letter in order to acquaint myself with the circumstances concerning Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan and the people under the jurisdiction of Jalalabad about which you have written. I now write to say that, as regards Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan and the regular Afghan army, not a single man is or will be with the followers of Mulla Najm-ud-din, and hereafter too none will accompany him. As regards tribesmen you know yourself that for fear of me they can never openly join such a movement; if any one has come, he must have gone secretly. You are aware yourself that a few years ago Mulla Najm-ud-din fled from Kabul and settled at Jarobi in the Peshawar district, that the trusted officers of the British Government summoned him to their presence on several occasion, and, though he did not attend on them, he was keeping up correspondence with them and had fled from my country. On account of the evil acts he had committed, and the many disturbances which he had created among the people, he was so much frightened at his own misdeeds

that he took refuge near Peshawar. The Mohmands and the people of Jalalabad and of the mountain districts of Jalalabad look upon him as their prophet, and at his bidding and the bidding of the Mulla of Manki thousands of men are their devoted disciples. Just as in old days in Europe the Popes used to profess to be the sole disposers of heaven and hell, and the people also accepted the word of worthless priests, so too these Mullas claim to possess the same power; and during these last few years they have stirred up my own Afghan subjects to rebel against me, so that in every rising, whether at Kandahar or in the case of Mulla Mushk-i-Alam or in the case of the Uzbek Mullas who joined Ishak in Balkh, it was the Mullas on every occasion who created the disturbance. There is a village called Hadda, which is inhabited by Chumars, or leather tanners, but because it is the residence of this mischievous Mulla Najm-ud-din, his disciples have named this impure village, Hadda Sharif, that is to say, Hadda the noble, and his pupils and disciples regard him as a prophet. What calamities are there that they have not suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed by his senseless commands? He has now taken up his abode in a country which is independent of Kabul and in the neighbourhood of Peshawar, and has made himself a notable personage. Under these circumstances, let the trusted officers of the British Government themselves look at the matter impartially and say in what way I could deal with him, and how am I to arrange for him and his disciples, who regard him as a prophet and gather round him secretly? Every Mulla for many years denounced me in various ways as a Kafir, and at their bidding their disciples fought against me, and their houses were destroyed and they themselves were killed. For fourteen years they raised every part of Afghanistan against me, both in the plain country and in the hills, till thousands of men perished on both sides, and several of the Mulla agitators themselves were killed with thousands of the disciples of these turbulent priests. Every Mulla raised the people against me as long as he could, and when he had failed, he used to take shelter within the limits of the British Government, and, by the magnanimity of that Government, a morsel of bread used to be given him, upon which these Mullas used to maintain themselves. These now are the very same Mullas who have fled from me and have settled in territory which is independent of me near Peshawar. In what way then can I manage them? As regards the Sipah Salar and the regular army, you may rest assured that no such hostile act shall ever be committed by them, but as it has been or may have been reported to you that the regular army or the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan is taking part in this disturbance, this is all a fabrication, and I myself take oath that neither the troops nor the trusted officers of Afghanistan have any part in this matter. Every word that may have reached the ears of the trusted officers of the British Government is without foundation. On account of the proximity to you of these Mullas who are close to your country, and have now according to the boundary demarcation fallen within the limits of the British Government, what more can I add in this matter to these arguments? For the rest, by the grace of God, all is well. May the days of honour be perpetual.

---

Enclosure No. 49.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 22nd August 1897.*

Following reply from Amir (*see* preceeding enclosure).

No doubt when the Mulla of Adda fled to the Mohmand country in the first instance, it was to escape from the Amir. There is no truth in the Amir's statements that British officers have ever been in communication with the Mulla of Adda, or that Government has given allowances to refugee Mullas who had fled to India. The Mohmand village of Jarobi, in which the Mulla resides, belongs to the Usman Khel section of the Baizai clan; it is therefore on the Amir's side of the political boundary agreed upon last spring, which gives to us only the Musa Khel section of the Baizais. If, however, we adhered to the Durand boundary as described in my proclamation of June 1894, Jarobi would be, as the Amir now says it is, on our side of the line. The Amir practically does not seem to deny that his subjects from the Jalalabad district joined the



Mulla, and, though he asserts that they must have done so secretly under the Mulla's overwhelming spiritual ascendancy with which he implies that he is unable to cope himself, he entirely ignores our accusation of rafts being publicly held ready for their passage across the Kabul river, and, in point of fact, the contingents started and returned most openly in large bodies with flags flying and drums beating.

---

Enclosure No. 50.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 23rd August 1897.*

Telegram from Political Officer, Khyber, from Jamrud states that a patrol of Khyber Rifles brings in news of fighting at Ali Masjid since early morning to-day. A second telegram, an hour later, from Jamrud says that the Afridi gathering at Ali Masjid has divided into two portions, the second coming by Shudanai towards Fort Maude where the beat of their drums can be heard. Colonel Aslam Khan adds that the Afridi Maliks are responsible for safety of Khyber Pass, that these Maliks are now present in their own limits, and that, considering the difficulties and heat of weather, he is opposed to our going to help the Maliks in the Pass, but that we should go against lashkar if it comes to open ground. I quite agree, and, Maliks must be required to act up to their engagements without extraneous assistance, nor are the troops at Jamrud equipped to enter the Pass.

---

Enclosure No. 51.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Murree, 21st August 1897.*

I have received political information which is so voluminous and in some respects so conflicting that I have not thought it necessary to repeat it. The general impression it produces is that frontier disturbances from the Khyber to Para Chinari are daily becoming more probable, and that considerable further reinforcements are likely to be required at Kohat. Brigadier-General Yeatman-Biggs should reach Kohat this morning, and I have desired him carefully to consider the situation, decide on his scheme of operations and report his requirements, bearing in mind that an unlimited supply of troops is not available. Officer Commanding, Kohat, reports that last night he proceeded with movable column to Hangu at instance of Deputy Commissioner, column consisting of four squadrons, four mountain guns and 5th Punjab Infantry, 600 strong.

---

Enclosure No. 52.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 20th August 1897.*

I sent for Colonel Aslam Khan who came in yesterday from Jamrud, and after discussing the matter with him we went to General Elles. Result is that we are all three absolutely and unanimously opposed to calling in Khyber Rifles from posts in the Pass to Head-quarters at Jamrud, even if matters were as bad as represented in my telegram of 17th; such a measure would have worst possible effect, as it would at once be supposed that we had abandoned the Pass, and the posts at Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid would probably be looted by tribesmen. We are all of opinion that we must trust Khyber Rifles under their own native officers to the end, and that even if they eventually failed us and bolted with their arms and ammunition, this would not be so bad as showing distrust of them by calling them into Jamrud before they had been fairly tested. I do not say that we are out of the wood yet, but every day of inaction makes a breach of the peace more unlikely. Colonel Aslam Khan thinks that it would put an end to all discussions in Tirah if we threw troops into Landi



Kotal and Ali Masjid, but General Elles and I are both disinclined to take this step merely for protection of Khyber posts and road. Moreover, if troops were stationed in the pass the supply question would be an awkward one, as we should be obliged to send everything out from Peshawar, except grass and wood at Landi Kotal, and wood at Ali Masjid. From a political point of view, too, I think the Maliks should be required to act up to their engagements without extraneous assistance.

---

Enclosure No. 53.

(Telegraphic.) *From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 24th August 1897.*

A sepoy of the Khyber Rifles returned to Jamrud this afternoon from Ali Masjid; he reports that the Ali Masjid post was evacuated and burnt last night. Garrison of Khyber Rifles and Malik Amin Khan, with his supporting party of Kuki Khel tribesmen, are said to be at Lashora on their way back to Jamrud. I have just had a long consultation with Colonel Aslam Khan, but it is impossible at present to make proposals for punishment of Afridis or future arrangements till we see what happens at Landi Kotal. No attack on that post has yet been reported, but the next four or five days will show us what we have to reckon with, as the Afridi gathering is not likely to stay longer in Khyber.

---

Enclosure No. 54.

*Letter from the British Agent at Kabul to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 18th August 1897.*

I attended His Highness the Amir's Darbar yesterday noon at Balabagh, which was held in honour of the anniversary of the assumption by His Highness of the religious title "Zia-ul-millat wad-din" which was assumed by him last year. The Darbar was a very large one and was attended by all civil and military officers and other persons. The principal Khans and Mullas from different parts of the country were also invited to attend the Darbar.

At about 4 p.m. His Highness the Amir gathered all the Darbaris near him, and he first asked me whether I had received any communication from the Commissioner's office regarding Mulla Hadda's revolt, but as I had received no such communication I replied accordingly. Afterwards His Highness the Amir himself read out the translation of the telegram of His Excellency the Viceroy, received through the Commissioner of Peshawar, in which the particulars relating to the Mulla Hadda's revolt, &c., were written.

His Highness the Amir was much concerned and moved when he read the concluding part of the telegram, relating to the points that Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar had connived in the matter of some sepoys having assisted the aforesaid Mulla at Shabkaddar in burning a British village and causing severe loss, and that the Sipah Salar should be removed elsewhere, and that the persons residing in Basawal, &c., who had joined the Mulla, should be recalled, otherwise His Highness the Amir would be held responsible for their actions.

The Amir repeated the old story of his accession to the throne and the circumstances connected therewith, and he assured the whole assembly present that he had always adhered to his words, and that he never wished to go against the British Government, and that he had never instigated or induced his subjects or his sepoys to take any rebellious action against the British Government.

During the course of his speech he also remarked to the effect that "they were seeking some pretext," which hint was perhaps meant that the Government of India were devising some means to throw blame on him, and at the same time he also recited the Persian proverb:—"When the cat is cornered \* \* \* !"

As far as he spoke to the audience he did not appear to have in any way instigated or instructed his subjects or his sepoys to cause a rebellion against the British Government, and he solemnly swore more than once in the presence of the whole assembly that he always maintained friendly relations with the Supreme Government, and that he never had wished to do any harm to them.

He also spoke to the effect that some time ago he had received a letter from Mulla Manki stating that, in case of (His Highness) carrying on a jihad, he would supply him with two lakhs of his disciples, but His Highness did not pay any attention to his letter, and replied that the Mulla's aid would not be of any avail to him. After this he read a letter received from some persons residing at Peshawar, in which it was stated that the British Government had gathered 60,000 troops and had given them rations for 4 days' consumption, and that they were ordered to proceed to Kabul, but the Amir said that the above information was wholly false and unfounded, and that some one of Mulla Hadda's followers must have concocted the above story for the purpose of prejudicing his mind against the English Government.

Subsequently a draft of the letter proposed to be addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy in reply to his telegram was also read out by the Amir to the persons present in the Darbar, and His Highness asked them whether it was properly drafted or required any amendment.

It should also be stated that, when His Highness the Amir made the above speech to the Darbaris, all of them were considerably moved and supported the words which he uttered on the occasion.

Sweetmeats, fruits and dinner were given to all who attended the Darbar, and in the nighttime fireworks were let off, and the city was illuminated, which was all done in honour of the anniversary of the above title. There were about three thousand men present in the Darbar, which was held on a very grand scale, and the Darbar was closed at about 5 p.m.

Enclosure No. 55.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Thana, 26th August 1897.*

Expedition thoroughly successful. Column returned to Thana to-day. In case question of Buner expedition is being considered, I would offer the opinion that the present opportunity is a favourable one for such expeditions, and that a brigade, entering by the Karakai Pass, with troops also threatening Ambeyla, would accomplish the matter in ten days. Fine of twenty thousand rupees on right bank has been paid in to-day, and remaining question with them is surrender of breech-loaders. To-morrow I proceed to Chakdarra to take up working with tribes on right bank of Swat river.

Enclosure No. 56.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 25th August 1897.*

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter of to-day's date, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a telegram, received from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, announcing that a lashkar of 12,000 Orakzais is collected at Karappa close to the Samana.

Enclosure No. 57.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 27th August 1897.*

Although the details of attack on Landi Kotal are still very imperfectly known, Aslam Khan says that the total loss up to date among the Khyber Rifles since Afridi lashkar first entered the Pass on morning of 23rd instant, does not exceed ten men both killed and wounded; this includes one sepoy killed at Ali Masjid, the rest of the loss being sustained at Landi Kotal. On the other hand it is believed that besides wounded the enemy have lost from two hundred and fifty to three hundred men in killed alone, namely, 34 at Fort Maude, 12 at Ali Masjid and remainder at Landi Kotal, where it is agreed on all hands that loss of enemy was very heavy.



The Landi Kotal garrison consisted of five native officers and 370 men of Khyber Rifles, including 25 recruits, Munshis, &c., who were unarmed. Of these 120 belonged to miscellaneous classes, principally,—Peshawaris 40, Shilmani Mohmands 25, Adam Khel Afridis 28, from Kohat Pass and neighbourhood. Of the remaining 250 men, 70 were Lwargai Shinwaris, in whose limits Landi Kotal stands, while the other 180 were pretty evenly divided between three tribes, namely, Zakha Khel Afridis, Malikdin Khel Afridis and Mullagoris. These 250 men formed the main strength of the garrison and seem to have behaved very well on the 24th when they inflicted severe loss on the enemy by volley firing; but on the morning of the 25th, after the Shinwari Subadar Jawas Khan had been wounded, the Shinwari sepoys made a sudden bolt of it by jumping down off the northern wall of the post towards their own villages, and the rest of the garrison were so disgusted at their desertion that they fired after them as they fled, killing three or four of them. A little later some Shinwari tribesmen and Zakha Khels of the Bazar valley managed to scale the wall of the post at its north-east corner near the officers' bungalow, but were promptly met by a party under Subadar Mursil and driven back over the wall after a smart little fight in which Mursil was shot through the head and killed on the spot. On his death the defence fell to pieces: the sepoys on the walls began to exchange greetings with their fellow-tribesmen outside the post, the gate was treacherously opened from inside and the ghazis of all tribes swarmed in. The Mullagori sepoys and probably the Shilmanis too then made their escape over the wall with their rifles, as the Shinwaris had done before, while the Zakha Khel and Malikdin Khel sepoys ran under the flags of their own clansmen in the lashkar, and joined in the general loot of the post. The 28 Adam Khel sepoys also joined the Ghazis, and, like the Zakha Khel and Malikdin Khel sepoys, retired with the lashkar when the sack of the post had been completed. Of the 40 Peshawaris, six are known to have been carried off prisoners, but the rest seem to have been allowed to escape, of course without their rifles, though only a few have yet arrived at Jamrud. After the looting of the post, the lashkar withdrew to China in the Bazar valley, and, in spite of the remonstrances of their Mullas, the men are said to be fast dispersing in order to carry home their dead and wounded. It remains to be seen how many of the Mullagori and Shilmani sepoys will turn up with their rifles, but it is not improbable that a good many of them will rejoin sooner or later, and it is even possible that some of the Zakha Khel and Malikdin Khel sepoys, though not likely to rejoin in person, may send in their rifles when the excitement has subsided.

---

No. 7.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 14th October 1897. (Received 1st November 1897.)*

MY LORD,

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 1st September 1897, we have the honour to forward a selection of further correspondence regarding the disturbances on the North-Western Frontier. We propose in this despatch to give a short description of the development of events in each section of the disturbed area, in order to show what has been effected during September, in the direction of subjugating and pacifying the different tribes, and what remains to be done in that respect.

2. First, as to Swat, where the first outbreak took place, towards the end of August, a satisfactory settlement had been effected with the tribes on the left bank of the Swat river; the tribes on the right bank were showing readiness to comply with the terms demanded; and a column under General Jeffreys was detailed to visit the Utman Khel country on the left bank. Reports were, however, received that the Adda Mulla had collected a large gathering, and that it was his intention to advance on Dir. Accordingly early in September, General Jeffreys' column was recalled, and we decided that a force under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood should advance by Sado and Nawagai into the Mohmand country, while another force under Major-General Elles advanced



from Peshawar. The objects were to destroy the Adda Mulla's power and disperse his gathering, to clear the Mohmand country of hostile forces, and to protect the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai against attack.

The total sum collected in fines by Major Deane up to the end of September from the Khan Khels, Ranizais and Adinzais, and by the Khan of Dir from the tribes on right bank of the Swat river, amounts to 85,000 rupees : 3,800 guns and 1,500 swords have also been surrendered. Major Deane has also obtained 162 breech-loaders, of which 30 were obtained from Jandol, and 15 from the Shamozaï Utman Khels. The Utman Khel of Kuz Totai have surrendered 100 guns, and are collecting 50 more, as their share of the 600 imposed on the Cis-Swat sections. The Utman Khel of Agrah and Bar Totai will apparently only surrender under compulsion.

On the 24th September Major Deane received at Chakdarra the Upper Swat jirga and the younger Mian Gul, a lad of 14 years, who came in with them, thus ratifying the submission made at Mingaora. Major Deane announced to the jirga the Amir's public denunciation of the disturbance and his friendly letter to Government, which showed that the Amir's name was being wrongfully used by the Adda Mulla.

3. It will be remembered that, in the last stand made in Swat against the force under Sir Bindon Blood, the people of Buner took a leading part in the opposition. Subsequently, conceiving themselves threatened by the troops in Swat on the one side, and at Rustum in the Peshawar District, on the other, the Bunerwals, at the end of August, made overtures of submission to the Assistant Commissioner in Mardan, but these advances were not from the sections most implicated against us. We have decided not to send a force into Buner, until, at least, the Bunerwals have been given an opportunity of making reparation. Terms will be communicated to them; the submission of the whole tribe will be demanded, and a certain time will be allowed for compliance. Major Deane told the Upper Swat jirga that Government would accept a settlement with Buner similar to that arranged with some of their own sections, namely, the surrender of arms and payment of fine. No particulars were specified. There is no need to hurry the announcement of terms, and there is advantage in delaying it until a more convenient season for enforcing them if they are not accepted.

4. When deciding upon the advance into the Mohmand country, of which mention has been made in paragraph 2, we caused it to be announced that this advance was not made in order to deprive any tribes of their independence, but because we must insist on due assurance that the tribes would not attack us again. We explained to the Amir that, if the British forces were opposed, the retiring foe would, if necessary, be followed up, and that the Adda Mulla might be pursued into the Bohai Dag or other place on this side of the Kunar watershed, but not beyond the line of the Durand convention.

The march of the brigade under General Jeffreys to the Utman Khel country having been countermanded as already stated, General Blood, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-Generals Jeffreys and Wodehouse, at once prepared to advance on Nawagai. The tribes, it is said, had decided to seize the Panjkora bridge; but being anticipated by the troops under General Wodehouse, their plans were upset and no opposition was offered to General Blood's force. At the suggestion of Major Deane, the troops halted three days at Gohsam, in the hope of being able to effect a settlement with the Shamozaï Utman Khels, who had agreed to surrender 100 rifles. On the 10th, the Maliks brought in 15 breech-loaders and 57 old guns, which latter Major Deane declined to accept. He was unable, in the limited time, to settle with the tribe. During the halt, Major Deane visited the Jandol valley with a squadron of cavalry, proceeding as far as Barwa, and he brought back with him Mir Khan and Hasan Khan, brothers of Umra Khan, both of whom had taken an active part in the late disturbances. He secured 27 breech-loading rifles, and is detaining these men until they surrender the other breech-loaders in their possession.

5. On the 14th September, part of the 2nd Brigade under General Jeffreys marched from Khar to the foot of the Ramat Pass, with a view to entering the Mohmand country by that route. The rest of the force under Sir Bindon Blood on that date reached Nawagai. There had been no sign of any gathering to

oppose the advance, and, although an uneasy feeling prevailed in the country, the Khans of Nawagai, Khar and Jhar showed a good example and afforded every assistance to the force in collecting supplies. Major Deane stayed with the 1st Brigade, Malakand Field Force; Mr. W. S. Davis accompanied Sir Bindon Blood as Political Officer, and Mr. Gunter was attached in the same capacity to General Jeffreys' Brigade. On the night of the 14th, General Jeffreys' camp at Markanai, at the foot of the Ramat Pass, was fired into, and two British officers were killed and one dangerously wounded. Two men were killed and a few sepoy wounded, and there were many casualties among horses and mules. This hostility on the part of the people of the Mamund valley, in General Jeffreys' rear, caused a change of plans. He discontinued his movement towards the Mohmand country, and his force spent the next few days in punishing the Mamunds and Salarzais concerned in the attack on the camp. On the 16th there was severe fighting with the Mamunds in the Wadelai valley, in which our losses were considerable. The punitive operations were continued till, on the 27th September, the Bajauri Mamund jirga came in. They offered 4,000 Kabuli rupees and 50 useless matchlocks as earnest that they were prepared to treat for terms; but they refused to bring in either the 50 breech-loading rifles originally demanded from them for participating in the attack on Chakdarra, or the 22 lost by General Jeffreys' troops on the 16th September. They excused themselves on the plea that men from trans-Kunar districts were with them on the 16th and had carried away the rifles. They positively refused to give up other breech-loaders in their place, or hostages until the rifles should be forthcoming. The jirga said the Sipah Salar had encouraged them to attack the troops and had promised them ammunition as well as compensation in kind for any loss of grain they might sustain. The attitude of the Mamund jirga necessitated resumption of punitive measures. In the meantime the 1st Brigade of the Malakand Field Force was on the Panjkora river, holding the bridge and Serai.

6. The 3rd Brigade under General Wodehouse, with General Blood himself, halted at Nawagai until the 21st September. The Adda Mulla's gathering attacked the camp of the brigade on the nights of the 19th and 20th; on the first occasion the attack was not pushed home, but on the night of the 20th it lasted four hours, and was repulsed with heavy loss inflicted on the assailants.

In view of the desirability of completing terms with the local tribes, and maintaining order on the Serai-Malakand line, we have decided to leave with Sir Bindon Blood a larger force than had been intended. General Blood will now be able to deal at leisure with the Mamunds and other neighbouring tribes and to enforce their submission.

7. General Elles's force, consisting of two brigades, concentrated in the meantime at Shabkaddar. On the 15th September he advanced to the Karappa Pass, meeting with no opposition. At Galanai on the 18th September, the Halimzai of Gandab submitted to the following terms:—free forage for all troops in Gandab, surrender without payment of 2,400 maunds of grain, of all breech-loaders and Enfields in Gandab, and 300 guns of local make and 300 swords, also payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000 in cash, all to be given in within seven days; in addition the forts of the principal supporters of the Adda Mulla in Gandab were to be destroyed. The Nahaki Pass was crossed on the 19th, and on the 21st General Elles, bringing up one brigade, met Sir Bindon Blood at Lakarai, when the latter decided to place the 3rd Malakand Brigade at the disposal of General Elles to enable him to deal effectually with the Adda Mulla, while he himself joined General Jeffreys. General Elles's other brigade remained to guard the communications by the Nahaki.

8. General Elles attacked the Adda Mulla's gathering on the Bedmani Pass on the morning of the 23rd September. The Safi Mulla and the Ningrahar contingent had already left for their homes. The enemy, chiefly Baezai Mohmands, were taken by surprise, as they had expected the troops first to reduce the Mitai valley and attack Bedmani afterwards, consequently only some 500 men held the pass, the advance up which was, however, stubbornly contested. The Adda Mulla fled westwards by Salala towards the Sangu Khel Shinwari country, as soon as the guns opened fire, and his gathering was completely dispersed. All towers in Bedmani were destroyed. The Musa Khel of Mitai were punished on the 24th, and those of Suran on the 25th. General Elles



proceeded on the latter date to Jarobi, which proved to be a rocky glen with steep hills on each side. His advance was opposed, but his casualties were slight. The Mulla's residence was found to be a mosque, near a village at the head of the glen. It was left untouched, but all forts in the glen were destroyed. As the Atamar Khel, Lashkar Khel, and Khoda Khel Baezais and the Khwaezai refused to surrender rifles and to pay fines, offering only a paltry number of country-made guns, their towers were also destroyed.

9. On the 26th General Elles moved into the Bohai Dag, within two miles of the watershed, by which, according to the map attached to the Durand Convention, the boundary of the Amir's territories was to be defined, returning thence to Karwarina. General Westmacott moved straight down the valley towards Kung punishing as he went by the destruction of towers and forts. The Khwaezai, Dawezai, Utmanzai, Kamali and Pindiali jirgas having come in, terms were dictated to them, including provision of free grain, forage and fuel for troops, the surrender of all breech-loaders and Enfields in their possession, as well as a fixed number of other weapons, and the payment of fines. The Khwaezai, with the exception of the village of Kung, complied with their terms on the 28th September, and the others who were given to the 3rd October for compliance have also paid up. The towers of Kung were destroyed before the troops left it. On the 29th September General Elles's First Brigade remained at Nahaki, while his Second Brigade proceeded to march round the Utmanzai, Dawezai, and Isa Khel country. Operations in the Mohmand country have been brought to a successful issue. The various sections of the tribe have been subdued and punished, and the force under General Elles has retired from their country without being molested during withdrawal.

10. Turning now to events on the border further south, in our despatch dated the 1st September, we briefly mentioned the rising of the Khyber Afridis and their attack on the Khyber posts. The pass remained open and quiet until the 19th August, and it was believed that the timely arrival of troops at Jamrud had greatly discouraged the Afridi lashkar. On the 23rd, however, Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were attacked. In the afternoon the garrison of Fort Maude retired under cover of fire from Royal Horse Artillery guns at the mouth of the Khyber. The Afridis then burnt the post. The Bagiari post was evacuated during the night, eleven Zakka Khels deserting with their rifles. Ali Masjid was also captured and burnt, the Khyber Rifle garrison retiring to Jamrud with their rifles. The Landi Kotal post was attacked on the 24th August. The garrison consisted of 370 Khyber Rifles, composed of 70 Lwargai Shinwaris in whose limits Landi Kotal is situated, 180 Zakka and Malikdin Khel Afridis and Maligoris, 40 Peshawaris, 25 Shilmani Mohmands, 28 Adam Khel Afridis from the Kohat Pass and unarmed recruits, munshis, &c. The garrison held out on the 24th, inflicting severe loss on the enemy; but, on the 25th, the Shinwari jemadar was wounded and his tribesmen then deserted; Subadar Mursil, Commanding, was shot dead in repelling an assault; and the defence collapsed.

11. From first to last the Khyber Rifles did not lose more than ten killed and wounded, whereas they are said to have inflicted a loss of 250 killed on their assailants. Lieutenant-Colonel Sardar Muhammad Aslam Khan, acting on his own responsibility, disarmed and granted leave to all Khyber Rifles at Jamrud, except the Kuki Khel. We had heard that this measure was proposed, and on learning of the gallant way in which the men of the Khyber Rifles had at first resisted the Afridi attack, we telegraphed suggesting reconsideration of the proposal, but the telegram arrived after action had been taken. We have caused an announcement to be made that suitable pensions will be given to the families of all those members of the corps who died fighting on our side, and that rewards will be given to those who suffered by remaining faithful during the disturbances. During September, 134 men of the Landi Kotal garrison came in to Jamrud with their rifles. This leaves 274 Sniders to be accounted for, out of a total of 836 in the hands of the corps. The men, other than Kuki Khels, who came in to Jamrud with their rifles, and were disarmed and given fifteen days' leave by Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, have now been paid up to the end of August and dismissed to their homes. Their names will be kept on the rolls,



but they have been told that their services are not required at present, and that their pay will not recommence unless and until arrangements shall hereafter be made with the tribe for their re-employment.

12. We mentioned, in our despatch of the 1st September, that the Orakzais showed signs of restlessness, and their rising developed at the end of August, and assumed serious proportions. At first they appeared to be half-hearted; the Samil faction seemed inclined to hold aloof, and it was thought that Mulla Saiyid Akbar's efforts to raise an Orakzai coalition would prove abortive. On the 25th August, however, a large lashkar, composed of Ali Khels, Alisherzai, Mamuzai and Malla Khels, concentrated near Karappa in Akhel limits, and their advance was only deferred because the Mishtis and other sections still refrained from joining. On this date, a force of 250 or 300 Daulatzais collected in the Ublan Pass, with the view of attacking the Muhammadzai post. On the 26th, they were reinforced by 600 Firoz Khels and Bazotis, and sent word to the Deputy Commissioner that they would disperse if the Kohat salt-duty were reduced and Swat evacuated. During the night they attacked the old police post of Muhammadzai, temporarily held by 25 Border Police and a few armed villagers: the garrison retired to the new police post, into which a company of infantry had been thrown that same night. The enemy did not attack the new post, but retired to the Ublan. Early on the 27th, a force marched up from Kohat and drove them out of the Pass. The Lakka post was attacked on the morning of the 27th August, and Shinawari and Saifaldarra during the previous night. The Lakka and Saifaldarra posts were relieved from Hangu, but as the garrisons could not be reinforced, the posts were evacuated; they were subsequently burnt by the enemy. The Shinawari garrison repulsed the attack on them, inflicting some small loss on the tribesmen. The garrison subsequently evacuated the post, which was then burnt. On the 28th, a night raid was made on Kahi, and the police lock-up partly burnt; the villagers turned out and the raiders decamped. On the 29th, the bazaar at Nariab was looted and the school-house burnt. On the 30th, news was received from Fort Lockhart that the posts on the Samana were surrounded by a force of Ali Khels, Mamuzais, Alisherzais, Mishtis, Shekhans and Malla Khels. The Mishtis had sent the Political Officer a message that, though they had joined with reluctance, they now intended pursuing hostilities to the bitter end, and to burn every village to the foot of the Sufed Koh, unless the demands formulated by the Afridis were complied with. The Daulatzais and Sturi Khels returned to their homes, leaving only a few men to hold the Ublan Kotal. They sent a message to the Deputy Commissioner that they engaged in hostilities owing to the enhancement of the salt-duty, and the occupation of Swat, Samana and Waziristan, and that, if even the first request was granted, they would cease hostilities, otherwise these would be recommenced on the 3rd September by a force twice as large as before.

13. On the 31st August two regiments of Native Infantry and a regiment of Native Cavalry were sent from Peshawar through the Kohat Pass. No opposition was encountered, and throughout the recent disturbances the Kohat Pass Afridis have held aloof and have at no time joined the enemy.

14. During the last few days of August, the enemy remained in large numbers before Gulistan, sending out raiding parties daily to harass the valley below and firing into the posts at night. Early in September contingents of Afridis, who gave out exaggerated accounts of their proceedings in the Khyber, began to join the Orakzais. A half-hearted attack was made on Gulistan on the evening of the 3rd September. The enemy would not risk an assault. During the next few days the lashkar continued to invest the Samana posts, cut the telegraph line and commit other acts of aggression. On the 11th an Afridi lashkar, headed by Mulla Saiyid Akbar and Mir Bashir, reached Khwaja Khidar and was seen moving down the Khanki valley below the Samana ridge. The Daulatzai lashkar was at Lar And Khel and moving about in the Mastura valley. General Yeatman-Biggs, by moving eastward along the range, checked a meditated attack on Hangu, but during the night his own rear guard was smartly attacked, while on the crest between Tsallai and Saifaldara. On the 12th scarcity of water compelled the force to return to Hangu; and in their absence, the

lashkar attacked the Crag Picket and Saragarhi in force. Saragarhi fell after a very gallant resistance, and the garrison of 23 men of the 36th Sikhs were killed. The Hangu force again moved up to the Samana on the night of the 13th, and relieved Gulistan and Fort Lockhart. The Samil lashkar in great force opposed General Yeatman-Biggs's advance at Gogra, but the fire of his guns drove them from their position with loss.

15. Towards the end of September, it was reported that the Orakzai pickets left in observation near the Samana had disappeared, and that the Samil Orakzais, very disheartened, were anxious to make terms. The Mishtis, Shekhan and Malla Khels sent in a petition on the 22nd September, alleging that they had been driven to hostilities against their will, and expressing a desire to make peace. They added that the Afridis and Gar clans had sent a deputation to Kabul, but that they had declined to go and were awaiting the decision of Government. That the Afridis and Orakzais sent deputations to the Amir, is true, as we know from the British Agent at Kabul, but the Maliks and Mullas were stopped at Jalalabad under orders from the Amir, who refused to help them, and ordered them to return. A notification by His Highness announcing his refusal to help the Afridis has been published at Kabul. An Afridi headman, who had started for Kabul, has returned to Tirah and warned all his tribesmen not to go to Kabul, as the Amir had ordered the arrest of any Orakzai or Afridi deputations who might arrive there.

16. Sadda in Kurram was attacked on the night of the 31st August ; and Balish Khel on the following day. The enemy were beaten off by the villagers aided by the Kurram Militia. The camp of the flying column was attacked at Sadda on the night of the 16th September by a lashkar of Massuzais ; there were only a few casualties ; the enemy's loss is believed to have been heavy, and the attack was not repeated.

17. As we have already acquainted Your Lordship in telegraphic correspondence, we are of opinion that the situation created by the Afridi and Orakzai unprovoked aggression is so grave and so subversive of our dominant position on the frontier, that nothing short of dictating our own terms in the heart of the country will meet the occasion. We had given neither tribe any cause of offence. Our relations with the Afridis, founded upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal service on the Khyber route, had stood the test, almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed. The Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai valley, have been left equally undisturbed. The present risings have been stirred up from within and have not been excited by any action of ours. We believe that the demands which they have formulated are after inventions put forward to cloak an outbreak which is fanatical in its origin.

18. Orders were issued on the 3rd September for the concentration of forces for an advance into Tirah, to exact reparation from the Afridi and Orakzai tribes for their unprovoked aggression. The Tirah Expeditionary Force will be under General Sir William Lockhart with Sir Richard Udny as his Chief Political Officer. The advance will probably commence about the 12th October.

19. We mentioned in our last despatch that the Amir had emphatically denied that men of his regular army had joined the Adda Mulla, and personally engaged that no such act of hostility would ever be committed by them. Several very interesting communications will be found among the enclosures of this despatch, indicating the attitude which the Amir has adopted towards the authors of these frontier disturbances. The Viceroy in a letter dated the 30th August, expressed his pleasure at receiving the Amir's assurances, and, after giving His Highness some details of the information which indicated that Afghan tribesmen had joined the Mulla of Adda, requested the Amir to publicly announce to the tribesmen through his local officers that, if they crossed the border and joined in disturbances against the British Government, they would incur his displeasure. The opportunity was taken to tell His Highness of the situation in regard to the disturbances on the border, and of the Government of India's determination to deal with the tribes concerned in a



manner to make clear their supremacy. The British Agent at Kabul having heard reports that Afghan subjects and soldiers were joining the Adda Mulla's lashkar in large numbers, addressed the Amir on the subject, of his own motion, on the 21st August. This elicited from the Amir an autograph letter to the effect that Afghan subjects, from fear of His Highness, could not have openly joined the Mulla; they might have joined secretly, but instructions had been given to the officials in Ningrahar, they were keeping secret watch and had recently dispersed a gathering of 500 men who were intending to join the Mulla. The Amir added that he was powerless to prevent men going secretly: but as far as possible he would watch their movements. The Amir adopted a similar strain in replying to the Viceroy's letter of the 30th August. He protested that he was doing everything possible to prevent his subjects joining the Adda Mulla, but that it was impossible to prevent those who might "join him during the night, travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads." The Amir professed to attach no importance to the reports that the troops assembled at Peshawar were intended to advance on Kabul, and added assurances of friendship and loyalty to his engagements.

20. His Highness evinced his desire that we should be made acquainted with his sentiments by sending, through Kandahar and Quetta, a copy of the letter which His Highness had already sent to the Commissioner of Peshawar denying that Afghan soldiers had joined in the frontier disturbances. In this, he enclosed one of the proclamations issued by the Adda Mulla, inviting the tribesmen of Afghanistan to join the jihad, and said that the Mulla had sent many such to his disciples in Afghan territory.

In acknowledging this letter, the Viceroy took the opportunity of informing the Amir of the intention to despatch a force into the Mohmand country "to search out the Mulla of Adda and his lashkar, and to disperse and destroy them," and if necessary to follow him up to Jarobi, or to any place similarly situated; at the same time His Highness was assured that the British troops would not remain in the country and would not go further into it than was necessary to carry out the object with which they had been despatched; and that if the Mulla should take flight across the mountains into the Kunar valley, the troops would not follow him beyond the watershed, but the Government of India would look to His Highness to deal with him as he deserves and restrain him from exciting the tribesmen to further acts of hostility.

21. In his reply, dated the 12th September, the Amir said that the Adda Mulla was unlikely to enter Afghanistan, as he had acted badly (towards the Amir), but should he do so the Amir would expel him, "so that he may go towards Arabia, because he is a very wicked person." His Highness expressed a hope that the troops going in pursuit of the Mulla would not advance too far lest confusion should arise among the troops in Kunar.

22. That the Amir has taken effective means to make his attitude known is evident from the fact that, while the Mulla of Adda's intentions were still matter of uncertainty, he received, on the 1st September, a communication from the Amir, as a result of which he broke up his gathering and returned to his home at Jarobi, giving out that the Amir had ordered him to postpone fighting for eight days, or till further orders, and that meanwhile His Highness was consulting his military officers, and would communicate his decision later. Major Deane has obtained an original letter, dated the 2nd September, written by the Adda Mulla to the Mian Guls, in which he magnifies the successes of the Afridi and Orakzai lashkars in the Khyber and on the Samana, and mentions having received a letter to the above effect from the Amir. We have sent the letter which Major Deane obtained in original to the Amir, as an instance of the way in which His Highness's name had been made use of by the Mulla. About the time that the Mulla received the Amir's letter, news was received that the Amir's cavalry at Peshbolak had turned back a lashkar of the Sangu Khel Shinwaris which had started for *ghaza*. It is not improbable that the paper which the Mulla received, and of which he gave an interpretation suited to his own ends, was the Notification already alluded to in the 15th paragraph. In that, and more especially in His Highness's letter to the British Agent at Kabul, the Amir with characteristic clearness



and shrewdness turns against the fanatical tribesmen their pretensions to wage jehad ; and from their own scriptures and actions he demonstrates them to be no true Moslems.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN.  
G. S. WHITE.  
J. WESTLAND.  
M. D. CHALMERS.  
E. H. H. COLLEN.  
A. C. TREVOR.

---

Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 23rd August 1897.*

With reference to the telegrams of to-day from the Commissioner, Peshawar, I am desired to submit, for the information of the Government of India, and such action as may be considered necessary, the following remarks.

2. The position as regards the attack by the Afridis on the Khyber posts is a curious one. There is no one to fight against except their own levies. Under clause (2) of the Pass Agreement the Afridis undertook to maintain order throughout Khyber in consideration of certain allowances ; and under clause (5) they were not to require military aid from India for this purpose.

The Khyber Rifles (then called Jazailchis) were under clause 6 not to constitute a Government force. Thus the Afridis are, so far as the Khyber is concerned, in the position of attacking their own agents, whom we are not pledged to defend.

At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that, if the Khyber Rifles, true to their salt, make a stand, and do not go over with their arms and ammunition to the tribal lashkar, we should by all means strengthen their hands in any way that we can without weakening our position at Fort Jamrud, or losing sight of the fact that we now have to deal with the tribe as a whole, and that our ultimate objective may have to be Tirah and Bazar.

---

Enclosure No. 2.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 25th August 1897.*

I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of telegrams, and to point out that the Lieutenant-Governor has already emphasized the necessity for immediate reinforcements for Kurram.

2. I am again to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor is still of the same opinion. It is true that, as the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, has reported that the Kurram Militia may be fully relied on and the Turis are behaving loyally, there is not apparently any immediate danger to Para Chinari, though Sadda is much exposed and isolated, and must be a source of anxiety. Still it must be remembered that the Cantonment of Para Chinari is very open to attack, and serious damage could be caused even if the defensible enclosure remained intact. The Turis also are badly armed and the assembling on our immediate border of these large collections of Khostwals under Sardar Sherindil Khan, who was reported to have taken a considerable military force with him, must create a feeling of great unrest throughout the valley, and lead to general raiding which our small garrison at Para Chinari could not prevent.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that the present demands upon our troops elsewhere are already severe, but even so he considers that an early attempt should be made to strengthen our position in Kurram, as we cannot afford in the present state of feeling on the frontier to risk a repetition of the Shankargarh and Khyber incidents. In this connection I am to intimate that,

as matters stand at present, and if the Afridi rising is promptly put down, His Honour is disposed to concur in the opinion expressed by the Commissioner as to the situation in Waziristan.

4. The Deputy Commissioner of Kohat reports that the wire to Kurram has now been cut, but I am to request that, as soon as possible, intimation may be sent to Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, of any measures that are contemplated with the object of strengthening his hands. It is unnecessary to point out that, with a rising in Tirah, a strong force in Kurram would probably be extremely useful, so that in reinforcing the garrison we shall not be locking up troops uselessly.

Enclosure No. 3.

*Extract from Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 25th August 1897.*

IN continuation of my letter dated 12th instant, I am desired to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a report on the recent attack on the Shankargarh town and Fort, and to communicate the following remarks of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

It was hardly to be supposed after the settlement of last year that the assured clans of the Mohmands would have joined in the raid on Shankargarh, regardless of their pledges, their allowances and their jagirs and possessions in British territory, more especially as the leading Maliks of the Mohmand tribes adjoining British India had come in and tendered their services on 28th ultimo. But the fanatical wave which has been passing over the tribes has swept away all prudential considerations, and His Honour has just heard that the Afridis have committed themselves, and thus the revolt of the tribes on the Peshawar border is complete.

Having recently recommended that a force should be sent through the Salarzai country of Boner, and in view of the present attitude of the Afridis His Honour feels that it is for the Government of India to decide whether an immediate advance into the Mohmand country is possible. He has no doubt this should be done ultimately, and that the Utman Khel also should receive attention at the same time. And he does not think this expedition should be postponed longer than is necessary, because the Mullah Adda is said to be making fresh attempts to raise the Mohmands, and the Afridi rising will very possibly rekindle their fanaticism. Moreover, the autumn crops are now in the ground and they will be cut by the end of October. The Lieutenant-Governor's reasons for saying that we should visit the Mohmand country are as follows :—

- (1) The raid on Shankargarh, a British village immediately under the Shabkadar Fort, is the most open and audacious violation of British territory which has occurred in the Peshawar District, or indeed in any frontier district for many years. Their success on the present occasion is the more regrettable, as previous attempts in 1852 and 1863 were repulsed, and our failure to protect the town now will be much noticed on the frontier.
- (2) It seems absolutely necessary, owing to the widespread fanatical rising which commenced at Malakand and has culminated in the Khaibar, to re-assert our supremacy in a very marked manner, and without the delay and uncertainty which attach to the more lenient course of imposing a fine or a blockade. Nor does Sir Mackworth Young consider that the confiscation of jagirs and allowances by itself is a satisfactory way of settling such an outrage, if only because their permanent confiscation will not suit our own purposes.
- (3) The force assembled in the Peshawar Valley is, His Honour understands, sufficiently strong and sufficiently mobilised to carry out punitive expeditions in any direction that may be necessary without risk, delay, or much extra expense.
- (4) The flagrant breach by the Mohmands of the engagements into which they have so recently entered demands exemplary punishment.



It must be admitted that a punitive expedition will not touch many of those who joined the raid, a large proportion of the raiders having come from the territories of His Highness the Amir of Kabul. But the principle which is one of the cardinal points of our frontier administration must be asserted that those through whose territory the raiders passed and from whose territory they launched the raid on British territory should be held primarily responsible, and a force advancing by the Gandab Valley, especially if it can be supported by a column from the Malakand Field Force marching through the Utman Khel country as previously suggested, will be able to deal with a considerable number of the tribes or sections which were implicated in the raid, and at any rate with all of those who are under special obligations of loyalty to us.

The Lieutenant-Governor therefore concurs in the Commissioner's proposals contained in paragraph 11 of his letter including his remarks regarding the arms to be demanded, which however may require further consideration hereafter. For the present he considers that the payment of all allowances to the Mohmands should be suspended, and not restored except under the orders of the Government of India.

The confiscation of the Halimzai jagirs of the value of Rs. 4,500 at Panjpao in British territory temporarily or permanently is a matter which requires separate consideration, and the extent to which the Tarakzai Mohmands were implicated requires further elucidation. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes it may be found that this tribe generally repudiated the raiders, but if 300 members joined, some notice must be taken of their conduct.

As regards the conduct of our own villagers, I am to suggest the further report may be awaited. General instructions in regard to the treatment of British subjects who have joined in tribal risings have been given to the Commissioner which are applicable to the present case.

The Lieutenant-Governor wishes the recommendations made in this letter to be considered subject to such measures as may be immediately necessary with reference to the Afridi and Orakzai rising. These tribes occupy a central position with opportunities of raiding at many points along a frontier extending for about 120 miles, from Fort Michni to Para Chinar, and from the present attitude of the Afridis it seems unlikely that they will settle down without being visited by our troops. If an expedition into Tirah is undertaken, this should be done as soon as possible and then the Mohmand question may have to wait.

---

#### Sub-Enclosure.

*Extract from Letter from Sir R. Udny, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 17th August 1897.*

It only remains to consider the form in which punishment should be awarded. If, as I imagine will be the case, the Government of India still wish that the assured clans should receive allowances in lieu of what they formerly enjoyed during their connection with the Amir and the Khan of Lalpura, it seems to me absurd to demand only pecuniary fines which, even supposing that we could enforce payment of them without military operations, we should begin at once to repay as it were in half-yearly instalments when we distribute their subsidies. I am quite certain too that, if we recommence these allowances before we have taught the Mohmands by a severe lesson that we can distribute bullets as well as rupees, they will fail to understand our leniency, and our relations with them will never be satisfactory. Sooner or later in fact we should be compelled to teach them this lesson whether we like it or not, and surely no opportunity could be better than after this unprovoked attack. I therefore recommend strongly that a field force should be assembled at Shabkadar as quickly as possible, to advance by the Gandab route, and to search out the whole tract of country south of the Koh-i-Mohr range referred to in the preceding paragraph. This must be done before the autumn crops are off the ground, and I would demand from each section not a pecuniary fine but a certain number of breech-loading rifles on pain of our destroying their villages and crops. It is notorious that most of our stolen rifles find their way into the Mohmand and neighbouring countries, and the Mohmands as a tribe are probably better armed



than any other on the border, as we found to our cost in the fight near Shabkadar on the 9th August. This therefore would be the most appropriate way of punishing them, and, though we have no means of ascertaining the exact number of such arms in the possession of each section, the number to be demanded might in each case be apportioned at the rate perhaps of one in five of the estimated fighting strength of the section. If the number of arms thus demanded were produced, no harm should be done to crops beyond the cutting of forage for cavalry horses, gun mules, and transport animals; but in case of only partial compliance additional crops might be cut to the value of Rs. 500 for every rifle short of the required number, and in the case of absolute refusal villages and crops should be destroyed wherever found. The non-Mohmand clans in the tract of country to be overrun, viz., the Utman Khel and Kandahari Safis, are probably less well armed, but these too should be similarly dealt with, though perhaps the proportion of arms to be demanded from them should be pitched rather lower. It is impossible of course at present to say how far it might be found necessary to modify the foregoing details in practice, but I trust I have said enough to give a general idea of the manner in which I think that punishment should be inflicted, and if these measures are carried out we might resume payment of allowances to the assured clans of the Mohmands in the spring of 1898. I think, however, in any case that the allowances due for the current half-year, ending on the 30th September 1897 should be forfeited, and, as I have said already, the Panjpao jagirs of the Gandab Halimzais should be confiscated for three years.

---

Enclosure No. 4.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 29th August, 1897.*

Reports state that Adda Mulla is still at Jarobi, but do not mention any following with him. Afridi messengers, however, had reached him with information that Afridi and Orakzai lashkars had collected to attack the Khyber and Samana, and urging him to collect a fresh lashkar for action on the Shabkaddar border. Mulla replied that he had sent letters to summon lashkars from Ningrahar, Kunar and Jalalabad districts, which he expected to arrive in a few days, and he would then start again. Meanwhile, he is reported to be having a large quantity of wheat ground. A letter from the Fakir of Swat has also reached Adda Mulla, pressing him to send a lashkar against the Khan of Dir, because the latter had sided with Government and had prevented Ghazis from coming down the Panjkora line. Adda Mulla accordingly wrote to Khan of Nawagai, urging latter to send him at Jarobi a lashkar of the people living this side of the Tonga watershed, and to despatch another lashkar of people living to the north of that watershed against the Khan of Dir.

---

Enclosure No. 5.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 29th August, 1897.*

After consultation with Deputy Commissioner it appears that, although we know that a large number of Utman Khel tribesmen were with the Adda Mulla at Shabkaddar, we have no particular information with regard to the villages of this tribe adjoining the Peshawar border east of the Swat river, but as men of Sapri on this border were certainly killed at Shabkaddar, it is more than probable that the Utman Khels of the same neighbourhood were also implicated on that occasion, and, in any case, it would seem that these Utman Khels deserve punishment for joining in attack on Malakand. I do not think, therefore, there is any need for us to enquire into the doings of particular villages, and the fact that Utman Khels were certainly engaged in considerable numbers, both at Malakand and Shabkaddar, makes it necessary that every corner of their country, both east and west of the Swat river, should be searched out and punished. As regards the Mulla of Manki, although it would be too much to suppose that he has not passively encouraged his disciples in this jihad, there can be no doubt

that he has made illness a pretext for never moving from his house at Spankhara, and we have heard nothing of his circulating inflammatory letters like other Mullas. The Deputy Commissioner and I, therefore, think that he might be addressed by parwana in the following terms: "Troops are about to be sent into the country of the Utman Khel, among whom you are now residing, in order to punish them for their recent unprovoked attacks; but as no information has been received of your having taken any active part against the British Government, you may, if you choose, save yourself from being included in this punishment by coming into the village of Kheshki, which is the home of your family, in the Nowshera Tahsil. If you do this, you will not be molested, but if you neglect this warning, when the troops advance, you will be treated in the same way as the tribesmen with whom you may be found."

Enclosure No. 6.

*Kharita from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated Simla, 30th August, 1897.*

After compliments.—It gave me pleasure to read the letter of Your Highness to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to the 18th August 1897. The denial which Your Highness has clearly expressed therein, of any complicity on the part of Your Highness's officials and sepoys of the regular army, was made in a still more marked manner by the public utterances of Your Highness at the Darbar held on the previous day. Your Highness may rest assured that I should not have suggested the possibility of so grave a breach of the relations that must subsist between friendly allies had I not had reason to think that the complaints made to me were well founded. That Your Highness has taken thus early the opportunity to make public an emphatic repudiation, on behalf of yourself and your officials, of any complicity with the actions of the Mullas, who have been stirring up strife on the borders of India, justifies the hope that the charges made can be disproved, and that for the future no doubt will arise of the loyalty of Your Highness's subjects and servants to the alliance with the British Government which Your Highness has again so openly professed.

It is right that I should tell Your Highness the information which I have received which indicates that tribesmen from Your Highness's territories have joined the Mulla of Hadda, and have, in other respects, committed aggression against the British Government. Bodies of men from Jalalabad district crossed the Kabul river openly with flags flying and drums beating. After the fight at Shabkaddar they returned in the same manner, carrying their dead and helping their wounded. On the side of Khost numbers of camels stolen from my troops in Dawar have been taken across the border, and it is even reported that these camels have been ordered to be collected by Sardar Sherindil Khan. Your Highness will no doubt recognise the propriety of directing the restoration of camels belonging to the Government of India, which have been stolen and carried into Afghan territory.

Your Highness has said that "tribesmen can never join such a movement openly for fear of me. If any one has come he must have gone secretly." What I now ask Your Highness, in accordance with those assurances of friendship which you have so readily made, is that you will publicly announce to the tribesmen through your local officers that, if they cross the border and join in disturbances against the British Government, they will incur your displeasure. The belief is entertained by many misguided persons that they will not incur Your Highness's displeasure by acting in a hostile manner against the British Government, and this belief can be dispelled if Your Highness's local officers will keep watch along the Kabul river and at other places in order to prevent Your Highness's subjects from crossing the frontier with hostile intentions, whether secretly or openly. I ask Your Highness, therefore, to issue orders to this effect.

I mention, for Your Highness's information, the following facts regarding the disturbances that have arisen among the tribes. These disturbances were wholly unprovoked and cannot be tolerated. I detailed a force of troops to



punish the tribesmen concerned in the attack upon Malakand and Chakdarra. This force has visited the Upper Swat valley and received the submission of the tribesmen there.

The circumstances of the Afridis are these ; they have been stirred up to break their engagements of many years' standing with the British Government and to display hostility. The men who are responsible for this are Mulla Said Akbar, Aka Khel, and Mir Bashir, Malikdin Khel. Some of the Afridi tribe in the Khyber have remained true to their engagements, but they were unable to resist the attack of the rest of the tribe. The posts have been burned, and the road is now undefended and closed to the passage of kafilas. In the present state of the frontier, the carriage of valuable goods and especially of warlike stores must necessarily be for the time discontinued.

I shall deal with the Afridis and any other tribe which attacks the British border or British posts in a manner to make clear the supremacy of the British Government. I am glad to learn that Your Highness in Darbar characterised as false and unfounded the story concocted by designing persons that the troops assembled at Peshawar were intended for an attack on Kabul. Your Highness is well aware that, so long as Your Highness on your part observes the obligations you have undertaken to the Government of India, the Government of India will honourably adhere to its promise of supporting Your Highness's Government.

---

Enclosure No. 7.

*(Telegraphic.) From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 30th August, 1897.*

A large number of Mullas from Ningrahar and many other subjects of the Amir from the Jalalabad district, namely, Khugianis, Shinwaris, Dehgans and Ghilzais from Surkhrud, are said to have been included in the Afridi gathering, which finished its operations in the Khyber by burning the Landi Kotal post on the 25th. The leaders of this gathering are also said to have sent a letter to the Amir through the Sartip of Dakka announcing their capture of Landi Kotal, and offering to make it over to Afghan troops. Lastly and most flagrant of all, the day after Landi Kotal had been taken and the Afridi gathering had retired to the Bazar valley, a contingent of Sangu Khel Shinwaris, with two standards, came up through Landi Khana and stayed a night or two in the ruined post at Landi Kotal, but finding they were too late to do any mischief returned homeward on the 28th. On the other hand, it is said that a lashkar of Safis from the far distant valley of Tagoo, fifty miles west of Jalalabad, which had started under the leadership of Sufi Burhan-ud-din, a well-known Ningrahari disciple of the Adda Mulla, was stopped at Jalalabad under instructions from the Amir. Except a detachment of forty men of the Abdal Khel section, the Kuki Khel Afridis of Tirah seem to have held aloof from the Afridi lashkar of all other clans, which attacked the Khyber posts from the 23rd to the 25th, but on the morning of the 26th, after the main lashkar had withdrawn from the Khyber, a contingent of five hundred Kuki Khel from Rajgal appeared at Ali Masjid in order, it is said, to make some show of joining the general movement, and thus to save their houses in Tirah which the Mullas had threatened to burn if they continued to hold aloof. It is believed to have been the men of this contingent who were sniping for a few nights round Jamrud, and who fired on a cavalry patrol at the mouth of the Pass, but they are now reported to have returned to Tirah, and for the last night or two there has been little or no firing at Jamrud. Zaman Khan, a brother of Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, who is with the Sipah Salar in the Amir's service, was at home on leave and is said to have come down with the Kuki Khel contingent to Ali Masjid, whence he sent in a message to Amin Khan that the Sangu Khel Shinwaris were under orders from Jalalabad to join the gathering in the Khyber, and that he himself had received a firman from the Amir appointing him Malik of the Kuki Khel, as his brother had turned Kafir. This is Amin Khan's own story.



## Enclosure No. 8.

*Extract from letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 31st August 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 25th August 1897, regarding the recent attack on the Shankargarh town and fort by a gathering under the Adda Mulla.

The Lieutenant-Governor's views as to the desirability of despatching an expedition into the Mohmand country have been read with interest. The consideration of this question has, however, been temporarily postponed pending a decision as to the steps to be taken for punishing the Afridis for the unprovoked breach of their agreements with Government, and their attack on the posts in the Khyber Pass.

The payment of all allowances to the Mohmands should certainly be suspended and not restored except under the orders of the Government of India.

The Lieutenant-Governor's opinion as to the suggested confiscation of the Halimzai jagirs in British territory will be awaited.

## Enclosure No. 9.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 30th August 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement dated 28th instant, asking for an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on Major Deane's proposal in regard to the Mulla of Manki and the punishment of certain Utman Khel villages close to the British border, and in reply to convey the following observations of the Lieutenant-Governor.

2. His Honour accepts Major Deane's statement that the villages of Pranghar, Bucha, Nawadand and Sapri were implicated in the Malakand attack, and it has been reported by the District Superintendent of Police, Peshawar, that some Sapri people were killed in the attack on Shabkaddar. Under these circumstances, Sir Mackworth Young considers that the Utman Khel villages adjoining the Charsadda border, which are still under the political control of the Deputy-Commissioner, Peshawar, should certainly be visited, and reparation exacted and the surrender of arms demanded in such numbers as the Political Officer may determine with reference to the condition of the tribe. The Political Officer will doubtless also remember that the Laman Utman Khel villagers cultivate as tenants on nominal rents large areas, some 1,600 acres, in the British village of Tangi Barakzai.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor would again draw attention to the suggestion made in paragraph 6 of my letter dated 8th August 1897, that a force from Abazai should co-operate against these villages, which will prevent the possibility of their breaking out to the south-east on the advance of our troops, and damaging the Swat canal head works or the Nawadand aqueduct.

4. As regards the Manki Mulla, the Government of India are doubtless aware that he is a British subject and by birth a resident of Manki near Nowshera. He has in recent years purchased considerable estates at Mulla Kili near Khesghi on the Swat canal in that tehsil and the rich village of Gumatai in the Charsadda tehsil. For some years past, however, he has spent the hot weather at Spankhara at the head of the Darwazgai Pass in the Totai country just across the border of British India. During the demarcation of the Peshawar border in 1894, he was believed to have been the cause of the trouble at Darwazgai, when a body of several thousand Utman Khels and Totaiwals collected, but the matter was skilfully handled by Mr. Waterfield, Commandant, and Subadar-Major Abdul Rauf, Khan Bahadur, of the Border Military Police, and no actual collision occurred. During the Chitral expedition the Mulla of Manki remained at Spankhara, having announced that he was going into a *Chihlam*, or forty days' retreat, to pray for the success of the Swatis, and must not be disturbed.

5. In the present disturbances he has apparently followed the same course of conduct. The evidence for and against him as derived from the daily telegrams is the following :—

Captain Minchin reported on 29th July that he had joined the enemy with the Utman Khel. Major Deane, however, noted that there was no sign of this. Commissioner, Peshawar, in his telegram dated 30th July, stated that the Manki Mulla had not moved from Spankhara. In Major Deane's telegram of 3rd August it was noted that a large body of Utman Khel, who had been marching up from the direction of Darwazgai, returned, but there is no mention of the Manki Mulla being with them, and from Major Deane's letter dated 8th August, it would appear that the Mulla did not actively side against us.

6. On the whole the Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, especially as the Mulla is now an old man between 70 and 80 years of age, concurs in the proposal of the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and would send him the parwana suggested in that officer's telegram of August 29, with the modifications indicated on the margin to emphasize the fact that he is a British subject and therefore owes special allegiance to the British Government. He has a considerable following in the Utman Khel country, in Lower Swat and in the British pergana of Hashtnaggar in Peshawar, but his influence in Nowshera is rather on the wane, as his iconoclastic tendencies are too rigid for the pleasure-loving Khattaks, while across the border even his quiescence in 1895 rather damaged his reputation as a champion of Islam.

#### Enclosure No. 10.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 1st September 1897.*

I AM directed to reply to your letters as noted in the margin. In the

Dated the 21st August 1897.

„ 30th „ „

first you communicated the conclusions to which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor had come regarding the complicity of the Bunerwals in the recent fighting at Malakand and Chakdarra, and in opposing the advance of a British force into Upper Swat ; you also stated His Honour's proposals for dealing with the Bunerwals.

2. Since the receipt of this letter, information has been received from Sir Richard Udny as to the sections of Bunerwals who have fought against British troops, and his recommendation is that the tribe should be visited in their own country and punished there.

3. Meanwhile, certain advances have been made to the Assistant Commissioner at Mardan by or on behalf of some of the Bunerwal sections. The Commissioner gives reason for believing that these advances have been made by the Daulatzai and Nassuzai sections, who are less deeply implicated than the Salarzai, Ashuzai and Gadaizai ; and he has formed the conclusion “that, except perhaps the Nurizai, all sections of Bunerwals have been engaged at one time or other since the rising first began on the 26th July.”

Major Deane throws some doubt upon the genuineness of the letter which purports to have been sent by leading men of the Daulatzai and Nassuzai sections, and he indicates that there is evidence to implicate the Nurizai section also to some extent.

4. The Government of India must admit that, according to this evidence, the Bunerwals as a tribe have gravely committed themselves against the British Government, both in the fighting at Malakand and in opposing Sir Bindon Blood's advance into Upper Swat ; and in any case they agree with Sir Mackworth Young in the opinion that the tribe should be called to account and dealt with as a whole.

5. When your letter of the 21st August was written, the column under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood was still in Upper Swat, and Sir Mackworth Young proposed that, if the passes from Upper Swat into the Salarzai country would admit of an advance being made from the north, immediate orders should be issued for an advance from that side, while a column from Mardan co-operated by the Sanghao pass. His Honour desired to issue a proclamation to the Bunerwals declaring it to be proved that large numbers of them, and especially



of the Salarzai, had been concerned against the British troops; that it had been decided to punish them, and that a force would advance into the Salarzai country and announce the terms there. The proclamation was to conclude by warning those who were not implicated not to interfere on pain of being included in the punishment, as only those sections who were concerned in the recent disturbances would be punished unless opposition was offered to the British force.

6. Regarding the settlement to be effected in the event of no further opposition being encountered. His Honour proposed in your first letter to demand surrender of the arms known to have been taken from our troops, together with such a number of other arms as may seem at the time desirable, and payment of a fine equal to the value of one-fourth of the property stolen or destroyed at the Malakand position during the recent rising.

7. Subject to the remarks which will be found below, in regard to the nature of the fine to be imposed, the Governor-General in Council regards these terms of settlement as appropriate, but His Excellency in Council would prefer, before authorising an advance in force into any part of Buner, to give the offending tribe an opportunity of making reparation. The decision of the Government of India in this respect is in accordance with the general principles on which they desire to act in dealing with frontier tribes, and they are of opinion that the circumstances in which the Bunerwals have offended, do not take their case out of the category of frontier disturbances which should be dealt with on these general principles.

8. The Governor-General in Council desires that a communication should be made to the Bunerwals to the effect that it has been clearly proved that they, and especially the Salarzai section, took part in the attack upon British posts at Malakand and Chakdarra, and in opposing the advance of British troops into Upper Swat; that they have taken away fifteen rifles, four mules and a horse belonging to the British Government, that this property must be restored, together with such payment, in guns or otherwise, in reparation for their misconduct as may be deemed adequate, and that a representative jirga of the tribe must meet a British officer at a place to be named, to whom the property thus demanded is to be handed over. This jirga must also be prepared to make submission on behalf of the whole tribe, which is held responsible for the acts of its several sections, and must undertake, in virtue of such submission, to abide by the terms which may be then declared to it, and to come under such engagements as may be necessary in order to ensure peace for the future.

9. The Government of India do not wish to say, at present, what course should be taken if reparation is refused. It will be sufficient if the announcement to be made, in accordance with the decision explained above, leaves the tribe no option but to comply.

10. The Governor-General in Council concurs with the Lieutenant-Governor in the opinion that the submission of the Bunerwals, thus demanded, might be conveniently made to Major Deane, and His Excellency in Council would leave to Major Deane, in consultation with the Commissioner of Peshawar, the choice of the place, at which the jirga would be required to attend. The place may, as His Honour suggests, be in British Territory, if that is consistent with Major Deane's other duties. This procedure would have a salutary effect in marking, without possibility of mistake, the hostile action on account of which submission and reparation were being made. Major Deane would, moreover, be in a position to deal with the jirga with great effect as the Political Officer who is accompanying the military force which could, if required, enter Buner and exact terms if they were not complied with willingly, or under any other means of compulsion.

11. The manner in which the announcement should be made to the various sections of the Bunerwals may also be settled by the Commissioner of Peshawar and Major Deane, it being obviously advantageous to show the Bunerwals that the Peshawar District officers and Major Deane at Malakand are acting in agreement in the matter. Major Deane will in the same way be authorised, in consultation with the Commissioner of Peshawar, to fix the amount of the reparation which is to be demanded from the Bunerwals when their jirga comes in. In determining the amount, Major Deane will be able to avail himself of the experience gained in dealing with the Upper Swatis and other tribes, and to



make the contribution of the Bunerwals fit in with the general settlement. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the course hitherto pursued of accepting the surrender of guns, in lieu of demanding money payments, is a wise one, and may, with advantage, be adopted in this case also; while to fix at once that a certain proportion of the damage done is to be demanded, will only tie the hands of the Government.

12. In the present position of affairs, it is essential that there should be no avoidable delay, particularly where military movements may be involved. While, therefore, the Government of India desire to maintain the arrangement under which the Punjab Government is responsible for the management of Bunerwal affairs, they think that it is necessary that all communications regarding the settlement of matters arising out of the Malakand outbreak, should be made to them direct. His Honour will perhaps have no objection if, while the proposals are sent through the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Punjab Government for transmission to the Government of India, Major Deane forwards at the same time, copies of these communications direct to the Government of India.

13. A copy of this letter is being sent to Major Deane in order that he may understand the action which the Government of India propose to take and the reasons for it.

---

Enclosure No. 11.

*Translation of a Letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to the Address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 19th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to the 19th August 1897.*

After compliments.—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received a friendly letter from Mr. R. Udny, Commissioner, Peshawar dated the 13th August 1897 (corresponding to the 13th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H.), in which he writes to the following effect :—

*(His Highness quotes the whole letter. [See page 75.] )*

When I received the Commissioner's letter, according to the quotation given above, in which he included the instructions issued by Your Excellency, I wrote in reply to him giving true particulars, and writing them to him in a very sincere and friendly manner, as follows :—

*(His Highness quotes the whole reply written to Sir R. Udny. [See page 88.] )*

My dear friend, these are the details of the Commissioner's letter, together with the reply which I have written to him, and which I now write for Your Excellency's information.

If the false utterances and fabricated reports of self-interested persons be investigated in a friendly manner, God be pleased, the relations of union and friendship between these two Governments will always be considerably strengthened.

Further, I have to state that I have secured a letter, written by Mulla Najm-ud-din (of Hadda), which he has issued as a notification to the people of Ningrahar, and which is one of the letters of a similar kind which he has sent to tribesmen in other parts of the country. I send the original letter of notification issued by the Mulla, in a separate envelope, which is closed and bears on it my hand-writing, enclosed in this friendly letter to Your Excellency. My kind friend, no doubt he has sent such letters, perhaps hundreds of them, to his disciples among the tribesmen in Afghanistan. The people also regard him as holding the position of their Prophet. Such are the particulars of the Mulla and his disciples, as I have given above.

---

Sub-Enclosure.

*Translation of a Letter of Invitation issued by Mulla Najm-ud-din, the Mulla of Hadda, to the Tribesmen of Ningrahar, Shinwar and other places, to join in a "jihad."*

"By the aid of God victory is at hand."

Be it known to all the followers of the religion of the Chief of the messengers (of God)—may peace be on him—residing in Ningrahar, Shinwar

and other places, that all the people of Swat, Buner and Bajaur have united and assembled together. They have killed all the troops of the infidels who were in Swat, and have plundered all their property and belongings.

I therefore write to all the followers of Islam that all the Mohmands have collected together here. We will go by the Gandab route to Deri for the purpose of making "jihad." I hope therefore that, as soon as you receive this letter, you should, whether sitting or standing, start at once. You should positively come taking the necessary provisions with you, as soon as possible. God be pleased, the time for the annihilation of the infidels has come. Do not practice negligence and delay. I cannot enjoin you any further. Peace be on you.

---

Enclosure No. 12.

*From the Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 1st September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Lieutenant Waterfield, Assistant Commissioner, who is with the troops at Shabkaddar, reports that during the last two or three days a few Hindus who had returned to Shankargarh, have left it again, and that both Hindus and Muhammadans from Matta Mughal Khel and other villages in Doaba, have been migrating with their families across the Adizai bridge into Daudzai. This looks as if the people considered another raid to be imminent. Reports continue to come in that the Adda Mulla is preparing for another raid immediately somewhere on the border between the Swat river and Michni. The Afridi headmen are said to have sent him a letter by a Tarakzai Mohmand messenger, whose name is given, reproaching him for remaining inactive when they themselves had started a jihad at his instance, to which the Mulla has replied assuring them that he is about to advance. His lashkar is expected on this occasion to come down partly as before by the Gandab valley, and partly by the Ali Kandi route down the Pindayali valley.

---

Enclosure No. 13.

*Letter from the British Agent at Kabul to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 25th August 1897.*

I stated in my diary of the 21st instant that further particulars of the matter mentioned therein would be communicated to you after visiting His Highness the Amir. I now beg to say that on my request His Highness the Amir was pleased to appoint Saturday last for me to visit him at Balabagh.

On my going there at the appointed time I was stopped by his officials in the Mehman Khana which is situated towards the entrance at a distance of some 200 yards from the palace; meantime a respectable official of his court came there and told me that His Highness the Amir had ordered that the particulars which I wanted to mention verbally to His Highness should be reduced into writing. As the matter was an important and urgent one, I unhesitatingly wrote down the particulars for the information of His Highness the Amir in letter form, and the letter was handed over to the said officer.

The particulars noted below were written in my letter in question with a view that some early steps might be taken by His Highness the Amir to prevent the further rising of his subjects.

1. It was heard that the Khan of Lalpura was sending supplies of flour, &c., to the Mulla of Hadda;
2. That persons from the direction of Laghman, Ghazbin and Suabin, &c., were going to join the Mulla of Hadda for Ghaza, and
3. That some sepoy's belonging to the troops stationed at Asmar were also intending to carry on a crusade.

The above were recorded in my letter in question, and a copy of the said letter is herewith enclosed, together with the reply received from His Highness. The reply was written on the back of my letter by His Highness the Amir himself, and it was brought to me at the above mentioned place by the aforesaid officer of his court.



The Amir has written to the effect that on account of their fear of His Highness the Musalmans would not openly accord help to the said Mulla, but if they were assisting him secretly he could not say anything. It was also stated by His Highness that he had issued orders to his Hakims that they should secretly keep watch on the said Mulla's disciples, and that one of his disciples called his Khalifa had gathered about 500 Laghmani men secretly, but when the Hakim concerned had come to know about the above gathering he dispersed them all, and out of them 40 men were put in confinement.

The other particulars which are written in the same letter will also be known to you when you have read his reply.

---

*Translation of a Letter from the British Agent, Kabul, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, dated the 21st Rabi-ul-awal 1315 H.=21st August, 1897.*

After compliments.—In accordance with the intimation given to me by Your Highness' Shaghasi, I beg to write that I have heard a rumour that the people from Laghman, Ghazbin and Surbin, &c., are going to join Mulla Hada for the purpose of Ghaza. I have also heard that the Khan of Lalpura is aiding him by sending supplies of flour, ghee and other articles, collected from different villages.

I have even heard that some of the men of the regular troops stationed at Asmar are intending to make "Ghaza." If Your Highness deems it proper to make some arrangement, no more people will join the said Mulla.

---

*His Highness the Amir's reply to the British Agent.*

After compliments.—On the day of the "Jashu-i-Muttahida" (feast of unity) you were present also : and you heard what I said on the occasion.

The Moslems are sincerely devoted to the Mulla, but on account of their fear of me they cannot openly help him in any way. I cannot say anything about the aid they may render secretly.

The report appears to be correct, because if the Mulla's disciples do not supply him with provisions, how can he get any food to eat? But owing to fear of me his disciples cannot openly send him anything. I have issued instructions to all the officials in Ningrahar, and they are secretly keeping watch.

One of the Mulla's disciples in Lamkan, who is a Khalifa of the Mulla, beguiled some of the inhabitants of Lamkan, and collected about 500 men ; but the Hakim hearing about it, attacked the Khalifa, and dispersed the men collected by him, arresting forty of their number. The Khalifa with some of his followers has escaped, but measures are in progress for his arrest. There are thousands of such disciples and Khalifas of Mulla Najmuddin in Afghanistan. As far as possible, I shall watch their movements. Please God, they cannot do anything openly, but I cannot stop anything that may be done secretly, because if I arrest any persons on suspicion, they will deny all complicity.

Thus they cannot do anything openly, and I cannot arrest them on suspicion. These are the particulars about the Mulla, his Khalifas and his disciples, which I have given above.

There need be no anxiety as to their having done, or being able to do, anything openly. Their proceedings must have been in secret. They cannot do anything openly on account of fear of me. These are the particulars which I now write to you.

---

Enclosure No. 14.

*From the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 2nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Blakeway wires from Hangu, 1st September "150 Zakha Khel Afridis have reached Ghogra on Samana, and messengers from Kamar Khel have arrived to-day in Mishti Lashkar at Lakka with information that 12,000 Afridis



are to reach Samana to-night. It has been arranged that tribesmen of Ger Lashkar, who have gone off to their homes with loot, will return on Thursday, and on Friday an attack, with help of Malakdin Khel, Bar Kambar Khel and Adam Khel will be made on Gulistan, while Samil Lashkar with Larkambar Khel and Zakha Khel will fall on Hangu. Talibs of Aka Khel Mulla are now in Adugarhi in Mamizai Daradar limits. Jirga held at Khwajakeslar on 29th was to discuss answer to letter sent by Afridis asking whether their assistance was required by Orakzais. Reply is stated to have been in negative. On 30th, Chikkai sent 3 men to Madugarhi in Akel limits asking Ger Lashkar to combine with him in attack on Thal. No doubt that unrest among Zaimushts is spreading; and I have received information that some of them are now in Ger lashkar, menacing Thal. Only a small portion of this lashkar has remained here, Shinawari, and remainder is scattered in raiding parties of about 20 or 30 men between Kahi and Naryab and Kashi and Shinawari. The Samil Lashkar still lies between Ghogra and Lakkar." Combination of Afridis and Orakzais most serious, and shows urgent need for reinforcements.

---

Enclosure No. 15.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Chakdarra, dated the 2nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

The following military operations have been authorised:—First, a force under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood will advance by Sado and Nawagai to Kamali in Mohmand country; second, a field force will advance from the Peshawar border directly into the Mohmand country under command of Brigadier-General Elles.

The objects with which these movements are ordered are to destroy the Adda Mulla's power and disperse his hostile gathering, to clear from the Mohmand country any hostile forces, and to give support to the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai against any threatened attack by the Adda Mulla.

Sir Bindon Blood's force will not remain in the Mohmand country for the purpose of making arrangements with the Mohmands for the future, but will join hands with the force under General Elles and march out by the Peshawar border.

The Government of India wish it to be understood and made known that the advance is not made in order to deprive any tribes of their independence, but because the British Government must insist on due assurance that these tribes will not attack them again. They have no desire to injure any one who does not attack them. If the British forces are opposed, and the opposing foe retires before them, the retiring foe may if necessary be followed up, and in particular in such a case the Adda Mulla may be pursued into the Bohai Dagh or other place on this side of the Kunar watershed and not beyond the line of the Durand Convention. The intentions of the Government of India as above described are being explained to the Amir of Afghanistan.

---

Enclosure No. 16.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Chakdarra, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 2nd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Three hundred guns, two hundred and eighteen swords, a few pistols, knives and spears, and ten breech-loading weapons, which include one Lee-Metford, two Martini rifles, one Martini carbine, four Sniders and two Remingtons have been brought in this evening. Total arms surrendered on right bank of Swat river up to date amount to eight hundred and twenty-six guns and seven hundred swords; guns include seventeen breech-loaders. This with payment of twenty thousand rupees fine is evidence of submission of the tribes who are a poorly armed lot. Am continuing the work for another two or three days as we may as well secure as many arms as possible. At the same time I recommend, for consideration, the fact that the present work will be thrown away if

the present facilities for obtaining arms from our own districts be not removed : at present, there is practically nothing to prevent these people from purchasing arms from British subjects of Peshawar and Kohat ; I would suggest that these also should be disarmed.

Enclosure No. 17.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd September 1897.*

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, and such action as they may consider desirable, the following remarks upon the general situation on the North-Western Frontier of this province. Sir Mackworth Young understands from Foreign Department letter, dated 31st ultimo, that the Government of India contemplate operations against the Afridis for their unprovoked breach of the Khyber Agreement and their attack on the posts of the Khyber Pass. As indicated in this office letter dated 25th August, he considers that such a movement, in the necessity of which he fully concurs, should be combined with operations against the Orakzais, whose demonstrations and attacks on the Kohat border and the Kurram have been the subject of recent telegrams, as summarized in the attached list. If an advance in force is made by the Landaki Pass, or from the Samana, or from Sadda in Kurram, or on more than one of these lines, while the Afridi country is menaced by the despatch of a force from Peshawar up the Bara or Bazar valley, this will, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, have the effect of restraining both Afridis and Orakzais from further violation of British territory along the whole of the border exposed to their attacks. But it seems improbable that such operations can be at once launched, and meanwhile the task of clearing the tract between Kohat and Sadda of hostile lashkars and of protecting our posts in the Kurram will no doubt be carried on by the column under General Yeatman-Biggs.

2. Meanwhile the advance into the Mohmand country having been deferred under the orders received in Government of India, Foreign Department letter, dated 31st August, and the proposal to occupy Buner territory having, as His Honour understands from Government of India Foreign Department letter, dated 1st September, been negatived, while, owing to rumours of an attack on Dir by the Adda Mulla, the column about to visit the cis-Swat River Utman Khel country, has been recalled, as reported in General Officer Commanding, Malakand Field Force's telegram, dated 30th August, there appears to His Honour to be great probability of a renewal of attacks on the Peshawar border during the interval of some weeks which must elapse before an expedition can start for Tirah. And though he is of the opinion already expressed in the paragraph above quoted that the operations against Afridis and Orakzais should have precedence, he does not think that it is yet time to accept a policy of inactivity in regard to the northern Peshawar border. If no action is taken either in respect of the Bunerwals or the Mohmands or the Utman Khels for some weeks, while during that period mere preparations, of the nature of which the tribesmen cannot judge, are being made for an expedition *viâ* the Samana into Tirah, Sir Mackworth Young ventures to think that we shall hear of renewed activity on the part of the Mulla of Adda, who is already reported by Commissioner, Peshawar, in his telegram, dated 1st September, to be on the move, or of the mad Fakir, or of both, and of fresh raids by Afridis and Mohmands, if not Bunerwals, on the Peshawar border. The Lieutenant-Governor would remind the Government of India that the tribes which have committed themselves against us will, until they are dealt with, do their utmost to induce their neighbours to do the same, and in the present state of feeling among the tribes they are not unlikely to be successful. The reports received regarding the schemes of the Adda Mulla also show that he is still influencing large numbers of persons in Afghan territory and this side of it. The Lieutenant-Governor views, therefore, with some apprehension the prospect of no active measures being taken for some weeks on the Peshawar upper frontier. Our usual policy of allowing tribes to run up a large score of offences and then



dealing with them at our leisure by means of pacific negotiations is, in Sir Mackworth Young's opinion, totally inapplicable to the present time, while retaliatory measures promptly dealt out will be the most effectual means of quelling the movement, partly religious and partly political, which has spread over the whole northern border.

---

Enclosure No. 18.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd September 1897.*

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, translations of two letters received by the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, from certain Halimzai Maliks in regard to the part taken by them in the raid on Shabkaddar.

---

Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a petition from Saiyid Hassan Sahibzada, Naosher, Umar, Mirs, Shamsher, &c., Halimzais, to the address of the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, dated 17th August 1897.*

After due respects we beg to state that when the Mulla of Adda with 20,000 men reached Nahaki, the Mulla summoned us and asked for permission to pass through Gandab. We refused his request several times but without avail.

We informed the authorities that the Mulla of Adda forces us to join the jihad.

We were helpless, and afterwards the Mulla attacked and looted Shankargarh, and with him were some bad characters of the Halimzais.

The Mulla Sahib pressed us and the Baezais to join the "Ghaza."

We acknowledge our fault and pray for mercy.

The Mulla has gone to collect forces. We inform the authorities that we are obliged to obey the orders of the Mulla. We cannot go against the British Government nor can we oppose the Mulla, because the Mulla has a considerable number of men with him, and we are few in numbers. If we do not comply with the Mulla's orders, we are denounced as Kafirs; on the other hand, the British authorities attack, kill, and burn us. We beg to inform you that the Mulla's lashkar is coming to Gandab. We are obedient servants of British authorities, and it is not advisable for you to attack us.

We again beg to inform you that the Mulla will attack Gandab. We furnish this information in order that we may not be blamed afterwards.

---

Sub-Enclosure B.

*Translation of a petition from Kamran, Salar Khan, and Haji Zaman, &c., leading men of the Kamali Halimzais, to the address of the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar.*

With due respects we beg to state that on the arrival of the Mulla of Adda at Nahaki we informed you that he had come down with a following of 20,000 men. The fact that he compelled some of our community to join him was a matter of great importance, for if we had refused to obey his order he would have pronounced us Kafirs for not taking part in a religious war. We acknowledge our fault, but we are unable to oppose the Sirkar or the Mulla. We, considering ourselves as your obedient servants, will never shrink from the discharge of any service entrusted to us. We further beg to state that the Mulla has gone back with the intention of raising lashkar again.

We will discharge every service entrusted to us with great zeal and honesty, and solicit the favour of a reply to this letter.

---



## Enclosure No. 19.

*From the Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 4th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

The following report was received last night : "On 1st September, about 5 p.m., Adda Mulla was in a mosque at Kung when a man of fair complexion, who seemed to be a Kabuli, handed him a letter, after perusing which the Mulla addressed his disciples and directed them to stop the assembling of the lashkars, telling them that the letter was from His Highness the Amir to the effect that the Amir was consulting his military officers, and that the results would be communicated to the Mulla hereafter, but that meanwhile he should defer fighting for eight days or until further orders. On this his disciples went off to inform the Mohmands, while the Mulla himself gave orders for the dispersion of the lashkar of five or six thousand men in attendance at Kung. This lashkar included no Mohmands, but was entirely composed of subjects of the Amir from the districts of Ningrahar, Kunar and Jalalabad, and, after directing them to disperse, the Mulla returned to his own house at Jarobi." Deputy Commissioner adds that there is corroboration from a separate and independent source of the fact of Adda Mulla's having received a letter from the Amir on 1st instant.

## Enclosure No. 20.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 4th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Maulvi Shwaib arrived at Pir Baba Ziarat in Buner four days ago with about 70 copies of Amir's book on Jihad.

## Enclosure No. 21.

*Letter from Major-General P. J. Maitland, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Simla, 3rd September 1897.*

I am directed to state that, in view of the unprovoked aggression of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat border, the Governor-General in Council sanctions, with the approval of the Secretary of State, the preparation and concentration of forces to operate against these tribes. The principal object of the expedition will be to exact reparation for the attacks made on our frontier posts, and the damage to life and property which has been inflicted on British subjects and those in the British service.

2. The Government of India believe that this can best be accomplished by the invasion of Tirah, the summer home of the Orakzais and Afridis, which has never before been entered by a British force.

3. I am, therefore, to ask that a plan of the operations, which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would recommend for effecting the object in view, may be submitted for the consideration of the Governor-General in Council as soon as practicable.

## Enclosure No. 22.

*Kharita—From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated Simla, 6th September 1897.*

*After compliments.*—I have already, in my letter to Your Highness of the 30th August, acknowledged Your Highness's letter of the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to the 18th August 1897, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, in which Your Highness has denied any complicity with the disturbances on the frontier of India. I have now to acknowledge the receipt of

Your Highness's further friendly letter on the same subject, dated the 19th Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to the 19th August 1897, which was sent by way of Quetta in Baluchistan.

With this letter, Your Highness has sent me a copy of the proclamation issued by the Mulla of Adda to the people of Ningrahar. I thank Your Highness for taking so much trouble to send me this information. I had already seen this proclamation, and I was informed that the person from whom my copy was obtained had himself received the Mulla's proclamation from Your Highness' Sartip of Dakka.

I cordially agree with what Your Highness writes that "the false utterances and fabricated reports of self-interested persons" should be investigated in a friendly manner, and with a view to forestalling any such report which might be made to Your Highness, I write this letter to inform you that my troops are about to enter the Mohmand country in order to search out the Mulla of Adda and his lashkar, and to disperse and destroy them. In the letter written by Your Highness on the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal to the Commissioner of Peshawar, Your Highness has stated that Mulla Najm-ud-din "has now taken up his abode in a country which is independent of Kabul and in the neighbourhood of Peshawar."

Your Highness has also written "what more can I add in this matter to the foregoing arguments, having regard to the proximity to you of these Mullas who are close to your country and have now, according to the boundary demarcation, fallen within the limits of the British Government."

It is no doubt true that the Mulla has committed hostile acts within the territory which it has been agreed falls within the limits of the British Government, and if my troops meet him there his punishment will be speedily accomplished. But I am informed that the Mulla has established his abode in the village of Jarobi, and though, as Your Highness is aware, the country is wild and unsurveyed, and no permanent boundary pillars have been erected, it is understood that this village probably lies within the territory which, according to the arrangement proposed in my letter of the 12th November 1896, would fall within the limits of Afghanistan. Your Highness will agree with me that this man, who has given so much trouble to Your Highness's Government as well as to the British Government, must not escape the punishment for his misdeeds, and if the Mulla retires before my troops to Jarobi, or to any place similarly situated, my troops will be authorised to follow him up and destroy him and his habitation. I do not wish Your Highness to regard any such action on the part of my troops as indicating an intention to vary or depart from what we have agreed upon as the dividing line in the Mohmand country. I have no intention that my troops should stay in that country, and they will certainly not go further into it than is necessary in order to carry out the object with which they are being despatched. On the other hand, if the Mulla should take flight across the mountains into the Kunar valley, my troops have orders not to follow him beyond the watershed, but I shall look to Your Highness to give orders to your officers to deal with him as he deserves, and to restrain him from exciting the foolish tribesmen to further acts of hostility.

I have always endeavoured in my correspondence with Your Highness to write frankly and openly so that misunderstandings may be avoided. Your Highness will, I hope, recognise that this is my object on this occasion.

---

Enclosure No. 23.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Have received reports to the effect that Mulla of Adda is thinking of leaving the Mohmand country and transferring himself to the Afridis, but up to date he appears to be sitting quietly in his own house at Jarobi. When letter from Amir reached him at Kung on the 1st instant he is reported to have given out that he had written to the Amir and Sipah Salar immediately after fight at Shabkaddar on the 9th August, and that as he had just received replies directing him to stop fighting for the present, he could not continue the jihad without the

Amir's permission. The messengers from the Sipah Salar who brought these replies also brought with them a present to the Mulla of five rifles, some cartridges and a horse. Another report says that Sipah Salar has written to the Halimzai Mulla, Sahibzada Sayid Hussain in Gandab, that correspondence is going on between the Amir and Government of India, and that the Mohmands should therefore abstain from further aggression on British territory.

Enclosure No. 24.

*Extract from Letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Station Camp, Uch, the 31st August 1897.*

In continuation of my letter dated the 8th August, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the following report upon the expedition which has just been made into upper Swat along the left bank of the Swat river.

The force for the expedition consisting of one brigade assembled at Thana on the 16th instant, and on the same day a reconnoitring party proceeded from that place towards the village of Landakai, the hills above which were regarded by the people as the only point in the route which was favourable for opposition. The information received had shown that the Upper Swatis themselves were by no means anxious to fight, but the fanatical Mullas and preachers did their utmost to arouse them, and they succeeded to a certain extent. The reconnoissance party found a few men breaking up the causeway at the foot of the cliffs above the river. A few standards were also to be seen on the ridge above, and my information was that a miscellaneous body of some 600 men were collected to resist the advance of the force. The return of the reconnoitring party to camp appears to have encouraged the enemy, for later reports stated that they were advancing along the ridge above Landakai towards Thana, and the Khan Khels sent me word that a night attack on the camp at Thana was intended. I informed them that if any such attack were made the punishment for it would fall on them; for they were strong enough to prevent such a demonstration as they had been strong enough to prevent the rising from the first had they chosen to act up to their agreement with Government. This warning had the desired effect, and not a shot was fired during the night.

In the morning when the troops reached Landakai position it was seen that the enemy had been reinforced, and I was informed that the gathering now numbered some 1,200 or 1,500 men from Upper Swat and Boner. As soon, however, as the troops appeared in sight the Bonerwals, evidently fearing that their line of retreat towards the Bag-Darra Pass might be intercepted, commenced to move off. The position was so extended that it was some time before our troops could take and occupy it, but the resistance offered by the enemy was only half-hearted. The troops after taking Landakai moved on to Kotah and encamped there for the night. The loss to the enemy is variously estimated at from 50 to 100. The Bonerwals, I understand, have given out that they suffered heavily. I regard this as being done to afford excuse for their speedy retreat and for not again coming this way. They are heartily abused by the Swatis.

Next day a move was made by Abuah and Burikot to Ghaligai. No enemy were seen. At Ghaligai, however, we found that the Maliks and many of the people had remained in the village. An order was given to them to surrender all Government property as well as all the arms and standards they possessed, and they were also required to provide wood, grain, and fodder for the troops and transport. These orders were complied with and the same treatment was meted out to all villages on the route as far as Mingaora, which the troops reached on the following day and where they stayed until the 24th of August. Here a few shots were fired into camp at an early hour on the first night, but, the Maliks and villagers being reminded of their responsibility in the matter, the firing ceased. From Mingaora reconnaissances were made to Manglaor and Chahai Bagh, the furthest point reached being Gutibagh within Chahai Bagh limits.



The force marched back to Burikot on the 24th of August, and on the 25th a reconnaissance was made to the top of the Karakar pass into Boner. This pass though rather a long one does not offer much opportunity for defence to the tribesmen, and is next to the Ambela pass, the easiest route into the Boner country. The reconnoitring party, which was accompanied by Swat Maliks of Burikot, did not proceed beyond the Swat boundary. On the 27th the Brigade marched back to Thana and the expedition terminated.

Advantage was taken of the halt at Mingaora to disarm the country side as far as practicable, and arms were taken not only from the sections through whose territory the troops had passed, but also from those beyond Mingaora up to Kohistan who had taken part in the disturbances against us.

During the advance to Mingaora the Nawab of Dir, accompanied by my Assistant, Mian Ahmad, Extra Assistant Commissioner, moved along the right bank of the Swat river parallel with the troops, taking up daily such position as he was directed to occupy, and collecting the fine of Rs. 20,000 which had been imposed on the tribes on that bank. This fine was paid in full on the 26th instant.

At Appendix will be found a copy of a document signed by the Jirgas of Upper Swat expressing their unconditional submission to Government. The Jirgas have been informed that Government have no desire whatever to interfere with them, but will insist on the maintenance of peace.

The Mianguls have so far submitted only by letter and through their leading Mulla (known as the Pisani Mulla) who met me at Ghaligai. The elder of the Mianguls is only 21, and both are entirely in the hands of their Sheikhs. They had moved up to Ilam on the Boner border, and I thought it best to leave them alone there. They were afraid of being arrested, and deported to India. They have since sent me a message asking if they may return to their village, and I have replied that I will have nothing to say to them until they surrender twelve Government rifles which I understand are in their possession.

The pretension of the Mianguls that this disturbance was due to the action of the Nawab of Dir in Nekpi Khel territory may be flattering to their own-selves as crediting themselves with power, but in no case have any of the people in speaking to me, or to natives either, so far as I can learn, mentioned this as a grievance or hinted at its being a cause of the rising, and I cannot accept it as such. There are many grounds on which my opinion on this point is framed, the main one being that this was not a tribal but a religious disturbance. The letter sent by the Mianguls was in my opinion undoubtedly prompted by Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan of Mardan with whom the so-called servant of the Mianguls, Muhammad Ibrahim, has been staying. Ibrahim Khan has, I suspect, taken some pains to prevent his protégé from coming near me. He evidently wishes to pose as a friend of the Mianguls, and if he does so, it is not a matter to be wondered at, nor is it worth our while to interfere. I may add that the last letter received from Muhammad Ibrahim appears to me not only to have been prompted by Ibrahim Khan, but also to have been actually written by him.

The Jirga's statement as to the causes of these risings will be found as Appendix. I have made every effort to ascertain in other ways what these causes really were, and the results of my investigation have confirmed me in my opinion that a widespread and deep fanatical feeling is at the bottom of the matter. The people not only believed that the fakir was really possessed of the powers which he professed to exercise, but they also expected assistance against us from other tribes. The Swatis and Bonerwals, it is true, are cowed for the present, but the existence of the feeling is a cause for anxiety. For if it be so deep rooted in the minds of the people on this side on the lower portion of our line to Dir and on the other side of the Panjkora river, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that it is probably ready to show itself amongst the Upper Panjkora clans. Until this spirit of fanaticism dies down, we can feel no assurance that disturbances further up the line will not occur; and the hold of the Nawab of Dir on his people is not to be trusted. With this consideration in view I have thought it advisable to keep the Nawab and as many of his men as possible working directly for Government, and it is on this account that I urge strongly the opinion that for sometime at all events we should not run the risk of again leaving this position without a garrison of troops sufficiently strong to

move out at once and take offensive operations on necessity arising. So extensive is the Malakand position that every man of the former garrison was required to defend it, and it was utterly impracticable to spare troops to form a moveable column which could take the field.

I think that if an expedition were to move against the Mohmands from the Peshawar border without co-operation on this side, or before the Adda Mulla's power for mischief be broken a move be made against the Afridis, the Adda Mulla may succeed in raising a large gathering, in which case the Panjkora clans would, I believe, join him notwithstanding any efforts the Nawab might make even if they did not take direct steps to close the road to Dir.

It is stated that a large number of copies of the Amir's book on jihad have been in circulation in this country, and that they have been destroyed or concealed to prevent their falling into our hands. I have myself only come across one copy, but time did not allow of our conducting a thorough search for them. One point in connection with this book is worth noticing, and that is that it is signed by the Amir Abdul Rahman himself. We cannot doubt that those who have raised the disturbance have made as much capital as possible out of this impression.

As a further proof of the fact that these outbreaks are inspired by a widespread religious sentiment, I may remark that in the Chitral expedition one of the points which attracted my attention to the then fanatical out-burst was the sudden desire expressed by native gentlemen from the Peshawar District who were in my employ to return to their homes, and that during the present disturbances and this expedition to Upper Swat I have received only one offer of service, though as a rule in an ordinary expedition there is great clamouring for employment under Government. But knowing Yusufzai and Peshawar as well as I do, this unwillingness to offer service has struck me as very significant of the general feeling abroad.

I will conclude this report by remarking on the excellent service rendered by Khan Bahadur Rahim Shah Mian during this expedition. It is to him that the credit of tracing and procuring Government rifles in the country is entirely due.

Since writing this letter a report has been received from Peshawar that the Adda Mulla is incensed with the Nawab of Dir for having sided with Government, and now intends to raise a gathering to attack him. This appears to be an additional reason why, with as little delay as possible, steps should be taken for preventing the Adda Mulla from creating further complications for Government.

I may note as a postscript that the fakir had been preaching a jihad in that country for three months before coming into Swat, but that the people thinking him a lunatic had paid no attention to him at the time.

---

#### APPENDIX A.

##### *Translation of the Agreement of the representatives of Jirgas of Upper Swat.*

We, the representatives of the tribes of Musa Khel, Aba Khel, Barat Khel, Aka Khel, Maruf Khel, Bami Khel, Bahlol, Ala Khel, Azi Khel and Jinki, do hereby express our unconditional submission to the British Government and agree to carry out any orders which Government may give us or to anything which Government may impose upon us without demur and excuse. Dated 22nd Rabi-ul-awal, corresponding with 22nd August 1897. Signed and sealed by representatives of the above tribes, namely, Kalo Khan, Husan Khan, Zarif Khan, Agar Malik, Feroze Khan, Hafiz, Saloo Khan, Abbas Khan, Moula Khan, Mozam, Salo Khan, Mir Aslam Khan, Jamdad Khan, Mir Azam Khan, Nabbi Khan, Mirdad Khan, Hamid Khan, Ahmad Khan, Yakub Khan, Feroze Khan, Ghulam Sarwar, Abdul Husan Khan, Bahadu, Shah and Mehtab Khan, etc.

---



## APPENDIX B.

*Statement of Aka Khels, Maruf Khels, Bami Khels, Azi Khels, Matorizais, Jinki Khels, Aba Khels, Barat Khels and Musa Khels.*

A fakir with a grey beard, thin in body and in an insane state of mind, came from Boner to Mingaora by the Jowari Pass, accompanied by seven or eight boys about 15 days before the Malakand disturbances. He came to Mingaora first, but did not go to Saidu. The fakir declared in Mingaora that he would wage a jehad. We told him that he had no fighting men nor any articles of war, and asked how he could wage a jehad, but the fakir replied that he was not in need of any person, and that his own strength and support were enough. The Pisani Mulla on his own account and on behalf of the Mianguls dissuaded the fakir from jehad, saying that it would ruin the Mussalmans. The fakir laid a charge of infidelity upon the Pisani Mulla, adding that he did not require the assistance of any body, but that if any Muhammadan took part in the jehad for the honour of Islam, it would be to his own welfare. He also said that his messengers had gone in all directions, *viz.*, to Kabul, Bajaur, Chitral, Sama, Yusafzai, Peshawar, and India, and that the work had been undertaken after careful consideration and with steadfast purpose. The fakir passed a day in Mingaora and went down next day and stayed at Landakai. Three or four days afterwards a rumour got abroad that a fakir around whom people gathered from all sides had come to Landakai, that he intended waging a jehad and was exciting the people to take part in it. Having heard the above news, we and the Mianguls sent a messenger to the fakir at Landakai, saying that his action was not good, and that the ruin of the Muhammadans would lie in it instead of any good to them. The fakir again replied that he did not require us to join, nor did he want our assistance, but that he would carry through this undertaking himself. He also said that he possessed such power that troops would come to him from all directions, that the Government guns and rifles would be stopped from firing, and that the bullets in them would turn to water. The messenger brought the above reply to us, stating that numbers of men had gathered about

*Note.*—This refers to people visiting the fakir, and that the numbers visiting the fakir, for he had no gathering or armed men with him. him were increasing daily. He also said that it was rumoured in Landakai

that the fakir had a pot with him in which he cooked 5 handfuls of rice, and then having covered it with a chadar, distributed the rice to an enormous number of people. The messenger further added that the Khwaja Sahib of Ajmere, at whose Ziarat he passed several years, ordered him in a dream to wage a jehad, so that if any Mussalman took part in it and died, he would go straight to Paradise, the doors of which were open to him, and that if any Mussalman joined in the jehad and was not killed, he would have a reward equivalent to that gained by a pilgrimage, and would go to Paradise after his death. Two or three days after the introduction of the above news, it was heard in this country that the Malakand had been attacked and taken by the fakir, that Government property had been plundered, and that Chakdarra which was besieged would also be taken shortly. On this we and the Mianguls started for Malakand and Chakdarra, and joined with the Ghazis, fearing lest, if we should not do so, we should be condemned as infidels. When we started down the valley, the fakir was in Landakai, because he had returned to that place after his hand had been wounded the first day of the fight. We sat down there close to the fakir, and shots were heard being fired at Malakand and Chakdarra. The Mianguls went straight to Nimkai without visiting the fakir, and stopped there. The fakir threatened us, asking us why, as we did not come before, we joined now. We were taken in by the fakir's words, and we joined the Ghazis. The people of Swat stayed at Piran Kili, which is on the side of the graded road. At night time, when having made preparations for a fight, we went to our sangars and had an opportunity of seeing each other, we found that men from all parts, *viz.*, Boner, Swat, Thana, Ranizai, Sam Ranizai, Yusafzai and Peshawar District, were present there. Next day the fakir came to Malakand at 10 or 12 o'clock accompanied by 7 or 8 other fakirs who were not of one kind, but of various sorts. Some of them were like Indians, some were Kabulis, having long hair, and some were like Pathans. The fakir was also accompanied by 8 or 10 boys having standards in their hands, and in fact one of them was called King of Delhi. Afterwards we



took our meals and again engaged in our affair. During these disturbances two new fakirs came one day (we do not remember the date) to the Landakai fakir and asked him why he had commenced the fight soon and before the appointed time. The fighting continued for one or two days, and at last (on 2nd August 1897) when the Government troops started to Chakdarra in the morning, the Ghazis were defeated, and they ran away to their territories. The fakir also went to Landakai by Khar, Badwan and Adinzai. The Bonerwals had mostly come by the Karakar Pass, only a small number of them came *viâ* Jowari, after the defeat of Malakand and Chakdarra. When the fakir reached Landakai, there were other fakirs, too, present. These fakirs were telling the fakir that he commenced the business prematurely, and that had he taken action four or five days later, reinforcements would have come from all sides. The fakir still continued to preach a jehad and excite the people, and told us not to go but to remain there, as assistance would come from all directions soon. We remained there. On the second day after the defeat another fakir with a standard in his hand was seen there. He told the mad fakir that he had come very rapidly from Asmar, that ten regiments of the Amir with stores had started with him and would very soon arrive, and that the majority of the tribes from that side would also come. Although the fakir tried to excite us again to jehad, we went away to our homes. He continued to excite the people, but we did not go to him nor believe in him, because what he said before that Government rifles would be stopped, and their contents would become water, turned out to be untrue. In the fight at Landakai, there were very few of us present. The men there were mostly Salarzais, Ashurzais and Gadezais. The fakir was at the time of the Landakai fight at Burikot, and his other companion fakirs had dispersed. Saiyid Badshah Miangul was at the time at Saidu, while Gul Shazada was at Burikot. The fakir and Mianguls did not see each other, nor did they talk to each other. At Burikot the fakir and Gul Shazada lived in separate places. After the defeat at Landakai, the fakir went to Boner *viâ* the Karakar Pass with the Bonerwals. Gul Shazada went to Ilam from Burikot, and Saiyid Badshah also went to the same hill from Saidu. The Mianguls are now somewhere near the Pir Baba Ziarat. We have stated all the facts. We have been deceived totally. We pray for pardon, and promise to act in future in whatever way Government may order. Dated 23rd August 1897, and signed and sealed by Mir Abdulla Khan, Mirdad Khan, Janeroz Khan, Rahmatulla Khan, Abdul Hamid, Mir Khan, Muhammad Zaman, Atta Muhammad, Asuf Khan, Kalo Khan, Zarif Khan, Salo Khan, Agar, Hafiz, Gulai, Husain, Baidulla, Khainai, Yakut, Firoz, Pero, Agar, Sadulla, Mir Aslam, Ghulam Muhammad, Ilyas, Firoz, Sultan. Habibulla Hyder, Abdul Khalik Khan, Abdul Ghafur Khan, Sohbat, Shahid Khan, Mir Azam Khan, Ghulam Nabi, Asip Khan, Mamut Khan, Foujun Khan, Ghafar Khan, Mukarrab Khan, Hamidulla Khan, Saifulla Khan, Abdulla Khan, Sharifulla Khan, Nardulla Khan, Said Ali Khan, Muhammad Khan, and Junas Khan.

---

Enclosure No. 25.

*From the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner, Peshawar, dated 13th September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Following telegram received from Blakeway, from Hangu :—Am informed that Saragarhi, after being attacked yesterday (12th) from 9 a.m. to 3.40 p.m., fell on third assault, about time of Colonel Houghton's heliogram. Enemy assaulted gate, and, on garrison descending to repulse them, effected entrance by scaling walls. Fate of garrison not ascertained. Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Kazi Nur Ahmed and Mir Bashir, Malakdin Khel, are all with lashkar. Until troops can take enemy in rear by advancing along Khanki valley, it will be very difficult to break up tribal combination and prevent attacks in force on Samana posts or Hangu. Garrison of Saragarhi, 23 sepoy and one follower.

---

## Enclosure No. 26.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Nawagai, 15th September, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

A somewhat vigorous attack by the Mamund and Salarzai tribes made upon General Jeffreys' camp last night was vigorously repulsed. The enemy did not come to close quarters. The attack began soon after 8 p.m. and was continued, with a lull about 10 p.m., till 2.15 a.m., 15th. Our fire was carefully regulated and every encouragement given to the enemy to come to close quarters, which they carefully avoided. Their early retirement was evidently due to fear of the cavalry. The large proportion of casualties among officers is attributable to the fact that, while the men were in shelter trenches, the officers were moving about in rear of them without cover. I have directed General Jeffreys to assemble his Brigade and proceed at once to the punishment of the Mamunds and Salarzais, as to which I have given him detailed instructions. I have arranged for additional supplies of food and ammunition at Panjkora, where a considerable reserve still remains.

## Enclosure No. 27.

*Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 12th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., corresponding to the 10th September 1897.*

*After compliments.*—I have received Your Excellency's friendly letter, dated the 30th August 1897, and understood the contents which were to the following effect :—

(His Highness quotes the whole letter.)

I have understood the purport of the friendly paragraphs of Your Excellency's letter.

As regards the report which Your Excellency had received to the effect that my subjects had openly collected together and, forming themselves into separate bands, with flags flying and drums beating, crossed the Kabul river and joined Mulla Hadda's party; that after the fight at Shabkaddar, they returned to their places carrying their dead and helping their wounded; and as to Your Excellency asking me to order my local officers to prevent my subjects from crossing the frontier and joining Mulla Hadda with hostile intentions against the British Government, and even to appoint guards along the Kabul river and at other places, to prevent them from crossing, my dear friend, after Your Excellency wrote to me, such a thing has not occurred, viz., that Afghan subjects openly collected in such bands and crossed the frontier with flags flying. The true state of affairs has been what I have communicated to Your Excellency in my former letter, *i.e.*, that Mulla Najm-ud-din, an inhabitant of Jarobi, having spread the net of his cunning, has made numerous people from the different Afghan tribes his disciples, and they obey his orders to the utmost extent. During these times, when he became the source of mischief and disturbances, he has sent letters in every direction, and invites all people to join him. I had secured one of his letters, which I sent for Your Excellency's perusal, and which Your Excellency must have received some time ago.

I have ordered the local officers to keep watch on Afghan subjects to the best of their ability, and prevent them from joining Mulla Hadda. Thus the inhabitants of Lamkan (Laghman) had collected a large number of people, numbering about 30,000 men, and prepared flags; but on the officers receiving my orders, they used their best endeavours and succeeded in dispersing them; and they all returned to their homes. No doubt the news-writers on the frontier must have communicated this report to Your Excellency.

No tribesmen from my territories can do such an act in an open manner. Some of them, however, have great faith in Mulla Hadda, and it is possible that they may have joined him during the night, travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads. How is it possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier?



Your Excellency writes that guards should be appointed along the Kabul river and on other roads, so that no one might be allowed to cross over to the other side.

My kind friend, such an arrangement could only be possible by posting about ten thousand soldiers on all the mountain tops and at all the fords in that district. Then they will be able to execute properly such an arrangement, otherwise how would it be possible to stop the people who are familiar with the country? If the well-known roads be guarded against them, they can, owing to their knowledge of the country, find paths, over mountains and through desert tracts, to cross the frontier. As far as possible, however, the local officials have been watching and will watch any open movements of the tribesmen.

As regards the dead and the wounded whom Your Excellency writes that the tribesmen carried away with them after the fight at Shabkaddar, I beg to state that, if they have brought back their dead secretly, they have already, according to their custom, buried them, and now no trace can be obtained of them. As to the wounded, if questions be asked, they explain that they are always engaged in tribal feuds with one another, and they often kill and wound one another, and that the wounded men have received their wounds in such tribal feuds; and, as the witnesses belong to the people concerned, it is difficult to prove anything contrary to what they allege.

Your Excellency has kindly informed me that the disturbances which have broken out on the frontiers of India have been wholly unprovoked; that a force of troops was detailed to punish the tribesmen concerned in the attack upon Malakand and Chakdarra; that the force visited the Upper Swat valley and received the submission of the tribesmen there; that the Afridis, who have had engagements for many years' standing with the British Government, have been stirred to hostility; that the men who are responsible for this were Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, and Mir Bashir, Malikdin Khel; that they have burned some of the posts in the Khyber; that the road was undefended and closed to the passage of kafilas; that in the present state the carriage of valuable goods, and especially of warlike stores must necessarily be for the time discontinued; and that the Afridis and other tribes, who have attacked British Government posts, would be dealt with in a manner to make clear the supremacy of the British Government.

I have understood the facts of the circumstances which Your Excellency has detailed, and I feel certain that the tribesmen, who have stirred up disturbances and who, without possessing any warlike materials and appliances, commenced hostilities against the Government, will be put to flight and dispersed.

I saw some of these people and asked them by way of advice why they were disobeying the illustrious British Government, and exposing themselves to slaughter and loss. They said that their proceedings were undertaken owing to the hopeless circumstances in which they were involved, and they gave the particulars as stated below, *i.e.*, that during former years a firm promise was given, on behalf of the illustrious British Government, to the frontier tribesmen that they would always be exempted from the restrictions of Government laws, and would remain independent in their own country; that when they received such orders from the great Government, they lived with perfect assurance of mind, and never paid any taxes to anyone; that subsequently the frontier British officials, disregarding the orders of the Government of India issued to them (tribesmen), began to make roads in their country, and subsequently asked them for revenue and inflicted fines, &c., upon them and generally treated them in the same way as the old inhabitants of India were treated.

That the people inhabiting hilly tracts are generally poor and possess no property; that they have, therefore, exposed themselves to destruction, and they desire that the frontier officials should act in accordance with the promise which the Government of India had given them.

I then asked them to produce any Government "Sanad" in support of their statements, and they produced several printed notifications, declaring the independence of those tribesmen, issued by the Exalted Government of India.



As I have heard the above mentioned particulars from some of the said tribesmen, and as I saw the notifications also which they had in their possession, I have communicated the above as a piece of information to Your Excellency. Apparently the complaints of these people are against the local frontier officers of India. It is possible that Your Excellency may have received similar accounts.

Further, as to the closure of the Khyber road owing to the instigations of the Mullas and its remaining unprotected, Your Excellency has informed me about the causes which have led to the discontinuance of the carriage through the pass of merchandise and especially of valuable goods and warlike stores.

I am aware that those independent tribesmen do plunder. Thus some time ago Sartip Muhammad Hosein, stationed at Dakka, had entrusted to the charge of the escort party (Khyber) some packages of raisins and raw goat skins, but some mischievous people carried off the above goods. There was another kafilā carrying about six lakhs of rupees, belonging to merchants, which subsequently reached Dakka; but the money was called back from Dakka.

I have, therefore, arranged that any articles which may be required to be despatched urgently should be sent by Karachi and Kandahar, until the Khyber road is made safe again.

Your Excellency writes further about the story concocted by designing persons that the troops assembled at Peshawar were intended for an attack on Kabul, and that the Government of India will honourably adhere to its promise of supporting my Government. My dear friend, many men with interested motives and foolish prattle are to be found everywhere, and they say whatever comes to their silly thoughts. No importance has ever been attached to the foolish statements of such persons who only look to the surface, and who seek to create mischief.

Peshawar is a country which is in the possession of the British Government who are free to adopt any arrangements and measures which they may like in it. In this way both our Governments have authority to adopt measures which they consider it necessary to take in their own territories. Further, up to the present, no such thing has occurred as should lead to the entertainment of such unnecessary thoughts. Supposing such a thing were to occur, the first step would be to ask for the cause of it from the side where it should occur.

If the matter were such as to require an exchange of correspondence, correspondence would no doubt take place, so that the cause of it might come to light. Otherwise why should ear be given to the foolish talk of interested persons?

In the same way that Your Excellency has written, so long as the British Government retain sentiments of good friendship and union in regard to friendship and alliance with the God-granted Government, please God, I will, with full confidence, adhere to the friendship of the illustrious British Government in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

As regards the camels which the Waziri thieves stole from the troops in Dawar, and brought to Khost where they sold them to the inhabitants, I have to state that Sardar Sherindil Khan has ordered the owners of the camels to keep them safe. If Your Excellency considers it necessary that the camels should be taken back from them, then, as the inhabitants of Khost have bought the camels from the Waziri thieves, the price current in the country should be given to them and the camels taken back, so that the people of Khost may not suffer loss.

---

Enclosure No. 28.

*Translation of a Letter from the Amir of Afghanistan, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 12th September 1897.*

*After compliments.*—I beg to inform Your Excellency that I have received your friendly letter of the 6th instant. Your Excellency writes :—

*(His Highness quotes the whole letter.)*

Firstly, the said Mulla will not come to this country of mine, because he has acted wrongly, and, should he still come, I will expel him from my country, so that he may go towards Arabia, because he is a very wicked person. Your Excellency's troops, however, should not advance too far (*lit.* should not make a great advance), lest some confusion arise within the limits of Kunar or among the troops which are in Kunar. The Mulla is a great knave. He should not be allowed to (*lit.* let it not be that he might) excite the people and troops of Ningrahar. Precaution is necessary, so that the Army of the Sublime Government may not raise commotion and tumult in the neighbourhood, and the Mulla excite the people and be the source of disturbances.

As regards the remaining portion of the undemarcated boundary of that district, Your Excellency states that Jarobi is possibly within Afghan limits. As up to this time no decision has been come to in regard to those places, it will, undoubtedly, be as Your Excellency has written.

---

Enclosure No. 29.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 18th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

It is reported that proclamations in Pashtu, but bearing no signature, have reached Tirah from Peshawar, warning Afridis that Government are about to invade their country from all sides and to exterminate men women and children. These proclamations have been read out by Mullas and have greatly excited the Afridis, who swore that it was better to die sword in hand in an attack on British territory. I give this report for what it may be worth. Also Political Officer, Khyber, at Jamrud, confirms report, that lashkar of several hundred Afridis with three standards is at Dora, near mouth of Bara valley, and reports continue to come in from more than one source that this is only the advance guard of a much larger lashkar of many thousands, which has either collected or is about to collect in the lower end of the Bara valley, and which will attack Bara post on arrival of Mulla Saiyid Akbar, who is expected to join them to-morrow. Political Officer, Khyber, also reports that the Afridi lashkar which attacked Samana retired towards the Bara valley on 16th, having suffered a loss of 16 killed and 37 wounded, but this loss seems incredibly small.

---

Enclosure No. 30.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Mohmand Field Force, to Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 20th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The Adda Mulla, with a gathering of about four thousand men, is on the Bedamani Pass and in the Raisa Khel country near it. Two days ago he was joined by the Safi Mulla from Battikot, near Basaul, in Ningrahar, with some four hundred men of Ningrahar and Safis from Deogal; and men from Kunar are also in the gathering; there is very little doubt of this. The Khwaezai have gone to join the lashkar. The jirga of Kamali came in to-day, and I expect the Pindyali jirga to-morrow; both jirgas will be dealt with on my return.

---

Enclosure No. 31.

*Telegram from the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Panjkora, 21st September 1897.*

I am leaving this to-morrow. Upper Swat jirgas are reported on their way to Malakand. I will see them at Chakdarra; it is important to dispose of them as this coming in is final touch to their submission.

## Enclosure No. 32.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Nawagai, to Adjutant-General, dated 21st September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Last night the Hadda Mulla's gathering, which has been joined by Mulla Safi as well as a contingent of Shinwaris from Afghan territory, attacked my camp in force, total present not less than 3,000 men. Attack was rather well carried out tactically, rapid rushes being made from several points at once covered by rifle fire. It commenced about 9 p.m. and the firing continued without intermission till 1 a.m., constant rushes being made from all directions more or less simultaneously. The troops behaved with the utmost steadiness, and the fire discipline was really perfect. The safety of the camp was never for a moment in doubt, although some individuals advanced to within ten yards of the parapet, their corpses being found this morning.

## Enclosure No. 33.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., Lakarai, via Nahaki, to Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 22nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

The information of yesterday (20th) regarding composition of the Hadda Mulla's lashkar is confirmed. There is good ground to believe that Afghan sepoys are in it; they are said to be men who have left Amir's service or are on furlough, altogether about one hundred. The Musa Khel of Mitai have joined the lashkar.

## Enclosure No. 34.

*From Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner, Peshawar, dated 22nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Samil clans of Orakzais, Mishtis, Sheikham and Malla Khels have just sent in a petition in which they allege that they were driven to hostilities against their will and desire to make peace. They add that the Afridis and Gar clans have sent a deputation of Maliks from each section to Amir, but that they have so far declined to go, and are awaiting our decision. By this is presumably meant that, if our reply is unfavourable, they have no alternative but to go too. I have sent a verbal reply that their petition has been referred to Government for orders.

## Enclosure No. 35.

*From Political Agent for Div. Swat and Chitral, to Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Chakdarra, 22nd September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Obtained last night a letter from Adda Mulla to Mian Guls, informing them of attacks on Khyber, also of plan to attack Jamrud and Bara, also of his intention to join the Khyber gathering and of his being stopped by a letter from the Amir to whom he had sent a letter. This letter states that Amir's reply was that he was to wait while he himself consulted with his officers and leading men, after which a further reply would be sent to the Mulla. Mulla states that, on receipt of that reply, arrangements would be made for carrying on jihad; he states that his Sheikh was dismissed by the Amir with a present of one hundred rupees. He bids Mian Guls to have patience and not lose heart, as rising of Muhammadans was general, and there was hope that Swat would be relieved. He gives hope that Amir would proclaim jihad. Referring to a message which Mian Guls asked him to convey to Sipah Salar, Mulla states that Sipah Salar can do nothing independently of the Amir. I also obtained a letter addressed to Adda Mulla, supposed to be either from Saiyid Akbar or



Karbogha Mulla, giving glowing account of conquest of Khyber, and hopes of capture of the one remaining fort on the Samana, and telling Adda Mulla to get his own lashkar ready and attack on his side, to also keep up working in Swat, and to send word to Mian Guls.

---

Enclosure No. 36.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Nawagai through Panjkora, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Nawagai, 20th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp here was attacked at midnight by Adda Mulla. First line crept up unperceived to within 30 to 50 yards of Queen's parapet and fired two or three volleys, but being met by steady fire disappeared in a few minutes after trying other faces of camp in a half-hearted way. Enemy then devoted their attention with much shouting to sniping Nawagai's picket on the low hills a mile west of us for about half an hour and so made off. Casualties one man Queen's killed, one severely wounded, by first volleys. Enemy, of whom about 150, chiefly swordsmen, were in first line, and about 1,000 in second line, left no dead or wounded, but must have suffered as they were under cross fire, and Queen's shot with utmost steadiness and could see them plainly when they stood up. No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, fired four very successful star shells. Whole affair most satisfactory as proving complete steadiness of troops. We were warned of the approach of the enemy at 8 p.m. by the Political Officer and were prepared. The bravery shown by troops of 2nd Brigade on 16th is being much talked of with admiration by the people of the country. I am going to give the men a walk out this evening to see what has become of the Adda.

---

Enclosure No. 37.

*From the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 23rd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Deputation of Orakzai and Afridi Maliks to Kabul confirmed from other sources. I understand a representative from each of the Daulatzai sections has also gone to Kabul. The Orakzai jirga left on 19th September, and the Afridi jirga was to follow next day.

---

Enclosure No. 38.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Chakdarra, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 23rd September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Swat jirgas are reported to have reached Thana to-night. If true, I shall see them about 11 to-morrow. As I propose to endeavour through them to bring pressure on Buner, may I act on supposition that recommendations made are approved, and will Government allow me to use my discretion as to details of terms if I should find hopes of satisfactory settlement being brought about?

---

Enclosure No. 39.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Chakdarra, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 24th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

The younger Mian Gul came in this morning with Upper Swat jirga. He is a boy of about fourteen, his brother is a year older, and I am struck with their utter absence of influence with the Pathan Maliks. The boy brought in

two Martini rifles, some country guns and Lieutenant Greaves' sword. I have had a satisfactory interview with the jirga. In their coming in at this time we have secured the desirable result of checking the unceasing working to induce tribes to rise again and of ratifying submission made at Mingaora. I found that last night Korans were sent to Mian Gul begging him to return, as Amir had promised 10,000 rifles to tribes on this side and that his son had been sent to Jalalabad, and exaggerated reports also given of Khyber and Samana. I accordingly announced to jirga Amir's public denunciation of the disturbance and his friendly letter to Government, which showed that Amir's name was being used by Mulla, who had fled his country. The elder Mian Gul sent in letter saying his brother attended on his behalf, as he himself is ill, which is untrue. I go to Malakand this evening for a day or two to see to matters in Swat valley. In jirga the Maliks protested that neither they nor the people wanted any disturbance, nor had they contemplated such, but that disturbance arose through their losing hold of the people owing to the Fakir's miracles.

---

Enclosure No. 40.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, dated 24th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Yours 23rd September. The Government of India have no objection to leaving the details as to the terms to your discretion, but they think that if you were to now tell the Swati jirga what the terms to be given to the Bunerwals will be, there would be danger that they might think the opportunity favourable, while our troops are engaged elsewhere, for resisting the terms and even giving trouble outside Buner. The Government of India would prefer to announce terms at their own convenience with regard to enforcing them if they are not accepted.

---

Enclosure No. 41.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 24th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Corroboration received of Kohat reports that the Afridis have sent letters to the Amir and have either despatched, or are talking of despatching, a deputation to Kabul. It is also reported in confirmation of Kohat news that on 19th instant, in consequence of a rumour spread by Mullas that troops were advancing on Afridi Tirah and had already reached the Malla Khel Orakzai settlements in the Mastura valley, a lashkar of Malikdin, Zakha and Kambar Khel Afridis started hurriedly towards the Malla Khel country to assist in opposing them, after sending word to the Kuki Khel, Aka Khel and Sepahs to follow quickly. Reports are already coming in that Afridis are beginning to remove their families and property to Ningrahar, and the news that Adda Mulla has fled to Kunar has greatly disturbed them.

---

Enclosure No. 42.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 25th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

I dismissed Swati jirga yesterday, telling them without specifying any particulars that Government would accept similar settlement with Buner as arranged with some of their sections, namely, surrender of certain arms and payment of fine.

---

## Enclosure No. 43.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Mohmand Field Force, Camp via Shabkadar, dated 24th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

If the Gandab Halimzais have not complied in full, by the date which you fixed, with the demands you made upon them, let them understand that the Government of India intend to enforce those demands and any further demands which in consequence of their failure to comply seem to be proper, and that all allowances hitherto made on conditions of service and loyalty, whether they be in the shape of jagirs or cash grants, have been forfeited by disloyalty, and, if regranted at all, will be regranted only as a matter of grace as part of a new settlement and at the pleasure of the Government.

The Government of India wish, in settling future relations, to deal as far as possible with all sections of the Mohmands together as one tribe, and it is, therefore, important that you should tell all, and not only the Gandab Halimzais the above principle which is applicable to all allowances, and that when you impose fines and forfeitures on any sections, you should give them to understand that future relations will be settled by the Government of India, and that until those relations are settled their allowances of all kinds are suspended.

## Enclosure No. 44.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inayat Kila, 25th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Political situation is as follows:—The Musa Khel villages in Mitai valley, including Sultanai's own fort, were destroyed yesterday, and other Musa Khel villages in Suran will have been destroyed to-day. This completes punishment of the tribes, and I am ordering 3rd Brigade to move to Lakarai preparatory to marching down Gandab valley to Shabkaddar. Merk will have reported that Adda's gathering has dispersed, and troops met only slight opposition at Bedmani Pass. I think Adda's gathering having broken up country will settle down. The Utman Khel are quiet, and are reported to have brought their women back to their homes. I do not propose to take any action against Charmungis or Salarzai, as they have not opposed us as tribes, although individuals have fought against us in Mamund valley. The Khan of Nawagai can put pressure on former tribe, and the Salarzai can be kept in order by Khans of Jhar and Khar. There remains the Mamunds. Political Officer has to-day received word that Wara section, which comprises about half the tribe, is on its way in with some arms and instalment of fine; the Kakazai, which is the remaining half, is also inclined to come in, and I am suspending further punishment till intentions of tribes are quite clear. I propose, as far as may be possible, to enforce surrender of 50 rifles originally demanded, and restitution of the 22 taken from troops on sixteenth. Damage to villages and property already done is estimated at twenty-five thousand rupees.

## Enclosure No. 45.

*Extract from Letter from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 24th September 1897.*

I have the honour to forward the enclosed letters, No. A being by some one from Tirah, but I am unable to decypher the seal, which is probably that of either Said Akbar or the Karbogha Mulla to the Adda Mulla; No. B is a letter addressed by the Adda Mulla to the Mian Guls, to whom the letter from the Afridi country was also being forwarded.



The letters speak for themselves. The important point in regard to them, in my opinion, is that they are evidence of concerted working on the part of the different religious leaders, which is fortunately not backed up by more united action on the part of the tribes.

That portion of the Adda Mulla's letter regarding correspondence being between him and His Highness the Amir of Kabul is practically the same as was reported by the Commissioner of Peshawar in his telegram of 3rd September 1897. I think it, however, right to point out another view of the matter, which may be that the Adda Mulla is not only using the Amir's name for his own purposes of maintaining and raising disturbances, but he may have a direct object in sowing the seeds of distrust between Government and the Amir by free use of the latter's name. It is a fact that this Mulla fled from Afghanistan to escape the Amir. It is a well-known fact that the Mulla is a great personal friend of the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan.

Telegrams received from the General Officer Commanding, Mohmand Field Force, lead to the belief that his troops to-day are attacking the Adda Mulla's gathering in the Bedmani Pass.

I regret that I have been unable to send translations of the letters A and B owing to press of work.

---

Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a Letter to the Mulla Saheb (of Adda), dated 2nd Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (31st August 1897).*

*After compliments.*—I beg to inform you that, in the first fight which the Afridis had in the Khyber, the Khyber was conquered by the aid of God. All the forts, particularly the fort at Loargai (Landi Kotal), were destroyed. Some of the Mujahid Moslems were slain, and the infidels lost more than 300 men in killed.

I have directed the "lashkar" of the Orakzais to be engaged in fight at Samana, and along the whole of the frontier, since the last twelve days. They have destroyed four forts there. The villainous infidels have lost many persons in killed. At the Ublan, an English Subedar Major was killed; and his head was severed and brought. There is one fort alone which remains untaken on the top of the Samana. The "lashkar" of the Orakzais has surrounded it; it is hoped that it will be taken by the grace of God.

I have again prepared another Afridi "lashkar," and have ordered them to attack Jam (Jamrud) and the cantonment of Peshawar. I hope that God will grant a permanent victory. I trust that you also have been praying for the success of the "lashkar" of this side.

On receipt of this note you should prepare the lashkar on that side, so that they may begin to fight from that side, and we, from this side, so that God may be pleased to turn out the infidels from the Moslem country. You should send a letter to Swat, so that the Mian Guls may also use their endeavours and fight, so that the enemy may be destroyed, according to the word of God:—

"Verily, the victory of God is at hand."

Accept most sincere salaams and best wishes from Muntasar, inhabitant of the shrine of Kaka Saheb of the Akhundzada Khel.

*Note.*—Seal not legible.

---

Sub-Enclosure B.

*Translation of a Letter from Mulla Adda to the Mian Guls, Swat, dated 4th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (2nd September 1897.)*

*After compliments.*—I have to inform you that I am doing well, and I pray always for the health and welfare of you all. The news about the Moslems in Tirah and the Khyber as regards their relations with the villainous infidels is as follows:—

All the "thanas" of the infidels, above Jam (Jamrud) in the Khyber, have been, by the grace of God, burned and destroyed, and the property seized. All thanas in the direction of Kohat have also been plundered and burned. "Thana"

of Lowargai (Landi Kotal) contained every kind of articles including ammunition, rifles, cash, &c. The whole of the above property has been taken away, and the Moslems have been satiated with the plunder. Now all the Moslems, having regard to the religion of the Prophet, have prepared themselves for a "jihad." They intend to attack the cantonment of Peshawar and Jam. I am going to join the jihad. I had written to His Highness the Amir, "Zia-ul-Millat Wad-din," on the subject of jihad. His Highness replied that we should wait; that His Highness would consult all the Military Officers, Khans and Maliks of His Highness's territory, and then write again in reply, telling me the arrangements and preparations for jihad. His Highness gave 100 rupees to the Sheikh, who carried my letter to His Highness for his road expenses. This has been a great kindness of His Highness. I have told the tribesmen to wait, telling them to be ready by the time the second letter comes, and that on receipt of this letter arrangements for a jihad would be made.

I therefore write to you to be patient, and to let no anxiety enter your mind, because all the Moslems, with great zeal for the religion of the Prophet, and the honour of the people of Islam, have raised a general disturbance against the infidels.

I hope that God may be pleased, for the sake of the holy Sheikhs, to keep Swat safe, and that it may be left alone (by the English).

Please God, His Highness the Amir will make arrangements for the jihad, and issue a notification to that effect.

On receipt of the second reply, I shall let you know the contents. You asked me to inform the Sipah Salar about the state of your affairs. My friends, the Sipah Salar, cannot do anything without the orders of His Highness the Amir. Your affairs will be arranged in accordance with the directions which His Highness the Amir will issue.

Further, I pray for your welfare under every circumstance.

(Signed) FAKIR-I-HADDA.

Enclosure No. 46.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inayat Kila, 26th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I start to-morrow for Panjkora, where I shall be at end of the wire. Davis and Gunter stay here. Mamund jirga has just come in and will be interviewed by Political Officer to-morrow morning. It is a representative one of both sections, and Davis hopes to effect settlement with tribe.

Enclosure No. 47.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding Malakand Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Panjkora, 28th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday Davis saw the Bajauri Mamund jirga who offered 4,000 Kabuli rupees, and fifty useless matchlocks as earnest that they were prepared to treat for terms. However, they refused to bring in either the 50 breech-loader rifles, originally imposed for participating in attack on Chakdarra, or the 22 rifles taken from the troops on 16th. They admit having joined in attack on Chakdarra without provocation, and allege as excuse that the whole world went to do ghaza and they went too. On night of 14th they assembled, and went some 5 miles from their valley to attack us at Markanrai. The damage to their villages already done is estimated at from Rs. 20,000 to 25,000. They state that men from Pechdarra and other trans-Kunar districts were with them on the 16th, and that the rifles taken from troops were carried away by those men. The jirga refused flatly to give up other breech-loaders in their place. They said that Government might burn their houses, but they would neither give up rifles, nor hostages till rifles were forthcoming. Eventually the jirga left to consult the tribesmen and bring answer this evening. The jirga told Native Political



Assistant that the Sipah Salar had encouraged them to attack the troops, and promised ammunition as well as compensation in kind for any loss of grain. This corroborates the information I received previously. I hear that special concessions have been promised the leading Maliks, who have property on both sides of the boundary. The Khans of Nawagai, Khar and Jar, who have been doing us good service, had undoubtedly secretly encouraged the Bajauri Mamunds against us. Davis now considers that these Khans have changed front, and that, if we now continue to punish Mamunds, they will find themselves isolated and give in. I am fully in accord with Davis that to effect this, troops must be passed right up the valley, and that, unless this is done, we cannot withdraw without loss of prestige. The first brigade is now standing fast here awaiting orders. They are sufficient to enable me to deal with the Mamunds, and other neighbouring tribes as may be necessary. But Khel, Utman Khel Maliks have been found by Davis loitering about camp and Nawagai. I must strongly urge the advisability of my being ordered to deal with the Bajauri Mamunds and enforcing their submission. Should we leave before they submit, I endorse Davis's suggestion that the Khans of Nawagai, Jar and Khar, should be ordered to blockade the Mamunds and turn all that tribe out of Nawagai limits, the Khans being told that, unless they comply, the rifles will be demanded of them. I can propose no other alternative, and, if the force now with me can be made available, I strongly deprecate such an unsatisfactory arrangement, especially in view of the influence that can be exerted from Bajaur, adverse to the maintenance of the Chitral road. Unless an unexpected reply is received from jirga this evening, Jeffreys will recommence operations to-morrow, and I await further orders.

---

Enclosure No. 48.

*From Major-General E. R. Ellis, C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kung, 28th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Khwaizai have given in to terms which were three hundred guns and two thousand rupees cash; they have no rifles. Two villages have not yet paid their shares, and if by to-morrow morning they do not do so they will be punished.

---

Enclosure No. 49.

*Letter from Ghafur Khan, British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 25th September 1897.*

I have the honour to inform you that His Highness the Amir has sent me an official letter, dated 25th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., corresponding with the 23rd instant, in which he has recorded the full contents of applications submitted to him by some eighteen leading Maliks, Mullas, &c., of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. The reply given to the above applicants by His Highness the Amir is also copied therein.

The applicants, who were coming to Kabul to make an representation, were stopped at Jalalabad, and thence their applications were forwarded to His Highness the Amir. They prayed for assistance in money, guns and men to fight the British Troops; but the Amir totally declined to help them in any way, and ordered them to be sent back to their country at once.

A copy of the above letter is herewith sent for your information, and I would suggest that it be replied to by you either through me or direct, at early convenience.

I further beg to report that I heard yesterday that a fresh notification had been issued by His Highness the Amir regarding the petitions of the Tirah Mullas and Maliks, and that a copy of the same was pasted on a board in front of the city Kotwali. I accordingly sent my Munshi to examine the above notification, and from his statement it appears that the contents were nearly the same as in the letter sent to me by the Amir.

---



## Sub-Enclosure.

*Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to the address of the British Agent at Kabul, dated 25th Rab-us-Sani 1315 H. corresponding to the 23rd September 1897.*

After compliments.—The Afridis of Tirah have sent me now 18 of their men, consisting of Maliks, Ulamas and elders, each sect sending separate petitions and asking for my help. In accordance with my orders they were detained in Jalalabad, and their petitions were sent to me, and I have perused them.

I have written and sent them replies to their petitions to Jalalabad that they may receive them and go back. I send a copy of their petition and of my reply to them, enclosed herewith for your information and that of the Government of India. The particulars of their petitions are as follows :—

“ The British Government have been from olden times gradually encroaching upon our country and even upon Afghan territory ; and they have erected forts at various spots and places. We complained of this to the Afghan Government on numerous occasions, but Your Highness paid no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being helpless, and having regard to Islam and our constancy in religion, we have, under the guidance of God, opened the door of jihad in the face of the said Government, and we have severed our connection with them in every way. We have plundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana, above Hangu, one fort at Shinawari at the foot of the Samana in British territory ; one fort at the Oblan Pass near Kohat ; one thana at Tora Wadi ; a second thana at Kahi ; one thana at Ghalo-China ; one thana at Shams-ud-din ; one thana at Chardi ; one thana at Kar-Kila near Khatak ; one thana at Namak ; one thana at Narai-ab, and the Hindu Bazar at Nari-ab. There are three big forts on the top of the said mountain, which have not been taken yet. By the grace of God, we will destroy and burn these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position in the top of the mountain and at its base. From Kohat to Rud-i-Kerman, in the district of Kurram, the frontier of the Orakzais runs ; and the tribesmen have been making jihad from time to time within their respective limits ; and we will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British Government and become their subjects ; and we will never give up the reins of authority of our country to the hands of that Government. On the contrary, we are willing to tender our allegiance to the Government of the King of Islam. It is incumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our interests and to consider our position, but that of the whole of Afghanistan. We, therefore, send these 18 persons from among our Maliks, Ulamas and elders with our petitions to Your Highness's presence. We are at present engaged in jihad on the Samana range, and we request that Your Highness will be pleased to do what is for our good and benefit, and, by the Grace of God, we will act up to Your Highness's instructions, because we leave the conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of Your Highness in every respect.

“ We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to Your Highness. This is the time to gain the object of Your Highness. All the Moslems are now at the disposal of Your Highness, the King of Islam. We are now in hopes of getting aid from Your Highness in the shape of regular troops, artillery and money. If the British prove victorious, they will ruin the Moslems.

“ The services to be done on this side may be left to us by Your Highness.

“ We hope that after perusal of our petition Your Highness will favour us with a reply. Dated the 7th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., corresponding to the 5th September 1897.”

I have perused your petitions, all of which were founded on one object. I now write to you in reply that it is eighteen years since I came to Kabul ; and you know yourselves that I went to Rawalpindi by the Khyber route. In consideration of my friendship with the British Government I had gone to their country as their guest, and on my way I found many of your tribesmen, on both sides of the Pass, who made salaams to me.

If what you now state is true, why did you not tell me at that time about the matter, so that I might have conferred with His Excellency the Viceroy about it?

Some years after this, when the boundary was being laid down, Sir Mortimer Durand passed through the Khyber and came to Kabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this, and saw the Mission with their own eyes; why did not then your Mullas, Maliks and elders come to me, when Sir Mortimer Durand came with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could have discussed the matter with him?

At that time you all remained silent; and silence indicates consent. I do not know on what account a breach has now taken place between you and the English. Now after you have fought with them and displeased them, you inform me. I have entered into an alliance with the British Government in regard to matters of State, and up to the present time no breach of agreement has occurred from the side of the British, notwithstanding that they are Christians. We are Moslems and followers of the religion of the Prophet, and also of the four Khalifas of the Prophet; how can we then commit a breach of agreement?

What do you say about the verse in the Koran—'Fulfil your promise? To fulfil a promise is the first duty of a Moslem. God on the day when the first promise was taken, asked all the creatures whether he was their God or not. They said—'Yes, you are our God and our Creator.' Therefore on the day of resurrection, the first question will be about the observance of agreements. Infidels and Moslems will thus be distinguished by this test. You will thus see that the matter of agreement is of great importance. I will never, without cause or occasion, swerve from an agreement, because the English, up to the present time, have in no way departed from the line of boundary laid down in the map they have agreed upon with me. Then why should I do so? To do so will be far from justice. I cannot at the instance of a few self-interested persons, bring ignominy on myself and my people. What you have done with your own hands, you must now carry on your necks. I have nothing to do with you. You are the best judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into trouble (*lit.* spoiled the matter), you want me to help you. You have allowed the time when matters might have been ameliorated to slip by; now I cannot say or do anything.

I have sent back from Jalalabad the Maliks you had deputed to me. I gave them each a lungi and Rs. 10 for their road expenses, and I did not trouble them to come to Kabul.

The above are the details of the correspondence I had with the people of Tirah. In consideration of the union and friendship between our two Governments, I have communicated the above in a clear manner for your information. Further, everything is well.

*P.S.*—I have compared the above passages with the letters of the Orakzais and Afridis, and I find the purport of their letters and also my reply to them to be correct.

(Signed) AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN

#### No. 8.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 4th November 1897. (Received 22nd November 1897.)*

MY LORD,

OUR despatch of the 14th October 1897, gave a short description of the development of events in each section of the disturbed area on the North-Western Frontier. We now forward a further selection of correspondence relating to the progress of affairs in the Bajaur direction, and to the withdrawal of the Mohmand Field Force. A separate despatch will follow regarding events in connection with the Orakzais and Tirah Afridis.

2. On the 29th September, as the Mamund jirga still held out, their punishment was resumed. General Jeffreys visited 12 villages on either bank of the river unopposed; he blew up 15 towers and destroyed much property. On the



30th he attacked the villages of Agrah and Gat, and met with strong opposition from a force estimated at 2,000 men. Agrah was occupied and burnt, as was also part of Gat. The enemy suffered severely, but the action was not sufficiently decisive to crush further opposition. Our casualties were heavy. Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Bryen, 31st Punjab Infantry, and 2nd Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton, Royal West Kent, were killed; three other British officers were wounded; and of the rank and file 10 were killed and 38 wounded. Badalai was destroyed on the 3rd October. The Mamunds were collected on the opposite side of the valley near Agrah, and did not get across till the troops reached the open country, when considerable loss was inflicted on the tribesmen. The total losses of the enemy in the Mamund valley up to this date are estimated at over 350 killed and many wounded.

3. At the end of September instructions were sent to Major-General Sir Bindon Blood that he and his Divisional Staff, Brigadier-General Jeffreys with his brigade, and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with his brigade, were to remain on the Malakand side to complete terms with the local tribes and to maintain order there. General Blood returned to Inayat Kila on the 2nd October, and joined the 2nd Brigade, with one and a half battalions of infantry and 8 guns to enforce a settlement with the Mamunds, who still had a large gathering at the top of their valley, and who were receiving daily reinforcements from their settlements in the Shurtan valley and along the Kunhar river.

4. On the 5th October, Major Deane telegraphed that, in consultation with Sir Bindon Blood, it had been decided to give the Khans of Nawagai, Khar and Jhar an opportunity of endeavouring to bring about the submission of the Mamunds; and he sent word to the tribe that, if they desired peace, they should put pressure on the gathering from Afghan territory to return to their homes. The Mamunds acted on this advice, and turned back a fresh contingent who were coming to join them; but negotiations proceeded slowly. On the 11th the Mamund jirga brought in 20 of the Martini rifles lost by the troops on the 16th September, and gave security for the remaining two, which have since been surrendered. They swore to maintain peace and promised to turn Umra Khan's following out of their valley. Sir Bindon Blood accepted their submission, and in view of the heavy losses inflicted on them in lives and property, agreed to consider the account with them as closed. At their request, Major Deane gave them a written paper to the effect that Government had no desire to annex their country, but he added a warning that, if they misbehaved and entered into hostilities with Government, they would only have themselves to thank for anything that might befall them. They also asked for an assurance that the Amir would not interfere with them, and were told that the Amir and Sipah Salar had nothing to do with tribesmen living on the British side of the line, and that Government would not interfere with matters on the Afghan side.

5. The settlement with the Mamunds being concluded, the force moved to Matta Shah in the Babukarra valley on the 13th October, to effect a settlement with the Salarzais. At first the Salarzais offered a money fine in lieu of rifles and guns, but after a few days' delay, finding that this would not be agreed to, they surrendered 131 guns and ten breech-loaders, and gave security for ten more of the latter. General Blood thereupon marched (20th October) to Jhar, and on the day following his arrival there, the Shamozaï jirga brought in 20 rifles. They had already given up 15 rifles and 100 guns in September, and in consideration of their subsequent attitude, and especially of the assistance they had rendered in keeping open the road and in guarding the convoy sent to General Jeffreys's brigade on the 19th September, Sir Bindon Blood accepted these 20 additional rifles as a complete settlement of their offence in joining in the attack on Chakdarra.

6. The force recrossed the Panjkora on the 23rd October. Several more guns have been brought in by the Sam Ranizais during the month; and more rifles and guns by the brothers of Umra Khan in Jandol. At Major Deane's recommendation, we have sanctioned the grant of a cash present of ten thousand rupees to the Khan of Nawagai, and smaller sums to the Khans of Khar and Jhar in recognition of assistance they have given and in compensation for damage done to crops and houses during the late operations.

7. On the 2nd October, before proceeding to join Sir Bindon Blood, Major Deane interviewed at Malakand Gul Badshah and Amir Badshah, two of the



Mian Guls, with a considerable following of Maliks, Mullas and Sheikhs. The eldest brother, Saiyid Badshah, was unable to attend, being seriously ill. The result of the interview was satisfactory, the fanatical element in Swat was fully represented, and Major Deane considered the danger of further trouble from that side was removed. Since Major Deane's return across the Panjkora, the eldest Mian Gul has visited him at Chakdarra, with a large gathering of followers. Major Deane's interview with the Swatis will be dealt with in a later despatch.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN,  
G. S. WHITE,  
J. WESTLAND,  
M. D. CHALMERS,  
E. H. H. COLLEN,  
A. C. TREVOR,  
C. M. RIVAZ.

Enclosure No. 1.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral, Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 30th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Have realised fines from the Ranizais, thirty thousand. Thana and Darra Khan Khels, twenty thousand four hundred. Adinzai and right bank Swat river, through Nawab, Dir, thirty-five thousand, including three thousand five hundred in jewellery—total, eighty-five thousand four hundred. Rupees six thousand have been paid in compensation to families of two men killed, and who lost all their property and were left destitute, and to three or four subordinate officials who lost everything in first attack. Balance seventy-nine thousand. I do not know what claims for compensation by officers and others will amount to; the fines realised should more than cover such claims, but will hardly cover Government loss in camp equipage, telegraph line, &c. Account of details of arms has not been carefully kept; details of three thousand eight hundred guns and some fifteen hundred swords are given in my diaries. In addition to above, thirty breech-loaders surrendered by Thana and Ranizais, forty-five by Upper Swat left bank, forty-two by Upper Swat right bank and Adinzai, thirty by Jandol, and fifteen by Shamozaï Utman Khels.

Enclosure No. 2.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Yakhdand via Nahaki, 30th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

All quiet. Utmanzai have complied with their terms.

Enclosure No. 3.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Mohmand Field Force, Pipal, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 30th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

All quiet. Dawezai are paying up their fines.

Enclosure No. 4.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., Nahaki, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 3rd October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

We hope to be in Peshawar on 6th. All quiet, and clans paying up satisfactorily.

## Enclosure No. 5.

*From General Jeffreys, Commanding, 2nd Brigade, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Panjkora, 29th September 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

No further reply was received from Mamund jirga yesterday; I resumed punishment to-day. I visited 12 villages on either bank of river from near Thana to Kamp, blew up 15 towers and destroyed much property. This included villages of both Muhammad Amin Khan and Momin Khan. No opposition. The camp at Jhar was fired into last night; one mule killed. Health good.

## Enclosure No. 6.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Malakand, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inayat Kila, 3rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Five Afridis of Punjab Infantry deserted last night with rifles and ammunition. The force destroyed Badalai to-day; Mamunds were collected on opposite side of valley near Agrah, number about 4,000, and did not get across till troops got into open country when considerable loss was inflicted. Our casualties slight; remaining reinforcements, including field artillery, arrive to-morrow.

## Enclosure No. 7.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Inayat Kila (through Panjkora), 2nd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I arrived here this morning. Wounded here all doing well. The affair of 30th was a piece of really hard fighting. The enemy, 2,000 strong, well armed with Martinis and a few Lee-Metfords with plenty of ammunition in a position of great natural strength, presented a most difficult task to our troops. The enemy own to a loss of over 60 killed and showed no inclination to follow up our troops beyond the very difficult and broken ground from which they had been driven in the morning. The great drawback of all this work is the inevitable withdrawal after each action. Great credit is due to General Jeffreys for the able manner in which he handled his troops on this occasion. General health of troops is good. Her Majesty the Queen telegraphed through Her Private Secretary, enquiring after General Wodehouse.

## Enclosure No. 8.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 5th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

The following is present situation here. The enemy consists of some two thousand Mamunds belonging to this valley, reinforced by their brethren from Shurtan and Marawara and by miscellaneous men from Badel, Pech and other valleys adjoining Kunar. Sher Khan is, I am assured, now in Shurtan valley, but it is impossible to obtain undeniable proof of this. Our troops are encamped at mouth of Mamund valley, and there is apparently no site further up the valley which the troops can occupy owing to want of water. To reach the enemy entails a march up the valley of some five or six miles. The enemy occupy a strong position which cannot be satisfactorily attacked and carried, as troops must again return to their camp each (evening). Such retirement encourages

the enemy who have according to enquiry lost up to date about two hundred and sixty killed and wounded. I have consulted with Sir Bindon Blood, and the following line will be taken. The Bajaur Khans will make an effort to bring about submission of Mamunds. To give a fair chance of this being done, it is necessary the troops should remain quiet for three or four days. Failing submission and settlement, there remains no alternative but to move troops up valley and inflict such damage as is possible, and then quietly withdraw, unless troops are to be kept here indefinitely until snow cuts enemy's communication with Shurtan and prevents their retreating on to higher hills. I do not recommend the consideration of this course owing to many obvious objections.

---

Enclosure No. 9.

*From Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 6th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmand Field Force dissolved to-day. Last night passed quietly and not a shot has been fired since the destruction of Kung on the 29th ultimo. Three of the breech-loaders mentioned yesterday have come in, the remainder I expect to-morrow. I calculate that the expedition has cost the Mohmands over a lakh and a half of rupees.

---

Enclosure No. 10.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 6th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

A gathering was seen this morning on hills above Kalazai. This consists of a thousand men from Pech, Shigal and Nunai on Amir's side of boundary, and came by the Ghakki Pass. This morning the Mamunds are with the Nawagai Khan and Rahim Shah, and have sent word to this gathering to return to their own country. Would there be any objection to my writing direct to Sipah Salar and calling his attention to the matter and asking him to take steps to prevent men coming over to this side? It is not unlikely that this gathering will make a night attack on camp in order to delay chances of settlement with Mamunds. The foraging party was fired on this morning near Kalazai. The men concerned were Umra Khan's old servants.

---

Enclosure No. 11.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Inayat Kila, dated 7th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Question of your writing as proposed yesterday depends on accuracy of your information. There is no objection to your writing to Sipah Salar if there is no doubt as to the gathering coming from Afghan limits.

---

Enclosure No. 12.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 7th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I sent word in the evening to Mamunds that, if they desired peace, they could show their desire by putting pressure on gathering from Amir's territory to return to their own homes. I have received information this morning that



the Mamunds at once sent messages to them to return, stating that they themselves intend to make peace with Government. I am awaiting news to hear whether the gathering has returned to the other side of the hills. I cannot say definitely for the next two or three days how far the Mamunds are prepared to submit, but I consider their action in regard to gathering from Amir's territory as favourable, as also the fact that men are starting ploughing their fields in the valley. Plans for dealing with other sections depend on settlement with Mamunds, and I have accordingly not yet submitted proposals. All quiet last night.

---

Enclosure No. 13.

*From the Political Officer for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 8th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Affairs are much complicated by Sipah Salar's interference from Asmar; the submission of the jirga depending a good deal on reference made to him whether the jirga has his permission to submit. Negotiations proceeding slowly. Two mule-loads of ammunition arrived from Kabul this morning from Umra Khan to Ustad Muhammad and Said Usman, his followers, who are at present in the Mamund valley; there is no doubt about this information or about gathering reported in my telegram of sixth instant. I have just received yours of seventh, and though certain of my information, am waiting to ascertain whether Mamunds have themselves been able to turn back gathering before writing.

---

Enclosure No. 14.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 9th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Fourteen of the Martini rifles demanded have been collected by the Mamunds, of which ten have been sent into camp. The gathering from Kunar returned across the boundary line and dispersed yesterday. The ammunition, which arrived yesterday from Kabul, was escorted by twenty of Umra Khan's followers, armed with Martini rifles. The losses suffered by enemy in fighting have been much understated. Enquiry in different villages has elicited that two hundred and nine Mamunds belonging to this valley have been killed and in addition sixty unidentified bodies have been buried in the valley, eighty bodies have also been taken across the Hindu Raj Pass, and there are one hundred and twenty badly wounded men on hills, where jirga is now meeting. The Mamunds are apparently earnest in their desire to settle with Government, as last night they posted picquets to prevent miscellaneous snipers from coming near the camp.

---

Enclosure No. 15.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Inayat Kila, 11th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

There appears to be no doubt that Mamunds difficulty is settled. Just going down with Deane to see the Mamund jirga which has come in and surrendered twenty Martini rifles lost by troops on sixteenth. As clouds are threatening, I send you this information.

## Enclosure No. 16.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Inayat Kila, 11th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

To-day interviewed Mamund jirga with Sir Bindon Blood ; they undertake to maintain peaceful relations with Government, and urge that much for which they have been in no way to blame in the past, has been put down to them ; they asked for written assurance that Government does not desire to annex their territory, stating that former paper given at Mundah has been burnt by troops when burning villages ; they also asked for assurance that the Amir or Sipah Salar would not interfere with them. They have complied with demand for rifles with exception of three, for which they have given security. I informed them that the Amir or Sipah Salar would not interfere with them on this side of boundary line, but we had nothing to do with the other side. I have stated to them in writing that Government do not desire to annex their country, but that if they misbehave themselves and enter into hostilities with Government, they will only have themselves to thank for anything that befalls them. I drew attention to their harbouring Umra Khan's gang, and they promised to turn them out of their country. They deny having been represented at Chakdarra. Troops move to-morrow to Jhar. In accordance with your telegram of 3rd October, after consultation with Sir Bindon Blood, we think we should now effect final settlement : first with Salarzais, and next with Shamozaïs, from Jhar, and submit that sanction to this be given. The settlement I propose is surrender of arms or prompt destruction of villages. This should not occupy more than ten days.

## Enclosure No. 17.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Matta Shah, 13th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Force moved here to-day. The Salarzais admit part taken by them at Chakdarra. They are discussing terms and have promised to let me know by to-night the result of their meeting. They are anxious for money fine to be imposed in lieu of rifles and guns. Shamozaï jirga are also meeting, but I am keeping matters with them pending until we have finished with Salarzais. If operations against Salarzais should be necessary, they could be more easily carried out than in the Mamund valley.

## Enclosure No. 18.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Matta Shah, 16th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Troops went up valley to-day as far as Pashat. Upper and Lower Salarzai jirgas unable to agree between themselves on details of terms of Government ; they have, therefore, decided to settle up separately. Upper Salarzais have started to collect guns ; Lower Salarzai jirga is with me.

## Enclosure No. 19.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, via Panjkora, dated 16th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 11th. Government of India approve your proposal to effect settlement with Salarzais and Shamozaïs.

## Enclosure No. 20.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Camp Matta Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 18th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Mamunds have sent in remaining two rifles due by them. Upper Salarzai jirga came in to-day and gave in fine of one hundred guns. Ten breech-loaders and thirty-one guns also surrendered by Lower Salarzais. Delay is due to difficulty in obtaining breech-loaders from them.

## Enclosure No. 21.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Camp Matta Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 19th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

It is uncertain what line the Shamozaïs will take. I expect to meet the jirga to-morrow, but at present I understand they are not prepared to surrender rifles. The Lower Salarzais have given in good security for surrender of ten more rifles within ten days to complete number demanded. This enables this force to move to-morrow instead of waiting on here till the rifles are collected.

## Enclosure No. 22.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Matta Shah (through Panjkora) 16th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Last night news came in that the Salarzais had decided to agree to Government terms. I, therefore, countermanded the move of camp this morning, and marched up the Salarzai valley with all available troops, proceeding with cavalry and field guns as far as Pashat. The ground traversed was rough and required good driving. The guns were placed in a position from which they commanded all the villages on the south-west side of upper valley, they could easily have taken up other position commanding the Leogram and Butwar valley, and if fighting had occurred, there fire would have been decisive. Every difficulty was easily overcome by Major Anderson and his officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose hearts were in the work and to whom the greatest credit is due. The people in the valley were carrying on ordinary avocations, the women and children were in the villages. It was reported that Mamunds have picketed the passes to prevent any assistance coming to Salarzais. Salarzai jirga has not yet come into camp. Colonel Reid has been employing troops under his command for some time improving the defences and communications at Malakand. Health of troops here good. Issue of warm clothing completed.

## Enclosure No. 23.

*From Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding, Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Matta Shah (through Panjkora), 19th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Health of troops as reported yesterday. Satisfactory settlement arrived at with the Salarzais, who have given in the greater part of the arms demanded and sufficient security for the rest. I move to-morrow to Jhar with a view to settling matters with the Shamozaï Utman Khel.



## Enclosure No. 24.

*From the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Jhar, 21st October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

This evening Shamozaïs complied in full with demand for twenty rifles, as agreed on by Sir Bindon Blood and myself. The force is now free to move across the Panjkora.

## Enclosure No. 25.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Malakand, dated 28th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

The Government of India sanction your proposal to make present of ten thousand rupees to Khan of Nawagai, three thousand five hundred to Khan of Khar and two thousand to Jhar.

## No. 9.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 11th November 1897. (Received 27th November 1897.)*

MY LORD,

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 14th October 1897, we have the honour to forward a further selection of papers regarding the Tirah Afridis and the Orakzai tribe, and the punitive expedition sent against them under General Sir William Lockhart.

2. Early in October, Sir William Lockhart, under our instructions, issued a notification to the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais, announcing the determination of the British Government to despatch a force to march through their country and to proclaim from the heart of it the terms which we intend to demand in satisfaction of their recent misconduct. A copy of the notification will be found in enclosure.

3. We did not consider it advisable to announce in the notification the conditions which we would be prepared to accept by way of reparation, and we left it to Sir William Lockhart to proclaim them in such manner and at such time as might seem best to him. The following terms will probably be demanded :—

The restoration of all lost rifles and Government property ; and, in the case of the Afridis, of the private property taken at Landi Kotal, or its value.

The surrender of one thousand breech-loading rifles by the Tirah Afridis and of the same number by the Orakzais.

A fine of 50,000 rupees from the Afridis and 30,000 rupees from the Orakzais.

Formal submission to the General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force, and the surrender of hostages until the fulfilment of such of the above terms as are not required to be fulfilled forthwith, or during the pleasure of Government as Sir William Lockhart may decide.

We further contemplate that both Afridis and Orakzais shall be required to make good the damage done to buildings, and they are to be given to understand that all tribal allowances have been forfeited by their misconduct, and that any question of their renewal can only be entertained as part of the general settlement of future relations. The Afridis will be told that the British Government intend to open the Khyber Pass in such manner as may seem most desirable, and they will be required to agree to accept any arrangement which we may subsequently decide upon.

4. The answers received from the different sections of the tribes to Sir William Lockhart's notification are interesting. The Massuzai clan of the Orakzai tribe wrote that the answer of the Orakzais and Afridis was that Government had in three matters behaved tyrannically—firstly, in closing the Kohat salt supply; secondly, in taking possession of the Samana; thirdly, in taking possession of the Khyber. "If you will give up these three acts of tyranny, then we are willing to make peace with you." The Daulatzai clan of the Orakzai tribe asked that members of the tribes after they had taken an oath of innocence might be free from punishment; that women who elope to British territory should be restored to their husbands, and that the rate of salt duty should be reduced. The Zaimusht tribe wrote that they had agreed that no member of the tribe should raid in British territory, and that anyone doing so should be surrendered for punishment. The Khani Khel clan of the Chamkanni tribe said that friendship and enmity were not in their choice, and that they could not refuse to obey whatever orders they might receive from the "Fakir Sahib of Swat," the Adda Mulla or the Aka Khel Mulla.

5. Several of the tribes concerned in the disturbances have put forward as one of their grievances the enhancement last year of the duty on Kohat salt. The enhancement may have been utilized by mullas and others, as a means for exciting discontent and disaffection; but, so far as we are at present in a position to judge, it seems more likely that the increased duty was only advanced as a pretext, after the tribes had committed themselves to hostilities. However this may be, we consider it desirable that, when the time comes for reconstructing tribal arrangements with the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais, our policy in regard to Kohat salt should be fully explained to them. They will be given to understand that, at our discretion, we will adopt such measures as may from time to time appear to us desirable from a consideration of the salt trade as a whole, and that the only limit which we feel bound to observe in respect of the duty on Kohat salt is that it will not be raised higher than the duty on cis-Indus salt, which is at present in excess of the trans-Indus rate by about one rupee a British maund.

6. The Tirah Expeditionary Force comprises two Divisions—the First\* under Major-General W. P. Symons, the Second† under Major-General Yeatman-Biggs: Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer commands the line of communications: Colonel W. Hill is in command of the Kurram Movable Column: Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond commands the Peshawar Column, operating from Bara. Sir Richard Udny is Chief Political Officer under Sir William Lockhart, and the following are also employed on political duty:—Colonel R. Warburton, Mr. L. W. King, Mr. C. G. W. Hastings, Captain F. J. H. Barton, Lieutenant D. B. Blakeway, Mr. D. Donald and Sardar Sultan Jan.

Sir William Lockhart left Kohat for the Samana on the 9th October. The troops from Peshawar marched through the Kohat Pass in three columns unmolested, on the 10th, 11th, and 12th October respectively.

7. An Afridi and Orakzai jirga came to Jamrud on the 16th October to make a representation, but the men were told to present themselves before Sir William Lockhart in Tirah. At a jirga held by the Orakzais at Kandi Mishti on the 9th October, it was decided to hold the Sanpagha Pass against the British force. For some days previously the enemy had taken no offensive action, beyond sending out raiding parties, and had been disputing as to their line of action. On the 11th it was reported that Mulla Saiyid Akbar was organising the defence of the Sanpagha; the Samil Orakzais had already assembled, as had a large contingent of the Gar Orakzais, more of whom were on their way. The Zakha Khel Afridis had arrived or were coming; and the Mamuzais were watching Shinawari from a pass west of the Chagru Kotal.

8. Meanwhile, the Expeditionary Force was concentrating for the advance with as great rapidity as transport difficulties would permit. The working parties improving the road over the Chagru Kotal were daily annoyed by a



number of Ali Khels, Alisherzais and Mamuzais who entrenched themselves in sangars at Dargai, and fired on the covering parties on their retirement in the evening to camp. On the 18th October, a force was sent from Shinawari under General Sir Power Palmer to operate against Dargai. Dargai was captured and the defences demolished by noon, with but small loss on our side. About 3 p.m., however, a large Orakzai and Afridi lashkar, which had assembled in the morning at Khangarbur, hearing the sound of firing, marched with great rapidity up the lateral valleys leading from the Khanki river in the direction of Dargai and the heights to the west, to attack the troops engaged in punishing the Ali Khels west of the Chagru defile. Severe fighting ensued, and the enemy were driven off. The defences of several other villages were destroyed, and the troops returned in the evening absolutely unmolested.

9. On the morning of the 20th, General Yeatman-Biggs was ordered to march with the 2nd Division by the Chagru Kotal to Karappa, supported at the Kotal by two British Battalions and a Mountain Battery of the 1st Division. The enemy were posted in great strength along the crest of the western heights, and it was not till the afternoon that the position was taken. Three British officers were killed and five wounded, and the force lost 163, killed and wounded. The enemy comprised a large Afridi lashkar, and the whole of the Gar Orakzai lashkar of Mamuzais, Ali Khels and Alisherzais, with a small Mishti contingent from the Samil Orakzais.

10. The force halted at Karappa nearly a week, the advance again being delayed owing to difficulties of the road and transport. The camp was fired into at intervals both by day and night, and some losses were sustained. Foraging parties were sent out daily up and down the Khanki valley, and large quantities of supplies were obtained. On the 28th, both divisions moved to Gundaki, and a reconnaissance was made to the foot of the Sanpagha Pass; the enemy was seen in large numbers on the Sanpagha and the spurs of the hill, east and west.

11. The Sanpagha Pass was taken on the 29th October. Only one British officer (Major DeButts, R.A.) was killed and one wounded, and the total casualties were about four killed and twenty wounded. The gathering who opposed the advance were, mostly, Samil Orakzais, aided by a few Afridis. The Gar Orakzai lashkar, who were holding the hills west of the Sanpagha, did not arrive on the scene until the fight was nearly over, as a reconnaissance in their direction the previous day had led them to suppose that the attack would be to the west of the pass, whereas the attack was on the centre with a turning movement from the eastward. Owing to difficulty of bringing up transport and supplies over the Sanpagha, Sir William Lockhart was unable to attack the Arhanga on the 30th, but reconnoitred towards it on that date. The position was seen to be a strong one, and held in force by the enemy. The Mastura valley where the force halted on the 30th is very fertile, thickly studded with villages, apparently full of grain and fodder, but all villages near the camp had been set on fire by the retreating Afridis. The Arhanga Pass was taken on the following day, with but slight opposition. The troops camped in Maidan, three miles below the Pass. We shall deal with subsequent events in a later despatch.

12. On the Kurram side, the tribesmen have not given much trouble. A few cases of raids and attacks on small parties have, however, been reported. A lashkar of the Massuzais and Chamkannis assembled in the Kharmana Darra on the 26th October. They sent in a letter asking if our intentions were peace or war; and blocked the defile with felled trees and rocks. A reconnaissance was made from Sadda on the 29th October to the top of the Khug Sir, which returned unmolested, by the Ghoriatang Pass; the survey party mapped a large tract of new country.

13. The enclosures include further correspondence with the Amir on the subject of the frontier disturbances. In a letter, dated the 7th October, the Viceroy informed the Amir of the intention to despatch a punitive force against the Orakzais and Afridis; thanked His Highness for turning back the Afridi representatives who were on their way to Kabul; and asked him to disarm any tribesmen who, on the advance of the troops, might take refuge in Afghan territory, and to prevent them from making Afghan territory a base for attacks on the British force. The Amir in his reply said that, if fighting should ensue



between the British troops and the Afridis and Orakzais, he could not prevent the latter taking refuge in Afghanistan ; but he would not allow such refugees to interfere in British territory or permit his subjects to join them.

On the 14th October, some 200 Afridis and other Tirah tribesmen arrived at Kabul. The British Agent asked the Amir to reject their petitions as he had done before. The Amir replied that he had seen the deputations on the 17th October, that they were full of alarm and repentance, and wished him to submit their apology to the British Government, and to learn the conditions of pardon. The letter continued :—" You should enquire whether any negotiations should be undertaken, so that I might speak to them. But, if orders have already been issued for the punishment of these foolish tribesmen, then there is no room to say anything whatever. They deserve every punishment which may be given to them." The Viceroy has thanked the Amir for the undertaking in regard to Afridis and Orakzais, who may take refuge in Afghan territory ; and has sent him a copy of the notification issued by Sir William Lockhart, showing that terms and conditions will be announced to the jirgas on the General's arrival in Tirah.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN.  
G. S. WHITE.  
J. WESTLAND.  
M. D. CHALMERS.  
E. H. H. COLLEN.  
A. C. TREVOR.  
C. M. RIVAZ.

---

Enclosure No. 1.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 21st September 1897.*

With reference to your letter, dated 15th September 1897, asking for the early submission of the Lieutenant-Governor's views in regard to the scope of the operations against the Orakzais and Afridis and as to the aim of the political arrangements to be entered into with these tribes, I am directed to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

2. From the information now received it appears that all the Tirah Afridis have fully committed themselves, though the migratory Kuki Khel are perhaps less guilty than the others. The action of the Tirahi clans is, the Lieutenant-Governor considers, deserving of severe punishment, as their outbreak was entirely unprovoked and they have recently proceeded far beyond the limits of their own country and joined the Orakzais in desperate assaults on our troops and forts on the Samana.

It will be seen from telegrams which have been repeated to the Government of India, that the Kalla or Galla Khel section of the Pass Afridis have also apparently received some of the rifles stolen from Landi Kotal, and that the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, has placed them under blockade, but for the present purposes we may, His Honour thinks, confine further punitive measures to those of the clan residing in their summer quarters in Tirah, and Sir Richard Udny will be asked to report on their case in greater detail. It also appears that the Loargi Shinwaris joined in the sacking of Landi Kotal, but the extent to which they are generally implicated is not clearly ascertained. A report has been received of the arrival of practically the whole Shinwari Company of the Khaibar Rifles—81 strong—with their rifles under Jawas Khan, the Subadar, and in view of this loyal development it will, His Honour thinks, be best to defer the consideration of what punishment should be awarded to the tribe, which is a small one.

3. The correspondence also shows that the whole of the Orakzais have committed themselves to a greater or less extent, except the Shiah sections which comprise the Muhammad Khel clan and the And Khel and Tazi Khel sections of the small Alizai or Sturi clan, who are also stated by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to be Shiahs, though in the Gazetteer no sections of the clan are quoted and they are returned as Sunnis.

The small Shaonkanri clan lying to the west of Tirah and the Chamkannis\* and Zaimushts on the Kurram border have also not been implicated tribally, and may for the present be considered to lie beyond the scope of the operations, though it may be necessary for military reasons to insist upon a free passage for the troops through their country, and this the Political Officers will probably be able to secure. Similar provision for a free passage must probably be made in the case of the Shiah Orakzai clans also, and no doubt with the strong force available it will not be difficult to secure the co-operation of these clans to the extent desired.

4. It will thus be seen that with the exception of the Shaonkanri, Chamkannis, and Zaimushts on the west and south-west and of a wedge of Orakzai Shiah clans to the east, the proposed operations must be directed against the tribes occupying the whole tract between the Khaibar on the north and the Samana on the south and between the country of the Kohat Pass Afridis on the east and Kurram on the west, so that the scope of operations, though very extensive, is clearly defined.

5. As to the aims of the political arrangements to be entered into with the tribes, I am to say that His Honour considers that the reopening of the Khaibar Pass, which has from time immemorial been the royal road to Kabul, must necessarily be insisted upon, though the precise method in which this shall be carried out, as well as the question whether the Khaibar Rifles shall be reorganized must, he thinks, be left over for consideration till all armed opposition on the part of the tribes has been thoroughly subdued. The Lieutenant-Governor's decided opinion is that the occupation of the Pass up to Landi Kotal by a military force would be most inexpedient. The length of road to be covered, its liability to be attacked at any point, the insalubrity of the posts, the want of a good water-supply, and the inconvenience of assuming direct responsibility for the safety of caravans, all point to a tribal arrangement as far preferable. Such an arrangement has proved most successful for sixteen years, though the Pass Afridis have never been humbled, and have always prided themselves on the inaccessibility of their summer retreat to the British arms. Under the pressure of a religious movement, which has swept round the whole of the Peshawar and Kohat frontier, the arrangement has broken up, and the tribes will now have to be thoroughly humbled. When this has been effectually accomplished there is every reason to believe that the tribal system of protecting the Khaibar Pass, if re-established, will have no less success, and be invested with greater stability and permanence than has been the case since 1881. It is one of the characteristics of the tribes on our north-west frontier after a sudden outbreak of fanaticism to resume a friendly attitude when they have been coerced. And it is better policy to punish them adequately for their offences at the time when these are committed than to inflict upon them a continuing disgrace, which may at any future time supply the motive for hostilities. Sir Mackworth Young would therefore advise that the idea of garrisoning the Khaibar Pass with British troops be definitely abandoned, and that the reopening of the route under tribal arrangements be accepted as one of the objects to be attained by the submission of the tribe. And as, in accordance with the proposals about to be made, it will be necessary to formulate this object as one of the conditions of that submission, while, as above observed, details must be left for after consideration, he would thus describe the requirements of the British Government in this respect, *viz.*, that the Khaibar Pass should be reopened for traffic and safe-guarded in such manner as to the British Government may seem most desirable. Whether in the event of a general tribal rising it will be desirable to provide for the support of the tribal levies by sending a force on such occasions into the Pass may be matter for consideration, but this is totally distinct from the general question of the watch and ward of the Khaibar.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that there is an alternative to reopening the Khaibar Pass, *viz.*, to resort to the Kabul River route, by which

---

\* Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, reports in his telegram, dated 20th instant, that the Chamkannis are likely to commit themselves. Should this be the case, suitable punishment on similar lines to those adopted for the Afridis and Orakzais can easily be meted out to them.



the Afridis can be left out of the arrangement, and the means of establishing railway communication between Peshawar and the Kabul frontier secured. As to the prospects of such a scheme the Lieutenant-Governor is not at present prepared to advise. But considering that the Khaibar route has been established for centuries, it is in his opinion impossible to contemplate its abandonment or its being left defenceless. It seems to him to be a matter affecting British prestige that it should be promptly reopened.

7. Apart from the question of the reopening of the Khaibar Pass, the immediate aim of the operations now to be undertaken against the Afridis and Orakzais is the adequate punishment of the tribes for their heinous offences and the prevention of their recurrence. Sir Mackworth Young feels that nothing less than a severe humiliation will produce this result under the circumstances. The terms proposed by Sir R. Udny for the Afridis are—

- (1.) Restoration of all Snider rifles (about 300) carried off from or by Khaibar Rifles, and of all Captain Barton's property looted at Landi Kotal, including valuable silver plate.
- (2.) Unconditional surrender of (say) twelve leading Mullahs who have been prominent in exciting the present disturbances.
- (3.) Surrender of 1,000 breech-loading rifles in good condition.
- (4.) Payment in cash of a fine of Rs. 50,000.

Sir R. Udny would at any rate in the first instance deal with the Afridis as a whole, leaving them to apportion our demands themselves among the different clans, and in announcing the terms he would tell them that if they comply promptly with the first and second and produce at once half the number of breech-loaders demanded under the third term we will refrain from invading Afridi territory, but that the tribe will be kept under strict blockade till the other half of the rifles and the cash fine are paid up in full. If they do not comply with this demand then our troops will overrun and lay waste their country and villages, and they will be kept under strict blockade thereafter until they have satisfied all the demands above mentioned.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor will remark upon these terms further on, but he feels that the first point to be decided is whether, as suggested by Sir R. Udny, we should give any *locus penitentiae* to the Afridis before entering their country, or whether we should reserve our terms until we have occupied it. The remarks which follow apply equally to the Orakzais, though Sir R. Udny has not yet replied regarding the terms to be exacted from them. The Orakzais are perhaps less culpable than the Afridis, as they have not been on such intimate relations with us and their allowances are not so large; still it is in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion desirable that both tribes should for political reasons be treated as of equal importance, and unless special reasons to the contrary are shown in Sir R. Udny's report, which will be submitted at once on receipt, he thinks that they should be treated in the same manner as the Afridis. In giving his opinion on this subject Sir Mackworth Young feels considerable difficulty. On the one hand it will be remembered that Sir R. Udny's advice at an earlier stage of the present frontier disturbances, though at that time the Afridis had not risen, was that we should visit with our troops every tribe that had risen against us, and in regard to the Boner tribe he strongly recommended that no submission should be accepted till our troops were in the heart of the country. Moreover, the expedition against the Afridis and Orakzais has been organised and will shortly be ready to advance, and at all events up to within the last few days these tribes have been actively engaged in attacks on our position on the Samana range, and at present there are rumours of a contemplated attack in force on the Bara Fort. The Lieutenant-Governor has no hesitation in saying that anything in the shape of an ultimatum to these tribes would be entirely out of place if when our troops advance they are still engaged in hostilities against us, or if our advance is practically a pursuit after they have been repelled in such hostilities. The question also arises whether anything short of a visit to the home of the Orakzais and the Afridis' summer fastnesses will be an adequate punishment for the systematic hostilities in which these tribes have engaged, or whether without such an invasion and occupation their spirit will be sufficiently broken to enable us with any confidence to resume



relations with them. Finally, there is the wider question whether the occupation of Maidan and Tirah is not necessary in order to reassert the British ascendancy all along the North-West frontier, and even further.

9. On the other hand, assuming that there has been a pause in hostilities before our troops advance, the Lieutenant-Governor has no doubt that it is more consonant with British ideas of clemency, and with the habitual forbearance which we have exercised towards the tribes on our frontier to give them an opportunity of submission before proceeding to put forth all our strength against these misguided, ignorant yet plucky barbarians. The ordinary practice of the British Government has recently been emphasized by the Governor-General in Council, in regard to the punishment of the Bonerwals for acts of wanton and unprovoked hostility very similar to those now laid to the charge of the Afridis and Orakzais, so that, if our policy is to be consistent, it seems desirable that they should be given an opportunity of making reparation. It is true that in the case of the Bonerwals the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that the terms should be announced when the troops, after the issue of a proclamation announcing their object, had entered the Salarzai country, but it will be remembered that this section at any rate had actively resisted the advance of the force, and it was contemplated that the advance into their country should practically form part of the pursuit of a beaten enemy.

On three successive occasions, in 1860, in 1881, and in 1894, terms were proclaimed to the Mahsud Waziris either simultaneously with or prior to the despatch of troops into their territory, and the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to recall any instance in the history of Border Administration, except that of the recent expedition into the Tochi Valley, when the treachery of the Madda Khel was supposed to form a special feature in their attack on the Political Officer's escort, in which a similar procedure has not been followed. And as regards the question whether an occupation of tribal territory is not necessary in order to humble the tribes and re-establish our ascendancy, the Lieutenant-Governor holds that this is a matter depending entirely on the alternative which we intimate that we are prepared to accept. If the terms are sufficiently severe, he sees no reason for anticipating that our prestige will suffer from those terms being substituted for military operations. As a matter of personal opinion, Sir Mackworth Young does not think that the Afridis or Orakzais will accept such terms as he is about to propose, even for the sake of maintaining the idea of their much-vaunted inaccessibility or averting the force of the British arms. But in his opinion it is right to give them the opportunity, and I am accordingly to proceed to explain the manner in which the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that it should be done.

10. In the first place, the Lieutenant-Governor has arrived at the conclusion that there should be no check in the military operations, and no delay in making the advance, and, moreover, that in any case we should insist upon a complete survey of the country being made; but he holds that the terms on which we are prepared to accept the submission of the tribes should be formulated at once; that these terms should be such as to humble the tribes and materially weaken them for future aggression; and that they should be communicated to them without any delay, together with an intimation that, provided these terms are complied with before the troops reach their country, and provided also that before that time a representative jirga of the whole tribe come in and make their submission to General Sir W. Lockhart, they may avert the devastation of their homes and other punishment which will otherwise certainly be inflicted upon them. If the Military Authorities are able to fix a time, say a week or a fortnight, which must still elapse before the troops reach the tribal territory, the Lieutenant-Governor would give them this period of grace from the date of the ultimatum for complying with its terms.

11. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees in the first of the terms proposed by the Commissioner for the Afridis, but in addition to the demand for the restoration of Captain Barton's property he would also require that all Government property looted should be returned by the tribes. He would not, however, require that this should be returned within the period of grace allowed, as the articles have probably been widely dispersed and could hardly be collected in the time.

As regards the second, he would not insist on the unconditional surrender of Mullahs as such, though he considers that we may well demand the surrender

of the ringleaders, whether Mullahs or not, to be kept as hostages for so long a period as Government may consider desirable. The present outbreak of the Afridis and Orakzais has been an act of open hostility, and their conduct has not been disfigured by secret treachery, so that it does not appear to the Lieutenant-Governor to be desirable to demand an unconditional surrender of the ringleaders in this instance with a view to their being criminally tried.

As regards the third, Sir Mackworth Young attaches special importance to an effective disarmament of the tribes in order to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the present situation, and to ensure that the local force for watch and ward, under whatever conditions it may be recruited, shall be strong enough to dominate and overcome all antagonistic pressure from other members of the tribes not enrolled in that force. The Commissioner of Peshawar's demand for 1,000 breech-loading rifles from the Afridis is probably based on a careful consideration of the number of such weapons possessed by the tribe, and may, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be accepted, though it is a question, if the terms are refused, whether we should not carry the policy of disarmament to even greater lengths.

The fourth seems appropriate.

In addition to the four terms as thus modified the Lieutenant-Governor would add the following, viz. :—

- (5). Reopening of the Khaibar Pass on such terms as may seem to the British Government most desirable.
- (6). A complete survey of the tribal territory in such manner and under such precautions as the British Government may consider necessary.
- (7). Formal submission of a fully representative jirga of the whole tribe, and surrender of such hostages as may be required by General Sir W. Lockhart until the fulfilment of such of the above terms as are not required to be forthwith fulfilled.

12. For the Orakzais the terms will be suggested hereafter, but the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that they should probably be similar with the exception of those relating to the Khaibar Pass and the offences committed in it.

13. It is in His Honour's opinion also a matter for consideration if we should take some definite action in regard to the pensioners, military or civil, and reservists belonging to these tribes. That military pensioners are numerous is a matter of notoriety, and at the request of this Government a list of such pensioners is being prepared by the Comptroller of Military Accounts. It is also clear from the telegram from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, that even the pensioned Subadars have not refrained from joining in the attacks on our forces, so that it may be inferred that the pensioners of inferior rank have not kept aloof. On a parity of reasoning it is probable that the reservists, of whom an accurate account doubtless exists in the military records, may also have committed themselves. It appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be questionable whether we should allow men, whom we have trained and who are still in receipt of pay or pension from the British Government, to actively organise and take part in open attacks on British territory without taking action to escheat their emoluments of whatever description these may be. In the case of men who have taken a leading part against us, such as the Subadars mentioned in the telegram from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, their pensions might well be stopped till further orders, if not entirely ; and as regards the other pensioners and the reservists, a notice might be addressed to them requiring them to report themselves at some station in British India forthwith before the forces enter Tirah limits on pain of forfeiting their pensions in default of compliance.

14. As regards the immediate present, then, the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that a proclamation in the form appended should be issued to the Afridis, and a similar one to the Orakzais, the terms on which the latter will be allowed to make their submission being completed when Sir R. Udny has submitted his further report. The names of the ringleaders to be surrendered as hostages under the second head of the Afridi terms can then also be entered. If any additional argument is needed for the issue of such an ultimatum, I am to draw attention to telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, from which it will be seen that the intentions of the British Government are being actively misrepresented by fanatical agitators. An authentic proclamation will probably



have a great effect in allaying the exaggerated apprehensions of the tribes, and preventing them from committing themselves to measures of desperation when they realize that an advance of the British troops is imminent.

---

Sub-Enclosure.

PROCLAMATION TO THE TIRAH AFRIDIS.

In the year 1881 the Afridis of the Khaibar Pass entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, undertaking, in consideration of certain allowances to maintain order throughout the pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purposes, and to abstain from committing outrages in British territory.

Up to the month of August, 1897, these engagements have been on the whole faithfully observed. But during that and the succeeding month the Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, plundered, and burnt the posts in the Khaibar pass which were garrisoned with the levies furnished by them for the purpose, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British posts and villages on the Kohat border.

For these offences the British Government has determined upon despatching a force under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., into the Afridi country to enforce the following terms :—

I.—Restoration of all Snider rifles (about 274) carried off from or by the Khaibar Rifles and return in good condition of the Government property and of the effects of the Commandant, Khaibar Rifles, looted at Landi Kotal, or payment of the value of such property as fixed by the British Government.

II.—Surrender of the following ringleaders in the recent disturbances to be kept as hostages for so long a period as the British Government may consider desirable :—

(Names of hostages.)

III.—Surrender of 1,000 breech-loading rifles in good condition.

IV.—Payment in cash of a fine of Rs. 50,000.

V.—The re-opening of the Khaibar pass on such terms as the British Government may consider most desirable.

VI.—A complete survey of the tribal territory in such manner and under such precautions as the British Government may consider necessary.

VII.—Formal submission to General Sir William Lockhart of a fully representative jirga of the whole tribe and surrender of such hostages as may be required by him until the fulfilment of such of the above terms as are not required to be fulfilled forthwith.

If before the October the 274 Snider rifles mentioned in the first condition, and 500 of the breech-loading rifles mentioned in the third condition, are brought in ; and the hostages named in the second condition are delivered up ; and the formal submission of a fully representative jirga of the whole tribe is made under the seventh condition together with the surrender of such hostages as may be demanded under that condition for the due fulfilment of the remaining terms ; then in that case no injury will be inflicted upon you or your property, and the British troops will advance into the Afridi territory only to such extent as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the above terms and for the reduction of any tribes which refuse to submit to the British Government.

---

Enclosure No. 2.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 24th September 1897.*

In continuation of my letter, dated 21st instant, I am directed to submit, for the orders of the Government of India, the opinion of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor on the terms to be offered to the Orakzai.



2. As regards Mr. King's insistence on the necessity that our troops should enter the tribal territory and announce the terms there, in which opinion Sir R. Udny now apparently concurs, His Honor has already fully considered the question and has nothing to add to the remarks contained in the letter above quoted. With the one exception of the place at which the terms should be announced there is very little real difference between his suggestions and what His Honour has proposed. In fact his proposals amount to what was suggested by this Government in the case of Boner, which the Government of India would not accept.

Sir Mackworth Young proposes to announce the terms and only to enter the country so far as is necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the terms. This seems the most logical course, as if the terms are not complied with we proceed to such coercive measures as may be necessary from the day on which we enter it. According to Mr. King's suggestion in the event of no resistance being offered we should not be able to resort to such measures until the time allowed for compliance with the terms had elapsed and the position of our force would be anomalous.

The Lieutenant-Governor considers that his proposals possess two decided advantages. First, time will be saved by the terms being communicated to the tribes at an early date; and second, the tribes will have an opportunity of reconsidering their attitude with reference to the terms offered.

3. As regards the terms themselves, they are very similar to those proposed for the Afridis, and might, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, with some slight additions as explained hereafter be embodied in a similar ultimatum. The terms which Sir Mackworth Young would suggest are these—

- (i.) Return in good condition of all Government property looted or payment of the value of such property as fixed by the British Government.
- (ii.) Surrender of selected ringleaders to be kept as hostages for such period as Government may determine.
- (iii.) Surrender of 1,000 breech-loaders.
- (iv.) Payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000.
- (v.) A complete survey of the country in such manner and under such precautions as Government may consider necessary.
- (vi.) Formal submission to General Lockhart of a fully representative jirga of the whole tribe and surrender of such additional hostages as he may demand for the fulfilment of such of the terms as are not required to be fulfilled forthwith.

The hostages mentioned in term (ii.) and half the breech-loaders mentioned in term (iii.) must be surrendered by October, failing which the British forces will enter the tribal territory and enforce compliance in such way as may appear best to the British Government.

4. As regards the terms, I am to point out that it will be seen that the Commissioner has practically abandoned his demand for the surrender of Mullahs as such. He suggests that 700 breech-loading rifles should be required from the Kohat Orakzai and 150 from the Kurram Massuzai. His Honor thinks that it is best to settle the punishment of the Pitao Alisherzai at the same time. The fighting strength of the Orakzai, deducting the Muhammad Khel and Shiah Sturi Khel sections, is about 21,880 men against a fighting strength of less than 19,000 in the case of the Afridi clans implicated, *i.e.*, omitting nearly all of the Adam Khel and about one-third of the Kuki Khel on account of the Wudredunki sections. It therefore appears to be desirable to require the surrender of an equal number of breech-loaders in the case of the Orakzai. The fines proposed by the local officers excluding the Pitao Alisherzai amount to Rs. 20,000 on the Kohat sections and Rs. 7,000 on the Kurram tribes including all fines on the Massuzai. The Orakzai are not as well off as the Afridis, and the degree of their guilt is perhaps somewhat less as the Afridis moved first, so that a fine of Rs. 30,000 as proposed in term (iv.) appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be sufficient for the whole of the sections implicated.

Terms (v.) and (vi.) are similar to those suggested in the case of the Afridis.

5. All tribal allowances will of course be withheld till further orders, and Mr. King's suggestion that these should at any rate be withheld until the cost of reconstructing any Government buildings damaged has been recouped appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to deserve consideration, but no mention of this need, he thinks, be made in announcing the terms.

6. The Commissioner seems to think that the crops will have been cut and carried before we get in. This will perhaps be the case with the rice, but if the advance is made within the next fortnight it is hoped that the maize and jowar crops will be standing, and the rice will not have been threshed. At any rate, it is obviously impossible to delay the advance into Tirah until next spring, which no doubt, as the Commissioner suggests, might if circumstances permitted be the most effectual method of dealing with the tribes.

7. Mr. King at first proposed to exempt the Ismailzai sections from fine, as they have already suffered severely apparently since their country lies close to the Samana. There is also perhaps a question as to the guilt of the Rabia Khel, and even of some of the other sub-sections of this clan. Sir R. Udny does not notice the point, and as we are dealing with the tribe as a whole the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the exemption of particular sections or individual Maliks, that have not committed themselves, as well as the distribution of the fine between the different sections, if the tribal jirga cannot agree on this, must be left to the discretion of the officer in chief political control, who will no doubt be furnished with full particulars by the Political Officers.

8. Finally, I am to add that the form of the ultimatum to be issued to the Orakzai, if the Government of India approve of the proposal to inform the tribes of the conditions on which they will be allowed to make their submission before the troops enter their country, should be, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, the same as that suggested in the case of the Afridis, and that the terms should be communicated to both tribes at the same time and as soon as possible.

---

Enclosure No. 3.

*From the Deputy-Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 29th September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Blakeway wired yesterday from Hangu :—"Have received reliable information that a deputation including the following men, Hamid Azad Khan, Yaru Umar Gul, Malikdin Khel, Mulla Muhammad, Bar Kamar Khel, and Lal Khan, Bar Lamar Khel, was sent by Mulla Said Akbar and Mir Bashir, Malikdin Khel, about the 23rd to Kabul."

---

Enclosure No. 4.

*Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 29th September 1897.*

WITH reference to the telegram from the Deputy-Commissioner, Kohat, dated 25th instant, I am directed to submit, for the orders of the Government of India, a copy of papers, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor agrees with the Commissioner, Peshawar, in thinking that pending definite orders as to the tribal settlement to be made with the Afridis and Orakzais communications should not be held with sections of the tribes implicated.

---

Enclosure No. 5.

*From the Deputy-Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 30th September 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

To-day Donald wires from Fort Lockhart. "Report regarding departure of jirga with Mulla Saida Khel to Dakka on 25th confirmed. No Shekhans have gone in jirga and the three Mishti men are not representative men."

---



## Enclosure No. 6.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 30th September 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

To-day's telegram from Political Officer, Khyber, from Jamrud states that Mulla Idris Zakha Khel, is reported to have returned yesterday evening to China in the Bazar valley from the Amir's cantonment of Kahi in Ningrahar, and to have sent off word immediately to Tirah that no Afridi jirga of tribesmen or Mullas was to proceed to Kabul, as the Amir had issued orders that if they appeared there, they should be arrested.

## Enclosure No. 7.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 2nd October 1897.*

In reply to your letter dated the 29th September 1897, I am directed to say that the Government of India agree with His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that, pending definite orders as to the tribal settlement to be made with the Afridis and Orakzais, communications likely to embarrass that settlement should not be held with sections of the tribes. General Sir William Lockhart is being given a copy of this correspondence.

## Enclosure No. 8.

*Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated Simla, 4th October 1897.*

I AM directed to forward copies of letters relating to the conduct of political work during the progress of the Tirah Expedition, and containing the recommendations of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab as to the terms to be offered to the Orakzai and those Afridi clans who have risen against the British Government.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor proposes in each case to announce to the tribes the punishment and reparation which the Government intend to exact, and to give them an opportunity to submit at once to the terms, and to fulfil a part of them in earnest of their willingness to comply with the whole, before the expeditionary force enters their country. In the event of the tribes so submitting, His Honour proposes that our troops shall only enter the country of the Orakzai and Afridis, so far as may be necessary to ensure fulfilment of the terms.

3. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that it is necessary for the re-establishment of British influence that Tirah should be entered, and that the terms upon which the Government of India are willing to consent, to resume relations with the tribesmen, should be announced in the heart of the country itself, and enforced thence if they are not accepted.

4. The first step, in the opinion of the Government of India, is for you to announce to the tribes the offences by which their relations with the Government of India have been ruptured, and on account of which reparation is required, and the fact that you have been authorised to enter their country and exact reparation. A draft notification is enclosed. In the opinion of the Government of India the sooner this announcement is made the better. As it will have to be translated into Pashtu, the text of it has been telegraphed both to you and to Sir R. Udny. The notification is addressed to the Tirah Afridis and to the Orakzais. If you decide on any better way of including those who have committed themselves, while excluding the Pass Afridis and the non-migratory Kuki Khel, you are, of course, at liberty to adopt it. The Government of India understand that the Kalla Khel sub-section of the Adam Khels, who are



implicated in the attacks on the Khyber, would be included in the term "Tirah Afridis." This announcement does not, as you will observe, make any mention at all of the conditions which will be accepted as constituting the reparation required by the Government of India. It will be left to you to inform the tribes what those conditions are, in such manner and at such time as, in the circumstances, seems best to you.

5. It is, however, desirable to settle beforehand, as far as possible, what these terms and conditions should be. In the first place the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to demand the restoration of rifles and Government property looted, and in the case of the Afridis, the private property also which was taken at Landi Kotal, the value as assessed by the British Government being required when the specific property cannot be returned. In this condition the Government of India concur, and they leave to you to assess the value of any property not returned in good condition. Next, His Honour would demand the surrender of certain ringleaders in the recent disturbances to be kept as hostages during the pleasure of Government. This was one of the conditions by the fulfilment of which the tribes would, according to His Honour's proposals, have been able to avert an advance into Tirah. Subject to the remarks to be made regarding the last term, the Government of India wish to say that, as it is in contemplation to carry out the advance to Tirah before the terms are explained to the tribes, the 2nd of the Lieutenant-Governor's proposed terms may be omitted.

6. The 3rd and 4th terms are the surrender in each case of 1,000 breech-loading rifles and the payment of a fine. It is proposed to demand Rs. 50,000 from the Afridis and Rs. 30,000 from the Orakzais. The Government of India consider these to be proper forms of punishment, and, subject to the remarks in paragraph 9 below, they accept the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendations as to the number of rifles and the amount of the fines proposed.

7. The stipulation as to carrying out a survey of the country is not necessary in consequence of the decision that the expeditionary force will enter Tirah under any circumstances. Surveying will doubtless be carried out to the utmost extent possible during the time of occupation.

8. The last term in each case is formal submission to you and the surrender of hostages until the fulfilment of such of the above terms as are not required to be fulfilled forthwith. The Government of India accept this, and if you consider that the hostages should be retained during the pleasure of Government rather than specifically as proposed, they authorise you to formulate and enforce your demand in that manner.

9. With the exception then of the 5th term in those applicable to the Afridis, which is applicable to them alone, and about which I am to treat presently, the Government of India accept, in brief, the Lieutenant-Governor's first, third, fourth and last terms in each case, and omit the second and the last but one, as not being wholly suitable under the conditions of your expedition. These terms of punishment and reparation have been formulated according to the best information which is available to the Governor-General in Council, and in accordance with the best advice which he can command, and you should announce them and proceed to enforce them, unless you see cogent reason for recommending any alterations. The Governor-General in Council does not wish to impose them literally and rigidly upon you. It is acknowledged to be probable enough that the extent to which you are opposed, the temper of the people, the information obtained on the spot, or other considerations may indicate to you the expediency of making alterations in what is here proposed, particularly with reference to the number of breech-loading rifles and the amount of the fines to be demanded. If you should desire to alter the terms in any material respect, the Government of India wish you to refer the question for their decision, and they will give full and immediate consideration to your proposals.

10. In the case of the Afridis, the Governor-General in Council wishes you also to announce that the British Government intend to re-open the Khyber Pass in such manner as they consider most desirable, and the Khyber Afridis should be required to agree to accept any arrangement which the British Government may subsequently settle. The actual formulation of the terms and conditions applicable to re-opening the route belongs to a subsequent stage of proceedings, being part of the reconstruction of British relations with the tribe.

The Governor-General in Council is not at present in a position to define the objects which should be aimed at in the construction of future relations. I am, however, permitted to tell you that, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, it is desirable to endeavour to re-establish tribal arrangements for maintaining the Khyber route, if, after you have received the general submission of the Afridis, this shall appear to be practicable.

11. The Government of India contemplate that both the Afridis and Orakzais should be required to make good the damage done to buildings. Whether this should be added to the terms of submission, or left to be included in the subsequent re-establishment of tribal relations, is a matter which the Governor-General in Council will leave to you to decide. If, however, the liability of the tribes for the restoration of the forts and posts and other buildings is left for subsequent consideration, it will be necessary that, in declaring to them the terms of submission, you do not preclude the right of the Government to enforce this liability. It must be clearly announced and understood that, all tribal allowances having been forfeited by the misconduct of the tribes, any question of their renewal can only be entertained as part of the general settlement of future relations.

---

Enclosure No. 9.

*Draft Notification to the Tirah Afridis and to the Orakzais.*

In the year 1881, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, undertaking in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the Pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purposes and to abstain from committing outrages in British territory.

Up to the month of August 1897, these engagements have been on the whole faithfully observed. But during that and the succeeding month, the Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, plundered and burnt the posts in the Khyber Pass, which were garrisoned by the levies furnished for the purpose by the Afridis themselves, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British posts and villages on the Kohat border.

For these offences, all tribal and service allowances hitherto granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzais, are declared to be forfeit and entirely at the disposal of the British Government to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they may think fit.

The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under my command to march through the country of the Orakzai and Afridis and to announce from the heart of their country the final terms of the British Government. This advance is made to mark the fact that these tribes took part in the attacks above mentioned, and the power of the British Government to advance if and when they choose. The Government have neither the intention nor wish to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they immediately make submission and reparation. The terms and conditions on which such submission will be accepted will be announced to the jirgas of the tribes when I have arrived in Tirah, and I am authorised to enforce the fulfilment of these terms and conditions, and of any further terms and conditions which opposition by any tribe or section or individuals thereof may render it necessary to impose.

It is, therefore, notified that all who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sarkar, should assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with my orders, and with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will save the tribes from the further punishment, which any opposition to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring upon them, and the tribal country from further occupation.



## Enclosure No. 10.

*From the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 5th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Donald, Fort Lockhart, wires to-day: "At a jirga held in Bagh last Friday it is reported that a petition signed by Afridis and Orakzais was sent by Mulla Saiyid Akbar, together with 12 Mullas, to Sipah Salar. In the petition the tribes agreed to pay the Amir rupee one annually per plough if he would help them against the Government; it was also decided that all clans of Orakzais and Afridis should assemble next Friday in Bagh to decide what action should be taken to prevent troops marching on towards the Khanki. Apparently Mulla Saiyid Akbar and his jirga never went to Dakka. He is said to have deferred his visit either on account of the order of the Amir regarding arrest of jirgas intending to visit Kabul, or on account of the entreaties of the men living in Khanki not to forsake them at this critical juncture, when troops were encamped so very near."

## Enclosure No. 11.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Kohat, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 5th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Yours of 4th. The translation of the announcement has been made into Persian and Pushtu, and copies will be sent to-morrow morning to all concerned.

## Enclosure No. 12.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Kohat, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 6th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

I am despatching the announcement to the Orakzais at fourteen o'clock to-day, and am sending copies of same to Udny by express sowars for distribution among Afridis.

## Enclosure No. 13.

*Extract from letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the British Agent at Kabul, dated Simla, 6th October 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 25th September 1897, forwarding a copy of one from His Highness the Amir regarding the action taken by His Highness in replying to the petitions sent to him by certain Afridi Maliks and others.

The Governor-General in Council has perused your letter and the enclosure with much satisfaction, and I am to request that you will so inform His Highness the Amir.

## Enclosure No. 14.

*Kharita from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated Simla, 7th October 1897.*

After compliments.—Your Highness has probably already heard of the result of the advance of my troops against the Adda Mulla, which in my letter of the 6th September 1897, corresponding to the 8th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., I told your Highness was about to be undertaken. The Mulla's gathering has been dispersed: my troops followed him to his home at Jarobi, but he had



already fled across the boundary into Your Highness's territory, and, in accordance with my promise, my troops did not pursue him further. It is now for Your Highness to fulfil the part which Your Highness in your letter of the 12th September 1897 announced the intention of taking, in the event of the Mulla entering Afghanistan. I look to Your Highness to prevent him from concocting further mischief from Afghan territory.

As an instance of the mischief which the Adda Mulla has been guilty of, I enclose in original a letter, dated the 2nd September 1897, from Najm-ud-din to the Mian Guls of Swat. The Mulla writes—"I had written to His Highness the Amir, Zia-ul-millat wad-din, on the subject of jihad. His Highness replied that we should wait: that His Highness would consult all the military officers, Khans and Maliks of His Highness's territory and then write again in reply, telling me the arrangements and preparations for jihad."

Further on, he adds:—"Please God, His Highness the Amir will make arrangements for the jihad and issue a notification to that effect."

In this way, Najm-ud-din has tried to make mischief between Your Highness and the Government of India, and it is not to be wondered at if, under such circumstances, people believe that they will not incur Your Highness's displeasure by acting in a hostile manner towards the British Government.

In my letter of the 30th August 1897, equivalent to the 1st Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., I informed Your Highness of the misdeeds of the Afridis, and of my intention to deal with them in a manner to make clear the supremacy of the British Government.

I now have the honour to inform Your Highness that a punitive force under the command of General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., will shortly start to march through the country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to compel both tribes to submit to such terms as I decide to impose upon them.

I have received a letter from my Agent at Kabul, enclosing copy of one sent to him by Your Highness on the 25th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., corresponding to the 23rd September 1897. From this letter I learn that Your Highness has refused to receive or encourage, and has turned back, the Afridis whose representatives were on their way to Kabul. I thank Your Highness for this friendly act, which is exactly in accordance with what I had proposed to ask Your Highness to do.

It is probable that, when the British troops advance, the tribesmen will follow the example of the Adda Mulla's lashkar, and take flight into Afghan territory. I have, indeed, been informed that they are already sending their women and property into Ningrahar.

Your Highness is aware that in December 1895 and in May last I caused the Kaffir refugees to be disarmed, and took measures to prevent their causing Your Highness annoyance.

I now ask Your Highness to take similar action in regard to the Orakzais and Afridis, by ordering your local officers to disarm those who enter your limits and to prevent them from making Afghan territory a base for attacks upon my forces.

---

Enclosure No. 15.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to General Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated 7th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

I have sent to Political Officer, Khyber, for immediate circulation among the seven Afridi clans, the ten Persian and ten Pashtu copies of Government proclamation, received from you this afternoon.

---

## Enclosure No. 16.

*From the General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, Fort Lockhart, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated 9th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, reports : Orakzais are holding a jirga, Kandi Mishti, to-day. It was decided to hold Sampagha Pass against our advance. Ali Khels have sent out two raiding parties towards Hangu road. No Afridis or Mullas in jirga at Vardi Mishti to-day. Afridis said to be holding jirga at Bagh to-day. The Khan of Tang Tang, Alisherzai, is said to have received 240 rupees from Sipah Salar.

## Enclosure No. 17.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Kohat, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated 11th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Saiyid Akbar has sent message to all tribes calling on them to assemble on Sampagha. Samil Orakzais already assembled. Large contingent, Gar Orakzais, arriving and reporting more coming. Zakha Khel Afridis also reported arrived and more Afridis coming. Small raiding parties Mamuzais watching Shinawari from a pass west of Chagru Kotal. Ali Khels say that, if remaining tribes will not join them in attacking Shinawari, they will attack it themselves. Mishtis unwilling to join, so have been placed in front. Mamuzais and Alisherzais were to hold jirga 10th with Aka Khels to ascertain if latter will give them passage through their territory. Shekhans and Mulla Khels asking Rabbia Khels same question on same day.

## Enclosure No. 18.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 13th October 1897.*

I am directed to state, for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that the following officers will be employed on political duty with the Tirah Expeditionary Force :—

1. Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I.
2. Colonel R. Warburton, C.S.I.
3. Mr. L. W. King, I.C.S.
4. Mr. C. G. W. Hastings, C.I.E.
5. Captain F. J. H. Barton.
6. Lieutenant D. B. Blakeway.
7. Mr. D. Donald.
8. Sardar Sultan Jan, C.I.E.

The deputation of these officers is hereby formally sanctioned. The recommendations of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the emoluments to be granted to them while on duty with the Expedition will be awaited.

Under the arrangement contemplated by Sir William Lockhart, Sir Richard Udny, with Mr. Blakeway as his Personal Assistant, Colonel Warburton, and Mr. King will remain with the Head-quarters of the force ; Messrs. Hastings and Donald with the Head-quarters of the two Divisions ; Sardar Sultan Jan will be employed on the line of communications, and Captain Barton with the Peshawar Column. Besides the above, Captain Roos Keppel, who has relieved Mr. Hastings as Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, will, if necessary, act as Political Officer with the Kurram Movable Column, in addition to his other duties.

## Enclosure No. 19.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, dated 15th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Political Officer, Khyber, wires :—" News just received that Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad are bent upon filling up with mud the Ullus well and to level the Landi Kotal Fort and Serai to the ground with a view to deprive the British troops of water and shelter in case they come up.

## Enclosure No. 20.

*Extract from letter from Colonel J. A. Miley, C.S.I., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, Punjab Circle, dated Simla, 13th October 1897.*

The Governor-General in Council has been pleased to decide that payments of reserve pay and pensions to reservists and military pensioners of the Tirah, Afridi and Orakzai clans, who are not residing within British territory should be suspended until the conclusion of the operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Reservists and pensioners of the tribes above named, who reside within British territory, may be paid their reserve pay or pensions on the production of certificates from the Deputy Commissioners, Peshawar or Kohat, to the effect that they have not been implicated in the recent tribal risings against the British Government.

I am to request that immediate instructions may be issued to the postal authorities and others concerned in order to give effect to the above orders.

Orders will issue hereafter regarding the time when, and the conditions on which, payments of pensions and reserve pay may be resumed.

## Enclosure No. 21.

*From the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 16th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Following just received from Political Officer, Khyber :—" The Afridi and Orakzai jirga with representations from the tribes came in from Tirah this evening. Their petition and statement will be posted in original to-morrow. They are awaiting reply in the village of Jam, independent territory." I suggest that petition and statement be returned to jirgas, and that they be told to present themselves before General Lockhart.

## Enclosure No. 22.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp via Fort Lockhart, dated 18th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Commissioner, Peshawar's telegram October 16th. Please telegraph to him if you concur in Commissioner's proposed action with regard to the Afridi and Orakzai jirgas.

## Enclosure No. 23.

*From the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 17th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Sir William Lockhart's proclamation to the tribes reached Massuzais twelfth instant. A reply, written on the back of the original proclamation sent to the elders of the Kharmana Massuzai, has been received to-day unsigned, but in handwriting of Mirza Khan, Akhundzada, Massuzai, to this effect. The



answer of the Orakzai and Afridi is this : that you have in three places behaved tyrannically—firstly, that the salt supply has been closed ; secondly, that for all time there has been free passage over the Samana, and neither the rulers of the Musalmans, nor of the Kafirs have seized it, now it has been taken possession of ; thirdly, that you have taken possession of the Khyber, and the Khyber country is ours. If you will give up these three acts of tyranny, then we are willing to make peace with you. Firstly, that you fix the price of salt at four maunds ; secondly, that you evacuate Samana ; thirdly, that you recognise that the Khyber is ours, and that you have nothing to do with it. You have also committed a fourth act of tyranny, in that you have denied our rights to the Reghi lands ; settle this also, and we will make peace and all Tirah will make peace with you. The Reghi lands referred to are lands lying near Balish Khel in Kurram, now occupied by Turis. A separate letter was sent by the same messenger to Afridi Khan, Naib Hakim, Kurram, saying all Islam respects you, because you are a Musalman and live in the country of the Mulla of Manki ; it is incumbent on you that you should make peace between the Musalman and the Kafir in such a manner that the advantage to the Musalman be great and to the Kafir small, because you are a Musalman and are respected.

---

Enclosure No. 24.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Fort Lockhart, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 18th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

It is reported to-day from several sources that, owing to strong entreaties of Afridis and Mishti Orakzais, the Shiah clans of the Orakzais have agreed to join the hostile coalition from which they have hitherto held aloof. A lashkar of the Samil Orakzai clans with ten standards has been collected for last few days in Khanki valley at Khangarbur on road to Sampagha Pass. This gathering was joined yesterday by an Afridi lashkar with twelve standards of Lower Kambar Khel, Zakha Khel and Malikdin Khel clans. Another Afridi lashkar, with six standards of Kalla Khel and Upper Kambar Khel, is said to be at Ramadan in Khanki valley, west of Khangarbur. Each standard averages three to four hundred men. The lashkars of Gar Orakzais, believed to number six thousand men, are in hills south of Khanki stream about Surghundai and Shadal, south of Ramadan, and it was probably a small contingent from this lashkar that opposed the attack to-day on Dargai. On night of 16th a lashkar, number not stated, composed of Daulatzai, Orakzais, and Afridis of Aka Khel and Zakha Khel clans was also reported to be on hills near Zera Kotai, threatening Bar Marai, ten miles north-west of Usterzai.

---

Enclosure No. 25.

*Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.*

13th October 1897.—(a) A telegram was received to-day from Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, stating that the Proclamation to the Kurram Orakzais had been received and distributed. A similar intimation had previously been received from all the other Political Officers, to whom the Proclamation had been sent for distribution by Sir W. Lockhart's order.

(b) A letter, dated 11th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 (8th October 1897), addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, was received yesterday from the Daulatzais (Firoz Khel, Utman Khel and Bizotis). Its purport is as follows :—

"We pray that Government may be pleased to consider the following requests :—

a—The practice of punishing members of our tribes after they have taken an oath of innocence may be stopped.

b---The old custom prevailing in Colonel Cook's time, under which women who eloped to British territory were restored to their husbands, may be revived. At present no fugitive wife is restored against her will.

c—The rate of salt duty may be reduced to its former limits.

We are a poor race, and it is not seemly that a King should wage war against beggars. We are just like the 'swarai' (a long tailed bird found in the hills) which flits from tree to tree. We cannot fight and must flee from place to place like this bird. The Sarkar can gain nothing by fighting against 'swarais.'

We are subjects of the Sarkar and pray for its prosperity."

In a similar letter, addressed to the Commandant, Border Military Police, they say that they are prepared to make submission and obey the orders of Government, and that, if they have gone astray, it was through the instigation of Mullas.

No reply was returned to this communication. A few days ago, the Mishtis, Shekhans and Malla Khels also approached the Deputy Commissioner with a view to tendering their submission, but of course no answer was vouchsafed to them.

(c) The third column arrived in Kohat through the Pass yesterday afternoon. No molestation of any sort was offered to the three columns on their march through the pass. The behaviour of the Pass Afridis and Jawakis at this juncture has been admirable.

Enclosure No. 26.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Shinawari, 20th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Sir William is at Fort Lockhart. 1st Brigade and part of divisional troops, first division, just marched in. General Yeatman-Biggs with whole of second division and two battalions, first division, started at 4.30 a.m. to clear Chagru Kotal defile. Reached Kotal without opposition by 8.30. At 9 received the following helio from him:—"Am now deploying for attack 1st-2nd Gurkhas, Dorsets, Derby. We attack under fire of guns and long range volleys by Gordons." His intention was to occupy Dargai. Sir Power Palmer reported nineteenth:—"In continuation of my signal message yesterday, I have to report that, after the enemy had been repulsed by our left attack, they were reinforced from the Khanki valley. These reinforcements came up from the north-east and north-west, and at one point alone their numbers were estimated by the Political Officer to be eight thousand with eleven standards. The Afridis had evidently joined the Orakzais. Owing to the difficulties of road, I had sent back all transport animals before I reached the Kotal, from which I signalled to you keeping with me only doolies and stretchers. The force thus unhampered by transport and assisted by the faultless disposition made by General Kempster, and the steadiness of the troops, both British and Native, was able to inflict considerable loss on the enemy, so much so that our return to camp at Shinawari was quite unmolested. The rear guard reached camp at 11 p.m., the troops having been under arms from 4 a.m. All ranks behaved splendidly, and considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy."

Enclosure No. 27.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Fort Lockhart, 20th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

This morning General Officer Commanding Second Division, was directed to march with his division *via* Chagru Kotal to Karappa, supported at the Kotal by two British Battalions and one Mountain Battery of First Division. On arrival at Kotal, General Yeatman-Biggs found enemy posted in great strength along crest of western heights; after attacking position for about four hours, he reported it to be impossible to get through; I therefore ordered him to seize and occupy best ground near Chagru Kotal for the night, sending back his baggage to Shinawari. About fifteen o'clock, however, position was taken by combined movements of Gordons, Derbys, Dorsets and 1st-2nd Gurkhas; the Gordons and



Gurkhas arriving first at top and behaving with extreme gallantry. The enemy were chiefly Afridis. Meanwhile Second Division bivouacs on ground, holding captured position. I advance with them to Karappa to-morrow. Further details and list of casualties will be wired when received.

---

Enclosure No. 28.

*From the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 20th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

All quiet Kurram. It is reported that twenty-four men from Tirah presented petition to Amir for help. Petition was laid before Amir by one of his servants, and he said he would give answer in four days. Some of the Sardars urged Amir to send help to Tirah, but he eventually answered deputation to effect that he intended to keep to his agreement with the British.

---

Enclosure No. 29.

*Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 16th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to the 13th October 1897; (received on the 20th October 1897).*

After compliments.—I have received Your Excellency's friendly letter, dated the 7th October 1897, enclosing a letter from Mulla Najm-ud-din, the Fakir of Hadda, to the Mian Guls, which I have perused. I have also understood the contents of Your Excellency's letter, which were to the following effect :—

*(His Highness quotes the whole letter.)*

As to the escape of Mulla Hadda from his house before the British troops reached it, and, as to my promise that I would turn him out from this side of the boundary if he should enter my territory, I have now to inform Your Excellency that I have issued orders to search for the said Mulla by day and night in view to arrest him. The news-reporters appointed for the purpose report that the Mulla has concealed himself and is secretly moving about. I have also ordered that his whereabouts should be found out and a report made. Please God, the said Mulla's mischief will be stopped, if he be within the limits of my territory; but if this mischievous man move about in tracts which have not been divided yet between the British and Afghan Governments, the British officials should instruct the Maliks of such tracts to make arrangements about the said mischievous man. This man does not pass a single night at one place. He is in motion like mercury; during night he is at one place, and during day at another. Such are the reports made by news-reporters. Notwithstanding this, I am engaged in endeavouring to arrest him. Your Excellency may rest assured that, if I succeed in arresting him, I will turn him out from my territory.

I have perused the letter which Mullah Najm-ud-din wrote to the Mian Guls of Swat, and which Your Excellency sent to me. I write to say that whatever the Mulla has written, he has done so with the object of deceiving the tribesmen. His object is to excite people to rebel. Some years ago he became hostile towards me, and excited all his disciples to rise against me, and made them fight with my troops. Now in this way he is making the distant people fight with the British Government. He is mischievous; he says what is advisable and beneficial in his own interests. If I had given him the said promise, he was not distant from my country, and at the outside, my troops at Jalalabad were only two stages away from his residence. Your Excellency can see from the date of his letter, what a lie he has told. Liars tell lies, but wise



persons should distinguish (between truth and falsehood). I have known these Mullas well for years. They are like the priests of the time of Peter the Great, who created great mischief in Russia. These Mullas pretend before the people that Paradise and Hell are within their power and authority.

I have understood what Your Excellency kindly wrote for my information about sending British troops for the chastisement of the Orakzais and Afridis. I have also learnt about the decision which the high officials of the British Government have come to in regard to punishing the said tribesmen and bringing them to obedience.

I have further understood what Your Excellency wrote about the report which Maulavi Ghafur Khan made to Your Excellency regarding the arrival of the Afridi jirga at Jalalabad, and my sending them back to their country from that place; and Your Excellency expressing thanks to me for my action. As the people are seeking their own interests, their statements cannot be relied upon.

Your Excellency writes that, if at the time of the British troops advancing against the Orakzais and Afridis, these tribesmen being obliged to flee, should enter my territory, they should be disarmed and prevented from making any attack on British territory. My dear friend, I will not, please God, to the best of my power, allow my subjects to join the tribesmen who have rebelled, in view to help them in their fights. But when they bring their families to the houses of their own relatives, I will take no notice of the circumstance, because these people are mutually related to one another. They have given thousands of their daughters in marriage to one another. If I were to prohibit this mutual intercourse and prevent them from bringing their families to Jalalabad, the tribesmen would become hostile to me, in the same way that they have become hostile to the British Government. Their hostility to the British Government cannot be of much account, because the British Government is a Great Government. They have appointed troops for their punishment, composed of English soldiers, Sikhs and Hindus. But all my troops consist of these tribesmen. They will never agree to the destruction of their own kith and kin; and they will again, under the orders of the mischievous Mullas, issue improper edicts against me.

It would be better if peace be made between the Tirah people, Afridis and Orakzais, and the British Government. But if not, and fight ensues, and these tribesmen should flee and come to the district of Ningrahar, Your Excellency may rest assured that they will not be able any more to attack or interfere with Your Excellency's country; and until they have consented to become subjects of the illustrious British Government, I will never allow them to make any interference with British territory. But if they continue to remain in their own mountains, they will be beyond my power and control. If they come to my country, like Umra Khan, they will not behave improperly, and I will not allow them to do so.

---

Enclosure No. 30.

*From the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 21st October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Sir W. Lockhart's proclamation reached Khoedad Khel Zaimushts on the thirteenth instant, reply received to-day, signed by six Maliks, Zalmai, Rasul Khan, Kalandar, Bamb Ali, Khwaja and Badshah Gul, to effect that they have explained the proclamation to their tribes and have agreed that no member is to commit any raid into British territory, and that should any do so, he will be given up by the tribe to the Sirkar for punishment. Chikkai writes that he is ready to do any service to Government that he can. His letter is written after he received the proclamation, but he does not directly refer to it. All quiet in Kurram.

---

## Enclosure No. 31.

*From the British Agent at Kabul, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, despatched from Peshawar, 22nd October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Copies of Amir's letters posted to-day. No order yet passed on Afridi and Orakzai petitions. In reply to my letter requesting rejection of above petitions, Amir assures that in his life he will never deviate from his friendship with British Government, and, in case of war with another power, he will fight his utmost, though his kingdom be utterly ruined. In subsequent letter he writes that above jirgas repent much, cry for peace, and offer re-submission. Amir asks how Government wishes to settle with them.

## Enclosure No. 32.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Karappa via Fort Lockhart, 20th October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Second Division attacked the position at Dargai assisted by the 3rd Sikhs and Derbyshire from the 1st Division. Formed for attack at 9.45 a.m. 1st-2nd Gurkhas firing line, Dorsets support, Derbyshire reserve. Batteries opened fire at 10 o'clock. At 11.45 Gurkhas attempted to rush position, but had to turn westward to meet severe attack by Afridis. Dorsets and Derbyshires then attempted rush position, but were checked by galling cross fire. Gordons, supported by 3rd Sikhs, came up, and under concentrated fire of four batteries took the position at 3.15 p.m.; the position was occupied for the night also Chagra Kotal and Samana Tsuk. Casualties, 163 killed and wounded.

## Enclosure No. 33.

*From the General Officer Commanding, 1st Division, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Shinawari, 22nd October 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Devons marched this morning, but can get no further than Chagru Kotal to-night. All movements delayed by block on Chagru Kotal, crowded with transport animals of 2nd Division, and where there is no water. No. 3 Bombay Sappers and Miners, also Maler Kotla Sappers and Miners, sent to-day to Chagru Kotal to improve road up Dargai hill. To-morrow morning the 30th Punjab Infantry will proceed from Chagru Kotal and hold Dargai hill, relieving Derbyshire and 3rd Sikhs, who will proceed to Karappa at once relief. Nabha regiment left this afternoon for Chagru Kotal and will go on to-morrow to Karappa, other troops will follow as road clears. Every possible effort is being made to make the best of our transport, and to help it along. Troops very keen and in good condition.

## Enclosure No. 34.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Camp Karappa, via Fort Lockhart, 22nd October, 1897.*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Third Brigade, under General Kempster, remained for night at Karappa valley with portion of transport which was parked there. 2nd Division moved from Chagru Kotal to Camp Karappa, north of junction of Khanki and Kandi streams, shelling enemy out of Khangarbur. A few shots fired into Headquarters camp during night, also attempted rush on west picquet. No casualties.

## Enclosure No. 35.

*From the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 22nd October, 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

A party of 120 Daulatzais robbed four men of Marai of their rifles and ammunition at a place called Talab Parachgan, two miles north of Marai, where the four men had gone to collect honey. The Afridi and Daulatzai lashkar, reported to have dispersed, re-assembled at Tanda Utman Khel and decided not to go back without fighting with the Sarkar. Daulatzais were reluctant, because no troops were marching against them, but the Aka Khel showed determination and the Daulatzais gave in. Both lashkars are said to have received a message from the lashkar on the Samana to fight at Marai or Ublan, so that some of the troops now fighting at Samana might be withdrawn to Ublan and Marai. The lashkar left Tanda Utman Khel on 19th evening, but their whereabouts are not known as yet.

## Enclosure No. 36.

*Extract from Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 20th October 1897.*

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated 15th instant, repeated to you, I am directed to submit a copy of papers from which it appears that the Shinwaris, whose case is described in Punjab Government letter, dated 21st September, the Shilmanis, who, as it appears, were only implicated to the extent of sending 100 men with a flag down to the entrance of the Tartarra route, and the Mullagoris, who are said to have behaved well throughout, are anxious to submit. I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that we might well let them do so on such terms as may be considered suitable by the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, in each case.

## Enclosure No. 37.

*Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 23rd October 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 20th October, 1897, regarding the Luargi Shinwaris, the Shilmani Mohmands and the Mullagoris.

2. The Government of India concur readily in the Lieutenant-Governor's view that the Luargi Shinwaris should be told not to call in their kinsfolk from Afghan territory, and I am to request that the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division may be at once instructed to cause a communication to this effect to be made to them.

3. The Government of India also agree that it will be well to accept the submission of these Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris without delay, and I am to invite His Honour's early recommendations as to the terms which should be imposed. The share taken by them in looting Lundi Kotal and the intention to insist upon the tribes concerned making good all damage will no doubt be kept in view. A reference is being made to Sir William Lockhart in order that he may have an opportunity of communicating his views, if he so desires. Meanwhile the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals need not be delayed. The notification issued by Sir William Lockhart was only addressed to the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais, and it seems to the Government of India, as at present advised, that the Luargi Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris can be most conveniently dealt with through the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division.



## Enclosure No. 38.

*From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp via Fort Lockhart, dated 23rd October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Khyber Political Officer's telegram, October 15th. Luargi Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris appear anxious to submit. Shinwaris joined in sacking Lundi Kotal, see Punjab letter, September 21st, enclosure of my letter to your No. 3803 F., October 4th. Shilmanis only made a demonstration in the Tartarra route which came to nothing. Mullagoris have behaved well throughout. Lieutenant-Governor thinks we might let them submit on terms, as this may enable us, if necessary, to re-occupy Lundi Kotal by the Tartarra route by a small force without opposition, and if we can prevent further damage at Lundi Kotal by calling in assistance of these tribes it would be a good thing. Government of India think Luargi Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris can be most conveniently dealt with through Commissioner, Peshawar. Do you agree or have you any recommendations to make? Meanwhile Lieutenant-Governor is being asked what terms he would propose with view to early settlement, keeping in mind that all tribes concerned must bear share of repair of forts. Orders are issuing for the Luargi Shinwaris to be told not to call in Afghan subjects to their assistance.

## Enclosure No. 39.

*From the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 25th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Reply received from Khani Khel Chamkannis to Sir W. Lockhart's proclamation which they received on thirteenth as follows:—Know that your letter, in which the whole affair was related, has been received by us. Friendship and enmity are not in our choice; whatever orders we may receive from the Fakir Sahib of Swat, the Mulla Sahib of Hadda or the Aka Khel Mulla and from all Islam, we cannot refuse to obey them; if we lose our lives no matter. If the Sahibs want peace, we are willing to have peace; if not life is in the hands of God.

## Enclosure No. 40.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Karappa, 24th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

It would, I think, be a mistake to take isolated action through Commissioner, Peshawar, in regard to Loargai Shinawaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris. The preservation of what Government property may still be left uninjured at Landi Kotal seems to me of comparatively trivial importance. The Afridi question, with the side issues connected therewith, should, in my opinion, be dealt with as a whole under a single authority responsible to the Government of India for the terms to be imposed.

## Enclosure No. 41.

*Letter from Maulvi Ghafur Khan, British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 18th October 1897.*

With reference to your letter, dated 6th October 1897, I have the honour to say that, as directed by you, I informed His Highness the Amir that His Excellency the Viceroy had perused his letter referred to therein with much satisfaction, and at the same time it was also requested that the petitions filed by Orakzai and Afridi deputations for help might be rejected like the previous ones which were submitted by another deputation.

In reply His Highness the Amir has written to me with his own hand that, as long as his life is spared, he would not deviate from his friendship formed with the British Government, and which has been existing firmly for a long time, and that in case of a war between the British Government and another power he will fight to his utmost, though his kingdom may be ruined. The Amir also assures me that he would not change his policy and the confidence he reposed in the friendship of the English Government for the sake of the above tribesmen.

In the subsequent letter, which was received in the night time, the Amir has written to the effect that the above jirgas were much repenting their evil deeds, crying for peace and mercy, and were offering their resubmission to the British Government.

The other particulars are also written in the same letter, which you will come to know on perusal of the copy of the above letter which is herewith submitted.

Now His Highness the Amir is anxious to know how and on what condition the Government of India are desirous to settle the affair with the above-mentioned tribesmen.

Copy of the first letter referred to above is also enclosed. A reply may be kindly given to His Highness the Amir in pleasing terms.

#### Sub-Enclosure A.

*Translation of a letter from the British Agent at Kabul, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 17th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H., corresponding to 15th October 1897.*

After compliments.—I beg most respectfully to inform Your Highness that I had sent copies of Your Highness's letter, dated the 25th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (corresponding to the 23rd September 1897), about the petition of the Afridi and Orakzai Maliks soliciting Your Highness's aid, and of Your Highness's reply to them, with my own letter to His Excellency the Viceroy of India; and I have now received the Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 6th October, in reply to my above letter, intimating that His Excellency the Viceroy is much pleased with the perusal of Your Highness's letter. I write the above in accordance with the instructions received from the Foreign Secretary.

From a copy which has been sent to me of a letter addressed by His Excellency the Viceroy to Your Highness, dated the 7th October 1897, on the result of the expedition against Mulla Hadda, &c., I find that His Excellency the Viceroy has expressed thanks for Your Highness's action in refusing to receive and encourage the Afridis. I now hear that a large party of the Afridi and Orakzai and other Maliks and Ulama have come to Kabul, and intend to submit again petitions to Your Highness soliciting Your Highness's aid, &c., and I hope that Your Highness will reject their petitions as before.

#### Sub-Enclosure B.

*Reply given in His Highness's own handwriting, dated 19th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H., 17th October 1897.*

After compliments.—I have understood your letter. His Excellency the Viceroy kindly wrote to me also in the same way that His Excellency wrote to you, and I was pleased to receive His Excellency's kind letter. As regards the jirga of the Tirah people, which has come to Kabul, I have not seen them up to the present, i.e., 12 noon, Sunday; and I do not know what they are going to say.

After I learn what they say I will inform you about it. As to my friendship with the British Government, it is existing since a long time and will continue to do so. I will not renounce their friendship so long as I live. What could these poor and affrighted people say to me which would change my ideas? If an enemy should attempt to fight with the illustrious British Government and notwithstanding their power and strength, and even if my country be

destroyed at their hands, I will not renounce my friendship with the illustrious Government. These men have acted in a foolish manner through their own ignorance or at the instigation of the Mullas. How could I change my ideas and belief in the friendship? Please God, so long as I can (I will never do so).

If these tribesmen are human beings, they will make peace with the high officials of the illustrious Government, and tender their allegiance to them.

But if they are devoid of good sense and humanity, they will see their own punishment. You may remain fully assured on this point.

---

Sub-Enclosure C.

*Translation of His Highness the Amir's letter to the British Agent at Kabul, dated 19th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H., 17th October 1897.*

After compliments.—I wrote to you to-day that the members of the Afridi and Orakzai jirgas had not waited on me up to noon this day, and that I had not seen them, and that, after they appeared before me and stated their object, you would be informed of the particulars. I have now seen the Afridi and Orakzai jirgas, and I find that, owing to their evil doings, their minds are filled with great fright and terror; and they spoke incoherently and foolishly.

But they are now repenting and regretting very much. They have no hopes owing to their improper doings; and they are praying God that the high officials of the illustrious British Government may grant them pardon for their crime.

But I do not know whether the high officials of the British Government will pardon them or not. They are ready to become subjects of the Government. But I do not know under what conditions the British officials would accept their allegiance. These men have stated that, as they had committed a great crime and fear much, they come to me, so that I may submit their apology to the illustrious British Government, in view to pardon them for their crime. They are desirous of knowing the conditions, so that they may go and communicate them to their own tribesmen, and then apply to the high officials of the British Government, stating that they had committed a great fault, and soliciting them to convert their despondency into hope.

I told them that they were liars and scoundrels. But they stated on oath that their statements were true.

The above is what they have stated.

If the high officials of the Government have received no orders for their punishment, you should inquire whether any negotiations should be undertaken with them, so that I might speak to them. But if orders have already been issued for the punishment of these foolish tribesmen, then there is no room to say anything whatever. They deserve every punishment which may be given to them. May their Mullas be cursed! They have upset and ruined these tribesmen, and yet they do not let these foolish tribesmen alone.

P.S.—The above is what has passed during their conversation with me. But these people are liars and conceited (*lit.* self-opiniated).

---

Enclosure No. 42.

*From the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated 26th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Reply to proclamation received from Massuzais protesting against occupation of Khyber, Samana and Swat, and stating they will oppose further encroachment. Report received that Mamuzais have asked Massuzai to join lashkars near Samana or attack troops in Kurram. Massuzais replied they would attack Kurram. And letter received from them this evening *viâ* Tendoh, asking if our intentions were peace or war. Their lashkar now in Khurmana Darra, two miles from Dum Khwar.



## Enclosure No. 43.

*From the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sudda, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 26th October 1897.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Letter received from Massuzais purporting to come from Kamber Khel, Zakka Khel, Malikdin Khel, Mamuzai, Alisherzai, Ali Khel, saying that they have received the proclamation to Orakzais and Afridis, and the answer is that the Khyber was never given to the English but lent, and it remained the property of the Afridis, but the English had seized it, made it their property and built forts and made roads therein and had done the same to the Samana, and considered the whole country of Tirah as their property and increased their frontier round Tirah; also they had taken in marriage Musulman women. That they had seized upon the country of Swat, which is a holy place to all Musulmans, and forced their laws and customs upon Musulmans; therefore, from despair, we, the Afridis, had, with the help of God, destroyed the forts in the Khyber, and have given up all the allowances and profits of the Khyber, because the Pass is ours and not the Sahibs'. If the Sahibs wish to take our country, we have a lakh of men in Tirah ready to fight. Report received that Samozais have written to Massuzais, telling them either to attack the troops in Kurram or, leaving a few men as guard, to move towards Samana to join lashkars there. Massuzais have replied that they prefer to attack in Kurram.

## Enclosure No. 44.

*Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the British Agent at Kabul, dated Simla, 28th October 1897.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters regarding the arrival in Kabul of deputations from the Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and your correspondence with His Highness the Amir on the subject.

2. I am to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Amir to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 13th October 1897, with copies of the Viceroy's reply thereto and of the notification issued by General Sir William Lockhart to the Tirah Afridis and the Orakzais.

## Enclosure No. 45.

*Kharita from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated Simla, 28th October 1897.*

After compliments.—I have received Your Highness's friendly letter, dated the 16th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H. (corresponding to the 13th October 1897), replying to mine of the 7th October 1897. I accept Your Highness's assurance that you are engaged in endeavouring to arrest the Adda Mullah, and that, if you succeed in arresting him, you will turn him out from your territory. My latest information in respect to the Mulla is that he has returned to Jarobi.

I also accept and thank Your Highness for the undertaking you have given that, if tribesmen of Tirah flee into Your Highness's territory, you will never allow them to make any interference with British territory. I should prefer the disarmament of refugees, but, if Your Highness is unable to effect this, the punctual observance of the above undertaking will go far to meet my requirements.

My Agent at Kabul has forwarded to me a copy of his correspondence with Your Highness in respect to the Afridi and Orakzai deputations who recently arrived in Kabul. I enclose, for Your Highness's information, copies in Persian and Pashtu of a notification which General Sir William Lockhart has, under my orders, issued to the Tirah Afridis and the Orakzais, calling upon them to make submission and reparation if they wish to escape further punishment. Your

Highness will observe that Sir William Lockhart will announce to the jirgas of the tribes, on his arrival in Tirah, the terms and conditions on which the submission of the tribes will be accepted.

---

Enclosure No. 46.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Mastura Valley, 29th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Opposition to-day on the Sanpagha is believed to have been chiefly by Samil Orakzais aided by only a few Afridis, the bulk of the Afridi laskhar having gone off to remove their families from the valleys of Afridi Tirah and to defend the Arhanga Pass which, as seen from here, does not look at all the easy position we had been led to suppose, besides being eight miles distant instead of five miles as previously reported. The Gar Orakzai laskhar, who were holding the hills west of the Sanpagha, were only slightly engaged to-day, as a reconnaissance yesterday afternoon in their direction had led them to suppose that our attack would be to the west of the pass, whereas our turning movement to-day was from the eastward, and the consequence was that they did not come on the scene till the fight was nearly over.

---

Enclosure No. 47.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Mastura, 30th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Mastura Valley very fertile, thickly studded with villages apparently full of grain and fodder, but all villages near this camp set on fire by enemy while retreating. Owing to difficulties of bringing up transport and supplies over Sanpagha, I have been unable to attack Arhanga to-day, but am reconnoitring towards it in force; position seems strong one, and is held in force by enemy. Health of troops good. Water excellent. Weather bright and cold. Frost at night. Elevation of camp six thousand feet. Yesterday's casualty returns not yet complete, but unless rear brigade suffered loss during afternoon and night, approximate total is four killed, twenty wounded. Enemy were deceived by demonstration on our left on afternoon twenty-eighth, and reinforced their right; my attack was on centre with turning movement to my right, result being that enemy were in some degree taken by surprise; concentrated artillery fire on successive sangars rendered them untenable.

---

Enclosure No. 48.

*From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Camp Mastura Valley, 30th October 1897.*

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday, the first and second divisions took Sanpagha Pass and camped in Mastura Valley, about two miles below the pass. Leading troops left camp Ghundaki at 5 a.m. The 1st brigade occupied Kandi Kushti on left of advance, also Najina village to the right of the Sanpagha on lower slopes of hills, and also occupied a central hill near foot of the Sanpagha which formed first artillery position. The 2nd Brigade, supported by the fourth, ascended the main Sanpagha route driving enemy before it. The pass was captured and firing ceased at 11.30.

## Enclosure No. 49.

*Letter from Sir W. J. Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated Simla, 29th October 1897.*

The Government of India have observed that several of the tribes concerned in the recent disturbances on the Punjab frontier have put forward as one of their grievances the enhancement last year of the duty on Kohat salt. The enhancement may have been utilized by Mullas and others desirous of creating disturbances as a means for exciting discontent and disaffection, but so far as the Government of India are at present in a position to judge, it seems more likely that the enhancement was only put forward as a pretext, after the tribes had committed themselves to hostilities.

2. However this may be, it is desirable that, when the time comes for reconstructing tribal arrangements with the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais, the Government policy in regard to Kohat salt should be fully explained to them. They must be given plainly to understand that the Government of India will, at their absolute discretion, adopt such measures as may from time to time appear desirable from a consideration of the salt trade as a whole. The only limit which the Government of India will feel bound to observe in respect of the duty on Kohat salt is that it will not be raised higher than the duty on Cis-Indus salt: at present it is lower by one rupee a British maund. There is no immediate intention of any further enhancement, and it is not the intention of the Government of India to connect the salt duty in the minds of the tribes with a war-penalty, or with their misconduct.

3. I am to request that Sir Richard Udny, who is well acquainted with the Kohat salt question, may be instructed to make in due season a suitable communication to the tribal jirgas.

## No. 10.

*Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 30th December 1897. (Received 24th January 1898.)*

MY LORD,

In paragraph 3 of our despatch, dated the 14th October 1897, on the subject of the rising on the North-Western Frontier, we informed Your Lordship that it was our intention to impose punitive terms on the Bunerwals for their unprovoked hostility during the disturbances in the Swat Valley, but that we had decided to give them an opportunity of making reparation, and did not propose to announce the terms until a more convenient season should have arrived for enforcing them if they were not complied with.

2. We now have the honour to forward some further papers\* regarding the progress of affairs in regard to Buner. At the end of October the Mian Guls, with a very large jirga of Swati Maliks, came in to Chakdarra to see Major Deane. After representing certain matters in which they were personally interested, the Mian Guls showed their desire to establish friendly relations with Government, by asking that they might be permitted to try to effect a settlement between Government and the Bunerwals, adding that they had already sent men to the Buner jirga to advise submission. Major Deane told them that they were at liberty to do what they could in the matter, pending the receipt of the orders of Government in regard to Buner; and that if, before a formal summons were issued, or before terms were announced under Government orders, the Buner jirga should come in and bring with them a thousand guns as a token of submission, Major Deane would recommend Government to accept this as sufficient.

3. On leaving Chakdarra, the Mian Guls, with Maliks from each clan in Upper Swat, went to Buner to try and persuade the Bunerwals to submit. Representatives of the Salarzai, Ashazai and Gadaizai sections of the Iliasai branch of the tribe came to Malakand on the 22nd November. They stated

\* Not printed.



that they distrusted the Mian Guls and asked whether Government would settle with them independently of the rest of Buner. Major Deane told them that this was impossible, that he was not in a position to announce the Government terms, that the Mian Guls were acting in our interests, and that if the jirga were sincere in saying that Buner generally was anxious to make peace with Government, they had an opportunity of doing so by acting as the Mian Guls advised. While, however, these jirgas were at Malakand, the jirga of the Malizai branch held a meeting at Sunigram, and came to an unanimous decision to surrender no arms and to pay no fine.

4. It seems clear that the Bunerwals have no intention of submitting, and the time having arrived when we could conveniently advance into the country in the event of their failing to comply with our demands, we instructed the Punjab Government on the 22nd December to announce the terms, giving the tribe not more than one week's grace within which to comply, and making it clear that failing compliance, troops would move into their country.

5. The terms which we have decided to demand are—

- (i.) The deputation of a fully representative jirga of all implicated sections to make submission in British territory ;
- (ii.) The surrender of all Government property in the possession of the tribes or payment of compensation in lieu thereof ;
- (iii.) The surrender of 600 guns, which must include any breech-loaders in the hands of the tribe, and the Enfield rifles, some 50 in number, which were stolen from the Peshawar border ; and
- (iv.) A fine of 11,500 rupees.

6. We have at the same time instructed the Punjab Government to announce terms to the Chamlawals, of whose complicity in the recent disturbances we are satisfied. In the case of Chamla the demand is a fine of 1,500 rupees, 100 guns and 100 swords and some standards as a token of submission. A representative jirga of the Khudu Khels (a sub-division of the Utmanzai), who were also implicated in the rising, have come in and promptly paid a fine of 2,000 rupees, 150 guns, 200 swords and some standards. The Gadun jirga also came in on the 22nd December. They expressed themselves ready to comply with any terms demanded, and were informed that they must pay 2,500 rupees, 200 guns, and 200 swords by the 2nd of January 1898. We have reason to expect that the Gaduns will meet all demands by the date fixed.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) ELGIN.  
G. S. WHITE.  
J. WESTLAND.  
M. D. CHALMERS.  
E. H. H. COLLEN.  
A. C. TREVOR.  
C. M. RIVAZ.

No. 111.

*Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 28th January, 1898.*

MY LORD,

I have received from time to time the various letters from your Excellency's Government, in which you have reported to me the progress of events on the Punjab frontier, and the success of the military operations which, during the past six months, you have been compelled to undertake against the tribes in arms against the British Government over a long tract of border land, extending from the valley of the Tochi to the country on the northern borders of the Peshawar district inhabited by the Bunerwals. Now that the active phase of these operations has almost closed, the time has arrived for briefly reviewing the narrative of events, in order to examine the causes of the late widespread outbreak and to indicate the policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue in the future.

2. The first of several violent outbreaks, which have thrown the extreme North-West borderland of India into confusion and disorder, entailing a series of actions that have been fought with the greatest gallantry and attended with heavy casualties, occurred on the 10th of June in the Tochi valley. It will be convenient here to give a short account of the circumstances under which Mr. Gee had proceeded from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maizar, when his escort was treacherously attacked. In 1894 Her Majesty's Government sanctioned a policy of more effective protection and closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes; and in his despatch of the 24th of August, Mr. Fowler wrote: "Since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable." In the following year measures were taken to carry out the delimitation of the Afghan boundary as fixed by the Durand agreement of the 12th of November 1893. On the 6th of April 1895 the Maliks, or Chiefs, of the Dawaris and of the Waziri tribes in the Tochi asked to be taken under British protection, and applied for service and allowances; and in reply to your letter dated the 15th of May 1895, I sanctioned your detailed proposals for giving effect to the policy laid down, in 1894, by my predecessor, on the clear understanding that your expenditure, both on Wano and Tochi, did not exceed the sum allowed for Wano alone. In my despatch of the 9th of August I reiterated the conditions which my predecessor had associated with his sanction of control over these tribes. In 1896 steps were taken to establish permanent military posts in the Tochi valley, and you reported for my information the outbreak of certain disturbances which occurred in February among the Madda Khel Waziris, and the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna post, which happened on the 9th of June of that year. For these outrages you sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs. 3,000 which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 1,200. It was with the intention of collecting this fine, and of choosing a suitable site for a military post, that Mr. Gee proceeded in June last to Sheranna and Maizar, when his party were suddenly attacked as they finished a meal prepared for them by the Madda Khels, and only succeeded in making good their retreat after the loss of all their British officers killed or wounded, and other casualties.

3. At the time of the dastardly attack made by the tribesmen the British force in the Tochi valley consisted of 1,476 rifles and 120 sabres, with four maxim and four mountain guns distributed over the five posts of Miran Shah, Datta Khel, Boya, Idak, and Saidgai. The retreat of the small escort in the face of a large gathering of hostile tribesmen was conducted with great gallantry, in which the wounded British officers and the native officers and men highly distinguished themselves. The Madda Khels upon the arrival of succour fled to the hills, and on the 21st of June Major-General Bird assumed command at Bannu of the punitive force which your Government collected for an advance to Maizar. On the 13th of July a proclamation was issued to the tribesmen announcing the terms of submission, and a few days later the British force reached Sheranna, encountering no difficulties other than those caused by the unhealthy season of the year and by the physical nature of the country traversed. It was not, however, until the receipt of your telegram dated 26th November that I learned that Sadda Khan, his brother, and other headmen of the Madda Khels who were concerned in the attack at Maizar had surrendered, and that the tribe had finally given in and accepted the terms of submission ultimately demanded from them.

4. On the 26th of July, within a fortnight of the issue of the proclamation to the Madda Khels, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was unexpected, broke the peace of the Swat valley which had been maintained without interruption since the close of the Chitral campaign. One Saidulla, known as "the mad fakir," also called the Sartor or bareheaded fakir, suddenly gained notoriety as a worker of miracles, and publicly announcing that he had been sent to lead a Jihad or religious war, prophesied that all British troops would be driven out of the country within eight days. His pretensions were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat and by other chiefs of the tribes, but the uncontrollable religious enthusiasm and superstition which his actions excited overbore all



opposition on the part of the responsible tribal headmen or Maliks, and in a few hours his supporters increased from a small gathering of boys and men to an army of well armed fanatics. The tribal levies in the locality fled, and the British positions on the Malakand and at Chakdara, held by about 4,000 men, were attacked with great fury on the night of the 26th July. Fighting continued without intermission, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted upon the tribesmen, who were constantly replaced by fresh adherents to the cause of the mad fakir, until the 31st of July when reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached the Malakand; and on the 2nd of August a relief column detached by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood completed the relief of Chakdara. In the interval between the first attack and the final relief the mad fakir had withdrawn, but his followers were joined by tribesmen from the Utman Khels, the Bunerwals, the Bajauris, Ranizais, Lower and Upper Swatis, and the Adinzais and Dush Khels. As soon as the first excitement subsided, those tribes with whom agreements had been made for the maintenance of the road to Chitral, between the Malakand and Chakdara, a distance of some ten miles, began to send in jirgas and to sue for peace, protesting that their tribesmen had been carried away by belief in the miraculous powers of the fakir, and by his call to a religious war. The Ranizais from Khar to the south were among the first to come in, followed by the Alladand jirgas, and by deputations from the Shamozaïs and other sections on the right bank of the Swat river. It is a significant fact that the disturbance did not extend northwards of the Panjkora river or affect the road or posts established on the way to Chitral, and that the Nawab of Dir resisted all pressure put upon him by the Akhundzadas, consistently refusing to break his agreement with the British Government.

5. I do not consider it necessary to follow minutely the course of the various operations which were undertaken by Sir Bindon Blood, who advanced to Saidu on the 12th of August, and rapidly succeeded in restoring tranquility and exacting compliance with the terms imposed upon the several tribes for their unprovoked attack upon the British posts established, under tribal agreements, for the maintenance of communication with Chitral. During the operations in upper Swat, a force was moved to Rustam to threaten Buner in the event of the Bunerwals rendering assistance to the Swatis and repeating the offence which they had committed at Malakand. The Bunerwals were in due course informed of the satisfaction which your Government demanded of them for their participation in the attack on the Malakand, and ample time was allowed to them for compliance. On the 24th of December you instructed the Government of the Punjab to announce the final terms of submission decided upon, and to give the tribe one week within which to comply with them. As they declined to avail themselves of this offer, you despatched a military expedition against them, and I have since been informed by your telegram, dated the 19th of January, that the Bunerwals have complied with your terms. Elsewhere the advance of British troops against the Swatis, Utman Khels and other tribes was uniformly successful, and from your Excellency's letters and telegrams I have learnt that the terms imposed by you in the matter of fines, restitution of property, and surrender of arms have been generally complied with.

6. Five days after the relief of Chakdara, and while all available resources were being hurried to the north, the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, Najam-ud-din, who has for years past been active in intrigues and hostility against the British Government, arrived with a following of 5,000 men on the frontier of the district of Peshawar, and after burning the British village of Shankargarh attacked the frontier post of Shabkadar, which was garrisoned by Border Police, and which, for fifty years, has been incorporated in British territory. It appears that this attack was not so entirely unexpected as that made upon the the Malakand, and the Commissioner of Peshawar, as well as the Hindu residents of the village, had been warned to expect it. But by the time that troops arrived from Peshawar the enemy were found in occupation of the low hills near Shabkadar, from which they were dislodged, with some loss on our part, on the 8th of August. The losses inflicted on the Adda Mulla's followers were very heavy, and these included not merely a number of Mohmands but also several Afghan subjects and levies from the country between Jalalabad and Dakka, as well as from Asmar. The Mulla withdrew to his home at Jarobi, which lies within the sphere of influence which you offered to recognise as belonging to the Amir, and when Major-General Sir



Bindon Blood, advancing *via* Bajaur, effected a junction with a force advancing from Shabkadar, the Adda Mulla attacked the two forces and sustained a severe defeat. In September a brigade was detached to punish the Mamunds, and after the forcing of the Bedmanai pass on the 23rd of that month further resistance collapsed, and the terms imposed upon the various tribes and sections between the Swat valley and the Khyber pass were in due course exacted. From your telegram of the 7th of October I learnt that the Mohmand field force had been broken up.

7. It was inevitable that the popular disturbance caused by these events, of which the most exaggerated and erroneous accounts reached the tribes occupying the tract of country intervening between the Tochi valley and the Khaibar pass, should react upon the powerful clans of Afridis and their neighbours the Orakzais. Reports were current, sometimes of an impending Afridi rising and sometimes of a coalition between them and the Orakzais. Sir Richard Udny was, however, not disposed to credit these rumours, and on the 20th of August you informed me by telegram that the reports which you had already transmitted to me appeared to be very much exaggerated. In a later telegram of the same date you reported a gathering of the Orakzais in the hills north of Sadda, but "no disturbance in the Khaibar." Two days after this reassuring news you informed me that a large hostile gathering of the Afridis was then approaching the Khaibar, and on the 23rd of August I learnt that Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were being attacked by them. Ali Masjid was captured and burnt on that day, and on the 25th of the same month Lundi Kotal was wrested from its garrison of Khaibar Rifles and the pass was completely closed for traffic. In your Excellency's telegram of the 26th of August you referred to this unprovoked aggression as gravely affecting your position on the frontier, and asked my approval to an expedition against Tirah, which I sanctioned in my telegram dated the 1st of September, on the express condition that all questions involving our future policy on the termination of the campaign must be referred for my consideration before any action should be taken. Further information respecting the treacherous attack upon Lundi Kotal only served to increase the gravity of the offence committed by the Afridis. They had entered into an agreement in 1881, undertaking to be responsible for the security of the road and the maintenance of all posts and buildings in the pass, and in particular for holding the fort of Ali Masjid. Liberal subsidies were paid to the tribesmen for these services, and the levies to which the custody of the Khaibar was entrusted were mainly recruited from them. As observed in your letter dated the 14th of October 1897, "our relations with the Afridis, founded upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal services, had stood the test, almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed." Under such circumstances, I can hardly doubt that the letters which were found on the 17th of November in the house of the Akha Khel Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran valley, addressed to him by the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, and calling on the Afridis to join in a religious war, supply the real explanation of an attack which you justly describe as "fanatical in its origin."

8. Whilst these events were taking place in the Khaibar, the southern neighbours of the Afridis, the Orakzais, commenced to attack the British posts established on the Samana range for the safeguarding of British territory in the Miranzai valley of Kohat. In your telegram of the 16th of August you informed me of the preparations you were making, "owing to a report of a possible hostile combination of Orakzai and Afridi tribes." I observe that at the very outset the earliest information received by you associated the Adda Mulla with these disquieting rumours, but on the following day you reported that a Mulla, who was preaching a religious war in the Orakzai country, had returned to his village on receipt of a further letter from the Adda Mulla. On the 18th of August you learnt that the Orakzais were about to attack the forts on the Samana, at the very time that the Afridis were marching on the Khaibar, and Parachinar was simultaneously threatened by the Massuzai section of the Orakzais. On the 20th, however, you were led to believe that these reports were "exaggerated," but on that same night an attack was made upon a village near Sadda in the Kuram, and reports of further disturbances in the Orakzai country reached you simultaneously with the news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The tribes,

however, still seemed somewhat half-hearted in their movements, and on the 8th of September you informed me that all was quiet in the Upper Kuram, and that confidence was fully restored. Two days later Fort Lockhart was vigorously attacked, and the gallant Sikh defenders of Saragari were killed to a man on the 12th of September. No time was lost in expelling the combined forces of the Orakzais and Afridis from the Samana range into the Khanki valley, but their open hostility left you no option but to carry out your preparations for the expedition into Tirah. As you state in your letter of the 14th of October, "we had given neither tribe any cause of offence. The Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai valley, have been left undisturbed."

9. I do not propose to dwell at any length upon the details of that campaign, which was carried out with complete success by the 18th of December last, as regards the Orakzais, but which has not yet been brought to a final close against the Afridis. But there are a few satisfactory incidents to which I may here advert. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with gratification that the Kohat pass Afridis, who are under an engagement with the Government of India to keep open the road through their country, and upon whom the main weight of the fiscal policy which led to the enhancement of the Kohat salt duty must have fallen, stood true to their engagements with your Government and resisted the pressure of the Mullas. In Tirah, owing to the inclemency of the season, and to the exceptional difficulties of the country traversed, consisting of a succession of rugged passes, intricate defiles, and swampy valleys, success could only be attained at the cost of severe hardship and numerous casualties. But the conduct of the troops employed has been excellent, and Her Majesty's Government have heard with the highest satisfaction, not only of the alacrity with which loyal offers of help were made by the native princes of India, but also of the conspicuous part taken by the Imperial Service troops in the Tirah and other expeditions during the last six months. I desire to record my sympathy with His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala in the unfortunate catastrophe which overtook the Kapurthala infantry in the Kharmana defile on the 7th of November, when the retreat of a party was cut off by a jungle fire.

10. Passing from the narrative of the events which preceded and marked the course of the several risings of the Pathan tribes, to a consideration of their causes, I entirely agree with your Excellency in Council in regarding fanaticism as the principal motive for an outbreak which has been unprecedented alike in the suddenness with which it broke out at each point, in the large extent of country affected, and in the simultaneous action of distinct tribes or sections of tribes. In referring to the outrage which had occurred in Tochi, you informed me on the 17th of June that the Commissioner regarded it as fanatical, and in your letter of the 21st of July you accepted the view that the attack was pre-arranged, but fuller information has led you to alter this opinion, and to attribute it to tribal quarrels. That religious excitement was not the predominant incentive in the Madda Khel rising, may be inferred from the inaction of the Waziri tribes when the news of the attacks on Malakand and Shabkadar reached them. But elsewhere fanaticism principally accounts for the proceedings of the Swatis, Utman Khels, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, and other Pathan tribes. Indeed, there appears to be a remarkable unanimity of opinion on the part of your officers along the whole of the disturbed border that the outbreaks generally were fanatical in their origin. The proceedings of the tribes, the express statements of His Highness the Amir, and the correspondence discovered in the course of the subsequent military operations, all point to the same conclusion. Although the first attack on the Malakand was unexpected, still several indications of a religious movement had already attracted the serious notice of your Government. You were aware that Mullas were busily engaged in circulating on the country side two books which had been published in Kabul, of a tone and character that must inevitably have stimulated the fanatical spirit of wild and ignorant tribesmen. From your letter dated the 14th of July, I learnt that efforts had been persistently made by Mullas, for several months previously, to arouse and combine the tribes, not merely in the Swat country, but also in Tirah and other parts of the Afridi land. Upon ground thus carefully prepared Najam-ud-din, the Adda Mulla, found it easy to work, and the letters addressed by him to the Mianguls of Swat, and to the Afridi Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the



Waran valley, show the range of his preparations and intrigues. That he was also the moving spirit in other parts is evident from the reply made by the Khani Khel section of the Chamkannis, when they stated that they could not refuse to obey the Fakir of Swat or the Adda Mulla. His Highness the Amir, in addressing the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 18th of August last, described Mulla Najam-ud-din as the reputed prophet of the Mohmands and the people of Jelalabad and the mountain districts of Jelalabad, and he added:—"What calamities are there that his disciples have not suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed by his senseless commands?" In writing to your Excellency on the following day, His Highness enclosed for your information a proclamation written by the Adda Mulla to the people of Ningrahar, exaggerating the successes of the tribesmen, and calling upon the Afghans to join in a religious war. So late as the 2nd of September last, the Mulla was endeavouring to rekindle the sparks which had died out in Swat, and was impudently promising external assistance in an early renewal of risings in that part of the country. At one time reference was made to the victories achieved by Mahomedans in Europe, and at another the active intervention of the Amir of Afghanistan was promised by this unscrupulous preacher and his fellow-workers. It is evident that in several places the tribal organisation was powerless to oppose this outbreak of fanatical fervour, and the Maliks were reluctantly forced to follow where the Mullas or the fakirs led.

11. From the information which has reached me, it is evident that the necessary task of delimiting by marks and pillars, in accordance with the terms of the Durand Convention, the spheres of British and Afghan influence, furnished the religious preachers with material for stirring up alarm and jealousy among the tribes, who were thus persuaded to connect the delimitation with ulterior designs upon their independence that were in no way contemplated by your Government. The work of marking out a frontier line through hundreds of miles of wild tribal country could not fail to arouse such suspicions, notwithstanding the scrupulous observance by you of the conditions laid down by Her Majesty's Government in 1894 with a view to avoiding interference with the tribes. I have every reason to believe that your Government has carefully kept within the scope of the operations sanctioned by my predecessor in his despatch of 24th August 1894, to enable "you adequately to fulfil your obligations in regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and to the Amir and to the well-affected amongst the tribesmen themselves." Although it is probable that the steps taken by you to delimitate the frontier under the Kabul Agreement of 1893 gave to the Adda Mulla and others an opportunity for misrepresenting your policy by associating it with an intention of depriving the tribesmen of their existing independence, I do not think that this necessary work could have been carried out with greater circumspection and caution.

12. Amongst other reasons set forth to give some colour of justification for tribal unrest was the recent enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt from 8 annas to Rs. 2 for each Kohati maund. In your letter of the 30th of September last, you explained to me your domestic reasons for raising the duty to a rate nearly approximating to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt, so as to allow of the abolition of the preventive customs line extending from the north of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej. I approved of your action in my despatch dated 25th of November 1897, and I have only to add here that, although the enhancement of the duty was skilfully used to excite disaffection, I consider that, in the interests of your own subjects, it was justified as a measure of internal policy.

13. Having followed the course of the risings and discussed their causes, I proceed now to examine the stage which has been reached in the history of our frontier relations with the Pathan tribes, in order that I may indicate the direction which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, our future policy must take. Our frontier relations assume so many varying phases, and include or touch so many interests, both local and imperial, that a comprehensive survey of the objects to be attained is a necessary preliminary to any general enunciation of policy. The duties imposed upon your Government by the advance of British influence and by consequent contact with the territory occupied by Pathan tribes may be roughly classified under three heads,—first, the police and administrative protection to be given to British districts in the immediate



vicinity of the tribal country ; secondly, the strict exclusion of extraneous interference from the tribal area that has been placed by a formal agreement within the British sphere of political influence ; and, lastly, the fulfilment of our obligations towards Afghanistan and the safeguarding of the natural frontiers of India.

14. The events of recent years have necessarily enlarged the area of your responsibilities to British subjects, and the chances of collision with the tribes. Commerce and trade between the tribal country and British India have grown to larger dimensions, intercourse for all purposes is more frequent, and the extension of cultivation and prosperity on the immediate borderland offers a greater temptation to lawless neighbours and enhances the need for protective measures. A rising which suddenly closes a main artery of commerce, like the Khaibar pass, is not a matter merely affecting your foreign relations ; it at once injures the interests of Indian trade. The tribes have learnt in your military service many lessons of war, and they are able to supply themselves with arms of precision and ammunition to a degree quite unknown in former days, when blockades and small punitive expeditions sufficed to bring them to terms. Their Mullas travel in India and proceed through India to Mecca, and on their return they propagate rumours and reports as to what is occurring in Europe and India of the wildest and most inaccurate character, but always appealing to the fanaticism of their entourage. A significant instance of this was afforded by the letter, dated 25th October 1897, which was found in the house of Mulla Sayad Akbar, and which contained the information that " Aden, a seaport which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six month to reach India." Moreover, the utterances of British statesmen and of members of Parliament upon questions affecting the status and prospects of Islamism and its rulers are reproduced, distorted, and exaggerated. To these and other causes may be largely attributed the recent combination, under the instigation of their Mullas, of trans-frontier tribes which have hitherto acted disunitedly. Their fighting strength and their power to combine have simultaneously increased of late years. It must also be remembered that sections of these tribes have permanently settled down in the adjacent British districts, and as they are always in close intercourse with their fellow tribesmen across the frontier, they are naturally affected, more or less, by the elements of disquietude and disaffection prevailing from time to time among them. Frequency and facilities of intercommunication have thus drawn together all sections, and incitements to Jihad on the common ground of religious fervour have gained adherents, not only from distant parts of the border land, but even on both sides of the British frontier. To these influences may be attributed the participation of British subjects in the disturbances on and around the Malakand pass, and even in the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar ; and they provide additional and substantial reasons why the state of the tribal country immediately outside our settled territory should have become a matter of much more serious concern than heretofore.

15. The above observations are almost equally applicable to the second branch of your responsibilities.

For the present I would direct my remarks to that section of tribal territory which is between British territory and Afghanistan, commencing with Waziristan and running up northwards to the Swat river. The character and internal government of the Baluchi tribes controlled from Quetta so differ from those of the northern Pathans that the arrangements working satisfactorily there need not now be reviewed, or criticised, as necessarily forming a foundation upon which to base our action elsewhere. The relations of the northern tribes with your Government vary greatly, graduating from those where a tribe has accepted our protection, as in the Dawari section of the Tochi valley, to the case of a tribe undertaking independent responsibility for specified duties, as in the Khaibar pass. In some cases a light assessment is paid by a tribe, and in others it receives subsidies from the Government of India in return for military or police duties. Though the characteristics of the tribes and their normal attitude towards the British Government vary considerably, yet there are certain features

in our relations with these which are common to all. In the first place, the fear of encroachment or attack upon their territory from Afghanistan has been removed by the Durand Agreement. The influence of fear which formerly led a threatened tribe to seek our help, is no longer felt. Nevertheless, the arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognised as belonging to the sphere of British influence. Mr. Fowler in his Despatch, dated the 24th of August 1894, adverted to this subject, and expressed his opinion that the programme advocated in the minute of dissent appended to the letter from your Government would not meet the necessities of the case, "and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Waziristan." The Waziri frontier was only one part of the line demarcated under the Durand Convention, and now that the sphere of British influence has been traced along almost the whole Afghan border, your responsibilities in connection with the territory thus delimited cannot be ignored or put on one side. Though the agreement made with the Amir of Afghanistan has relieved your Government from the constant friction which the undefined and debateable land lying between Afghanistan and British India produced between their respective Governments, in other respects it has not been an unmixed benefit, from the suspicions and misgivings it has aroused amongst certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of your Government. To gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future action. As communications multiply so the tribes will mix more freely with British subjects; and this intercourse, becoming closer in the course of years, cannot fail to increase our responsibilities on the frontier by drawing the tribesmen out of their highlands into closer contact with their neighbours and with your officers. Whether the risks of collision will have been thereby augmented or diminished, remains to be seen. By care and foresight it may be possible to avoid actual conflict, and the effect of frequent intercourse may be to mitigate the lawless and predatory instincts of the hillmen, without interfering with the tribal system of self-government.

16. If your obligations inside your territories and the sphere of British influence have been increased, the case is not otherwise in respect to the Amir of Afghanistan and his country. The engagement with His Highness in July 1880, as set forth in the communication\* from the Marquis of Ripon, contained this clause:—"If any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations." These responsibilities were again confirmed but not extended, when Sir Mortimer Durand concluded the agreement† of the 12th of November 1893; and as a proof of the increased goodwill existing between the two Governments, the subsidy of the Amir was at the same time increased by six lakhs. To the obligations thus contracted is added the ever present duty of watching over the frontier passes of the mountains into India, so as to maintain sufficient control over the main routes connecting Afghanistan with India, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of any political influence adverse to your Government in the higher plateaux which within Afghanistan dominate these passes.

17. Frontier questions ranging thus from the daily performance of a policeman's duties to the possible despatch of a large army present so many complications and entanglements that any set of precise instructions would prove to your Government a source of embarrassment rather than an assistance. The call for interference, or even for military help, may arise from different quarters

\* See pages 40 and 89 "Afghanistan (1881) No. 1, C. 2776," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1881.

† Printed in "East India (North-west Frontier), C. 8037," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1896.



and under conditions wholly distinct. You may be required suddenly to fulfil your duties of protecting your own subjects, as recently at Shankargarh when it was attacked by the Mohmands, or perhaps to discharge your obligations to the Amir. In either of these cases the points attacked or threatened may be few or numerous. You may have to insist upon the stipulated performance of tribal service in a pass, or to punish treachery or attack upon your posts. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances you might have to fulfil all these obligations at one and the same time. It is obvious, therefore, that the steps which may have to be taken by your Government cannot be reduced to a formula, or your procedure mapped out on a pre-arranged plan. The extent of the demand made upon your resources, military and financial, cannot be foreseen until the occasion arises and has had time to develop itself. Any attempt to lay down a set of uniform rules for your guidance would be apt to defeat the main object of the general policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue, namely, to show that we are as determined to respect the rights of others as we are able to enforce our own.

18. At the same time, there are certain leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government have resolved to adhere, and to which I proceed to invite your attention. The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the fulfilment of the policy just indicated. In my telegram of the 13th of October, I addressed your Excellency as follows :—" You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British-Indian border. I also think that the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary." As a practical instance of the questions to which I desired to invite your attention, I would refer your Excellency to my Despatch of the 9th of August 1895, in which I insisted on " the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits ;" and to my later Despatch, dated the 8th May 1896, in which, having regard to the extension of your military posts in the Tochi valley, I asked for a statement of your conclusions on " the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure." Your Excellency was unable to supply me with this statement before the recent outburst of fanaticism occurred, but my inquiry in respect of the posts occupied in Waziristan is one which should be extended so as to apply to the whole of the affected frontier. The two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated in my telegram of the 13th October, namely, the best possible concentration of your military force so as to enable you to fulfil the several responsibilities to which I have adverted, and the limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. I anticipate that the question of the best location of our frontier posts, and the selection of the communications through the border land which it is most necessary to maintain, will require very careful thought, but it is an essential step towards arriving, as far as it is possible to do so, at a clear and well-defined plan upon which to base local arrangements. The experience gained in the past few months has suggested the inference that certain military posts such as Saragari were not sufficiently defensible, and it is probable that, without altering or diminishing the existing lines of communication, you may wish to modify the past arrangements for their maintenance. In any such modification of existing arrangements I wish to impress upon your Excellency the advisability of establishing regular troops nowhere except in such posts or localities and under such conditions as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks upon them, and of making the local or tribal levies assume, as far as is possible, the aspect of a police rather than a military force. It will be necessary in framing these arrangements that an estimate of the cost of frontier defence, including charges for tribal services, should be prepared and transmitted to me, since full regard must be had to financial considerations. It is not sufficient that the measures proposed should be desirable ; it is necessary that the gain should be commensurate with the expense.



19. The second principle upon which stress must be laid is the avoidance of any interference with the tribes which can be avoided with due regard to the interests already set forth. It was for this latter reason that, after full consideration, I was unable to give my consent to the imposition of tribute upon the Afridis and Orakzais. I recognise the force of the arguments used in favour of such a visible assertion of the responsibilities which you have incurred under the Durand Convention. It is not improbable that the regular payment of even a nominal tribute might strengthen the hands of the tribal leaders, the Maliks, against the teachings of their Mullas and against fanatical outbursts. The fear of an enhancement of the tribute might at times restrain the evil disposed amongst the tribesmen. But, on the other hand, it is desirable to avoid giving any countenance to the idea that your Government means to administer the tribal country or to inclose it within your provincial limits. Moreover, I apprehend that the imposition of even a nominal tribute might rankle in the minds of the Pathan tribes, furnish disaffected persons with material for imputing to the British Government designs which it does not contemplate, and, above all, might enable the tribes to choose their own time for refusing payment, and thus for openly defying your authority. In such a case the only means of enforcing your demand, besides punitive expeditions and blockades, might be the imposition of direct administrative control, or, in the last resort, annexation of fresh tracts of country. But the extension of your direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities which it has always been our policy to avoid; and annexation would imply a still larger addition to your civil and military establishments, with a very serious and growing burden upon your financial resources. On the other hand, the fear of occupation is undoubtedly a deterrent to the commission of acts of violence, and it may prove an influence on the side of order which should not be wholly thrown aside.

20. The next point to which I adverted in my telegram of the 13th of October, in connection with the subject of protection, was that of disarmament. I approve entirely of the imposition of terms of peace which require a tribe that has resorted to arms to surrender as large a number of arms as may reasonably be demanded. But any attempt to keep the tribal country, or even one section of it, permanently disarmed, involves serious consequences. In the lawless state of society which prevails across the British administrative frontier, a tribe could not exist without the means of defence. Unless we are prepared to wholly undertake their protection against their neighbours, some limit must necessarily be put on their deprivation of the means of self-defence. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government are alive to the importance of the fact disclosed by the recent operations—that the tribes have access to large quantities of arms of precision and ammunition. To control this traffic in arms and munitions of war is an object of the first importance, and I consider that a systematic inquiry as to the sources of supply, whether from your arsenals and factories or by means of illicit importation into India, should be instituted. I have dealt in a separate communication with one part of this subject. I have only to add here that, whenever the trade routes to Afghanistan are re-opened and the export of arms and ammunition for His Highness the Amir is resumed, special arrangements should be made to keep an account of the class of arms exported, with a view to future identification should occasion arise, and to prevent any of them passing into the hands of the tribes *en route*.

21. The maintenance of the Khaibar pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of your obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. It may be that, as a military route, others may be preferred to this pass, but under any circumstances the retention of an effective control over the Khaibar is essential; and accordingly, in your letter of the 4th of October, addressed to General Sir William Lockhart, you desired him to announce to the Afridis your intention to re-open the pass in such manner as you might consider most desirable. I approved of this intimation, and on the 3rd of November I authorised your consideration of any scheme for improving or re-aligning the present road, provided that any changes of importance should be reported to me. I have not yet received your report, but whilst I agree that the arrangements which have hitherto subsisted with the tribesmen have been cancelled by their

own violent breach of them, I trust that it may still be possible to give the Afridis some share in your new scheme and thus to enlist their goodwill and assistance in the future protection of the road. But I do not consider that your Government is bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis so deliberately broke. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of your arrangements with the tribe.

22. The march of events in Central Asia and Afghanistan and the recent occurrences along our borders have tended to elucidate the problem to be solved. Facts have taken the place of surmise, and successive engagements or assurances have defined the legitimate spheres and responsibilities of the Governments interested. The recent outbreak of fanaticism, in response to the propaganda of the Mullahs, has revealed a source of danger deeper-rooted and wider-spread than was suspected, whilst on the other hand the leniency of the terms of submission imposed upon the recalcitrant tribes, and the manifest reluctance of your Government to interfere with their independence or customs of self-government, cannot fail to gradually allay any suspicions they might previously have entertained of the intentions of the Indian Government. The immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehension of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence. Your Excellency will doubtless give full weight to this change in the situation, and devote your foremost attention to that portion of the question which has thus prominently asserted itself.

23. I desire in conclusion to express on the part of Her Majesty's Government their high approval of the manner in which your Excellency's Government has met an arduous crisis, and of the success which has attended the various military operations conducted on the North-West frontier under conditions of extreme difficulty, upon which a separate communication will be made to you. Not only was the rising one of unprecedented extent and violence, which, moreover, occurred at the most trying season of the year, but your resources were already taxed to the utmost by the necessity for carrying on at the same time a campaign against widespread famine in India, and for dealing with the plague which had appeared in several parts of the empire. The contingency that frontier disturbances may arise at a time when attention is being devoted to other important affairs, must always have a certain weight in balancing the considerations which should determine your policy in that quarter. It adds weight to the conclusion that no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the Indian border.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.







954.23			
Call No.	GRE		
Accession No. 13274			
Title Military operations on the North-West frontiers of			
Author India.			
BORROWER'S NO.	DATE LOANED	BORROWER'S NO.	DATE LOANED

FOR CONSULTATION  
ONLY